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Preface

I became interested in a longer range interpretation of the Berlin crisis while researching
a seminar paper for Dr. Guenter Bischof at the University of New Orleans. I was familiar with
the Wall and the Airlift, but hadn‟t understood that the crisis began in 1958 with Nikita
Khrushchev‟s demands for a „free city‟ (without Western troops) and a German peace treaty.
The fact that Khrushchev suspended his deadline, once Geneva negotiations were in session,
seemed an important progression from containment and diplomatic estrangement towards
détente. For my thesis, I argued that the US leaders had to balance alliance problems with
pragmatic understanding of the limits of forceful response, which included possible use of
nuclear arms. They pragmatically chose negotiated resolution. I learned that period only
concluded the first visible arc of a much longer diplomatic experience.
While collecting source material from the National Archives and reading good authorities
like Marc Trachtenberg‟s A Constructed Peace, John Lewis Gaddis‟s Now We Know, William
Taubman‟s Khrushchev, and Hope Harrison‟s Driving the Soviets up the Wall, I saw that
Khrushchev used his demands as leverage for a peace conference that ostensibly could be used to
discuss disarmament. Clear connections were apparent between the Khrushchev‟s 1959 visit, the
Paris 1960 summit and the Berlin problem. I found a strong link between the Berlin problem and
arms control and test-ban issues. Berlin also catalyzed differences between the US and its
European allies, who wanted more control of nuclear deterrence but were unwilling to make
conventional force commitments. Berlin became a transitional issue for US-Soviet relations,
heavily influencing the first heads of state summits in many years.
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These impressions were even clearer after reading recent published Khrushchev-era
narratives like Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali‟s Khrushchev’s Cold War, Sergei
Khrushchev‟s Creation of a Superpower and Vladimir Zubok‟s A Failed Empire. These authors
had been able to work in the Soviet archives, which provided new insights into Kremlin decision
making. They showed how important an issue Berlin was for Khrushchev, both as a potential
threat to the Soviet Union and its Eastern European hegemony and a source of leverage for other
concerns, including disarmament. Michael Beschloss‟s Crisis Years, also benefiting from postSoviet sources, gave more indications of an ongoing, though troubled, effort to sustain
negotiations. Nikita Khrushchev‟s Statesman provided another important account, with details
missing from his previous memoirs. These works also indicated original and secondary sources
worth investigating for a dissertation on Berlin-crisis negotiations.
I saw that Berlin negotiations were ongoing from 1958-1963. These talks did not resolve
the Berlin and German questions, but averted war and gave an opportunity to begin high level
discussions between the superpowers. It was an imperfect process that gave rise to incidents like
the Wall and Missile Crisis, but it created a template for discussion. Expertise in Soviet thinking
was gained by individuals like Ambassadors Llewellyn Thompson, and Charles Bohlen, as well
as analysts like Walt Rostow, Gerard Smith, Paul Nitze and Foy Kohler. They helped form a
core of well informed Soviet observers. Leaders like Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles, and
eventually even Kennedy and Secretary Rusk created a tense but closer and more stable USSoviet relationship. Ironically, Berlin‟s situation - the catalyst, the artificial stimulus - was never
resolved with satisfaction for any side. When other concerns replaced Berlin, none of them
produced the same level of diplomatic relationship. As Berlin‟s importance diminished, so did
US-Soviet contacts, though not to the low pre-Crisis levels.
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The present work is an attempt to synthesize themes of Berlin as a transformative
issue in allied and Soviet relations. By telling the story of how negotiations were arranged and
conducted, at a number of levels, I seek to show changes in how the US, Allies and Soviets dealt
with each other. The role of disarmament in these proceedings is a major subtext, though
specific UN disarmament discussions never reached the scope and intensity of Berlin talks.
Berlin-era contingency planning for a limited war with nuclear options, as well as force buildups,
reveals basic shifts in US and NATO strategic doctrines. Alliance problems, US domestic
pressure and Soviet politics are further subtexts that continue through the whole history of the
Berlin crisis, with lasting effects. In the Berlin crisis, we see a redefining of the US-British
„special relationship,‟ beginnings of de Gaulle‟s isolation from NATO, as well as West
Germany‟s growing importance and first taste of Ostpolitik.
Much of the basic narrative here is based on the Foreign Relations of the United States
(FRUS) collections, which provide a good record of important meetings, correspondence, papers
and statements. As useful a guide as FRUS is, there are many influential revealing meetings,
cables and proposals not covered. My main sources for the „rest of the story‟ have been
Presidential Libraries, particularly the various national security and White House office file
series on Germany and the Soviet Union. Particularly useful material has included National
Security Council memos, State Department Policy Planning Staff material, CIA reports,
ambassadorial working group meetings, briefing books, embassy cable traffic, position papers,
and unofficial correspondence. Cross-referencing this material with the FRUS record has, I
hope, provided a thorough and well-grounded chronology.
This chronology, also heavily based on secondary sources discussed earlier, also draws
on specialized sources on specific leaders, issues and situations. For example, Frederic Bozo‟s
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Two Strategies for Europe, Frank Mayers‟ Adenauer and Kennedy, and Nigel Ashton‟s Kennedy,
Macmillan and the Cold War are good accounts of these very influential and distinctive leaders.
Wilfrid Loth‟s Europe, Cold War and Co-Existence and Christian Nuenlist‟s Globalizing de
Gaulle are very useful anthologies on European relations with each other, as well as with the US
and Soviets. David Mayer‟s The Ambassadors is an excellent history of the US diplomatic
missions to the USSR and the various emissaries, as well as Soviet views towards them.
Frederick Marks Power and Peace, Saki Dockrill‟s Eisenhower’s New Look, and Richard
Immerman‟s Waging Peace make insightful cases for Eisenhower-era inclination against force,
an impression also gained from Eisenhower‟s own memoirs and Stephen Ambrose‟s biography.
Joseph Whelans‟s Soviet Negotiating Techniques provided a long range perspective on Soviet
diplomacy
I have found consistent, well documented narratives the most useful sources, even in
specialized topics. Glen Seaborg‟s Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban and Robert Divine‟s
Blowing in the Wind provide well documented histories of the disarmament talks concurrent with
the Berlin dialogue. Anatoly Dobrynin‟s In Confidence connects other Soviet narratives with
diplomatic field experience. Robert Slusser‟s Berlin Crisis of 1961 may overplay its case
against Khrushchev‟s domestic critics, but does show strong domestic pressures that affected his
Berlin strategy. Frederick Taylor‟s The Berlin Crisis and Andreas Daum‟s Kennedy and the Wall
are helpful, if not critically deep, chronicles of the Berlin situation. Even Berlin histories
embedded in topical surveys like Mark White‟s Kennedy: the New Frontier Revisited or Marc
Trachtenberg‟s History and Strategy have been very helpful. Many other sources of good
supporting evidence are cited throughout, but the books discussed above have been especially
influential on my history of Berlin negotiations.
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A combination of published and unpublished primary document series and secondary
narratives account for most of my documentation. National Archive State Department
collections provided a basic orientation, especially the central decimal files and Policy Planning
Staff material. The long range of years documented in the Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library
helped me connect the early Eisenhower phase of the crisis with the decisive Kennedy period.
Further work at the Johnson, Eisenhower and Kennedy libraries provided most of my archival
sources. These sources provided background for the events covered in the FRUS record, and
showed important influences not indicated in other literature. The combination of FRUS,
Presidential Library and secondary readings form the supporting evidence for my own narrative.
The core purpose of this project is a documented history that I believe supports
conclusions listed in each chapter and summarized in a concluding chapter. My argument is
simple but I believe well supported: choosing negotiations over force to solve Berlin was a
significant step in a new direction, those negotiations changed from a multilateral to a bilateral
approach, and US, Allied and Soviet relations were transformed as a result. Arms control, basic
strategic doctrine and alliance politics were strongly linked to the course of negotiations, but
Berlin remained the most important issue between the involved countries from 1958 to 1963.
Though never resolved, Berlin provided a template for the later US-Soviet bilateral détente on
disarmament. I believe the progress of events outlined here illustrates these conclusions. If
successful, this history will provide a comprehensive reference on Berlin crisis negotiations, the
importance of which has not been fully appreciated but deserves greater attention.
The Berlin Crisis may understandably seem of limited importance today, in a post-Soviet
world where rubble for souvenirs is all that is left of the Wall and the EU is as much a rival as a
partner of the United States. East-West nuclear arms control agreements have been in place for
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nearly four decades. Unlike the leadership of the Berlin Crisis participants, many of today‟s
European, American and Asian leaders are women, with a different perspective perhaps on
negotiation and war, limited and nuclear. Superpower rivalries are considered more selfish
hegemonic rivalry than profound national responsibilities. Such changes in thinking might have
seemed almost unimaginable to the heads of state, ministers and even advisors who shaped the
decisions of the Berlin Crisis. Berlin remains significant because it was the first major conflict
since the war to be, if not resolved, then mitigated and deferred by negotiations. Unlike Korea,
Suez or Dienbienphu, these leaders, most importantly Nikita Khrushchev, Dwight Eisenhower
and John Kennedy, did decline to use force and did consistently pursue high level negotiation to
resolve the problem. In doing so, these holders of nuclear force departed from their conventional
wisdom and established a new dialogue that eventually did result in lasting disarmament
agreements.

*******

As important as the sources above have been in the progress of this work, I have been
fully as influenced by the encouragement and criticism of my teachers at Louisiana Sate
University and at the University of New Orleans. It is essential to acknowledge and thank them
for their support. My advisor Dr. David Culbert‟s LSU seminar in 20th century American
history helped greatly in getting me „up to speed‟ for professional work in history. Dr. Culbert
had taught me many years previously at LSU and I am very pleased and fortunate to have him as
my advisor. He brings a tremendous range of experience to bear and I am still amazed at the
breadth of his expertise. This work would not be possible without his support and direction.
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My other committee members Dr. Paul Paskoff, Dr. Charles Royster, and Dr. Charles
Shindo provided excellent seminars in American history, of which I am afraid I still had only a
woefully inadequate understanding as I entered doctoral studies. These are all recognized
authorities in their respected fields and outstanding teachers. I am very grateful to have such an
experienced and capable committee, and to have had them as professors. Hopefully, this
dissertation will not reflect badly on their attempts to overcome my innate denseness and
wayward writing habits.
I have also benefited greatly from other LSU teachers, notably Dr. Gaines Foster, who
taught a challenging course in historiography. My minor field teachers, Dr. Victor Stater and Dr.
Suzanne Marchand were not only excellent guides to English and European history, but were
most helpful in helping me get started in my LSU coursework. All these teachers have made me
write better, research more thoroughly, and analyze more critically. I have tried their patience
and turned in some „clunkers,‟ but I have appreciated their criticism and encouragement. I must
also acknowledge the great help I got from teachers I have assisted, including Dr. David
Lindenfield, Dr. Reza Pirbhai and Dr. Louise Walker, all excellent teachers and historians.
I must give special acknowledgement and thanks to Dr. Guenter Bischof for
continuing to share his impressive knowledge of Cold War and European diplomatic history. He
is also a rigorous critic, but his encouragement has been invaluable since I started studying
diplomatic history at UNO. He has directed me to the best archival sources and literature and
facilitated my research, providing valuable opportunities for study and insisting on the best work
possible. Working for his colleague and Eisenhower professor at UNO, Colonel Allen Millett
was also a formative influence of key importance to my development as a historian. Col. Millett
set essential standards for discipline and hard work that have been greatly appreciated.
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I would also like to thank the staff of the National Archives and Records Administration
at their College Park Maryland facility and at the Eisenhower, Johnson, and Kennedy libraries
administered by NARA. I am particularly grateful to David Haight, senior archivist at the
Eisenhower Library for providing a most useful overview of Eisenhower‟s staff structure,
guiding me through the collections and pointing out important secondary sources
I would also like to thank my mother, Mrs. Trudy Williamson for her love and support in
starting this work, helping me get through Hurricane Katrina, reading many drafts of this
material, and listening to me drone about Khrushchev and company. Without her, I would have
no dissertation. I would also like to thank my late father, Ernest L. Williamson for teaching me
many important lessons about work, knowledge and people. Without his love and hard training,
this dissertation would not be possible. My sisters, Judy and Nan, and brother Dave, as well as
my aunt Nan Glasgow, have also been great supporters, for which I thank them.
I also thank friends at LSU, UNO and elsewhere who have encouraged my history
studies. Bill Bertolette, Adam Pratt, Ashley Baggett, David Lilly, Kat Sawyer, Nathan Buman,
Alan Forrester, Yvonne Brown, Todd Borque, Matt Wilson, Brian Morrow, Kristi Whitfield and
other fellow students have been good comrades in this work. I thank them, as well as old friends
like Mark and Cheryl Wall, Russell Desmond, the late Bill Mallory, Rob Beckley, Randy
Johnston, Karen Anklam, and others who have kindly supported my doctoral studies. I am
grateful to all my teachers, family and friends, and apologize to any that I have overlooked. I
hope everybody find this paper pleasing.
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Abstract
"Berlin and the Origins of Detente" is a diplomatic history of the Berlin Crisis from 1958-1963.
'Berlin Crisis' usually means the events surrounding construction of the Berlin Wall in August
1961. The Wall, erected just two months after US President John Kennedy and the Soviet
Union's Chairman Nikita Khrushchev met at Vienna, physically divided East Berlin from the
Western sectors of the US, Britain and France, who kept occupation forces under the 1945
Potsdam accords. This work covers the events leading up to the Wall and after, when the focus
shifted from multilateral Allied diplomacy in the Eisenhower-era to bilateral US-Soviet
engagement in the Kennedy period. Salient events include the 1959 Geneva foreign ministers
conference and Western ministers/head of state meetings principally concerned with Berlin. It
covers ambassadorial meetings, papers and proposals, correspondence and historiography based
on Khrushchev, Eisenhower and other leaders, European and Allied issues. The Wall was the
most visible part of a dispute between the Soviet Union and the United States, Britain and France
who occupied West Berlin. In 1958, Khrushchev issued an ultimatum to the West: end the
occupation of West Berlin, turn it into an open 'free city' and recognize the (Eastern) German
Democratic Republic through a 'peace treaty' that would supersede the Potsdam agreement.
Principals displayed a readiness to use force if necessary, to defend their position, but attempted
a diplomatic approach to resolve the Berlin issue, which was related to disarmament. Berlin
acted as a catalyst in the US, USSR and Allied relationships. Diplomatic approaches lessened
tensions and brought brief, tentative periods of detente. Negotiation renewed US-Soviet
diplomatic engagement and provided a precedent for later attempts at detente, which were more
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centered on disarmament. No other issue led to summit conferences or engaged the US, Allies
and Soviet Union so intently.

xii

Introduction: The US, USSR and Berlin, 1953-1958

Before Soviet Chairman Nikita Khrushchev began his Berlin initiative in 1958,
US and Soviet relations had been distant and indirect for most of the period after Joseph Stalin's
death in 1953. Stalin had surprised the West with an April 1952 proposal for German selfdetermination to create a reunified, neutral country.1 Stalin's unattractive terms were declined,
partially because the Germans themselves were not ready to change the current arrangements.
The West assumed, probably correctly, that the Soviet proposal was simply a delaying maneuver.
Overall, the Soviets did not seem interested in renewing the wartime diplomatic engagement
seen at the Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam conferences. As US Ambassador in Moscow George
Kennan observed in September 1952, "the Soviet leaders have broken diplomatic relations with
the Western world."2 Kennan hoped to renew a more cooperative relationship, but found little
encouragement in either Moscow or Washington, especially after he made careless remarks
about the Soviet environment and over-zealous anti-Communist blacklisting at home.3
When former Supreme Commandant of Allied European Forces General Dwight
Eisenhower replaced Harry Truman as US President in early 1953, the Soviets waited to see
how American policy might change, especially regarding Germany. Kennan's appointment was
not renewed by the new US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who turned instead to Charles
Bohlen, thought to be more prudent. John Lewis Gaddis says that Dulles wanted to relax

1

Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of a European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton: Princeton
University press: 1999), p.129-30.
2
George Kennan, Memoirs Vol. 2 (New York: Pantheon, 1983), p.331.
3
David Mayer, The Ambassadors and American Soviet Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.180185.
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tensions and dramatically scale back US and Soviet forces in Europe, leaving a neutral, unified
but disarmed Germany, as well as lower US defense costs.4 Eisenhower thought Bohlen might
be able to strike a safe deal to in the period after Stalin, before a harder regime might emerge.
Both Eisenhower and Dulles were averse to nuclear war. They were also skeptical of the
summitry that British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was endorsing. Dulles thought summits
created problems between allies. He also worried that Berlin could cause alliance problems.5
Like Kennan, Bohlen had been in a team of specialists trained by Estonian and White
Russian nationalists in the 1920s and assigned to Moscow after diplomatic relations were
established in 1934. They were both in Moscow during the difficult years starting with Stalin's
purges and continuing through the war. Despite his experience and talent, Bohlen was not able to
earn more confidence from either the new Soviet or American leadership. To the Soviets he was
an errand boy for containment doctrines, to the Americans, an appeaser who accepted the
permanent division of Germany.6 East Germany was firmly under Soviet control, but the heavy
handed control of Party chief Walter Ulbricht produced strong popular resistance and a
disastrous economy. The Soviets attempted relaxation of controls in East Germany in June 1953,
when NKVD head Lavrentia Beria briefly seemed to be Stalin's likely successor, but the
„reforms‟ were short lived. When Beria was liquidated within weeks, reforms were replaced by
harsh official counter-measures by the client authorities. The Soviets used armor to quell worker
strikes and food riots, discouraging any hopes for a real rapprochement.7
After Stalin died in mid-1953, one likely successor, Politburo Central Committee
veteran Georgi Malenkov, revived Stalin‟s proposals for a German „peace treaty‟ that would
4

John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p.132-133.
Frederick Marks, Power and Peace (Westport: Praeger, 1993), p.48.
6
Mayers, The Ambassadors (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.98-101.
7
Hope Harrison, Driving the Soviets Up the Wall: Soviet-East German Relations, 1953-1961 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press) p.41.
5
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„normalize‟ the wartime arrangements of Potsdam. West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer
had shown interest in these proposals, though his conditions involving all-German selfdetermination were unacceptable to the Soviets. Other Soviet insiders like Communist Party
chief Nikita Khrushchev and Deputy Premier Dimitri Molotov forced Malenkov to abandon the
German overtures.8 Malenkov's tentative warming to the West also included an invitation to the
West to begin exploratory discussions to reduce tensions. Malenkov did not prevail in the post Beria power struggles. Khrushchev won out over rivals Molotov, Malenkov and Nikolai
Bulganin, who he would later purge as a Stalinist 'antiparty' group. First Secretary of Foreign
Affairs Anastas Mikoyan, a Bolshevik and Central Committee member longer than any of the
others, never vied for the leadership but would later be influential in the Berlin Crisis years.9
When Khrushchev began to project his new authority in 1954, he too experimented with
the German peace treaty idea, along with other initiatives designed to present a more conciliatory
Soviet image, particularly with the post-colonial regimes in India, Indonesia and other emerging
Third World Powers. Khrushchev established the Warsaw Pact, a Soviet bloc of Eastern clients
as a formal alliance to counter the Western NATO military alliance. He formalized relations
with East Germany, while keeping the „peace treaty‟ concept alive. When the USSR did not
contest the normalization of a neutral Austria in 1955, hopes rose for a new round of summit
diplomacy which might lead to a less hostile relationship, increasingly termed „detente.‟ 10
Eisenhower and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles were cautiously
interested in detente, particularly in hopes of easing the expense and tensions of the Cold War
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standoff still firmly entrenched after the 1949-1952 Korean conflict. Detente was understood to
mean an ongoing environment of close communication, diplomatic negotiation and head-of-state
encounters that could defuse conflicts and lay the ground for normalized relations, disarmament,
increased trade, conflict resolution and constructive exchange. Détente challenged hard-line
security polices sufficiently to arouse critics in the West and East alike. Though in public they
projected a tougher line against the Soviets, in private, Dulles and Eisenhower privately
considered cautious steps to detente.11
Even status quo containment proved to be very expensive. Rollback would be
unsustainably so and dangerous, possibly involving long-term inconclusive struggles like
Korea.12 Dulles and Eisenhower both had decided that nuclear weapons were the solution given
budget pressures and desired deterrent strength. Like the post-Stalin Soviets, the Americans
faced expensive, unpopular defense costs. The US was spending nearly $40 million a year in
support of West Berlin. These costs, said National Security Council paper No. 5404, issued in
January 1954, reflect the concern of the Congress for "Berlin's unique position and our special
responsibilities there." 13 The paper, approved by Eisenhower, reaffirmed US support for West
Berlin. Dulles said in February 1953 that the US was "vitally interested in the welfare and
security of this city." US High Commissioner for Germany Hugh Conant's stated a few weeks
later that "the new administration in Washington will not abandon Berlin ... the US is pledged to
do its part to see to it that this city continues as an unshaken outpost of the Western world ... the
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Frederick W. Marks III, Power and Peace: the Diplomacy of John Foster Dulles (Westport: Praeger, 1993) p. 7578.
12
Robert Bowie and Richard Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped An Enduring Cold War Strategy
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.103-108.
13
Copy of NSC 5404. NARA, RG 273, Box 23, folder '160-61.'

4

US, in cooperation with the other two Western powers, is determined to keep open the line of
communication with Berlin."14
Eisenhower's responsibility was ensuring American security while reining in the defense
spending that accompanied the early years of the Cold War. As a former military leader of US
and Allied forces, Eisenhower was especially concerned about the costs and hazards of military
intervention.15 Having worked with Russian generals in the war, he understood them
realistically. He knew the political leadership could be intractable and often undependable.
While the Western public may not have realized it, Eisenhower knew that the Soviets faced
similar arms-costs problems. His "New Look" policy aimed to roll back defense commitments
and spending, in part through a viable nuclear deterrent. The president faced a strong defense
lobby and congressional pressure to stem an amorphous global Communist threat. Although he
made the final decisions, he delegated most foreign-affairs policy and action to his Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles.16
Dulles enjoyed his image as the stern New England Presbyterian minister‟s son,
best law student (on the continent, too) and diplomatic journeyman with a resume including both
Versailles and Dumbarton Oaks. He may have been unlovable in public, but he knew what he
was doing, had the President‟s confidence and ran a clearly organized State Department.17 He
recruited and retained excellent personnel and assigned them effectively, including Bohlen and
later Llewellyn Thompson as Ambassadors to the Soviet Union and David Bruce to Germany.
Dulles appointed Robert Bowie and then Gerard Smith to the Policy Planning staff, Livingston

14
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Merchant, Foy Kohler and Douglas Dillon as Undersecretary of State. Dulles' State Department
grew experienced and efficient, especially in Eisenhower's second term. 18
Eisenhower and Dulles had many other concerns besides the Soviets. Eisenhower and
Dulles promoted a European Defense Community (EDC) which require the Allies to shoulder
more of their own defense. The EDC was not popular, in part because the US was willing to
grant control of nuclear weapons.19 In the Pacific. Dulles took a very hard-line against Red China
and believed in the „domino‟ theory, which held that Communist gains in one country would
destabilize neighboring countries, He understood that there were differences between China and
Russia but did not realize how serious that friction was. He famously refused to shake Red
Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-Lai‟s hand in 1954, which the Chinese took as a national
insult. Dulles offered only passive support for the French in Indochina, but he also laid
groundwork for American involvement. He also understood that anti-communist partners like
Korean president Syngman Rhee could be harsh, corrupt and unreliable partners.20
Britain and France tried to maintain their empires and used unattractive tactics that cost
them support in the colonies, even if they were popular at home. Dulles extended only reluctant
support for the British in Egypt, Iran and Iraq, while also approving initiatives to gain American
influence in the Mideast. He had respect but dwindling patience for British Prime Minister
Anthony Eden and French Premier Guy Mollett.21 He developed a particularly strong rapport
with West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who remained in office throughout Dulles‟s
term. Adenauer was very pro-American and Dulles had confidence in his leadership. Both
leaders were disappointed when the other Allies resisted their strong lobbying for a European
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Defense Community, which would have eased American commitments in Europe, furthered
European integration and bolstered West-German resistance to invasion from the East.22
Adenauer won a skillful victory in gaining West German admission to NATO in 1954.
Although both East and West were interested in neutral, unified Germany, the potential
advantages of a armed portion of Germany were also attractive. As Policy Planning Staff head
Robert Bowie had told Dulles in 195, neither side wanted to risk all of Germany deciding the
balance of European power,.23 At the Geneva summit, Adenauer attempted to make German
unification the central issue, even though he was not a participant. But the East Germans
upstaged him by signing a 'treaty of recognition' in Moscow. This fell short of the peace treaty
but did not please Ambassador Bohlen or the Western Heads. The Federal Republic of Germany
(FRG) responded with the Hallstein doctrine: the FRG reserved the right to break relations with
countries recognizing the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Adenauer advanced his own
plan for a demilitarized Germany, but found little interest.24
NATO's formation inspired Khrushchev to organize the USSR's East European satellites
into the Warsaw Pact later that year. First Secretary Walter Ulbricht‟s East Germany lagged
behind the West and its neighbors. Ulbricht complained that Soviet reparation demands had not
helped, nor did the continuing exodus of skilled workers to the West. The Soviets had little more
patience than Dulles did with his weaker partners and allowed only limited independence. Its
economy was arguably more dynamic than the British and French, though the Soviet Union's
political status was still that of a junior nation. 25 Within the Warsaw Pact, nations like Poland
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had less strict controls than East Germany, partly because their leaders were not as hard-line as
Ulbricht. Even the Soviets advised Ulbricht that he could improve production with some
relaxation, especially in the post-Stalin era. 26 Other satellites like Czechoslovakia and Hungary
attempted considerably more independence, which would in 1956 result in harsh Soviet reprisal
with Ulbricht‟s warm approval.
Tensions relaxed enough that leaders of same nations who had gathered at Yalta
to convene a Four Power Summit in Geneva in 1955. Eisenhower, Soviet Premier Bulganin,
French President Edgar Faure and British Prime Minister Anthony Eden met in hopes of relaxed
global tensions but without a fixed agenda. Soviet authority Vladimir Zubok says the Soviets,
then in good relations with their Chinese rivals, wanted to assert their leadership in the
Communist world and to probe Western unity, particularly on Germany.27 The West had no
common front, because there were no real issues of specific common interest, except in the most
general terms. The most substantive problems were Germany and disarmament, but all sides
were very apprehensive about unfocused discussions that might lead to unwelcome
commitments.28 Moreover Dulles and Eden were personally antagonistic to each other, Faure‟s
authority was uncertain, and the West Germans anxiously tried to project influence. Eisenhower
mostly wanted to showcase his „Open Skies‟ program for UN-supervised aerial inspections,
which he hoped would slow the expensive arms race, which was costing the US about $300
billion a year or 10% of GDP.29
Disarmament, peaceful exchange and normalized trade were discussed superficially, but
there were few agreements that could be signed. Bulganin was head of the Soviet state in an
26
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ornamental sense only and had no real negotiating authority. Party Secretary Khrushchev
represented the real power and controlled Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko who did the
practical negotiating.30 Khrushchev nearly disrupted the conference with his denunciation of
Open Skies as a sinister American scheme Eisenhower and Dulles were disappointed by their
allies‟ lackluster support and inability to work together. Russian obstruction and British and
French weakness and self-interest seriously discouraged the American president and his
Secretary of State from further summit negotiation for the foreseeable future. Khrushchev
mistakenly thought Eisenhower was Dulles' puppet but realized that the United States
represented the West's decisive strength. He wanted to pursue bilateral talks with the Americans
as soon as possible, but the Americans had had enough of Khrushchev at Geneva for many
months to come.31
Neither Eisenhower or Dulles were impressed by Khrushchev and they were not
convinced of Soviet good intentions. These doubts were only worsened by crises involving
Hungary and the Suez Canal the next year. In the meantime both Eisenhower and Khrushchev
had to validate their leadership for the rest of the decade. Eisenhower won re-election on a
campaign of peace through toughness with the Russians, coupled with a reasonable pursuit of
peace and restrained military spending.32 Adlai Stevenson raised the new issue of atmospheric
nuclear testing, which Eisenhower thought a necessary danger, he did not have the president‟s
charisma.33 Eisenhower's most pressing concerns after re-election were domestic, not foreign
policy related. Civil rights cases, notably involving housing and school segregation, and an
economic recession would not mobilize support for military intervention. Eisenhower resisted
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calls for major military actions in Iraq and other areas in 1957 and 1958. Nor did Eisenhower did
want to embark on new spending for ballistic missiles to match the production Khrushchev was
boasting about. 34
In 1956, Berlin appeared to be a stable situation. The Operations Coordinating
Group of the National Security Council observed, in NSC No.174, that the Soviets were
gradually transferring more jurisdictional authority to the German Democratic Republic (East
Germany)., including "police and protective powers of control over East German borders and
lines of communication to the Western garrisons in Berlin." NSC174 also noted the Soviets
were trying to formalize the partition of Germany and "prevent reunification except on terms
promoting Communist control of all Germany," a policy seen at Geneva and continuing
afterward. GDR internal security had toughened, they noted, even as their economy deteriorated.
Since Geneva, the report said, the Western allies had reaffirmed their goal of German
reunification and repudiated USSR-GDR agreements of September 1955, recognizing a divided
Germany. Those agreements were seen as part of a long term strategy to force Western
recognition, but no near-term East-bloc action on Germany was anticipated.35
Nikita Khrushchev‟s charisma was a much blunter instrument than Eisenhower‟s. He
secured his power by 1955 through convincing both party and military factions that he would
stand up to the Americans while still expanding Soviet influence and trade through peaceful
means.36 One of his first moves was to make clear that the Soviet Union would ensure that East
Germany remain a separate Communist state.37 With his speech denouncing Stalin at the secret
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20th Party Conference in Moscow in 1956, he signaled liberalization and modernization.38 But
his authorization of brutal Soviet suppression of Hungarian resistance showed that his reforms
had strict limits. Hard-line factions remained influential. The military was particularly
suspicious of Khrushchev because he wanted to cut conventional forces in favor of nuclear
weapons and missiles.39 The Red Chinese and Yugoslavians were also increasingly critical of
Khrushchev's foreign policy, including both his intervention in Hungary and overtures to
negotiate with the West.40 Khrushchev‟s talk of peaceful coexistence outraged Chairman Mao
Zedong, who exploited it for propaganda favoring his own leadership in the Communist world.
Walter Ulbricht was among those, such as the Albanians, sympathetic to Mao‟s denunciation of
the new Soviet direction.41
De-Stalinization was Khrushchev‟s project but the initiative also reflected widespread
desire for some kind of closure on the old terror. Hard-line reaction was contained by public
desire for consumer goods, less threat of war, and better social conditions. Khrushchev travelled
throughout the Communist bloc and made overtures to Third World leaders like India's
Jawarahal Nehru and Egypt's Gamel Nasser.42 Khrushchev assumed the title Chairman of the
Council of Ministers which signified that, like Stalin, he embodied the Party and the state
leadership. He expanded the Praesidium to include his supporters but tightened the Central
Committee to give him closer oversight. Khrushchev was a good party administrator, but an
erratic executive. He embarked on several expensive and troublesome ventures. He intensified
Soviet missile research which helped the Soviets to launch the first orbital space vehicle,
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Sputnik, in 1957.43 The missile program survived many tribulations, including a launch-pad
explosion which wiped out many top engineers and military men. Khrushchev tried to open new
agricultural lands with his „Virgin Lands‟ program but the costly program bred only
environmental ruin. He banked on increased production, the absence of which aggravated
shortfalls caused by other agricultural mistakes and drought. By 1958, Khrushchev was the
single most powerful Soviet leader but still lacked Stalin‟s absolute authority.44
Khrushchev gradually gained foreign policy experience while securing his leadership in
1957-58. Within days of weathering intense criticism for his crackdown on Hungary, he noisily
interfered in the Suez Canal crisis. Neither episode enhanced his international prestige; he was
criticized by both the liberal West and Communist East. Public opinion in the peripheral nations
was harder to gauge but clearly the Soviet leader had embarrassed both himself and his nation.
Old-line Bolsheviks - the "Anti-Party group" - attempted a coup in 1957 and Khrushchev soon
purged military rival Marshal Zhukov, the only Soviet leader who knew Eisenhower well.45
Fortunately for Khrushchev, he had a knack for ignoring his errors and shifting attention
to bold new moves. He needed to sustain momentum, confound the opposite camp when he
wished their assistance for their plans, and silence rivals with decisive action. He was a fearless
face to face negotiator in many encounters, especially when he thought he had some advantage,
as with the Red Chinese.46 Though Mao was able to humiliate Khrushchev, Mao was unable to
operate outside of China. Khrushchev furthered Soviet influence in the 1950s to a degree more
than Stalin had. This was an advantage for the Soviet leader, but he had to work vigorously to
exploit this edge. Khrushchev became visibly critical over what he considered as Chinese
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adventurism in episodes such as the Chinese shelling of the offshore islands of Quemoy and
Matsu. But he also knew he had to challenge the West, though it would help if he could be seen
as just and peaceful in his demands. In 1958, he revived the issue of a divided Germany, which
had received little attention since Geneva because it seemed an irresolvable but fairly stable
problem.47
In 1957 and 1958, the Allies slowly repaired relations badly fractured over Suez.
American reluctance to intervene was compounded by poor relations between Anthony Eden and
Dulles. Eisenhower still had little confidence in the other Allied leaders and was long since
impatient with their refusal to end their colonial empires. The post-Suez ascension of Harold
Macmillan and Charles De Gaulle to power in Britain and France offered hope that cooperation
could be set back on track.48 Konrad Adenauer remained Chancellor in the FRG and had made
tentative contact with the Soviets. In 1957, the Western allies had formed Four-Power
(UK/US/FRG/France) working groups to discuss issues like collective security, disarmament,
and collective security. Dulles sought to treat these subjects discretely but because they were
fundamentally related, the working groups only made fractious progress trying to deal with them
separately. The Germans clearly thought the issues had to be considered together.49 The
inefficiency of the 4-power working groups and the problem of dealing with inter-related topics
separately forecast problems that would best the Allies throughout the coming crisis over Berlin.
Direct negotiations with Khrushchev, on the other hand, seemed all but impossible. His
mercurial temperament and un-tempered stubbornness were obstacles enough, but his proposals
offered no attraction for the West. Along with very low-key ambassadorial contacts, the annual
47
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United Nations sessions represented the extent of US-Soviet diplomatic engagement.
Eisenhower's response to mid-1958 overtures from Khrushchev for a summit, was that UN
Security Council meetings were the only summits needed.50 The UN also provided an umbrella
to begin arms-control talks. By 1957, the US and Soviets, along with other nations, had begun
low-level, UN-sponsored nuclear arms control panel discussions. Public concern, along with the
costs and hazards of nuclear deterrence spurred new interest in disarmament. Talks held in
Geneva in July 1958 determined that atomic tests could be monitored with a global net of
inspection stations. Further Geneva conference sessions were held a few months later, but the
US and Soviets rushed to complete as many tests possible in the Operation Hardtack series in
late 1958. These included not only atmospheric testing of then high yield 9 megaton hydrogen
bombs, but the first delivery of a thermonuclear warhead by a missile, an Atlas-Redstone rocket,
for explosion beyond the atmosphere.51
Berlin and Germany seemed quiet issues, though Konrad Adenauer wanted a nuclear
deterrent, even if under American control. NSC No. 5803, issued on February 1958 detailed
how the West Germans (Federal Republic of Germany or FRG) had been contributing steadily
smaller shares of their NATO defense costs, while receiving larger amounts of US support( $408
million fiscal 1957). Overall, defense spending on West Germany had increased and that trend
was expected to continue. The increase costs were borne disproportionally by the US. The FRG,
noted the report, was limited in arms development and production by the Brussels Treaty (which
established NATO), but was thought to be exploring nuclear weapons development with France
and Italy, as well as developing and manufacturing their own short-range missiles. The US did
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not encourage the weapons research but did encourage the missile development. The FRG had
indicated they wanted more missiles integrated into their territorial defense systems. 52
Existing treaties obliged the Western allies to defend Berlin if access was
blockaded but the UK and France would be reluctant to take forceful action unless absolutely
necessary. Two important points are spelled out: "if either side miscalculates, the situation could
easily grow into war, even though neither side desires it" and "most courses of action can be
carried out only with the united effort of the allies." However, they note, "although US actions
must seek to retain Allied cooperation, the United Sates must be prepared to act alone if this will
serve its best interests." The report also observes that "the period between initiation of
aggressive actions and the 'showdown' is likely to be short." No imminent action was forecast;
recommendations included improved intelligence gathering, a visible commitment of support for
West Berlin and persuasion of the France and Britain to adopt US policies on Berlin.53
Nuclear weapons on East and West German territory were central to the security
equations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, but neither side was comfortable with their reliance on
this deterrent. In 1958, Nikita Khrushchev was concerned that NATO had approved the
stationing of missiles in West Germany, just as East Germany was also receiving nuclear
missiles strictly under Moscow's control. Walter Ulbricht was pressuring Khrushchev for
economic assistance and an end to the refugee exodus through West Berlin.54 These concerns,
along with other problems, led him to re-open the German question in November 1958, through
the issue of Allied occupation troops in West Berlin and a treaty to recognize a permanently
divided Germany.55
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Chapter 1: " A Free City," November 1958 - May 1959

Introduction
Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev‟s 1958-59 proposals to remove Western troops
from Berlin and revise the existing German settlement challenged the balance of power in
Europe and Western allied unity. The United States could not allow Khrushchev to unilaterally
abrogate the Potsdam occupation agreements without a serious erosion of American influence in
Europe.56 President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had to
reconcile longstanding goals, such as the reunification of Germany and reduced troop presence
in Europe, with the difficulties of effectively using military force to assert Allied treaty rights.
They pragmatically pursued a diplomatic solution that consistently resisted pressure from
Allied and U.S. military leaders to exercise force. In the early stages of the conflict, Dulles‟
personal command of the situation neutralized military assertiveness. When Dulles was replaced
by Christian Herter, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) made a more determined effort to extend their
influence. But Eisenhower was not going to change course at a point when negotiations were
indicating a near-term resolution to the crisis.57 At the same time, the President made it clear to
the Soviets that the United States would not allow its occupation rights to be nullified.
This restrained but tough course maintained the viability of the status quo in Germany
without armed conflict. It provided cautious hope for diplomatic resolution of Berlin's status and
the German question. The United States was able to neutralize the Soviet threat without
unacceptable retreat or use of force.
Thus, most of the US and Soviet actions regarding Berlin were conducted at the
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diplomatic level. Khrushchev‟s November 28 proposal to for a Western withdrawal from Berlin
and a new German settlement was a diplomatic challenge not a military confrontation. 58
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles went to Europe in December for consultations with
America‟s European allies. From these meetings, the US, France, Britain and West Germany
drafted communiqués and delivered them to the Soviets at year‟s end.59 Soviet Deputy Premier
Anastas Mikoyan visited Washington in January to present a more belligerent and impatient
response, including a draft German peace treaty. 60 In response, the ailing Dulles made a final
trip to Europe in February to restore some Allied coherence.61 However, Prime Minister Sir
Harold Macmillan‟s subsequent solo venture to Moscow62 and other differences during March63
skewed these gains to some degree.
Dulles‟s cautions to French President Charles DeGaulle and West German Chancellor
Konrad Adenauer for coolness and flexibility strained Allied relations. But his patience also
established a framework for his replacement, Acting Secretary Christian Herter, to build upon.
Direct diplomatic contact continued between the US and USSR throughout the spring of 1959,
including further tough hints from Moscow about their own nuclear resolve.64 The worst was
over by then. By late April, tensions with the East and among the allies dissipated in the
preparations for Foreign Minister‟s Conference between the US, the USSR, Britain, France, and
Germany65. These talks also provided some opportunity for one of Khrushchev‟s key aims, high
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level bilateral talks with the U.S., involving “some questions worthy of examination.”66
This brief summary of the November 1958 to May 1959 diplomatic events does not
challenge conventional interpretations. We have to closely examine the original material on
which the interpretations are based The archival records and relevant historiography covering
this Cold War show the difficulty of coordinating military action with the Allies. Confusion and
uncertainty over the effectiveness of force were principal reasons for choosing negotiations.
Another reason was the essentially diplomatic foundation of the original 1945 agreements on
Berlin. The Allied powers, in fact, made adherence to these agreements the cornerstone of their
resistance and consistently referred to them in most communiqués and discussions among
themselves.67
The record provides copious examples of Dulles‟s emphasis on considering force during
Berlin II as an option of last resort. The evidence contradicts the image of Dulles as a
“brinksman” who aggravated tensions. Instead, he enforced a general discipline of diplomatic
and military restraint. That discipline, of course, carried the ultimate authority of the President.
Eisenhower succeeded at an important level in making the Soviet Premier wait before getting his
summit meeting. He used the seasoned coolness of Dulles and his deputies to ensure that there
was a low risk of war. He did not want closer encounters with Khrushchev until Soviet attitudes
improved.

Background to Khrushchev's Ultimatum
Actual military hostilities leading to this period began with a rash of US-East German
confrontations at Berlin inter-zonal checkpoints in August and September over inspection issues.
66
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These were minor but messy. On September 13, the East Germans detained a British Soldier at
Helmstedt checkpoint, then transferred him to a Soviet car for delivery to Marienborn. There, he
was released at the British checkpoint.68 A West German man was beaten by the East Germans
when he attempted to return to the U.S. sector at Dresdener Strasse crossing on September19.
An East German crowd gathered and interceded on the man‟s behalf to help him escape; he took
an East German truncheon with him but returned it, although the volkspoleizei refused to return
the man‟s identification papers.69
David Bruce, the US Ambassador in Bonn, requested hat Washington allow them
authority to take 'prompt and decisive action' short of military intervention. Bruce noted that
military action would not improve the situation but taking no action would be 'inviting' further
incidents.70 US Embassy Counselor Bernard Gufler urged that a diplomatic response should
emphasize that Soviet occupation responsibilities included guaranteed inter-zonal access for
Berliners.71 On the 24th,two American soldiers on an East German train were detained, as were
British soldiers who had strayed into East Berlin a few days While the harassments did not
appear to be planned, Soviet complicity may have represented a testing of Western willingness to
insist on a strict interpretation of the occupation agreements. Those protocols dated from
Potsdam and had been clarified in 1949 after the airlift.
The continued exodus of East Germans through Berlin to the Western sectors and
resettlement outside of the Communist domain caused growing friction.72 The loss of so many
professional and skilled workers annoyed the East German authorities who started taking their
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frustrations out on hapless American soldiers. Khrushchev recalled in his memoirs, “The
resulting drain of workers was creating a simply disastrous situation.” He added, “If things had
continued much longer like this, I don‟t know what would have happened.”73
Pre-November access incidents were taken very seriously by the US mission in Bonn and
in Washington. These incidents almost exclusively involved US personnel. While worrisome,
they still did not directly suggest an imminent regional conflict. Just a few weeks before the
crisis, the NSC had approved a new master policy statement, for West Germany, Berlin, and East
Germany which did not anticipate any near-term change in Berlin‟s status quo. 74 NSC 5803
reflected no change in inter-German relations. It put the blame for reunification‟s stalled
progress firmly at the Soviet door and expressed concern over the alternative concept of
confederation. The report touted Berlin‟s economic recovery and downplayed Communist
provocations as diversions to aid East German morale and Walter Ulbricht‟s power. NSC 5803
did not anticipate active, imminent conflict over Berlin. Only two active-response strategic
options were discussed: nuclear deterrence and small-scale conventional war. Soviet efforts to
transfer occupational authority to the GDR were dismissed as a propaganda effort more than a
diplomatic problem. 75
Even though Germany did not loom as an expected theater of war in mid-1958, Dulles
had already been studying concepts of limited war with nuclear weapons. A July 3, 1957 memo
from State Department Policy Planning Staff (PPS) director Gerard Smith to his PPS colleague
Elgon Matthews noted that Secretary Dulles was impatient with Defense limited-war papers.
Dulles thought “military matters should be an instrument of political policy and not vice versa.”
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Smith also thought the Secretary‟s thinking was becoming “more fluid”, seen in his disagreement
with the military doctrine that limited war capacity varied directly with total war capacity.76
These memo records may refer to the “The Philosophy of Limited War,” a brief for a meeting of
State‟s Army Policy Council dated 9 October, 1957. This paper is notable for its references to
private strategists like Robert Osgood and Henry Kissinger, and because of the way it defines the
terms limited war: “one in which…one or more restrictions applies in some degree”. 77
Limited-war doctrines represented a transition from the massive retaliation doctrines
Dulles had been long been identified with and Eisenhower. These restrictions in Germany would
include protection of civilians and vital infrastructure, logistic difficulties in fielding large
conventional forces, difficulties in holding territory and political considerations. Limited war
options included tactical nuclear weapons delivered by artillery, fighter-bombers, short and
medium range missiles.78 General war would entail use of intercontinental bombers and
submarines, which the United States had advantages in. Even after Khrushchev's force
reductions, the Soviets still had overwhelming infantry and artillery advantages already in East
Germany and much shorter supply lines from home. The Soviets, it was thought, might also be
trying to build an ICBM missile fleet to outmatch the West's fast long-range jet bombers like the
new B-52 and British Vulcan.
An April 1958 protest by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko over U-2
surveillance was an early indicator of Soviet jumpiness over missile construction. 79 The Soviet
leadership, especially Khrushchev. was very apprehensive about any form of inspection on their
76
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territory. Aerial inspections, such as Eisenhower had suggested both sides carry out under an
'Open Skies' policy were particularly unacceptable.80 Khrushchev considered U-2 flights as a
calculated territorial insult. In August 1957, a U-2 had located the launch site of the mammoth
R-7 booster rocket which would a few months later launch the Sputnik satellite. That
development would allow photographic surveillance from space within five years, but in the
meantime the U-2 would be a most valuable but risky intelligence tool for the United States.
Khrushchev had accelerated development of the SA-2 surface-to-air missiles capable of reaching
the U-2's 70,000 foot cruising altitude.81 Those missiles would later have considerable disruptive
influence when they brought down U-2s before the Paris Summit and during the Cuban Missile
Crisis.
Limited war doctrines were still not influential on Dulles and Eisenhower, neither of
whom sought US combat situations, but neither of whom would relinquish US options for
massive nuclear deterrence. Despite his own earlier hawkishness, Dulles had become impatient
with those who refused to consider the inherent limits of particular conflicts. Germany was such
a case. Dulles was becoming increasingly aware that the threat of war was often more
constraining than anticipated. He had little confidence in the feasibility of limiting nuclear
combat. The new private strategists like Kissinger chided Dulles‟ over-reliance on massive
assured destruction.82 But he was skeptical of optimistic scenarios of tactical nuclear force. He
understood how rapidly a local war could spark a general war. The Eisenhower administration
had already avoided intervention in several limited wars, notably in Suez and Hungary in 1956.
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Private debate over defense force structure and spending, such as emanated from the
Council for Foreign Relations, did have some influence over the development of American
strategic policy. America‟s ability to project force remained a topic of much discussion. By the
next year‟s Fourth of July, 1958, Smith and Matthews were preparing yet another updated set of
limited war options, this time explicitly incorporating nuclear capabilities. Days before, Defense
officials had optimistically estimated that limited nuclear exchanges would last no more than 3060 days.83 But under questioning, they admitted that these estimates had not been based on the
certain probability of in-kind retaliation.
Scenarios about possible small wars were still largely theoretical in 1958. Limited wars
seemed more likely in post-colonial hostile situations. The U.S. did not yet have any large scale
involvements to shore up colonial regimes. Deployments in response to unexpected provocation
were the exception rather than the rule. The few military interventions Eisenhower had approved
were intended to be demonstrations of surgical precision, like the deployment of the U.S. Army
and Marines to Lebanon.84 Laos was beginning to loom as a possible new theater of combat, but
Germany seemed an improbable battleground. US occupation forces were usually just doing
routine base duty, such as the jeep-driving GI Elvis Presley. Containment in Europe maintained
a tolerable status quo , except for the flood of refugees from East Germany.
Several incidents in September involving inspections at border checkpoints may have
forecast increased hostilities over Berlin. These were apparently instigated by the East German
volkspolizei with a least tacit Soviet approval. A message from Ambassador David Bruce to
Dulles on September 2 details a proposed note, planned in conjunction with the British and
French, to the Soviets, “bring to your attention serious situation concerning life in this city…(re)
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measures now being imposed” by permitting them, the Soviet authorities are deepening the
division of Germany”.85 The same day, an American soldier had his camera taken at an
inspection point by the vopos. He struck back at a vopo who then, in pursuit of the soldier”
crossed the checkpoint barrier into the West. When told by the West Germans that he was now
on their territory, the East German fled back across the border with the American‟s camera.86
Further tripartite meeting summaries reveal that such harassment had become an ongoing
problem. British Foreign Service counselor Peter Wilkinson observed, “unless we were
prepared to submit to Soviet inspection procedures, we will probably be blockading ourselves in
Berlin.”87 At a meeting with acting Soviet political advisor Shilov two days later, the U.S.
embassy‟s legal counselor Bernard Gufler “emphasized increasing brutality of Soviet sector
police.” Shilov replied that, “this was a matter entirely outside Soviet competence”. He then
cited a similar incident the previous month as evidence of the Soviet distancing themselves from
responsibility for security in Berlin. When the US advisor inquired whether Shilov‟s statement
constituted definite unilateral abrogation of Soviet obligation to protect members Western allied
forces while in East Berlin, Shilov answered affirmatively. He said he “could not use influence
to return camera, matter out of his control.” 88 In quadripartite (US/Britain/France/FRG)
meetings a few days later, West Germany‟s Dr. Northe stated that the “Germans were impressed
with apparent confusion in GDR circles on East German prerogatives re controlling passage into
East German enclave.” 89 There may have been a slight breakdown between responsible East
German and Soviet diplomatic and military authorities. The provocations were mainly against
Allied military personnel, but there was no clear chain of command for the West to address their
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complaints. The situation had neither a ready military nor diplomatic remedy.
At this point, Dulles sent the Bonn mission an excerpt from his September 9 news
conference, which he directed to be forwarded to West Berlin mayor Willy Brandt. Brandt
queried Dulles: “Mr. Secretary, is it a fair understanding that …you and the President regarded
the threat of aggression in Quemoy and Matsu equal to the threat to the Western World in Berlin
and…are we again prepared to resist aggression?” Dulles replied: “…the two situations are
comparable…Perhaps Berlin is another example of a forward position which…could not be lost
in the face of a frontal attack without consequences which were unacceptable.90
Unfortunately, the situation did continue to deteriorate at the local level, chiefly because
of East German efforts during August and September 1958 to incorporate the neighborhood of
Steinstuecken, near the outer border of West Berlin, into their jurisdiction. This de facto
redrawing of the Potsdam-authorized borders was a serious concern in its own right, magnified
because of the unstable inspection and checkpoint climate. 91 In a message of concern from the
embassy to Dulles and other missions and military installations, Bruce specifically emphasized
that, “approval for the use of armed forces must emanate from the highest level of the US
government.” He also noted that “the time required to obtain this authority after an act of
aggression would preclude effective and timely reaction on the part of the US in Steinestucken.”
Despite the dilemma of needing to be able to „take immediate action with…deliberate
violations,” Bruce stated forcefully that “not think it essential ... (US Berlin Commander) be
given prior and unconditional authority to undertake military action” He concluded
pessimistically that “one constant factor is that there is no REPEAT no stable modus vivendi in
Berlin…only proposal might improve situation would be (if) generally known that if incursion
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took place US armed force would be used to restore situation.” Bruce concluded, “for all
practical purposes, our position is not such we can improve it fundamentally from military
standpoint. …situation hardly conducive to that.” 92 However, over some objections from both
Allies and the JCS, Dulles would only consider possibly conducting a light “garrison” airlift of
essential military and diplomatic personnel and materiel.
A more serious interruption took place on October 8 at Marienborn checkpoint when
Soviet, not East German, guards detained a large US truck and its driver. Bernard Gufler
protested to the new Soviet political advisor Colonel Dimitri Markushkin. Markushkin‟s
frequent cooperation with Bruce was generally a great asset to both sides all through Berlin II.
Though Markushkin could also be unhelpful when his superiors so directed, he helped in this
case. The truck was released the same day. The Steinestuecken dispute continued to occupy
much of the US mission‟s attention particularly from October 22 to 28. 93 On November 23,
Ambassador David Bruce issued general instructions that no inspection challenges, unauthorized
convoys, or retaliations of any kind were to be attempted by US personnel. He concluded with
this sobering caution: “any course of action designed to maintain freedom of Berlin will finally
depend upon our determination, if necessary to use force.”94
Contingency planning for armed combat over Berlin and along the inter-German borders
was challenging for both the US and USSR. Restrictions included the necessity to limit
collateral damage to civilians, economic assets, and infrastructure. A confined war zone could
nullify force advantages. The USSR‟s in situ advantages in conventional war assets were well
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understood and discouraging,.95 The Americans would be limited by their inability to match and
mobilize conventional assets into the region quickly. Military targets for all parties would have
to be selected very carefully. The Soviets had had an awkward time in both Poland and Hungary
in 1956, and was now wary of heavy tactics. Their relations with the East Germans had been
strained ever since 1953. East German leader Walter Ulbricht complained to Khrushchev that he
needed economic help as well as assistance in stemming the refugee problem. Khrushchev
thought Ulbricht had brought on his problems through heavy handed incompetence.96

Khrushchev's November Speeches
By the fall of 1958, the Soviets had begun installations for R-5 ballistic missile systems
in East Germany near Berlin. These intermediate-range missiles (IRBM) could reach Paris and
London and gave the Soviets a forward based rapid-delivery nuclear capability to match the
West's.97 That capability, along with strong Soviet conventional force advantage, gave
Khrushchev the muscle to back up his proposals. He wanted to remove the "bone in the throat"
of the West's Berlin occupation troops within East Germany. In a speech at Moscow's Sports
Palace on November 10, Khrushchev announced his intent to sign a separate peace treaty with
East Germany. This treaty would supersede the Potsdam accords, nullifying the basis for
occupation. Berlin would be transformed into a neutral 'free city.' He set a six-month deadline
before the Soviet Union would undertake action, but would meet with Western leaders.98
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Western Response
Consultations with European allies in the days after Khrushchev‟s November 10 p,
indicated wide divergence of opinion about practical options.99 The United States and British
urged an immediate strong note of protest be sent but the French were reluctant to respond
immediately. West Berlin mayor Willy Brandt, noting that the Allies seemed to be caught off
guard, urged the West German government in Bonn to break off diplomatic relations with the
Soviet Union. 100 The Europeans wondered if the Americans would abandon Germany for better
relations with the Soviets. The Americans wondered if the European allies, including West
Germans, had any idea what the costs of conflict would be. If one of Khrushchev‟s aims, which
might include summit talks with the U.S., was to sow dissension among the American, French,
British and West Germans, as US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles believed, the gambit was
succeeding. 101 Dulles would demonstrate that Allied unity was a greater priority for Eisenhower
than accommodating the Soviets. That unity included visible solidarity with West Germany. 102
US Ambassador In Bonn David Bruce told Dulles that he believed it "unlikely that (Khrushchev)
would carry his purpose to the bitter end." Instead, Khrushchev wanted "to force a summit
conference and to create an epoch of detente which he needs for his economic plans." 103
Dulles was in no hurry to involve the West in a Berlin conflict where they had
about 11,000 troops against the East's 38,000 in the immediate Berlin vicinity. Hoping to defuse
Khrushchev's demands through compromise, he made public comments that the West could
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consider some East German border presence as 'agents' of the Soviet Union.104 This would not
be a major concession in practical terms, but anything that implied recognition of East Germany
was anathema in Bonn and West Berlin. This flexibility on Dulles part, reflecting Eisenhower's
own inclinations, was an early indication of the tactics he would try to set as basic Western
strategy to deal with Khrushchev. Already, however, the US ran into resistance from the West
Germans and West Berliners, fearful of anything that suggested permanent acceptance of a
divided Germany. 105
Khrushchev underscored the seriousness of his intent with a formal statement of his
peace treaty/free city demands which he had his ambassadors deliver on November 28.
Although the West Germans remained suspicious of Dulles' flexibility on the 'agency' principle,
Ambassador Bruce found general interest in negotiations that might lead to serious reunification
discussions. 106 The French saw only three options, all unviable - refusing the note, finding a
Berlin-only solution or attempting an all-German plebiscite wanted to delay any response
pending inter-allied consultation. 107 Talking with French ambassador Herve Alphand in
Washington, Dulles noted the overtly hostile tone of the new Soviet statement. He said there
would have to be tripartite discussions in December, when the Western foreign ministers would
be in Paris for NATO sessions. In practice, Dulles would have to temper French attempts to lock
the West into difficult stances that hindered negotiation. 108 The West Germans would not
participate yet in these meetings because they were not occupying powers in Berlin. In coming
months, they became much more involved in negotiations, though indirectly.
The tripartite focus on Berlin tied in with French President Charles de Gaulle's
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inclinations. Dulles used that angle to get the French interested in a negotiated Berlin solution.
For the moment, the British reaction seemed more calm and steady than the US's other European
allies but they would seen by seen as too willing to negotiate. Unlike Eisenhower or de Gaulle,
British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan would send a personal letter to Khrushchev, on
November 22. He got back a restatement of the demands, along with "a plea for better relations
with the UK."109

Importance of Individuals in the Berlin Situation
Khrushchev's individual nature and personality would be the most decisive and constant
element of the whole Berlin campaign, but his Western counterparts were also very distinctive,
experienced politicians and national leaders. Charles de Gaulle's ascension to the French
Presidency three months earlier already portended trouble for Washington. De Gaulle had
already indicated to Eisenhower and the new British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan that he
wanted a triumvirate of Anglo-French-American global leadership, to which NATO would be
subordinate. Convinced that Khrushchev did not want war, de Gaulle hoped to lead the West's
Berlin response away from the negotiations Macmillan wanted. 110 West German Chancellor
Konrad Adenauer was eager to establish good relations with de Gaulle, as was the General, and
maintain a united front against Communist expansion. Adenauer and Khrushchev were already
adversaries, veteran but excitable politicians who used each other for propaganda.111 The West
Germans, along with the Belgians, Dutch, Italians and the rest of NATO, including the US and
Britain, viewed de Gaulle's vision with apprehension. Macmillan had his own dreams of
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restoring British influence and US ties after the setbacks of Suez. Eisenhower had a more
reserved but still authoritative style of leadership, made possible by his military background. Of
these Allied leaders, only Eisenhower had any experience with Khrushchev and even that had
been limited to the strained formal settings of the Vienna summit. 112
What were Khrushchev‟s other aims, besides discord and a new summit? Would they
limit his tactics? Not even his fellow Russians knew.113 Certainly he did not want a total war,
and probably not even limited war. He had not been pleased with the few limited war situations,
like Hungary, the Soviets had gotten embroiled in on his watch. Like Eisenhower, he had
trimmed conventional bases and forces and even moderated heavy arms purchasing. He needed
to preserve imposing conventional strength, yet keep costs manageable.114 The Soviet force in
East Germany included theater nuclear missiles requested by Ulbricht. Khrushchev had to
mollify Ulbricht who was losing control over Berlin as thousands of educated workers fled west.
German unification had essentially been a moot question since the establishment of the German
Democratic Republic and Warsaw Pact and the growing viability of West Germany as a renewed
commercial and political power. Khrushchev‟s surprise proposals for a new Berlin and German
settlement may not have been realistic, but they offered some political advantages.115 Ulbricht‟s
complaints about the drain of human resources from Berlin to the West had to be addressed.116
Berlin was the one place where Russia and the Western Powers were all still in close contact.
By focusing his challenge there, Khrushchev could also advance several domestic and
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Communist-sphere aims, including reinforcing his strength with the new Politburo.117 In
challenging the Potsdam agreement, he could challenge the final European judgment of the War,
and recognize a new status quo with two independent Germanys and a non-aligned Berlin under
UN auspices.118 He wanted to be seen as a peacemaker. Berlin was increasingly viewed by both
the Americans and Russians as something of a liability - symbolic but dysfunctional. It was a
safe target for political provocation. Berlin would be especially attractive if it could be acquired
without any danger to the Cold War landscape. He hoped it might be worth a U.S.-U.S.S.R.
summit meeting to Eisenhower as ransom for continued access. Culturally symbolic and
functionally superfluous, it could be demanded without disrupting essential commerce and
contact. The Warsaw Pact countries could be brought forth as diplomatic partners. Eastern
European involvement would especially bother the West European allies, who tried to avoid
initiatives like the Polish Rapacki plan. That plan would have made much of Europe a nuclearfree zone, and was viewed as a open door for Soviet conventional force advantage. Western
governments still did not politically recognize East Germany and were not keen on doing
business with Warsaw Pact client governments119
The new Moscow Politburo, finally purged of most of his rivals and old-line Stalinists,
was astounded and bewildered by the Berlin initiative.120 Khrushchev‟s impulsiveness had gone
beyond the internal Russian upset of de-Stalinization to a whole new level of international
mischief that might be dangerously unsustainable. But he did have control over his foreign
policy apparatus. Veteran Praesidium member and Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan had been
among the few to argue against the Berlin campaign and was later delegated to travel to the
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United States on unofficial visits intended to press Khrushchev's demands but also repair
relations in a more reasonable voice than Khrushchev used. Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko
obediently pursued the free city/peace treaty objectives with determination and little variation
from the original formula for the next five years..121
Khrushchev's November statements marked the beginning of an sustained diplomatic
campaign that lasted from November 1958 to a little after November 1963. The campaign required a
ready military back-up which he did not expect to use but which was already on hand with extensive
contingency plans already established. The West would also have to present a viable deterrent, but
did not have forces afield or good planning. Khrushchev hoped to slow NATO nuclear
deployments, remove the West's toehold in eastern Germany, and quiet critics like Ulbricht and his
own generals, without actually having to go to war.122 Khrushchev could concentrate his own efforts
on speeches and letters, as well as contacts with Western ambassadors like the American Llewellyn
Thompson or the visiting US Senator Hubert Humphrey.
Life magazine covered Senator Hubert Humphrey‟s December 1st visit to Moscow, a
week before Dulles would go to Europe, as a bigger event than it was. Life gave Humphrey his own
byline and lots of pictures. No real negotiations took place. To Humphrey, who had presidential
aspirations for 1960, Life‟s feature provided great publicity, but it was meant as a wake-up call to the
administration. But, Time showed how Khrushchev easily neutralized Humphrey. A scathing
critique, “Khrushchev‟s Plan,” was followed by, “The Cancer of Freedom,” contrasting Khrushchev
with Willy Brandt. Khrushchev and Brandt had more in common than the Luce magazines would
acknowledge; they were party politicians before they were statesmen.123
Reasonable and belligerent often in the same conversation, Khrushchev could mix formal
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statements and informal contacts to keep the West guessing about his real intentions. Gromyko and
Mikoyan would be his main representatives, along with ambassadors.124 His US Ambassador
Mikhail Menshikov had only been in Washington since January 1958 but already earned the
nickname "Smilin' Mike" for his baleful manner; Eisenhower was among the few who found
Menshikov agreeable. He was not a persuasive diplomat but he was faithful to his boss.
Where Khrushchev had initially hoped for an early 1959 summit with more following, he
would have to wait eighteen months only to abandon the conference with Eisenhower. Khrushchev
never imagined the Berlin diplomatic operation would take so long.125 His initial timetable was six
months, a deadline he suspended and would later re-impose, but suspend again. Even though the
West did not agree to his demands even after many months, it kept them distracted and provided
him with leverage for other issues, most notably disarmament. Disarmament was related to the
German problem, because of the recent nuclear deployments. The diplomatic campaign for Berlin
was much cheaper than a war and was intended to accomplish the same desired changes. It was
offered as an alternative to war but with an indefinite threat of force to ensure its demands. It
involved very little new military effort, unless things went awry.126 The campaign became timeconsuming for leaders and diplomats on all sides with almost no gains, but they became much
familiar with their counterparts. That sizing-up was also a key Soviet aim in the Berlin campaign.
The grand sweep of Khrushchev's ambition as well as his tough language was also
a challenge to Red China‟s Chairman Mao Zedong. Mao remained angry over the deStalinization program and Russian refusal to share nuclear technology. He ridiculed
Khrushchev's talk of peaceful coexistence. Mao had treated Khrushchev rudely on the latter's
state visit to China some months before. Mao had recently probed the Western presence in the
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offshore territories. Post-Soviet Russian historians Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov,
who stress the Sino-Soviet rivalry in Khrushchev‟s decision making, have pointed out that
Ulbricht had heard Dulles‟ recent comparisons of the Chinese offshore island situation with
Berlin. In October 1958, possibly to goad Khrushchev, Ulbricht suggested the next issue of
superpower contention might be Berlin‟s status. 127
President Eisenhower was dubious over Berlin‟s strategic value and not at all inclined to
summitry with Khrushchev, especially under duress.128 He regarded the previous summit of
1955 as a failure and did not think foreign-minister conferences very useful. Though Geneva
was the first post-war US–USSR summit, it had not been productive. Eisenhower remained
bitter over Khrushchev‟s subsequent abrogation of summit promises in both Poland and
Hungary, as well as his interference in the Suez crisis.129 Eisenhower believed in executive
authority but also delegation of command. His “New Look” policy aimed to replace expensive
“containment” strategy with a leaner, more responsive defense capacity. He wanted to eliminate
costly self-perpetuating bureaucracies and force redundancies. He was disinclined to wholesale
weapons system purchases premised on suspect intelligence.130 This economical approach to
maintaining sufficient defense assets also demanded a flexible foreign policy that looked to
negotiation in crisis situations. To avoid such interventions, a reliably subordinate security
establishment was required.

Stephen Ambrose has described the President as an advocate for

military caution and limits. More recent examinations of Eisenhower strategic policy such as
Bowie and Immerman‟s Waging Peace have further argued that the “Ike” White House was
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systematically inclined to restraint and prudent. The President was averse to military risk-taking
and committed U.S. forces carefully, if at all. 131
Eisenhower did not regard the State and Defense Departments as rivals, but rather as
equally subordinate institutions. Bureaucratization - whether at State or Defense - added a
deadly inertia and drag on decision making. 132 That could slow presidential authority unless an
expediter like Dulles could whip and cajole Washington‟s security fiefdoms into cooperation.
By 1958, Eisenhower had a sound grasp of Dulles‟ basic geopolitical instincts. After earlier
heated experiences and disagreements, they were well seasoned and understood each other.133
Their instincts about the Berlin situation were very similar. Both men thought this was an
indirect maneuver by Khrushchev, who had forecast and loudly proclaimed his moves. The
Kremlin leader established an extended timeline of six months, instead of simply occupying all
of Berlin as a fait accompli. But Eisenhower was also under considerable political pressure from
military and Congressional leaders wanting a more aggressive U.S. reaction.134 Their martial
allies in the press such as columnist Joseph Alsop advocated action.
Dulles's perceived direction of foreign policy insulated Eisenhower, reinforcing
presidential gravitas. The National Security Advisor role was less important than it had been
under Truman and would increasingly be with McGeorge Bundy and Henry Kissinger. Dulles
ran a more centralized and influential foreign policy apparatus than the next few Secretaries of
State.135 He relied heavily on a few capable subordinates like Undersecretaries Livingston
Merchant and Policy Planning Staff head Gerard Smith. In addition, he benefitted from
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experienced ambassadors like David Bruce in Germany and Llewellyn Thompson in Moscow.
Charles Bohlen and Foy Kohler were also experienced analysts of the Soviets and would remain
involved for most of campaign
While de Gaulle and Macmillan actively involved themselves in the negotiations,
Eisenhower, with confidence, delegated much of the US response to John Foster Dulles. As
Secretary of State from Eisenhower‟s inauguration till his death from cancer in May 1959,
Dulles enjoyed considerable leeway in carrying out policy yet could faithfully execute
presidential directives. His opinion was valued, though he had his disagreements with
Eisenhower. By 1958 his views were becoming especially more congruent with the
President‟s.136 At least in the preserved diplomatic record, there is little indication of divergence
between the President and Secretary over the U.S. response to Khrushchev‟s proposals for a new
German settlement.
Another reason for the executive branch‟s preference for diplomatic resolution was
conflict between the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Secretary of Defense Neil
McElroy was a weak partner of the Chiefs more than he was a forceful leader like Dulles.
McElroy could not lobby for his Department or for the JCS as effectively Dulles did for the State
Department.137 The State Department‟s “Militarization of Foreign Policy” noted the Defense
Department‟s divergent security goals and resistance to Eisenhower‟s “New Look” drawdown
and streamlining of American defense positions.138 That growing conflict between the State
Department and the Joint Chiefs (and disagreements between the various Chiefs themselves)
represented an unacceptable obstacle to Eisenhower's control over negotiations. The diplomatic
table, not Berlin and Germany, had to serve as the field of battle, with the nuclear backup kept
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both ready and contained. This would require Dulles, Merchant, Thompson, Kohler and others
to continuously have to deal with both domestic as well allied attempts to influence the situation.
Dulles' pragmatism and patience proved very constructive in the early, pivotal stages of the
campaign.139 He would however not live to see even the foreign ministers conference he helped
arrange, Dulles helped establish a Western consensus perhaps better than his successors would;
that lack of consensus would help ,prolong the campaign and make progress near impossible.
Though the U.S. and U.S.S.R. ultimately achieved some political resolution without
escalation to general conflict, the course of the 1958-59 Berlin negotiations did involve a high
degree of military planning and readiness. This coldest of Cold War conflicts had to be
conducted at the diplomatic level because the operating limits and resultant options for both sides
were so restrictive.140 Military confrontations consisted of only a few East German and Soviet
detentions of U.S. soldiers and vehicles over inspection rights.141
One indication of differences between State and Defense in the initial reaction period
came from Undersecretary Merchant. He wrote concerning an interruption on November 14,
1958 of an American military convoy at Soviet checkpoint Babelsberg in Berlin. Merchant
noted that such harassment had become chronic. Merchant stressed that the Bonn mission and
the Department agreed that “this is the wrong time, place, and issue on which to resort to force.”
142

But he discouraged plans for a full scale airlift as too visible a military commitment. He did

mention again the possibility for a light garrison airlift. He summarizes topics of a meeting with
the JCS as: Soviet determination to inspect American trucks, allied reluctance to actually use
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force, prospects for further allied disunity, and efforts to restore unity. The considerable Soviet
surface advantages were discussed as well as the “awkward” American staging environment.
Merchant added that the JCS were firmly against a new airlift, but also committed to defense of
convoys by force: “The JCS are following two lines of thinking that cause us considerable
concern.”143The Merchant memo shows the rough frontier between military and diplomatic
positions in Washington.
In Berlin, State Department staffers Finlay Burns and Bernard Gufler were seriously
pursuing the “little airlift” option which appealed to the allies as well. This is significant because
it shows the diplomatic corps taking the leadership regarding the degree of force to be used. It
was remarked at the time that detentions were almost always targeted against the Americans and
with full Soviet oversight. 144 It also seemed as though the Soviet military and diplomatic
offices were not always in full communication.
Khrushchev cast his November 10 and 28 proposals as a timetable for Berlin to
become a demilitarized “free city”.145 It was a surprise move, even given the hostilities over
Steinestuecken. But, initial US review of the Sports palace speech noted that the East German
leader Ulbricht had been trying to dismiss the legal foundations for the occupation for over a
year.146 Khrushchev co-opted Ulbricht idea of challenging the occupation protocols with his
“Free City” concept, which he claimed as his own innovation.147 The “free city” idea vaguely
evoked the peaceful transition Vienna had made from an occupied city to a neutral capital. In
Vienna, however, the Soviets had really had little reason to continue occupation, whereas in
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Berlin they were naturally dominant with nearly four times as many troops as the Americans had.
The real significance of his “free city” proposal may have been its non-military format,
delivered as a diplomatic message. The Soviets did not want a military reaction. They made no
lightning thrusts such as in Hungary, or as their Egyptian clients had done at Suez. This was a
long-course diplomatic challenge, yet with a potential nuclear threat. This diplomatic course
was likely chosen because it was less hazardous or expensive than military options. As
Khrushchev told his son Sergei after the second speech, “No one would start a war over
Berlin…if negotiations don‟t work, something will turn up.”148

US & Allies Consult in Europe (December 1958)
In December, Gerard Smith summarized a briefing led by Defense Secretary McElroy as
an indication that “in the immediate future the U.S. military capacity for meeting limited
aggression would rapidly decline.” Smith added that there would “likely be (a) number of
situations in which a strong foreign policy position will be difficult to maintain…” He stressed
the “necessity for strengthening our limited war capabilities”.149 To avoid accidental escalation
into total war and still pursue their respective interests, both sides confined their challenges to
official notes and resisted more than token military activity. But in November and December, it
was unclear whether or not the crisis could be contained diplomatically.
This meant containment of destabilizing military activity. In mid-December, retired
General Lucius Clay, who as US Commander in Chief for Europe in 1949, had masterminded the
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original Berlin airlift, promoted the idea of an armed convoy from West Germany to Berlin.150
This option was endorsed by the French and West Germans but was directly overruled by Dulles,
who was relaying the President‟s wishes.151 Eisenhower had no intention of conducting another
full scale airlift. This would have likely only provoked Khrushchev to take more forceful
measures. By preserving the status quo as much as possible, Khrushchev‟s challenge was
diminished and he could less credibly accomplish his indirect aims.
Throughout, the basic centrality of Germany to the crisis was more in German eyes, East
and West, than to the other allied nations. France and Britain considered Khrushchev‟s proposal
a challenge to them as much as to the Germans. A unified Germany would diminish their place
in the new European system. Not that Berliners were particularly pleased with the status quo. As
the West German Interior Minister Joachim Lipschutz emphatically told the American military
journal Combat in December, they were open to a new political situation but not under Soviet
ultimatum.152 To the Soviets, their role as victors over Germany and guarantors of the European
settlement was a cornerstone of their international stature. They still considered Berlin, Potsdam
notwithstanding, as their rightful prize. However, both the East and West German government
governments had eagerly sought and received the first installations of theater range nuclear
missiles.153 The rearmament of Germany prompted the Soviets to confirm their leadership – and
protect their western flank - by calling for demilitarization in Berlin and later for all of
Germany.
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Soviet primacy in German occupation matters had to be reasserted against the new
nuclear backdrop. Soviet military doctrine had come to regard nuclear weaponry as
indispensable for the time being. But their leadership was beginning to acknowledge its risks.154
Tactical nuclear missile deployment was still controversial in America and in the Soviet Union.
Morton Halperin describes the conflicting views on this topic. Advocacy of the tactical nuclear
deployment had to be considered alongside arguments against America placing its main reliance
on the unpredictable nuclear strategies. The latter “examined the political costs of initiating the
use of nuclear options and have found them very substantial.”155 Unwilling to encourage
military proposals for Berlin, Dulles turned down General Clay‟s request for an interview before
his departure for a mid-December NATO Foreign Minister meeting. 156 Acting Secretary
Herter‟s brief from Washington in advance of the Dulles trip did provide some window for
possible military action. Herter observed that “Soviets and East Germans should not be allowed
to entertain doubts as to our determination to use limited force if need be…” He emphasized that
the “purpose of (such) resort to is…test Soviet intentions”157
Ambassador David Bruce had recently reported that even amidst Adenauer‟s resolve to
“take a firm position,” other extenuating factors needed to be evaluated first. These included the
possibility that Khrushchev was trying to deflect attention from internal difficulties in Russia as
well as trying to impress the upcoming All Party Conference. Adenauer also suggested that
Khrushchev was acting out of frustration at West German influence with DeGaulle in the wake
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of Soviet disappointment about their unaccepted advances the previous May.158 Adenauer and
Lipschutz had little to say about how firmness would translate to force projections or defensive
positions.
Unsatisfactory practical applications of conventional power were often based on naively
assuming military means could be used for political goals while underestimating predictable
problems. Eisenhower was determined to avoid being ensnared in a dangerous quagmire over
dubious territory. The President had deep reservations about Berlin‟s worth. He told Dulles:
“This was another instance in which our political posture requires us to assume military positions
which are wholly illogical”.159 Eisenhower and Dulles still hoped to contain the situation
through middle range diplomatic engagement. At the NATO conference, Dulles would lay down
the law: The United States would not support unauthorized military ventures or even full scale
planning or deployment and they would consider Khrushchev‟s proposals at face value.
Eisenhower and Dulles thought that the Soviet leader‟s own positions could be used against him.
Dulles willingness to discuss compromises with the Soviets disturbed the Allies,
particularly DeGaulle .160 Meetings with the other foreign ministers indicated little consensus.
This resistance did not prevent communiqués from NATO on December 15 and 18th. The final
communiqué asserted resolve “not to yield to threats.” The Allies also indicated they too sought
a „solution to seek just settlements of the German problem…” This would include “European
Security arrangements… (and)…controlled disarmament. 161 The US cover statement left no
doubt that Dulles was acting at Eisenhower‟s direction; “The President reiterated our ... firm
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purpose” as a Four Power guarantor of Berlin‟s freedom.162 After these communiqués, though
there was a period of apparent relaxation, with some hints from Soviet aides that there was not
likely to be any war over Berlin.

A Hard Soviet Reply and Strains on Allied Restraint (January-February 1959)
In January, Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan visited Washington, ostensibly on vacation
and to renew trade discussions . Allowing an extended goodwill and trade promotion visit by as
high ranking an official as Mikoyan was itself a sign that tensions with the Soviets, had relaxed
since 1956.163 Dulles and Mikoyan had a generally friendly meeting, though Mikoyan made
clear he was also in the US to receive "acceptable proposals" on Berlin. Mikoyan also visited
with Vice-President Nixon; both these number two men expressed his country's desire for better
relations and the importance exchanges and discussion. They did however engage in some
ideological debate. Their discussion on Berlin was a little more pointed, with Mikoyan asking
why the Americans could not believe the Soviets did not want Berlin for themselves. Nixon said
the Western allies could not countenance a unilateral change over Berlin but, "the main thing
was to reach a mutually acceptable settlement so that we do not arrive in six months at an
intolerable position." Mikoyan said he hoped the question could be resolved earlier. This was
only an informal visit but Berlin had not interfered with the general expressions of mutual
interest in trade and cultural exchanges.164
On his return to Washington on January 16, Mikoyan met again with Dulles and his top
lieutenants. They discussed a number of global issues, such as the Near East, Iraq, Laos,
Taiwan and Korea, contrasting the worthiness of each other's clients. Mikoyan vigorously
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protested Western bases in Iran and Turkey. Dulles said the Soviets need not worry and anyway,
"with the increased range of missile, it made no practical difference whether a base were nearby
or away. The USSR perhaps could annihilate the US from one of its own bases."165 Mikoyan
asked if the US intended to provide the West Germans with atomic weapons? Dulles said the US
government was prohibited by law from doing so, despite many allied requests. They also
briefly discussed suspending atomic testing. Dulles indicated the US was open to comprehensive
test suspension talks and possible agreements, which Mikoyan welcomed readily. Again, the
tone was cordial and business like. Mikoyan did not relax Khrushchev's demands on Berlin. If
anything, he made clear a un-negotiable Soviet point: in the event of a treaty, the East Germans
would be in control of access to and from Berlin. Allied occupation troops would have to leave
because they would be encircled by East Germany which had to regard them as hostile.166
Khrushchev was slightly upping the stakes; there was more at stake than just Berlin. Thus the
Soviet message on Berlin in January was tougher. It was also the same whether it came from
Khrushchev in an angry mood or Mikoyan at his most charming.
Mikoyan met with the President the next day. He delivered a more forceful message on
Berlin than Eisenhower probably expected. He presented an expanded version of the November
proposals that now included calls for a possible demilitarized unified German settlement. He
made it clear to Dulles that the Soviets had problems with the U.S. in non-German matters,
particularly the possible U.S. bases being planned for Turkey and Iran.167 Mikoyan was
particularly strident on the subject of West German nuclear deployment.168 But the Americans
simply asked Mikoyan in return if the Soviets were really ready for open elections in Germany.
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They received no direct answer from Mikoyan, who simply repeated the official concerns about
nuclear encirclement and intent to resist such containment. The meeting was friendly, despite
some tenseness on Berlin and they again emphasized positive effects of trade and exchanges.
Mikoyan's visit convinced the Americans that the Soviets did not want war but seemed
not only contractible on Berlin but very confident nevertheless. One reason for that confidence
might have been serious differences of opinion were openly splitting the allies. Another might
have been that increased harassment, often with some Soviet component, was raising tensions in
Berlin. On January 13, Willy Brandt raised the prescient possibility of the East Germans
"possibly sealing off Sector-Sovietzone and Sector-Sector borders without blockade." This
would indeed be Ulbricht and Khrushchev's main solution to stabilize East German losses
through Berlin. It would take over two years longer than the end of May 1959 that Brandt
predicted. 169
The Allies were demanding more detailed contingency planning than Dulles was willing
to support. De Gaulle want to commit to a military strategy , to "resist force by force." In the
event of a blockade, he wanted a garrison airlift of troops.170 Macmillan was equally reluctant
to commit his country's troops, . Even Adenauer, whose country would be most disrupted by a
blockade, was troop-shy. All these leaders had criticized Dulles in December for daring to
consider the agency principle. Macmillan had already opened his own backchannel tot
Khrushchev. Livingston Merchant told British Foreign Secretary Sir Harold Caccia to be careful
not to tell many more journalist like Joseph Alsop that the British had second thoughts on
resorting to force to maintain Allied occupation. rights.171
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The US represented a middle position, inclined to negotiate but only with wellmeasured and supportable force. The US took a cautious attitude to mobilization and
negotiation, unlike respectively the British and French.. But they wanted promises of American
nuclear intervention in the event of a shooting war. Eisenhower, always reluctant to expose the
US to the dangers and costs of overseas deployments, was not content with the imbalance of
commitment and naive ides of containing and supporting limited wars. Only through Allied
cohesion could the West use diplomatic means to deflect Khrushchev's demands enough to make
him lift his deadline for Berlin.172 Macmillan's planned solo trip to Moscow and de Gaulle's
agitation for some military gesture disrupted the cohesion and made it easier for Khrushchev to
try and reach separate understandings among the Allies. Eisenhower remained unmoved towards
heads of state diplomacy under the circumstances. Although nearly too ill to travel from his
worsening cancer, Dulles nevertheless returned to Europe to bring the allies together.
However, almost as soon as he arrived, another serious incident occurred, involving a
more extended detention. This again required Soviet political aide Markushkin‟s assistance after
direct entreaties to Soviet Commander Shilov were ignored. The incident also revealed some
dissonance between the Soviet military and political authorities in Berlin. On February 2, the
Soviets detained an American truck convoy on the Autobahn, which allegedly refused
inspection. The complaint was somewhat dubious since the rear of the trucks was open and the
contents - jeeps – were plainly visible. The British also suffered a detention the next day.173 In
each case, the soldiers were not detained but the vehicles were, suggesting a very nuanced
attempt at deliberate provocation. Bruce wired Dulles that “this is an obvious move to force
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inspection rights”174 In his next-day follow-up, he noted that “we either submit to any inspection
demand or resort to self-imposed blockade”.175
This was the most serious actual military contact of the early phase of the crisis. Luckily
–or perhaps by design – it did not occur at a point where armed hostilities were likely to flare up;
inspection checkpoints are defensive more than forward positions and the US vehicles were
minimally armed. The detention is conspicuously marginal in most accounts of the Berlin
sequence, but it was of serious concern at the time to the US and British embassies. The French
offered to run some trucks through instead. Although Bruce considered the suggestion “worth
considering,” it was not followed up on. Perhaps they were concerned about escalating the
incident. As brinksmanship goes, it was not a particularly saber-rattling moment. General Lewis
Norstad, US NATO commandant, presented a plan for five light tanks to test the checkpoint.
This would be followed by a reinforcement battalion of light infantry.
But this escalatory idea was deferred in favor of Bruce‟s appeal to Markushin. Bruce and
Markushin visited the site, and after Bruce demonstrated that only a jeep was being transported,
Markushin replied: “It is cold. I will not detain you further…” He added, “you and I are not able
to settle the issues involved. It must be taken to a higher level.” 176 Markushin also let him know
the release was a personal favor. The inspection issue was still open, but less experienced and
adept representatives might not have been able to defuse the situation so peacefully.
Before higher level discussions with the Soviets could resume, the Allies needed to
develop a joint approach. Dulles had to analyze what the Soviet actions were really about. His
first stop was London where he was surprised to find that Prime Minister Sir Harold Macmillan
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and Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd had a much “softer” attitude than the U.S. expected.177
While the US had surprised the Allies in December with their flexibility, the U.S. was still not
prepared to recognize the GDR, especially since the Soviets were not going to recognize the
FRG. While still in London, Dulles also met with Norstad and raised the question of how
garrisoning nuclear weapons in Germany would affect understandings with other allies. Norstad
noted that it was a major step but also cautioned against putting the move up for approval with
the other nations. He also complained of delays in deployments. Undersecretary Livingston
Merchant commented that the “Rubicon with the Soviets will be crossed when the Soviets get
atomic weapons” in the field, only a few months away.178 The Soviets did not have to go far
forward to do that.
At the next day‟s round, Dulles stated that he was convinced that the Soviets did not want
to go to war over Berlin and they had to be careful not to back them into changing that position.
He also reiterated his opposition to any “thinning out” of forces without corresponding moves
from the opposition. But most significantly a diplomatic solution to the crisis began to surface
with discussion of a Foreign Ministers conference, possibly as early as May. Macmillan now
made public his intent to engage in his own personal shuttle diplomacy, including a trip to
Moscow. That prospect left both Dulles and Eisenhower aghast with disbelief.179
Fortunately, Dulles found French President Charles De Gaulle and Prime Minister Regis
Debre less shaky. Ever the effective diplomat, Dulles pleased de Gaulle with his reference to the
France‟s role as a victorious occupying power. He knew that de Gaulle resented the erosion of
tripartite prestige after French blunders in Suez and Indochina. It is interesting that Dulles also
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referred to a problem we now call the “leverage of the weak” when he says “we could not
permit…the vanquished to…rule the victors.”180 Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson cabled
Dulles from Moscow to advise that raising the vehicle inspection problem either tripartitely or
unilaterally with the Soviets would be “disastrous.” He added that the Soviets would back off if
not pressed to avoid further harsh publicity 181 Further talks with the French now went smoothly,
emphasizing the economic cooperation between France and the FRG as a natural basis for
influence, without Dulles having to make unsupportable concessions to the French.
Dulles‟ next stop in Germany was more troubling. Chancellor Adenauer frankly
described his apprehensions about Western unity and NATO‟s will and ability to stand up to
Soviet backed aggression. He wanted specific commitments of US military support from Dulles,
but acknowledged that "if force were used, the crisis would become acute." Dulles replied that
in the event of serious armed incursion, the West must be prepared to dispatch an armored
division to secure a land route to Berlin. Such a condition would equate to a general war
situation where the allies must consider the use of nuclear weaponry. Failure to show
commitment would “invite defeat on a purely conventional battleground.”182 Adenauer replied
that he feared there was little public support for such scenarios, while Dulles assured him that
there was indeed such public will in the United States. Dulles also contrasted the US position
with the softer British views and harder French view, and asked what the West German thoughts
were for a provisional resolution. Adenauer wanted the deadline postponed and NATO‟s
planned mission extended.183
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Explicitly committed to forceful resistance as Dulles was with Adenauer, he remained
non-confrontational with the Soviets. Dulles was serious in his commitment to Adenauer. But
his reassurances that the U.S. would not bargain its ally away were matched by his continuing
determination to avoid war. The inspection issue was then effectively sidelined, for the time
being, by the use of sealed supply trains instead of the more ostentatious convoys.184 Dulles
impressed Adenauer with his perseverance on West Germany‟s behalf in the face of obvious
physical pain.185 The Secretary then returned to Washington with some confidence that the
alliance had been effectively shored up. He was, however, soon back in the hospital, and Acting
Secretary Christian Herter began to assume full time responsibility for crisis management.

Compromises Emerge (March and early April 1959)
Dulles‟ efforts for Allied unity were well received by Eisenhower, whereas Macmillan‟s solo
diplomacy renewed concerns. Inter-zonal friction continued to simmer but involved no new
important disputes. The Soviets did reassert their “rights of inspection”, but conveyed this by
diplomatic messages, which the Americans countered by referring back to the original
occupation agreements.186 The British and French were willing to cede leadership on the issue to
the Americans. A possible additional option, a passive embargo dubbed a “pacific counterblockade” was presented to Herter but only limited actual contingency planning was initiated.187
Herter now had to consider just how onerous the agency principle might be in the case of
document stamping by GDR replacements at Soviet checkpoints. Herter, with State‟s legal
counsel concurring, was unwilling to entertain full stamping authority. Since that would be de
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facto recognition of GDR authority, such a possibility was being very quietly considered.188
There was still a very good chance that the Soviets would make good on their ultimatum.
With Dulles incapacitated in the hospital, American military advocates for a more
forceful response saw an opportunity to make their case anew. On March 13, Herter and his staff
held a meeting on Berlin contingency planning with Secretary McElroy, his deputy Donald
Quarles, General Nathan F. Twining, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, White House
liaison, Brigadier General Andrew J. Goodpaster and representatives of each service. The
military wanted to clarify reports they had gotten on a State Department meeting the day before.
They told Herter they were very concerned about plans for the cut-off point (May 27) and also
about his statement that in no circumstances should the US initiate general war. Herter explained
to the Chiefs‟ satisfaction that the policy remained the same: to leave military options open but to
be resorted to only in the event of the situation deteriorating to point of no return. 189
But McElroy and Twining belittled continuing the limited-use of force policy as being of
no deterrent value, with Twining even opining , “we have the capability to lick the East
Germans”. McElroy was concerned about getting ensnared in fighting satellites with the Soviet
armed forces so close at hand. The JCS protested laxity in preparedness in the US European and
NATO allies‟ forces. Twining presented a long list of more forceful recommendations,
including a large scale deployment of 7,000 troops to Europe. McElroy overruled that, sdaying
the President would veto the move as a waste of strength. Macmillan‟s pilgrimage to Moscow
had also stirred up the JCS.190
Diplomatic and legal alternatives to military force created their own difficulties. The
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level and scope of negotiation - ministerial or heads-of-state, Germany-specific or broader
ranging - was a very sensitive topic.191 Skeptical hopes for assistance from the UN in stamping
cases were answered with plans to refer cases to the International Court of Justice. While the
stamping issue seems arcane in many ways today, it was then crucial in cross-border transfers of
any kind. A deadlock in stamping would seal the borders. Such a standoff was potentially
destabilizing enough to worry everybody but Walter Ulbricht who was still hoping for escalation.
The UN had been of only peripheral assistance in resolving the crisis anyway. UN Secretary
General Dag Hammerskjold‟s reluctance during the worst of the crisis to take sides cost the UN
any role in negotiations or the Foreign Minister‟s conference. The US mission in Berlin also
had to contend with a protest from the Soviets about armed “escorts” dispatched by the US Army
to observe convoys.192
Negotiations with the Soviets towards the Foreign Minister‟s Conference
proceeded slowly. The Western ministers, meeting in Paris in early April, were still hoping to
bring uip in disarmament, but could not agree on whether or how to link arms control with
German questions. The Germans objected to any compromises on reunification.193 The Soviets
preferred a specific German settlement conference and/or a summit meeting with the United
States. 194 Harold Macmillan, having helped arrange a foreign ministers meeting, then lobbied
for a summit; the ministers might be more inclined to progress if it would enable a productive
summit. Acting Secretary Herter urged Eisenhower to provide assurances that the US would
participate in a summit following the conference. The President did indicate some willingness to
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Macmillan, but would not make a binding commitment for a summit.195
Macmillan was still worried, though for his own political reasons. He had taken
Eden‟s seat after the failures of Suez and knew he could be just as vulnerable himself.
However, he made good on his intent to visit Moscow. It was an uncomfortable visit.
Khrushchev stood him up so to entertain visiting Iraquis (who had recently overthrown a
British-backed king in Baghdad). He then taunted the Prime Minister at official dinners and
generally subjected him to a very public display of how far British foreign influence had
diminished. Khrushchev did take the opportunity to lift his May 28 deadline, though it is
unlikely that that decision was hastened by Macmillan‟s visit.196 Still, Macmillan had mollified
the Russian leader somewhat with praises of Khrushchev‟s war record as political commissar
and supply expediter. Macmillan‟s message was sufficiently muted to assure Khrushchev that
Britain was no threat in this matter.
Macmillan, along with British Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd and Ambassador Harold
Caccia briefed Herter in Washington within days. The Foreign Minister‟s conference now
seemed a certainty. On many points the British and the US attitudes were agreeable. Herter and
Eisenhower easily deflected Macmillan‟s suggestion that the most effective course would be to
actually negotiate with Khrushchev, which was, of course, not on the US agenda at all.197 When
Macmillan reported on what seemed to him certainly a great step forward, Eisenhower
congratulated him for good intentions and determination. But the ailing John Foster Dulles gave
the Prime Minister a very undiplomatic appraisal of his solo diplomacy with the Soviets.198
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In the wake of Macmillan‟s visit, Herter received the first rumblings of the next
challenge. Polish and Czech envoys were demanding conference participation equal to Britain,
Germany, and France. Herter expressed his doubts as to Soviet good faith and the follies of
dividing the world into “two hostile camps.”199 On March 30 in Moscow, Gromyko handdelivered the Soviet endorsement of the East European bids to Thompson at the US embassy in
Moscow. The good news was that the Soviets were hinting at resolution; the bad news was they
were not letting the West off the hook as easily had been hoped. 200 The Soviets were officially
demanding full participation for the Poles and Czechs, and even made reference to their status as
victims of Hitler‟s Germany, a neat reversal of the Allied invocation of World War II era legal
precedents. Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson observed that the Soviets were no longer chiefly
concerned with German reunification, but wanted to harden their line across Europe in order to
prompt negotiations on a broader level. Despite the recent gains, Thompson concluded that “the
present outlook seems to be a gloomy one.”201

Arranging and Conducting a Foreign Minister’s Conference (late April-May 1959)
But Allied relations did continue to improve in the weeks leading up to Foreign
Minister‟s Conference. The April 18 quadripartite meeting was less tense than January‟s
sessions when deep mistrusts existed among all four camps. 202 General Norstad suggested that
the US lead joint tripartite and NATO contingency planning dubbed “Live Oak,” with direct
intermediary command being delegated to British and French commanders. No mobilization or
action would be undertaken pending the foreign ministers meeting, but plans were drawn up for
199

Memo of Herter meeting with unnamed Polish aide, March 24, 1959, 762.0221/3-1259, Box 3535, RG 59,
NARA.
200
Soviet note to US State Dept, March 30, 1959, 762.0221/4-1859, Box 3535, RG 59, NARA.
201
Thompson letter to Merchant, April 6, 1959, 762.0221/4-659, Box 3535, RG 59, NARA.
202
Tyler memo re quadripartite meeting Bonn, April 18, 1959, 762.0221/4-1859, Box 3535, RG 59, NARA.

55

armed probes in the event of a new Berlin blockade and further measures suggested, including
deployment of atomic submarines, if necessary.203 Live Oak planning would end up outlasting
the May deadline as the basic framework for Berlin contingency planning.
Ambassador Thompson wired Herter that the Soviets "have shown obvious pleasure and
relief that foreign ministers meeting has been arranged and [Deputy Foreign Minister] Zorin
adopted almost pleading attitude for a summit meeting." Thompson noted that Gromyko was
afraid disarmament discussions would 'bog down' the conference. Thompson also saw
uncertainty among the Soviets about post-Dulles US objectives.204 Ambassador Bruce had to
reassure the West Germans that the Allies would not bargain away reunification for Germany.
However, he said, the Four-Power working group could not recommend plans, like phasedunification, which the Soviets would not accept. 205The British and French helped arrange use of
UN Secretariat facilities in Geneva, placating UN officials hoping to have some role.206
The briefing book prepared for the conference provides a good picture of the US agenda.
Primary goals included, “standing firm against pressure…stabilizing military situation
…effecting retraction of Soviet power…ascertaining Soviet intentions… furthering substantive
agreements…relaxation of intentions.”207 These are adaptive tactics, not proactive initiatives. It
is very significant however that the only topics listed for discussion concerned Berlin and
Germany. 208 The instructions to delegates are enumerated very specifically along with specific
references to limited and general war potentials, as well as intelligence opportunities, in their
briefings. Acting Secretary Herter wrote Merchant, “we are concentrating on the wrong danger,
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interference with allied access to Berlin …(instead of) East German interference with West
German access to Berlin.” Difficulty in simply seating participants to general agreement was
even one more reason why the US team limited its response to diplomatic means. 209
Simultaneously in Geneva alongside the ministerial parleys, the US and Soviets also held
bilateral discussions and began to lay the framework for Khrushchev‟s late 1959 visit to the
United States. These discussions were often tedious. The tenacious Gromyko had a deft touch
for turning the tables on American strategy. When the Americans insisted on limiting discussion
to German issues, he replied by insisting that a German settlement was purely a matter for the
Germans. An exasperated Herter asked what happened to other questions the Soviets had said
they wanted to discuss, like the growing nuclear stockpiles in Germany. But Gromyko was too
opaque for Herter to be able to engage more deeply. The Russians may have wanted to ensure
that these private bilateral talks could not substitute for a summit meting.210
Unfortunately, the architect of reason did not survive. John Foster Dulles died in
Washington and was buried with honors. All the Foreign Ministers attended his funeral in
Washington on May 28, one day past Khrushchev‟s original deadline. Their comity on the
occasion was proof that, in this last assignment as both architect and instrument of U.S. foreign
policy, Dulles had pursued the most effective course to defuse tensions constructively.211
Acting at Eisenhower‟s direction, he deflected a challenge that would not only have ended the
Allied presence in Berlin, but would have shredded their unity and global standing.
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What Was At Stake in Berlin
Several good reasons made Berlin an important and also unique concern. Though largely
ornamental as a theater of influence, Berlin was especially valuable as an intelligence center for
the America in Central Europe,212 Veteran intelligence operatives David Murphy and Sergei
Kondrashev argue that the Soviets actually ran a far more effective operation there than the U.S.
But Berlin also offered a an easy route for defection. General leakage of Communist assets to
the west was one of Ulbricht‟s most persuasive complaints with Khrushchev.213 The flow of
refugees was an uncomfortable advertisement for the Western alternatives to socialism and this
also may have motivated Khrushchev.214 But, in 1958-59, the value of German reunification and
occupation to either the Americans or Soviets was secondary to greater concerns about nuclear
armaments and peripheral situations. Influence in the peripheral areas of Asia, Africa and South
America, where the situations were less fixed than they were in Europe, demanded close
attention as well.
Germany‟s primacy as the Cold War's political epicenter has been the main area of
research for historians like Marc Trachtenberg. He said that Khrushchev‟s Berlin initiative “was
rooted in the USSR‟s concern with Germany as a whole and above all with what was going on in
West Germany…” Moscow “wanted the former allies to keep West Germany from becoming
too powerful.”215 Despite trade advances and the successful re-equipping of its army, West
Germany was still the junior partner of the Allies, not significantly threatening to anyone.
Indeed, it was supported in great measure by the United States. Any challenge to the Potsdam
agreements would have at least as much to do with the United States as the West Germans.
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Regardless of whether or not Khrushchev‟s primary concern was Germany, the resolution
of this challenge meant the most powerful players would have to use all military capabilities
available in case diplomatic activities did not succeed. The mix of military and diplomatic
options involved considerations extending far beyond Germany. Hope Harrison notes that while
the United States had not “confirmed the presence of Soviet medium-range nuclear missiles in
the GDR in 1959, U.S. suspicions were enough to deepen U.S. apprehension.”216 Even mediumrange missiles, however, invoked the possibility of either side making intercontinental nuclear
attacks. John Gaddis states that “NATO strategy had come to rely increasingly upon the first use
of nuclear weapons in the event of a war.” 217 If that was the case, then it may be understandable
why the Eisenhower-Dulles strategy kept NATO on the periphery of their response. American
insistence on controlling NATO nuclear weapons, especially in Germany, grew stronger and
complicated contingency planning throughout the crisis.218
Nevertheless, Berlin is not generally considered as a textbook example of pragmatic
restraint where diplomatic resolution was emphasized. Authoritative modern historians such as
Marc Trachtenberg, Hope Harrison, Thomas Schwartz and John Gaddis have generally viewed
the crisis as a primarily European problem, aggravated by Dulles penchant for brinksmanship.219
The question of whether the American strategy was a success or failure of in terms of allied
relations or resolution of the German problem may be irresolvable.220 The historiography is
contradictory in evaluating what is usually considered as a marginal interlude of Cold War
history before the Wall‟s construction.
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But there are other perspectives than the prevailing German emphasis. One is the crisis‟
role in the developing rivalry between Khrushchev and Mao. Berlin is also an important event in
the careers of British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, French President Charles DeGaulle, and
West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. These leaders all played active, but not necessarily
decisive, roles. The interpretations of their roles in Berlin present their own challenges. For
instance, Gordon Craig suggests that it was DeGaulle‟s unwillingness to compromise that
preserved West German independence, of which Adenauer remained very proud.221
These were all veteran leaders greatly familiar with war and the limits affecting the
effective application of force. But perhaps most essential to the success of diplomatic process
over actual war were the formidable experience, talents, and inclinations of Eisenhower and
Dulles. Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev‟s own strong disposition against needless war also
encouraged a diplomatic solution. Though projecting a more threatening public image,222 he was
relatively restrained in delivering his proposals. He also kept the Soviet forces in Germany
restrained, for the most part, during the crisis. Although he had a much colder relationship with
his diplomats –Taubman reports that Gromyko was terrified of Khrushchev – they did function
very efficiently on his behalf. 223
Eisenhower and Dulles were faced with many problems in using force with necessary
precision. Eisenhower was already dissatisfied with the Defense Department‟s efficiency and
reliability and had ordered organizational review in June 1958.224 His frustration was increased
by disagreements among the allies over strategy and by pressures to increase military spending.
Competition between the Departments of Defense and State for influence both in Washington
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and in the field, as well as inter-service conflicts within Defense compounded his frustration.
The ability to use military force effectively was essential because there was no guarantee that
negotiation would succeed or that the Soviets would not present new provocations. Effective
military capability had to be preserved and not squandered through ill-considered displays of
force. Eisenhower told a congressional group during this period “the Communist objective is to
spend ourselves into bankruptcy.” He went on, “This is a continuous crisis: Iran, Indochina,
Formosa, Iraq.”225 Instead of airlifts or heavily armored convoys through East Germany, the
Allies needed to conserve their forces and show firmness through readiness and cohesion.
Achieving this proved almost as intimidating as the prospect of Warsaw Pact tanks rolling across
western plains. Eisenhower and Dulles had similar basic instincts about their allies' limited
capacity to effectively muster and use force. Handling the allies was a delicate proposition even
before the state of alarm. Because Eisenhower‟s and Dulles‟s views were congruent, the
American President could send his Secretary of State to Europe as his direct emissary to allied
heads of state.226 The able work of the American diplomatic staff in Europe, such as Bruce and
Thompson, greatly facilitated Dulles‟s efforts. The United States successfully avoided a possible
nuclear conflict through negotiation. The US may have been summoned to the summit table
under duress, but consistently urged mid-level negotiation to avoid forceful conflict. This
allowed the Soviets to present the East Germans as their partners at the same table in Geneva as
the western allies, without either side having to extend formal recognition. The US and its allies
had outlasted Khrushchev‟s original six-month deadline and continued their presence in Berlin
without any loss of military stature or position.227
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The early months of the Berlin crisis were a pivotal Cold War moment for the United
States, its Allies and the Soviet Union. Though ostensibly involving all four western powers, it
quickly evolved into a bipolar dispute between the US and Soviets. It was the first major
encounter between the superpowers since Korea to carry the active potential of nuclear combat.
Khrushchev wanted negotiations, not war.228 The success of the US's diplomatic response, with
restrained contingency planning, established a template of negotiation with the USSR as a course
of first resort. Eisenhower‟s New Look defense policy emphasized flexibility, instead of
aggressive containment.229 His leadership style allowed him to benefit from new policy ideas
while managing to channel their influence.230 He could withhold force without appearing weak.
Khrushchev had similarly drawn down the Soviet Union‟s armed forces yet was anxious
to be able to project Soviet military strength if desired. There were compelling economic,
political and strategic reasons for the Russian streamlining. But, as with the Americans, they
also created some concern over maintaining effective strength. Nuclear deterrence involved
considerably more risk than conventional forces but it also provided capabilities that seemed
essential for superpower strategy. The writings of private nuclear strategists like Henry
Kissinger, Edward Teller and Robert Osgood reflected new rationales for risking fallout and
mass casualties. 231 The nuclear capacity provided the diplomats with a „big stick‟, but the
uncomfortable reality for both sides was that any conventional action would be hard to sustain
and nuclear exchanges would negate the value of the territory. If diplomats could just invoke
the potential of nuclear weapons while trying to forestall the need for that recourse through
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negotiation, many problems associated with limited wars could be avoided.
Growing distance between the United States‟ diplomatic and military establishments in
also discouraged Eisenhower‟s confidence in a military solution. State officials were openly
skeptical over military competence at exercises of force. Rivalry between the armed services
eroded Eisenhower‟s confidence even further.232 General Clay‟s December convoy proposal
and the March visit by the JCS to Herter show that the Pentagon was favorably disposed toward
armed conflict. But the President saw war as an option of last resort. He was inclined to pursue
negotiation instead.233 Because his Secretary of State had similar instincts about Allied relations,
the German question, negotiations with the Soviets and the hazards of accidental war, Dulles's
diplomatic team became the instrument of choice to resolve the Berlin problem.
Dulles was no longer the rigid policy hawk with little command experience he
had been when Eisenhower and Khrushchev had met in 1955.234 Nor did he attempt to put
Europe under the US‟s nuclear thumb with Eisenhower‟s distracted approval. Such criticisms
might have characterized Dulles earlier in the decade. Richard Goold-Adams says that, by 1959,
“first and foremost, he was from start to finish determined to prevent the use of force at almost
any cost.” 235 Thomas Schwartz has pointed out the US had other problems to consider and
could not undertake risk casually.236 For example, in the midst of the crisis, on the first of
January 1, 1959, suspected Soviet sympathizer Fidel Castro overthrew Cuba‟s U.S.-aligned
government. 237 Budget constraints and potential hazards of regional wars demanded the
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attention of both Washington and Moscow. Both countries analyzed militarization and limited
war issues, to project force short of general war. Khrushchev had to deal with resistance from
the Soviet military when he attempted defense cutbacks in the latter 1950s. 238

Conclusion: Nuclear Diplomacy as the Only Expedient Option
Throughout the first phase of the Berlin crisis, the United States‟ response was restrained,
but tough and open to negotiation. The U.S. was prepared – over the objections of the West
Germans and French - to negotiate objectionable topics.239 Americans called the Russian hand
by considering such unappealing measures as an “agency principle.” This would allow East
German document stamping and even plebiscites on reunification. But the President and Dulles
recognized that no unilateral reordering of the WWII jurisdiction arrangements could be
tolerated.240 The essentially diplomatic nature of the 4-power occupation agreement for Berlin an agreement between states - also prompted a diplomatic course. American diplomacy was
backed by a readiness to use force if and when the President deemed it appropriate.241 The
Soviets could not be sure how the Americans would define the limits.
The diplomatic course in Berlin may not have produced conclusive results but neither did
it leave Germany destroyed yet again. The proxy mode of conflict -- diplomatic exchange instead
of military action - was a very risky but viable alternative to general war. Diplomacy helped
avert war over Berlin, in part because the leaders involved had neither the inclination nor
resources for a serious conflict. But the danger of accidental war was growing, especially with
tactical nuclear weapons as a front-line defense. Paul H Nitze described dilemmas that would
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face the entire next generation of US presidents and their advisors: “The process of action and
reaction will test the resolution of both sides. It is comparable to the process of peeling off the
successive layers of two onions. At the center of each onion is a kernel of self-knowledge that
no stake, even the German stake, is worth a nuclear war. Each side will try to peel…the other
side‟s onion of resolution, while trying to protect its own. This is a dangerous game.”242 The
1958-59 Berlin crisis was the first round in the Cold War with real nuclear war possibilities, and
it would not be the last.
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Chapter 2: "Seeking a Summit," June 1959-December 1960

Introduction
Khrushchev suspended his original May 28, 1959 deadline for a new Berlin settlement
pending the outcome of the Foreign Ministers Conference in Geneva, but he did not withdraw his
demands. The opening sessions produced no progress and when the ministers resumed
negotiations, following Secretary of State Dulles funeral at the end of May, the deadlock
continued.243 Talk of an East-West Heads of State summit increased in June. Although the idea
had been rejected the previous winter, Western leaders now received the idea more favorably.
The Soviets sent clear signals to Washington that they believed direct talks between Eisenhower
and Khrushchev were necessary to break the impasse. Rather than an official bilateral summit,
both sides began to explore the feasibility of an exchange of visits that would include unofficial
talks between the US and Soviet leaders. 244
These visits would not replace a Four-Power summit but it was becoming understood that
the United States and the Soviets represented the real power. Harold Macmillan was eager for a
conference to regain rapidly eroding British stature. Charles de Gaulle wanted to enhance
French influence, but was wary of entering into a conference that might change the balance of
power in Europe to their disadvantage. Berlin resolution and disarmament progress would be the
twin objectives of the East-West Heads of State summit.245 Ostensibly, disarmament would be
the top priority, but preliminary discussions focused on Berlin.
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Early discussions imagined a conference in the fall of 1959, but the schedule was pushed
back so that the summit was eventually held in Paris in May 1960. Although disarmament is
often cited today as the main concern, there was little consensus on how to achieve it. Berlin
was an immediate concern. Disarmament did not have the same compelling interest, despite the
growing numbers of nuclear weapons in Germany. While Eisenhower and Macmillan hoped for
a test-ban agreement from Paris, neither Khrushchev or de Gaulle would accept their terms.246
An interim arrangement on Berlin might preserve the status quo for a couple of years. Despite
Berlin‟s importance, neither West nor East would reconsider their positions enough to allow real
negotiations. Stalled progress on Berlin or disarmament issues doomed the summit even before
the U-2 incident.247
Western hopes for a productive summit focused on a possible Berlin moratorium to be
followed by long-term measures that might lead to German reunification. Berlin, not
disarmament, was the one exclusive area of shared business that France, Britain, the United
States and the Soviet Union had in common. Berlin and disarmament were hardly exclusive
subjects. Regardless of the stated agenda, Berlin would have probably emerged as the main
topic if the summit had proceeded as planned. The final summit agenda released by the Western
allies listed, in order: disarmament, Berlin and international cooperation. 248 French and West
German resistance to any change on Berlin may have helped shift Allied interest towards
disarmament, as a way to achieve something at the summit.
Although the Paris summit was an important event in its own time, it receives
only passing references in much of the Cold War historiography. There is little consensus on the
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goals of the conference nor the reasons for its collapse. Disarmament and Berlin are recognized
as prime concerns, but the linkage between these two issues remains unexplored. The U-2
incident and Khrushchev‟s theatrics overshadow the serious problems regarding Germany,
among the Allies and between them and the Soviets.249 These problems helped convince
American leaders to begin direct discussions with the Soviets. Although the summit collapsed, it
still must be recognized as a pivotal event.
It was the last multi-lateral Heads-of-State meeting, in the tradition of Potsdam and
Vienna, and it marked a decisive shift towards US-Soviet superpower diplomacy. 250
Disarmament may have been the preferred purpose, but Berlin was the issue above all that
brought the leaders to the table. As such, it should be recognized as a key step in the 1958-63
Berlin crises. Paris was also notable as a media event; the leaders went through with the summit
mainly because they wanted to appeal to public opinion and they wanted to reassure the public
that their concerns were understood.251 Paris was a key event in the careers of all the leaders
involved, providing a good example of the importance of personal diplomacy in the détente
process.
But the final importance of the Paris summit is that it was an exercise in nationalism as
much as cosmopolitanism. Conflicting national interests and priorities hindered Allied unity.
The Soviet Union and East Germany also had differences. Common interests did not translate
into common actions to resolve either the Berlin or disarmament questions. The events in Paris
may not have great immediate effect on the nations involved, but were emblematic of how they
were perceived in the global arena. After the Paris summit, bilateral US-Soviet diplomacy
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displaced the multilateral approach to the Berlin problem. Historians need to look at the 1960
summit not as a thing apart, as in the historiographic examples following, but in context, to
develop a more complete synthesis of the event's purpose.

Historiography on the Paris Summit
For example, Russian political historian and biographer Roy Medvedev treats the subject
very briskly, identifying the purpose only as “discussion of problems arising from the meeting of
great powers in Geneva in 1955.”

252

He concentrates on the U2 incident as mainly a problem

for Soviet ground-to-air missile technology. The Americans, “did not offer even formal
apologies.” Khrushchev‟s visit to New York three months later receives more attention from
Medvedev, suggesting that the Soviets did not hold the event in high regard.
Saki Dockrill puts the summit into a context of Eisenhower‟s attempts to de-escalate
armament growth, if not to actually disarm without assurance of reciprocal actions from the
Soviets. She focuses on Eisenhower‟s attentions to disarmament in 1958-59, saying
disarmament was the most important concern during the Camp David talks. 253 That is
debatable; the memoranda show the most attention being paid to Berlin. She notes that
Eisenhower refused to negotiate under a Berlin deadline. Although she does not see Berlin as
the motive for a conference, both sides used the Berlin problem as leverage regarding
disarmament. Dockrill says Khrushchev saw the summit mainly as a step towards an eventual
test-ban treaty and pursued détente in reaction to domestic foreign communist pressure.
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Veteran Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis places the summit in the context of aerial
surveillance, Open Skies and defense spending limits. He does not deal with the summit
specifically in the emergence of detente. He sees the U-2 as having been worth the risk because
it gave the President the intelligence needed to fight ruinous missile costs. Gaddis leans towards
disarmament as the proper context of the summit, but does not deal with the sharp difference in
American and Soviet positions, nor the linkage with nuclear weapons in Germany and the Berlin
problem. In Gaddis‟s accounts, based on Khrushchev‟s own version, the decision to abort the
summit was made on the flight to Paris.254 Gaddis and Medvedev may be correct in minimizing
the failed summit‟s importance, but may also not give due respect to the fact that it was
attempted at all and that it marked the end of four-power summitry.
Timothy Naftali and Aleksandr Fursenko, who have done considerable work with Soviet
sources, say Khrushchev believed Eisenhower had a personal interest in peace and was inclined
to detente. Khrushchev hoped that the Eisenhower might be sensitive enough about the U-2
incident to look past the hard-line advice of Secretary of State Herter and Vice President Nixon.
He told the Supreme Soviet that disarmament and the German question were the key issues, but
suggest that he was open to general discussions. They say Khrushchev did want a successful
summit.

Khrushchev held more flexible views on disarmament than on Berlin but was too

concerned about US military strength to allow verification. This paper agrees with Naftali and
Fursenko's important point that Khrushchev had considerable prestige at stake. The U-2 may not
have necessarily have doomed the summit, but it threaten Khrushchev personally and as a
national leader.255
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Vladimir Zubok‟s observations deserve special attention because of his unparalleled
access to Soviet archives and his reliable objectivity. He frames the summit as an exercise in
public opinion, part of Khrushchev‟s global campaign for influence.256 On one hand he was
eager to continue the statesmanship and peacemaking he believed he was conveying in Third
World visits, the United Nations and other publicity opportunities. On the other, he wanted to
show up Mao Zedong after a very tense visit to Peking. Both public opinion and reaction to Mao
themes are important parts of the summit story. Zubok posits Berlin as a central Khrushchev
concern, because he did not like the idea of a nuclear armed Germany which he thought he could
use as leverage to gain German neutralization and disarmament concessions from the West.
Michael Beschloss frames the summit as backdrop for the U-2 incident. The real story
here is the aerial reconnaissance program, its risks and the reward of proof to thwart the missile
lobbyists. Beschloss sees the conference goals as a competing set of Western interests and
anxieties. The summit seen here is an isolated incident, not a direct consequence of the 1958
Berlin initiative or the emergence of a practical detente. though they are all too aware the
Khrushchev can easily tip their hands. He treats Khrushchev‟s summit goals as being very broad
and general.257 This may have been true at some levels, particularly in the realm of public
relations objectives. In terms of practical politics, though, Khrushchev consistently linked Berlin
and the German treaty with disarmament as his reasons for needing a summit.
Former State Department analyst Robert Bowie and diplomatic and military historian
Richard Immerman provide further background on Eisenhower era security policy, which was
not belligerent but required a strong deterrent. Eisenhower was not opposed to nuclear deterrent
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but was very wary of spending so much on inadequate systems that the nation might be
unprepared for an unexpected threat. In evaluating Eisenhower‟s legacy, the authors
conspicuously do not emphasize movement towards détente. They provide only marginal
mention of the 1955 Vienna summit where Eisenhower hoped to make a convincing case for the
Open Skies inspection program. They do observe that Eisenhower was always committed to
allied unity and held a special capability for leadership in this area. They note that Eisenhower
left office deeply disappointed at the lack of progress in disarmament, yet was determined to
keep the nuclear emphasis in US defense forces, including tactical weapons such as were in
Germany by 1960.258 It is difficult to imagine their version of Eisenhower approaching a Paris
summit with any intent of rejecting American prerogatives of aerial reconnaissance.
Political discourse analyst Ira Chernus offers another perspective on Eisenhower‟s public
diplomacy, namely the pursuit of promising goals in the interest of reassuring the public. 259
Nuclear weapons loomed ever more ominously in the public imagination. Chernus emphasizes
that the promotion of national security carried with it the implication of insecurity, requiring
continuous buildups of force. Thus the United States and Soviet Union tried to pursue
contradictory purposes in their public diplomacy. Leaders would use provocative language even
as they attempted to open negotiations where they did not intend to actually change their
positions. Berlin provided a dramatic image of the consequences of national insecurity. Period
media, such as the Luce magazines or Newsweek, show vivid examples of Berlin‟s symbolic
value, as well as an implied danger of atomic war if the situation became too unstable.
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Post-Geneva Calls for a Summit
Khrushchev‟s 1958 ultimatum had threatened to destabilize not only Berlin and
Germany, but East-West relations in general. John Foster Dulles had helped contain the postultimatum confusion with his visits to Europe in December and February. Dulles died during the
Geneva meeting, but he had already resigned as Secretary. Eisenhower had appointed former
Christian Herter as head of the State Department in March.260 The president had confidence in
Herter because of the latter‟s extensive record in public service as a state governor and a
diplomat, but did not allow Herter the same authority that Dulles had exercised. Herter relied
extensively on the State Department staff that had worked well with Dulles, in particular
Undersecretaries Livingston Merchant and Douglas Dillon.261 Ambassadors David Bruce in
Bonn and Llewellyn Thompson in Moscow had provided indispensable contributions in the first
phase of the Berlin crisis.

They would continue to do so, enabling Herter to proceed with

Eisenhower‟s and Dulles‟ strategies to neutralize Khrushchev‟s provocations as much as
possible. Thompson's close ties with Khrushchev and sound perception of trends in the Soviet
leadership made him invaluable as the Soviets concentrated increasingly on their bilateral
relationship with the US. 262
Khrushchev kept Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in Geneva. Once the ministers
reconvened, Gromyko wasted little time in hardening the Soviet position, just short of reimposing a deadline. He countered Herter‟s complaints about using Berlin as a basis for
propaganda and subversion by noting similar Western activities. 263 When the West complained
that Gromyko only wanted to consider the occupation situation in West Berlin, Gromyko replied
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that the West would not yield occupation rights and wanted also to interfere in East Berlin‟s
affairs. He suggested that the respective German ministers be invited to attend but Herter
refused to allow East German participation. By refusing to recognize the GDR, he was
effectively rejecting the German peace treaty idea. At that point, Gromyko re-introduced
Khrushchev‟s „free city‟ proposal for Berlin. The free city idea was problematic for the West
because it created a new German political entity, probably with Soviet peacekeepers, clearly
without Soviet guarantees of access. Gromyko said the Soviets were tired of continuing an
occupational function and wished to turn access over to the local government, which was the
GDR.264 He rejected the agency idea, which left the Soviet Union responsible through their
GDR representatives. The agency idea, which was only brought to the table after much
reluctance, was one of the few Western concessions offered. 265
Gromyko had taken the Soviet position on Berlin and Germany back to the November
starting point without any acceptance of Western compromises such as a troop freeze or
accepting East German agency stamping of documents. He suggested “the Germans be allowed
to decide this. Let them try for one year to undertake these tasks. The terms of reference would
be … reunification by stages and … a German peace treaty.”266 He said the Soviet Union
desired more sessions, but the reasons why were unclear. A major reason may have been to lay
the groundwork for a summit.
Berlin‟s Mayor Willy Brandt expressed his serious anxiety over the conference's lack of
progress on guaranteed access for West Berlin's civilians. Eisenhower was concerned about the
lack of progress. As he told Macmillan, some progress might be found in the fact that East-West
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negotiations were proceeding, though in a meandering fashion. The West needed to affirm its
commitments to Berlin. He suggested the ministers might declare, “Since the Geneva Conference
is partially a result of the crisis in Berlin, there must be an agreement confirming the continuing
status of Berlin, pending the reunification of Germany.”267 'Ike' considered a summit possible
only with Soviet agreement. Further plenary sessions in Geneva produced no opening in the
Soviet position. Despite the toughness of the Russians, they did not seem intent on any forcible
activities in the near future, though long- term interests were harder to gauge.268
Herter visited privately with Gromyko on June 12. They outlined their respective
governments‟ positions, and Herter considered Gromyko‟s statements that no deadline was
currently in effect as reason to continue the conference. Then Gromyko brought up a summit
conference, which he said the Americans had incorrectly linked to the Foreign Ministers
Conference. The Soviets considered a summit too important to be a made an “object of
bargaining.”269 American linkage of a summit to concessions on Berlin appeared as an
ultimatum to the Soviets, Gromyko informed Herter. The Secretary replied it might be thought
the new one-year moratorium might be constituted a deadline. He said Eisenhower had made
plain that he could not reconcile going to a conference to restore tensions while the Soviets made
threats over Berlin. The candid and tense exchange ended with the Secretary saying the new few
days would determine if progress were possible and Gromyko saying the US was to blame for
unsatisfactory relations between their countries.
A potential summit came up in the next plenary session of the Foreign Minster‟s
Conference. Gromyko told his counterparts that a summit, or series of summits, could be useful
but should not be made contingent on a Berlin deal. Herter told Eisenhower that he expected
267
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Gromyko to propose a summit conference within a week. The President replied that, while still
unwilling to proceed toward a summit under present conditions, he would write personally to
Khrushchev to express his concerns that Foreign ministers were being “considered only as errand
boys … some kind of (Soviet) concession on Berlin and German problem” would be essential”
for a summit.270 Eisenhower reminded Khrushchev of the President‟s March 20 letter linking
progress at the conference and any possibility of a heads of government meeting. The Soviet
Union had changed the topic of business in Geneva to summit meetings without solving the
Berlin problem. The US could not accept the call to a summit without resolution first. He told
Khrushchev that “final agreements on critical questions affecting world peace could probably be
best concluded at a meeting of Heads of Government.”271 His Secretary of State was in Geneva
negotiating in good faith and he hoped the Soviet Foreign minister was also negotiating seriously
and with authority. He hoped that they could yet make progress. Their progress would be the
best indicator that a sufficiently productive understanding was in place to proceed with a
summit.272
The next day, Gromyko requested a private audience with Herter, who said the Russian
“made even more clear than on any previous occasion Soviet indication to get us out of
Berlin.”273 Gromyko also brought up other topics including a nuclear-free zone in Europe,
global disarmament and a non-aggression pact. Herter found Gromyko friendly on this occasion,
but thought he might be probing American positions on matters beyond the ministers‟
conference.

Harold Macmillan wrote Eisenhower that he hoped the conference could conclude

with an agreement on a summit. He acknowledged the lack of progress but feared that, if the
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West made a summit contingent on Berlin resolution, that Khrushchev might force a summit
through some other action. The West would do better to consider a summit where it still had the
most leverage, Berlin notwithstanding. Perhaps, a Heads of State meeting minus a large staff
might actually be productive. Eisenhower rejected that prospect, saying that Khrushchev‟s reply
would give a good idea of Soviet attitudes.274
In the meantime, the Foreign Ministers could recess with the option for a quick
resumption if conditions warranted. Although French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville was
active in the discussions, the French Government did not offer new proposals of their own, nor
did they take nearly as strong a position regarding the summit as the Americans. Since Dulles‟
visit in February, they were congruent with the Americans but still had their own special
concerns about German reunification. De Gaulle was more interested achieving parity with the
Americans, possibly at British expense, in a tripartite Western bloc. He would later initiate his
own bipolar dialogue with the Soviets, though, and end up chairing the Paris summit. That was
later. In the summer of 1959, though, the French president remained reserved in the extreme.275
Khrushchev replied to Eisenhower by restating the Soviet positions, declaring that the
Soviet side had bargained in good faith, and laying the blame for the breakdown on the West.
The Soviet leader sidestepped the summit question, but his tone was cordial and he said he hoped
to continue a private direct correspondence with Khrushchev.276 Such correspondence had in
fact been very formal and sporadic; this would represent a step towards engagement. Such small
steps were not immediately visible compared to the overall intransigence of Khrushchev‟s reply.
The Western ministers were discouraged by the message and discounted the worth of continuing
in conference. In the final June sessions, Gromyko repeated his intention to resolve the matter
274

Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 403.
Bozo, Two Strategies for Europe, p. 40.
276
Taubman, Khrushchev, p. 415-16.
275

77

along Soviets line at an indeterminate but definite date within a year or so. When he called for a
two-week recess, the other ministers agreed but declined to sign a joint communiqué.
The conference resumed in mid-July but without any more progress. In the meantime,
Averill Harriman, a former US Ambassador to Moscow and longtime back-channel intermediary
for Kremlin contacts, reported to Eisenhower and Herter on his recent visit to the Soviet Union.
Harriman toured the country and visited privately with Khrushchev, with whom he mainly
discussed agriculture but also Soviet ambitions and military progress.277 They were joined by
Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan whose tour of America in January had combined tough
sessions with the president and largely successful publicity opportunities with business and
political leaders. Harriman thought that Mikoyan might be emerging as a co-partner with
Khrushchev. The possibility that Khrushchev‟s authority might not be absolute was underscored
by their chiding the Americans for placing too much emphasis on junior aide Dmitri Kurichenko
as a successor. Mikoyan and Khrushchev told Harriman that Deputy Premier Frol Kozlov was in
fact the most likely next Soviet leader.278 Kozlov, an economic specialist who had been made a
full member of the Politburo in 1957, was about to visit America on a similar goodwill visit to
Mikoyan‟s but would not bring the demands Mikoyan had brought in January.279 Harriman also
came away with the impression that Khrushchev had doubts about his country‟s missile strength,
despite his frequent boasts touting their destructive capacity. On the subject of Berlin, however,
Harriman felt Khrushchev was still convinced “he could end our rights in Berlin by signing a
piece of paper, and we would be the ones to move our tanks and accept the onus of war.”280
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Harriman thought a summit conference might be "a good idea" if a summit could be held to
informal discussions that might touch on disarmament.
Mikoyan‟s trip to the US in January had been the first in a series of high-level visits
intended to relax tense relations between the two superpowers. Vice-President Nixon would visit
the Soviet Union a few weeks later; both deputy leaders would host an industrial exhibition and
then travel around the host country.281 This exchange helped prepare the way for mutual visits
by the US and Soviet heads of state, which were at first projected to include informal executive
talks and goodwill tours, but stopping short of conclusive summit meetings. Such visits had not
been part of the wartime or Geneva 1955 summit formulas but would become an essential
feature of 1970s era détente. Publicity tours were intended as a confidence-building, tensionreducing counterpart to the executive discussions. Though still unconvinced of the practicality
or usefulness of mutual visits at the heads-of-state level, Eisenhower's advisors began exploring
the possibility of such visits in June 1959. A back-channel exploratory offer to Khrushchev for
an exchange was accepted unexpectedly.282 Eisenhower was furious because the precondition of
Berlin progress had been bypassed. Nevertheless, plans for the visit proceeded, especially after
the Kozlov visit.
Kozlov met with the President on July 1 and their discussions touched on many of the
same matters as Khrushchev's visit two months later. Agriculture was a comfortable opening
topic, with Kozlov investigating American corn production. He visited the Iowa rancher
Roswell Garst, who had already met with Khrushchev in Moscow. 283 Kozlov and the President
talked about peaceful uses of atomic energy in icebreakers and heavy industry. The Russia
declared that their own natural resources were superior to those of potential client states like
281
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Egypt and therefore the Soviets had no selfish designs in seeking closer ties in these Third world
countries.284
Kozlov also met with Vice-President Nixon for cordial but tougher talks, centering on
trade problems. Their discussions extended into other areas of contention between the two
countries, including propaganda and nuclear deterrence. These discussions touched on Berlin;
Nixon suggested that the problem remained unresolved at present but the peaceful cooperation in
agriculture represented a potential for improved general relations. Nixon probed for assurances
that he would be given comparable freedom of movement to what had been extended to Kozlov,
but the tacit assurances offered by the Russians were not in fact realized.285 But in talks with
Livingston merchant two days later, Kozlov reiterated Soviet demands for a new Berlin
settlement remained, even without a formal deadline.286
As important as Berlin was to US-Soviet relations, questions remained about the real
strength of the Soviet nuclear deterrent. Harriman had suggested that Khrushchev did not have
full confidence in his ability to deliver nuclear bombs with missiles, so the extent of that strength
was a necessary piece of intelligence for the West.287 On July 8, Eisenhower told Secretary
Herter and Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles that he was very apprehensive about
launching U-2 reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union to find their missile bases. The
President "expressed his concern over the possibility of getting involved in something costly and
harmful." Herter said only one operation was planned and the "the intelligence objective
outweighs the danger of getting trapped." 288 They agreed that "in case of protest, we would
defend ourselves with an absolute disavowal and denial on the matter." Prophetically,
284

Memo re Eisenhower-Kozlov meeting, Washington, July 1, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, Vol. X, doc. 79.
Memo re Kozlov-Nixon talks, July 1, 1959, Washington, D.C., FRUS, 1958-60, Vol. X, doc. 80.
286
Memo re Kozlov-Merchant meeting, July 3, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, Vol. X, doc.81.
287
Fursenko & Naftali, Khrushchev's Cold War, p. 226.
288
Memo re Eisenhower-Herter meeting, July 8, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, Vol. X, doc. 82.
285

80

Eisenhower noted that Khrushchev could "put us in a terrible hole over Berlin." He could say
Soviet interception of a U-2 flight "marks the end of serious negotiation." Eisenhower remarked
that " we must decide if we are trying to prepare to fight a war, or to prevent one," but he
approved the mission.289
Vice-President Nixon was due to visit Moscow two weeks later. The Nixon-Khrushchev
„kitchen debate‟ in Moscow was televised and became a celebrated piece of Cold War public
theater, a kind of proxy conflict for the cameras and a strange public counterpoint to the Geneva
talks. In private, Nixon and the president‟s brother Milton Eisenhower had much more serious
talks that focused on military strength and global political aims. They did not discuss practical
programs for disarmament nor the need for heads of state agreements to begin disarmament.
Khrushchev‟s all-or-nothing approach was as well known to the Americans as Eisenhower‟s
insistence on inspection during disarmament was to the Soviets.290 Neither position was
attractive to the other side. Khrushchev‟s vision of total simultaneous disarmament without
inspection seemed utterly unrealistic to the Allies.291 The Soviet efforts to link disarmament
with Berlin complicated efforts to develop a negotiating strategy. The Americans concluded
that, whatever plans might be made for a summit, Khrushchev would block progress in any other
area till he gained Western acceptance for the „free city‟ and German peace treaty proposals.
Ambassador Thompson thought that Nixon‟s visit had been successful in terms of public
relations and that the Soviets had extended favorable hospitality to the Vice-President.292 By the
time they returned to Washington, the Foreign Ministers conference had resumed and ended
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without resolution. Discussion of a summit assumed new urgency as Khrushchev‟s visit
approached.

Eisenhower Consults Allies in Europe
In August 1959, Eisenhower and Herter visited West German Chancellor Konrad
Adenauer and his foreign minister Heinrich von Brentano. They discussed possible interim
agreements to forestall new Berlin threats, but differed about possible revision of the occupation
arrangement. They discussed disarmament briefly and only after first speaking of Berlin. The
president emphasized “mutual and effective inspection.”293 Eisenhower asked Adenauer if
progress was necessary before a summit conference was in order; the Chancellor agreed. The
West Germans forwarded to the Americans their draft reply to a very tough July 17 note from the
Soviets, warning the West Germans from accepting US Polaris missiles. In their own public
reply to the Soviet note, the US made no apologies for the missile deployment, observing that the
Soviets “threaten the use of rockets in support of its policy towards Cuba.294 The Americans also
visited Macmillan, who believed personally in head of state diplomacy, having made a solo visit
to Khrushchev during the chilliest days of the crisis. Macmillan asked the President whether he
now saw any ground to explore the idea of summit with Khrushchev during the latter‟s
forthcoming visit to the United States. Eisenhower had cautioned Macmillan already that most
of his advisors still were unconvinced a summit was necessary and he shared their doubts. 295
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Khrushchev's and Eisenhower at Camp David; Conceiving a Summit
Khrushchev visited the United States in September 1959, partly to reinforce his country's
presence at the United Nations General Assembly sessions and partly as an experiment in
goodwill to Americans.296 Khrushchev, a few weeks later as Eisenhower‟s guest at Camp David,
Maryland, broached the topic of a summit. Eisenhower had opened their talks with a statement
on Berlin, affirming American commitment and a sincere desire to eventually move beyond the
occupation arrangements. He said Khrushchev‟s statements on Berlin had only increased
American determination to defend its responsibilities. The president said “if some [corrective]
statement [from the Soviets] could be made on this question, we could make progress on others,
up and down the line, such as disarmament.” 297 This is the first stated linkage of Berlin and
disarmament in the summit dialogue, and it indicates that disarmament was a topic dependent on
progress in Berlin discussions. 298 On September 29,White House Press Secretary James C.
Hagerty briefed reporters the president and the Chairman had “concentrated almost entirely on
the question of Berlin and Germany. There was discussion of one other topic…disarmament, but
the main concentration…has been on Berlin and Germany.” But the last communiqué of this
main day of meetings emphasized disarmament as the main topic, though no details were
provided. Eisenhower‟s visit to Russia was heralded, but there was no mention yet of an EastWest summit.299
Though disarmament was scarcely mentioned in their first session, Khrushchev soon
widened the discussion to include disarmament: “Mr. K said that without a thorough exposition

296

Sergei Khrushchev, Creation of a Superpower, p. 340-42.
memo re Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting, September 26, 1959, Camp David, FRUS 1958-60, Volume X, Pt.2,
Doc. 13, p. 36.
298
James C. Hagerty Press Briefings, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, September 29, 1959, Eisenhower Library, Ann
Whitman Files/Box 21/James C. Hagerty series, „Khrushchev Visit-Camp David‟ folder.
299
Ibid.
297

83

of the US position on Germany and disarmament, it would be difficult for him to report to his
government and say where the barometer pointed - to clear, changing or stormy.” 300 Eisenhower
answered in two phases, stressing that there was no need for any tensions over Berlin.
Americans were ready to seek solutions but patience was necessary. Eisenhower said some
progress on general disarmament was necessary to solve specific issues. Khrushchev said
disarmament offered more room to negotiate because the sides were not frozen into set positions.
Discussing the meeting later, Eisenhower reported that talks had centered on Berlin and
unacceptable Soviet deadlines and demands. A summit was impossible under such conditions,
said the president, but “he had told Khrushchev that he would rather have a summit meeting for
negotiations on the subject of disarmament if we were both ready to negotiate on this question.
In this sense he had made Berlin a catalyst.”301 The final communiqué said that the leaders
agreed that disarmament was the most important issue of the day, though Berlin, not
disarmament, had dominated their conversations. The communiqué referred to these negotiations
as a summit on disarmament. The summit had been conceived and its parameters roughly
described - two intersecting axial concerns of Berlin and disarmament. International cooperation
remained as the periphery of discussion.
Eisenhower told Adenauer he and Khrushchev had discussed a summit but reiterated
American commitment to defend West Berlin‟s interests and Allied occupation rights. 302
Eisenhower then wrote Macmillan and framed the summit idea as Khrushchev‟s. Although, the
President noted, “Mr. Khrushchev did not modify the Soviet positions regarding Berlin, German
reunification, disarmament or other major international questions … there was sufficient
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indication of a change of tone … I believe we would be assuming a heavy responsibility if we
now refused to meet him at the Summit.”303 Eisenhower expressed skepticism about summit
prospects; hastily conceived agreements entered into for appearances would solve nothing. But
even if little of substance might be accomplished, the West might better win world support than
if they declined such a meeting. 304
Before the State Department drafted a formal proposal for a summit, Secretary Herter,
along with Undersecretaries Livingston Merchant and Foy Kohler, met with the President to
discuss possible aims for such a conference. Eisenhower immediately brought up Berlin, asking
if there any possibility of reaching a Berlin agreement at a summit. “Our main aim,” Herter
replied, “that would be to get Mr. Khrushchev to agree to a moratorium for a couple of years.”305
The president then brought up the desirability of cutting US occupation force levels, citing costs.
All present doubted whether Khrushchev would seriously consider the Western version of a
moratorium. A Western conference would be necessary to plan an agenda.
De Gaulle made his own reluctance for a summit known in an October 8, 1959, letter to
Eisenhower. The President responded by suggesting disarmament as a possible topic, citing the
ten-power East-West disarmament talks as basis for higher-level negotiation.306 In reply, De
Gaulle repeated his doubts about any real progress, saying that of all issues, “only Berlin”
warranted heads-of-state negotiations, “yet its solution appears more uncertain than ever.”
DeGaulle mentioned Asian affairs as a topic of concern, but not disarmament. 307 The West
Germans offered further doubts, citing the Soviets failure to extend any concessions on Berlin or
Germany in spite of the compromises offered on July 28. In a letter from von Brentano to
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Herter, the Foreign Minister noted that, “in view of the attitude of the Soviet Union, we must
assume that any change in Berlin‟s status will necessarily be a change for the worse [italics in
original].” Von Brentano scoffed at the value of a United Nations supervised solution. Von
Brentano noted reunification problems, but did mention that Soviet budget pressures might
present an opportunity for disarmament progress. However, the most recent Soviet offer
appeared unsatisfactory, “it does not look like an act of good faith to speak of disarmament but
…indicate that controls should only become effective once disarmament has been carried out.”308
De Gaulle then sent a more optimistic letter to Eisenhower, outlining a possible agenda “general
disarmament, Germany, assistance to underdeveloped countries, non-interference.”309 He said
Khrushchev had just accepted a French offer to visit Paris.
Meeting with Eisenhower on October 21, Herter summarized the difficulties facing the
Western heads as they prepared to meet. Adenauer wanted to join in while de Gaulle wanted
only a tripartite meeting. Adenauer resisted the focus on Germany and Berlin and claimed that
disarmament was his main concern. Eisenhower observed that a summit might deal with issues
far afield of Germany‟s particular interests. Herter said the United States wanted a long-term
solution for Berlin. The British preferred a short-term situation to stabilize the situation, given
upcoming British and German elections. Herter moved on to disarmament, in the form of
conventional force cutbacks in Europe. Eisenhower replied that, though desirable, he would not
advance this proposal until some basic agreement was reached on disarmament.310 Low-level
East German provocations continued in Berlin and the refugee situation continued to erode, so
Eisenhower may have had some concerns about thinning- out at that time. Eisenhower finally
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convinced de Gaulle that that a summit with the Soviets would be useful to work on disarmament
and Berlin, but only after a Western summit later that fall.311
The West Germans were now signaling that disarmament should not be the only item
discussed at such a Summit; it would also be necessary to deal with Berlin.312 Herter told West
German Ambassador Wilhelm Grewe that that the Soviets would probably open with their
German proposals. Herter said there were two options - a temporary and a permanent solution and the West Germans did not favor an interim solution. Herter brought up the possibility that
the Soviets might simply direct the summit to whatever topics they wanted. He said he did not
know if summits were practical. Various distractions complicated planning. Adenauer was
working up his own new German and Berlin proposals, centered on German self-determination
through internationally supervised elections. A NATO ministerial meeting was scheduled for
December and the United States planned to make its case for a reduced share of expenditures.
De Gaulle‟s meddling in NATO business disturbed Herter, already impatient with the French
president‟s aspirations for dominance on the continent.313 Macmillan and his Foreign Minister
Selwyn Lloyd visited Adenauer and DeGaulle, finding them manageable but still troublesome.
Cautionary voices were heard as the Western meeting preparations concluded in midDecember. Livingston Merchant told Grewe that “primary stress on disarmament might be an
effective tactic but…armaments were essentially the symptoms of political tensions not the
reverse.”314 From Moscow, Ambassador Thompson wired Herter that he saw little chance for
resolution of the German and Berlin problems unless some more imaginative new proposals
were developed. Thompson agreed with German Ambassador Kroll that Khrushchev was under
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domestic political pressure from hardliners. It might be in the West‟s interest to give
Khrushchev some support to forestall a tougher new Soviet regime. Various distractions
complicated planning for the Western heads meeting. 315 Subsequent reports indicated Adenauer
was working up his own new German and Berlin proposals, centered on German selfdetermination through internationally supervised elections. A NATO ministerial meeting was
scheduled for December and the United States planned to make its case for a reduced share of
expenditures.
Policy Planning Staff head Gerard Smith told analyst Henry Owen, "in thinking about
Berlin, we should keep in mind the primacy of the need for a US-USSR detente. Probably the
first real test of the genuineness of the detente will be the Berlin negotiation." If Khrushchev
would freeze his plans till the next German elections, in September 1961, that might allow " a
serious disarmament discussion which I understand is the President's main motivation in trying
quickly to get a Berlin solution." Smith thought a postponement strategy was better than
unacceptable compromises just to get an agreement.316 That thinking would later underlie most
of US's negotiating approaches in the more bilateral phase after the Berlin Wall's construction.
Smith also suggested a post-freeze idea the Soviets would later propose in modified form but
which the West would decline: putting the occupation regime under the UN's auspices.317 Owen
would be one of the few carryovers at the State Department into the Kennedy administration and
a very influential advisor throughout Kennedy's public and private attempts to foster detente. He
had a good understanding of the Soviet Union as well as the Allies and was involved in the
Berlin crisis from the onset. After 1961, the Allies would become less directly involved, but in
1959 and 1960, they were all equal partners regarding Berlin.
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Western Heads Meet to Plan Summit
De Gaulle‟s meddling in NATO business disturbed Herter, already impatient with the
French president‟s aspirations for dominance on the continent.318 Macmillan and Selwyn Lloyd
visited Adenauer and DeGaulle, finding them manageable but still troublesome. NATO
member Canada expressed support for the summit, but also some impatience with its peripheral
role. Foy Kohler told them that the United States imagined, “almost an agenda- less meeting, “
with disarmament being “a tough question to place on the agenda…..the summit might be our
kick-off place for this topic; but there would not be enough time…to get very far with it.”
Kohler pleased the Canadians by asking their opinion and noted how difficult it would be to have
summit disarmament talks so close to the ten-power talks.319 Kohler approved NATO discussion
of the summit but could only offer limited hope of meaningful input. The Italian NATO
representatives also expressed similar sentiments of support mixed with frustration at their
second-tier status. (Following the conference, the Canadians and Italians would explicitly blame
de Gaulle for their diminished role).
Berlin was reasonably quiet, though the occupying powers were exploring tricky
questions of high altitude flights in the access corridor. The flag problem had receded but
political tensions ran high in anticipation of Mayor Brandt‟s upcoming run against Adenauer for
the Chancellorship. 320 The working groups continued their work, helping the Western heads
made their final preparations for their meeting in mid-December. Undersecretary of State
Douglas Dillon met with European leaders in mid-December and advised Eisenhower that trade
rivalries were dividing the Allies. Britain was afraid the European Economic Community, 'the
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Common Market,' would evolve into a political entity, a course the Americans, French and West
Germans desired. Europe also needed to provide more aid to less developed areas, said Dillon.
Both trade rivalries and aid to the underdeveloped would have to be discussed at the December
heads-of-state meetings.321
French president De Gaulle chaired the meetings, also including President Eisenhower,
Prime Minister Macmillan and Chancellor Adenauer, which began in Paris on December 19.
Their first session, with Heads alone and interpreters, dealt with arrangements for an East-West
summit. Eisenhower suggested they not plan too much on a fixed agenda because of
Khrushchev's tendency to "go from one subject to another." Eisenhower said "there should be
some definite items on the program and the subjects of disarmament, the under-developed
countries, non interference..and naturally Germany had been mentioned." On disarmament, they
thought, "there were no great possibilities of coming to grips with such a subject at a summit
meeting but it could be discussed in general terms." 322 The British had proposals ready but
without Allied support. They were in general agreement that "the juridical status and rights of the
West in Berlin should not be brought into question." Plans needed to be made in case of a new
blockade. Khrushchev had to be told that if he "created difficulties then this means he does not
want a detente." The main topics, disarmament and Berlin were agreed on firmly but without
much specificity. On other areas, like trade reform, aid to the undeveloped and colonial selfdetermination, the Allies exhibited cordial but obvious differences. 323
In their last meetings on December 21, the Western leaders agreed to send a formal
invitation to the Soviets, without specifying an agenda. Eisenhower suggested disarmament and
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related matters. De Gaulle and Adenauer wanted to at least mention Germany and Berlin. The
Four agreed that the ten-power disarmament committee should try to have a common Western
position ready to show Khrushchev. There was no consensus on Berlin. Adenauer reacted
sharply to Eisenhower‟s readiness to look beyond the July 28 proposal, but had no idea what to
do if the Soviets wanted changes on Berlin. De Gaulle said that Khrushchev would probably talk
about whatever he wanted, no matter what the plan was.324
De Gaulle said disarmament was a big question, but some progress might be possible.
Adenauer mentioned cost-savings which could be channeled to aid projects. Macmillan cited
UK disarmament interest. All agreed that warheads and delivery systems should be limited.
“On Germany,” De Gaulle concluded, “the four had centered on Berlin…juridical status and
Western rights should not be brought into question…governments should plan measures
…[to]…prevent interference…developments in Germany depend on intentions of
Khrushchev.”325 Citing the failure of the 1955 Geneva meeting, Eisenhower again spoke of his
fear that Khrushchev could use Germany was a blunt tool to obstruct progress. Macmillan
brought up possible economic obstacles to this limited agenda. Clearly, substantial differences
remained as to the summit„s purpose.326
In their final session, de Gaulle summarized their position. They had agreed that the
“Communist menace” was still great, but that Khrushchev‟s recent comments about peaceful
coexistence had prompted an invitation to a summit. The Four “had discussed Germany and
agreed that their position should be very reserved, especially re Berlin.”327 They must not give
up their occupation rights and they must affirm their commitment to the well-being of the West
324
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Berliners. Expectations for a German solution were modest unless international tensions should
relax. Disarmament was mentioned, with little expectation of progress. The Four made note
again of Adenauer‟s suggestion of disarmament savings being diverted for aid to underdeveloped
areas. They discussed joint efforts with Khrushchev on Nile development and public health
projects.

Macmillan opposed linking disarmament and aid projects without careful study. They

agreed to a summit date in May, then adjourned. The West was now committed to a summit, but
without a practical strategy towards agreements on either Berlin or disarmament.
Still intent on his tripartite vision, De Gaulle was able to get Macmillan and Eisenhower
to meet with him after the main meetings were done. De Gaulle said they needed to determine
what attitude to take towards Khrushchev. They could not let him browbeat them over Berlin
and wartime injustices but should allow the Soviets to raise the topic. Eisenhower cautioned
against overplaying Berlin as a test of the Soviets' interest in detente. They would continue to use
the 'Western Peace Plan' of July 28 as their basic program for Berlin.328 That program had been
rejected by the Soviets in July. Tentative talk of possible border concessions or long-range
reunification understandings found little agreement. The French admitted they were in no hurry
for German unification; the British agreed. Eisenhower said a permanently divided Germany
destabilized Europe; that was also the West German position.329
That schism would grow deeper in coming weeks. Their tripartite discussion of
disarmament was very brief and inconclusive. Other areas of non-Berlin tripartite like the
colonies and European military integration were even less productive. The meeting indicated
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that, whatever de Gaulle hoped for, Berlin was the only real piece of business that France,
Britain and the United States held exclusively in common.330

Slow Progress to a Summit Strategy
On New Year‟s Day, Llewellyn Thompson cabled Washington to describe his talks with
Khrushchev at a party the night before. Khrushchev told him how much he liked Eisenhower
and Herter too, though he did not look forward to the possibility of a Nixon presidency. He
wanted peace, lamenting the destructive potential of atomic weapons. He spoke at length about
Berlin, hinting that Adenauer might provoke him into signing a separate peace treaty. He told
Thompson the Soviets would not be throwing the Allies out of Berlin but simply turning over
access responsibility to the GDR. He refused to acknowledge that the Allied position would be
restricted by a separate peace treaty. Khrushchev compared the situation to the American
arrangements with Japan. Thompson disagreed and told him the American commitment to
uphold its position and responsibilities was unchanged. 331
Khrushchev said he could not see why the West placed such importance on Berlin.
Thompson asked the Soviet chief why he placed such emphasis on Berlin. Khrushchev replied
“because it was surrounded by East Germany.” Thompson followed up with a long letter to
Herter, noting how both East and West would probe the other side‟s positions at the summit
before advancing their positions. He thought Khrushchev “seeks a détente of long duration and a
real measure of disarmament if this can be had without jeopardizing the Communist empire in
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Eastern Europe.”332 Thompson warned that Western positions so far would appear as threats
too dangerous and fruitless to proceed with.
Even before their New Year‟s Eve talk, Thompson was convinced of Khrushchev‟s intent
to sign a separate peace treaty with Germany at the earliest opportunity. Eisenhower's security
analysts said, "The rhetoric of the Soviet treaty emphasizes the danger of German revanchism
and portrays the new treaty as a great initiative for global peace that would finally resolve the
last unresolved remainder of the Second World War. The treaty addresses not only Europe and
America but many developing nations by name. It promises German unity but would sharply
restrict self-defense and military alliance options; if the nations addressed do not affirm the
treaty in unison, they may recognize it unilaterally, which the Soviet Union makes it clear is its
intention."333 East German pressure to solve their problems was mounting. Soviet hardliners and
Chinese rivals also wanted action.334 If the West could not accept Soviet terms, they needed to
figure some way for him to save face. Linkage to disarmament progress might be a good
delaying tactic but it would not be long before Khrushchev felt compelled to make the separate
treaty with the GDR. Thomson saw few options: more flexible Western positions that still
maintained their rights, a pan-German solution that might put peace treaty and Berlin actions on
hold, or a breakthrough in disarmament, such as a US offer to thin its military presence in
Germany if the Soviets would do the same. Thompson‟s conclusion was the British and West
Germans should learn of the full range of the conversation, but the other NATO partners should
be informed only that the Soviet position on Germany was essentially unchanged. 335
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Discussions in the following weeks did not indicate that Thompson‟s advice was
understood. Adenauer backed away from the July 28 proposals on Berlin. 336 This was the kind
of provocative attitude Thompson warned against. The preparation process was so broad that
building a consensus for a more innovative strategy would be hard. Smaller NATO partners like
Italy and Canada were concerned the Big 4 would leave them out of decision-making.337 Gerard
Smith, the State Department‟s Policy planning head, cautioned against saber-rattling but warned
the status quo must be maintained.338 Livingston Merchant had told Gerard Smith the US
"should take a position which ruled out any change," but Smith said that was unrealistic given
the Soviets' large advantage in conventional forces. Besides, said Smith, "when the chips are
down, none of the other three Western powers would stand firm with the United States."339 Both
Smith and Thompson had reviewed the same set of options. Thompson in Moscow may have
had a better idea what might influence the Soviet leader. Smith„s view reflected much of the
thinking in Washington, which still favored tough positions and propaganda actions. State
Department leaders were beginning to realize that they had a narrow set of options, with limited,
chances for success.340
In Moscow, Khrushchev told Italian Prime Minister Giovanni Gronchi that “if the West
was trying to give disarmament precedence over German questions as trick to maintain status
quo, he was not such a fool as to fall into a trap.”341 Thompson, along with West Germany‟s
Ambassador Kroll, felt Khrushchev would still prefer negotiation, but might not be able to defer
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unilateral action on Germany. Both thought Khrushchev now saw an all-German commission as
the best vehicle to delay action while still moving toward his goals for a new settlement without
a Western military presence in Berlin or Germany. They also agreed that Adenauer was intent
on blocking any new Western concessions. The Soviets and GDR were testing the waters by
issuing new travel documents allowing continued access to and within Berlin, with a new layer
of bureaucratic interference. None of these alternatives were likely to be brought to the table by
May, but he saw signs the Soviets were interested in accommodation.342 Relaxation of tensions
might lead to more freedoms for the Soviet satellites including East Germany, thus quieting the
Berlin issue.
This relaxation was fortunate for the West because Live Oak contingency planning had
not proceeded very far since the Foreign Ministers Conference. Live Oak was essentially
tripartite (UK/US/France), representing the West Berlin signatory peace-keepers. In February
1960, they were reluctant to allow either further West German or United Nations participation,
which might dilute their tripartite responsibility. The Western ambassadorial group was still
working with basic position papers, not battle plans. This reflected not only lack of coordination
but caution on the part of their governments about over-mobilizing, which might tip
Khrushchev's hand towards action.343 Their immediate task was to prepare status reports to be
included in the four-power Western Working Group Reports for final review before the summit.
Frictions were visible even at the tripartite level, with the French being especially sensitive to
anything that hinted at compromises with the East Germans. The Americans and British saw
such compromises, such as which might flight notification or allowing GDR personnel to check
documents, as pressure-relieving devices to avoid flash conflicts. FRG Ambassador Grewe was
342
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present for March meetings and voiced strong concerns that the other Allies still might accept
the peace treaty.344
Berlin was still the primary area of discussion, but its military aspects explained why
disarmament was also on the table. US Army General Lauris Norstad, assigned to NATO,
reported to Eisenhower that control and inspection programs might be worked out for central
Europe. This could allow reduced force levels, thus easing tensions. Adenauer might be
placated a little by extending the control zones beyond German territory, but generally appeared
to be more inflexible than ever. The FRG‟s growing independence might, as US Ambassador
Walter to Bonn Dowling told Herter: “create problems of grave danger.”345 Adenauer was so
afraid of recognizing the GDR that he wanted to move quickly from Berlin to disarmament.
Dowling told him the likely progression was still Berlin-reunification-disarmament.
On the eve of Adenauer‟s mid-March visit, Eisenhower affirmed that Berlin was still the
“key.” He hoped Adenauer would be more interested than the French in his ideas for in
disarmament-inspection zones, which might even be palatble to the Soviets.346 He lamented
loopholes had been left in the original agreements and the fact that he could not guarantee access
or supply for West Berlin. Eisenhower still thought a UN solution for Berlin was possible,
though this option was not well received. Since Adenauer would be unreceptive to any revisions
on Berlin, the only areas where concessions of interest to the Soviets might be developed were
the West German-Polish border and limited East German access control duties.347
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Progress on even these concessions proved elusive, let alone on the really significant
issues; the Soviets wanted major revisions on Berlin and arms levels in central Europe. The
Chancellor did not object to Eisenhower‟s suggestion of continuous aerial inspection, apart from
any disarmament pact. This was essentially an update of his familiar “Open Skies” proposal. 348
In further talks without the President, Von Brentano warned against waffling on civilian access
to Berlin. The July 28 proposals had explicitly refused to separate civilian from Allied military
access rights to and within Berlin. Adenauer repeated his insistence that any recognition of GDR
authority - granting them access authority - was still unacceptable. Herter reminded him that
East and West Germany had ongoing toll and tariff arrangements that implied mutual
recognition. Adenauer demurred and expressed his concern that no common Western position
would be ready in time form the summit. He now opposed the inspection zone proposals. He
again suggested a plebiscite in West Berlin, which he wanted to hold before the summit. 349 This
was clearly impossible, causing both the Americans and the other West Germans to wonder if the
Chancellor was still serious about the summit.
Eisenhower and Herter's meetings with Adenauer had not gone well, foreshadowing
problems the Chancellor would present throughout the rest of the Berlin crisis. Adenauer's
insistence on a quick referendum for Berlin, demands that the FRG be more involved in
contingency planning and resistance to the inspection zone proposals prevented the West
Germans from more meaningful participation in summit preparation.350 Dulles, an old friend, had
been able to manage Adenauer better than Herter. 351 The problem was not so much with the
Americans as with the British and French, who were less eager to see West Germany as a senior
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partner in NATO.352 Adenauer was determined to see the FRG gain a nuclear deterrent, even if
they not control its use and did not welcome disarmament yet. Even reunification may have
been second to his nuclear aspirations.353
The Americans made their final preparations with the British and French.

Macmillan

visited Eisenhower at Camp David at the end of March. During discussion about a test ban
treaty, Eisenhower brought up the Soviets‟ concerns about an armed, reunited Germany. He had
seen firsthand evidence of reunification spirit in West Germany, yet knew that current borders
needed to be recognized. Macmillan commented that “this might be an important consideration
to the Soviets. If anything could be gotten from such a statement, he thought it might be
worthwhile. Eisenhower agreed that "this was not a thing we should let the Soviets have
cheaply.”354 He wondered whether a two year test ban moratorium might be traded for a two
year moratorium on Berlin. They noted Adenauer seemed intractable on any revision for Berlin
or for GDR recognition. Eisenhower said the Chancellor might opt for neutralization if too
disgruntled. Macmillan disagreed, saying the Germans liked being well armed. He personally
would be happy with a “free city” arrangement but said it was “unobtainable.” Eisenhower
feared an island city like West Berlin could not last indefinitely but “it would be serious blow to
the entire western position if we show ourselves to be weak on Germany.” He hoped Adenauer
could be persuaded to accept an inspection zone plan that might get Soviet agreement.
Macmillan wished they had done more tactical planning, fearing that they would end up trading
speeches.355

352

Ralph Dietl, "Sole Master of Western Nuclear Strength, " in Europe, Cold War and Co-Existence, ed. Wilfried
Loth, (London: Frank Cass, 2004), p. 139.
353
Klaus Schwabe, in "Adenauer and Nuclear Deterrence, "in Europe, Cold War and Co-Existence, ed. Wilfried
Loth, (London: Frank Cass, 2004), p. 50..
354
Eisenhower-Macmillan meeting, March 28, 1960, Camp David. FRUS 1958-60, Vol. X, doc. 105.
355
Ibid.

99

The next day Ambassador Houghton in Paris sent the first reports of Khrushchev‟s
meeting with de Gaulle. De Gaulle told Khrushchev his fears of an armed West Germany were
unfounded. He accepted the reality of two Germanys, but thought that West Germany‟s strength
helped balance strategic power in Europe.356 Khrushchev disagreed and expressed his intent to
sign a separate peace treaty. De Gaulle replied that France would still not recognize the GDR.
Khrushchev raised the German question again, concentrating on the peace treaty and free city
ideas. De Gaulle and Khrushchev, said Couve de Murville “agreed they want a détente…the
difference being that the French want a détente leaving the German situation in status quo …the
Russians want a détente based on a settlement of the German question… it appears fundamental
positions of both sides remain unchanged.”357 He did not make any new offers or accept
Western terms but he did encourage de Gaulle‟s independent ambitions. Khrushchev probably
understood now that de Gaulle did not share Eisenhower and Macmillan's flexibility . De Gaulle
wanted an armed West Germany next door, ready to take a first strike from the East.358
Although expectations were diminished for the summit, the participants were still
prepared to go forward. The ministers might actually succeed in finding some agreement among
the various papers on the table. These reports, the products of the working groups on
disarmament, Berlin, and cooperation, were received in April 7, just a few days before the U-2
incident.359 These reports summarized Western and Soviet positions, areas of agreement and
difference, and expected Soviet negotiating strategy. For instance, on disarmament, the Soviets
were expected “to maintain their public postures of champions of complete and general
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disarmament, to get the west to agree to certain disarmament principles, which would form the
basis of a treaty…later represented as being equivalent to the Khrushchev plan and consequently
available to blackmail the West …make the Western delegations responsible for rejecting the
concept of a general and comprehensive disarmament.”360 This assessment reflects low
expectations. US Ambassador to West Germany Walter Dowling reported from Bonn that the
plebiscite was simply impossible at the present time when even the regularly scheduled election
season was chaotic.
The Berlin working group released its report on April 9. Like the disarmament paper,
this was more a summary than a new plan. The preferred schedule would consider disarmament
first and then Berlin and Germany, followed by international cooperation. The Western aim
should be to eliminate Soviet threats without sacrificing freedom and cooperation in Europe.
The West would counter the Soviets‟ peace treaty with the Western Peace Plan (essentially the
July 28th plan), calls for a freeze on Berlin and then an all-German plebiscite proposal. 361 A
„free Berlin‟ would be countered with an all-Berlin plebiscite plan. They might then try seeking
extra time, whether by signed agreement or by tacit understanding. Like the disarmament paper,
it was intended to guide what would at best be an incremental process.
The Western foreign ministers, including West German Foreign Minister von Brentano
whose country would not take part in the summit, gathered in Washington, April 11 to 14, 1960,
to coordinate their plans. In a private session, Herter and British Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd
reviewed reports that the Khrushchev-de Gaulle talk had included a possible trade-off linking
interim freezes on nuclear testing and Berlin actions. Lloyd thought de Gaulle might “have less
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of a chip on his shoulder.”362 In Von Brentano-Herter talks, the Germans expressed their
concern that the West need to show unity on Berlin and German issues. Herter reassured him
that the positions were coming together. They also discussed a possible disarmament-Berlin
trade-off, agreeing it was difficult to forecast what the Soviets would do at the Summit. Von
Brentano predicted that “Khrushchev would provoke at least one serious crisis” 363 Herter
agreed but noted that the Soviet leader‟s usual technique – to start calmly, provoke, and then
level off. Von Brentano worried the Soviets might try to introduce the GDR into discussions. He
also wanted to know if there was any chance a test limitation treaty might be signed at the
summit. Herter said a signed agreement was not imminent.
Despite some US effort to emphasize disarmament, Berlin remained the most prominent
concern of pre-Summit preparations. In the final planning sessions in Washington from April 1224, the Big Three ministers tried to set a summit agenda, after reviewing reports of the workinggroups on Germany, disarmament and international aid. Herter “recalled that the Soviets had
generally mentioned four topics…disarmament, Germany and Berlin, East-West relations.” 364
He suggested that they proceed in that order, with nuclear testing first. Lloyd countered with the
idea of opening with East-West relations; that way, Khrushchev might be channeled towards
expressing the idea of a detente in principle right up front. De Murville said the French would
not object to discussion of nuclear testing, but would absent themselves from those talks. He
also told Herter that de Gaulle was opposed to any German-Polish border revision. Herter was
leery of the West‟s committing itself to détente and then being embarrassed if Khrushchev then
proved intractable over German/Berlin issues. Couve de Murville noted that détente would be
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futile if the Soviets would not budge on German issues. Herter asked that they give the subject
some thought and re-visit it later.365
Clearly, serious doubts persisted about chances for a real détente in Paris. De Murville
downplayed the idea of a disarmament-Berlin interim freeze and said de Gaulle was not eager to
go to Moscow. The French minister indicated that the French had not significantly changed their
positions since the December heads of state meeting. The West Germans and French were still
not fully reconciled with the working group‟s proposed tactics, such as popular referendums in
both Germanys. Nor did they like the idea of an interim agreement that would eventually hand
over Berlin access to the GDR. The French worried about creating a third category of nonaligned German territory. The Germans wanted to flatly state that normalization of Berlin
should be a first step towards reunification.366
Similarly, the working-group paper on disarmament revealed divergence in the Western
position. The Soviets were expected to insist on a commitment to general principles before
discussing concrete measures like inspection, but had also tentatively agreed to seismic test
research cooperation .367 The West had reached rough agreement on pilot programs of force
reduction and inspection zones. The British had ready a counter-statement on general principles.
Such a counter-statement might help move the Soviets towards feasible near-term disarmament
agreements. But Herter thought that French insistence on tackling the problem of nuclear
delivery systems would probably result in the Soviets successfully hiding their missiles and
warheads. Trying to do too much too early might derail meaningful progress. 368 Nor was there
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much enthusiasm for inviting the UN into the discussions. Khrushchev, it was felt, could simply
use the UN as a propaganda forum.
The ministers approved a Western five-power plan calling for a ban on space weaponry,
notification of missile launches, force ceilings of 2.5 million troops for the Soviets and 2.1
million for the West, and stricter controls on production and distribution of fissile materials. The
plan emphasized force balance, effective control and inspection, phased force reduction without
a strict timetable, and rejection of space weapons.369 Disarmament and non-proliferation also
figured in the ministers‟ session on East-West relations. Again, the Soviets were expected to
open with an emphasis on general principles that might prove more restrictive to the West than
the East. Non-interference pledges could be troublesome because the Soviets would try to
exclude their Communist Party activities from restrictions on government action. Trade and aid
agreements might be possible but would have to be coordinated with existing bilateral
arrangements, and would need approval by the U.S. Congress and other national assemblies.
Enough disagreement remained between the Allies to delay issuing a press statement that might
reveal those differences.370
The inter-connectedness of disarmament, Germany and East-West relations can be seen
in the military's reports to the summit planners. The test-ban debate was still unproductive, as
seen in the Geneva UN-panel discussions of January 1960 and the April Western Ministers
meetings.371 The most important area where arms, conventional and nuclear, needed to be
reduced was Europe, not the heartland arsenals of the United States and Soviet Union at stake in
the later detente. Disarmament in 1958 meant force reductions in nuclear artillery,
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fighter/bombers, short and medium range ballistic missiles in Germany, as well as troop levels.
With both Germanys now nuclear-armed, any change in their political systems would affect
military situations in the surrounding countries as well.372
Though tensions in Berlin had relaxed somewhat in advance of the summit, the basic
military standoff over Germany that disturbed Khrushchev also remained very serious to NATO
Commandant General Lauris Nortsad. Reviewing attempts to denuclearize central Europe,
Nortsad said that the Rapacki plan would have left Western Europe vulnerable and recent Soviets
proposals that lacked inspection options were impractical. Norstad argued that a robust and
mobile, ground and air inspection system would be the only way to satisfy public concerns and
guarantee safety. Though it would not protect central Europe from weapons launched outside
the control zones, it would greatly reduce chances and effects of armed conflict.373 Livingston
Merchant told him the US would support this plan in Paris, though the Soviets had not indicated
they were open yet to inspection measures.
The summit was now less than a month away. The State Department prepared a
last position paper that listed three main “affirmative purposes” for the summit: first, “a small
beginning toward practical controlled disarmament”; second, “deterring communist action
towards Berlin and paving the way for an eventual acceptable solution,”, third, “An increase in
the confidence and cohesion of the Western alliance.”374 This paper, which did not discuss
tactics, might be taken as a clear indication that disarmament progress was indeed the West‟s
primary summit purpose. But the discussions on Berlin had been the most extensive and
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conflicted in all these late-April foreign minister sessions.375 Disarmament proposals were less
likely to reveal Western differences and invite Soviet rejection. Arms control also had the virtue
of being an attractive cause in global public opinion. In Washington, Secretary of Defense Gates
told Herter he opposed any force reduction in Berlin and West Germany.376
The Soviets had been fairly quiet in the final pre-summit period, but Thompson brought
former ambassador Bohlen along with him to visit Gromyko on April 24. Gromyko expressed
his "disappointment" that the Geneva test-ban panel had not made more progress. He said he
hoped disarmament discussions in Paris would be more specific and substantive. Gromyko
discussed Berlin and Germany in more depth, but offered little hope that Khrushchev would
relax his demands. He said Allied occupation troops would have to leave West Berlin, but the
Soviets would guarantee the city's freedom. Bohlen observed that this meant the summit could
produce no solution on Germany, but Gromyko finally hinted at a possible interim
understanding. He did not discuss Khrushchev's visit to de Gaulle, which may have been a
turning point in Khrushchev's expectations for the summit.377
De Gaulle visited Eisenhower at Camp David on April 24 to make final plans for the
summit . De Gaulle said, unrealistically, he hoped Berlin and Germany "could be left alone for
the time being." On disarmament, he "wondered how they might take that up with the Russians."
Eisenhower said mutual inspections were essential to "sound" disarmament, but they should try
to also propose zones outside of Germany. De Gaulle said they should concentrate on pledges
against missile and bomber delivery of nuclear weapons, with inspection targeted on those
systems. Eisenhower said that would involve an "Open Skies" arrangement which the Soviets
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had pointedly refused. Ground inspection, he said, was a better starting point. De Gaulle
acknowledged then that Germany would be discussed, but offered no new ideas. Eisenhower
reiterated that there could be no Berlin discussions with any deadline attached and de Gaulle
agreed.378 Later that day, Herter said that no matter what agenda was set, there was a strong
chance the Soviets would "become difficult over Berlin." De Gaulle said they should ask
Khrushchev: "Have you come here to seek a detente" and if so, suggest disarmament as the
important topic. They must insist "all agreements were tied together." He thought they might
keep Khrushchev on track in small meetings. They would end up holding larger sessions with
staff. 379 The foreign ministers had their own differences with the executives they worked for.
Herter commented in private, “the Heads want to be alone and all the Foreign Ministers were
afraid of this.” 380

The U-2 Incident & the Summit
A week later, the United States released a statement on a missing aircraft, which was
actually a U-2 reconnaissance plan. Unbeknownst to the Americans, the Soviets had developed
the S-25 surface-to-air missile capable of intercepting and destroying Captain Gary Powers
reconnaissance flight over the ICBM facility Chelyabbinsk-40 near Kyshtym in Soviet Central
Asia. They recovered the plane‟s ruins and captured the pilot. Khrushchev viewed the incursion
as a personal betrayal by Eisenhower. 381 He remained silent for the moment, waiting for the
United States to attempt a cover-up. The first American statement, dismissing the matter as
routine, was carelessly drafted. The Soviets soon revealed the whole story. The over-flight and
378
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cover-up embarrassed the Americans and gave the Soviets an escape route from an unpromising
conference. Foy Kohler told Grewe that Khrushchev “seems to be preparing his people for
something less than success at the Summit.” The Germans told Kohler they‟d heard hardliners in
the Kremlin were forcing Khrushchev to act tough on the U-2. If this was the case, then
Khrushchev might have to take such a tough line on Berlin as to destroy the summit. But
Khrushchev did not want to be seen as the summit‟s spoiler. 382
The Western ministers had convened a final time, before the summit, at the NATO
meetings in Istanbul from May 2-4 1960. They adopted the America position paper in principle,
with the understanding that all agreements would be linked. The Germans, French, and British
diverged from the Americans, however, on how to address the issues. Would reunification be
taken off the table, asked the Germans? The French warned they could alienate Khrushchev with
too aggressive a stance on Germany. The French emphasis on delivery systems bothered the
others, who pointed out that the issue complicated disarmament. Should they just engage in
discussion or seek agreements? They noted that Soviet positions on Germany and disarmament
were unchanged.383 For all their professed agreement, the Allies not have specific common
objectives for the summit.
In the National Security Council‟s final pre-summit session, less than a week before the
Summit, Livingston Merchant summed up Western chances for progress. Disarmament talks
would have to be carefully nudged past Soviet insistence communiqués, without practical
measures. In the event of real negotiations, the French were likely to push prematurely for
missile control but without specific plans yet.384 The USSR would table the standard German
peace treaty and the West would counter with plebiscite and referendum options. Some chance
382

Kohler-Grewe meeting, May 9, 1960, Washington, D.C., FRUS 1958-60, Vol. X, Doc. 147, p. 379-80.
Western Minister meetings, Istanbul, May 2-4, 1960, FRUS 1958-60, Vol. X, docs. 140-143
384
National Security Council, May 9, 1960., Washington, D.C. FRUS 1958-60, Vol. X, doc. 151.
383

108

was seen of deferring the Berlin problem to a lower level panel for continuing study, which
might serve as an interim solution. Khrushchev might be agreeable to such a solution. He could
let the West have an interim Berlin truce without being seen as too flexible by Kremlin rivals.
Eisenhower said he‟d just let Khrushchev have his public say on the incident and then come
around for private talks. He wanted to point out Soviet espionage in the US. Eisenhower also
wanted to know why the West Germans had picked this time offer the East a $1 billion line of
credit. The President remarked, “the Summit meeting would not be a Sunday School Picnic.”385
In a May 10 press conference in Moscow, Khrushchev signaled he was far from
done with the U-2. He indicated the invitation for Eisenhower‟s Moscow visit might be
withdrawn.386 American intelligence analysts thought Khrushchev feared the West had a
problem because of U2 publicity. Therefore, his behavior “would lead to the conclusion that he
now considers it better to avoid a summit confrontation under present conditions and that he is
out to blame the United States for wrecking the summit.”387 The analysts speculated the Chinese
might have threatened a break over the peaceful coexistence policy. The next day, Llewellyn
Thompson, cabling from Moscow, seconded these views of Khrushchev‟s position. He
attributed Khrushchev‟s sea change to the de Gaulle visit.
Khrushchev saw that France was not disposed to negotiate away its presence in Berlin,
one of the few remnants of French power. Nor did any of the other Western parties seem likely
to make the concessions he wanted. He “may have believed that in view of the strong position
he had taken, it (the summit) would end in humiliating defeat for him which could seriously
jeopardize his situation as leader of the Communist bloc.”388 He urged the leaders to waste no
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time starting concrete negotiations. Thompson cautioned again that Khrushchev‟s words in
public and in private “indicate that the cold war is on again.”389 At the NSC meeting on May 10,
Eisenhower said he still hoped to let Khrushchev talk about the plane and settle the matter in
private, by showing him evidence of Soviet espionage in America.390
Two days later , the Foreign Ministers were in Paris, the next day. On May 15, the
Heads of Sate were scheduled to hold their first plenary, limited to them alone. That morning,
Khrushchev demanded an apology from Eisenhower and renunciation of the U-2 flights. If not
received promptly, he would withdraw the Soviet Union from the conference.391 Though the
Western gave him a chance to change his mind, Khrushchev enjoyed playing the outraged
statesman. He did not return to the afternoon and next days. He shunned the conference but
remained in Paris a day or so, giving sidewalk press conferences where he denounced the U-2
flights and generally taunted the Allies.392
The Allied heads of state had little new to talk about as they met bilaterally recently and
their ministers had been in close contact for weeks. All the working group reports, briefing
books and position papers were rendered obsolete as the Allies retreated to rethink their
positions. Squabbling broke out at the ministerial sessions that continued after the walkout.
British asked why they should consider war over Berlin when the West and East Germans had
large ongoing trade arrangements.393 The French wanted to plan delivery-system-limitation talks
when Geneva ten-power talks reconvened in June, but the Americans were cautious. The
French had few delivery systems, but wanted to keep testing.394 The Western Heads-of-State put
389
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on a show of unity, though Macmillan, and de Gaulle to a lesser extent, had tried hard to get
Eisenhower to apologize to the Soviets.
The decision to boycott the summit may have been even before the plane ride
Khrushchev publicly mentioned. It was probably made before the plane left Moscow, says
Vladimir Zubok.395 There is a fair chance the decision was made not long after his earlier visit to
Paris. Khrushchev biographer William Taubman says that Soviet generals were very displeased
by Khrushchev‟s provocative exploitation of the incident. As early as May 12th some Praesidium
members were already urging him to call off the summit; the final decision was made in
consultation with Praesidium members at the airport. These signals show that Khrushchev‟s
authority was by no means complete, 396 Khrushchev himself said in his memoirs that he decided
“present an ultimatum to the United States.” He and Gromyko radically revised their opening
statement on the plane and then sent a copy to the party leadership for approval.

In the same

section, Khrushchev says, "we had come to this summit to discuss this very question of
Germany.”397 Sergei Khrushchev discounts reports friction in the Soviet leadership but admits
some, especially in the military were “cool” to detente but “kept their opinions to themselves”;
he notes that some of his father‟s personally selected candidates were elected to the Praesidium
in early May, and future Premier Brezhnev replaced veteran Marshal Voroshilov, the last, though
apparently reformed, member of the „anti-Party‟ Group. Conspicuously, Sergei does not
advance any purpose for the summit.
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Union, exclusive of the United States. Berlin and German issues might be approached obliquely.
The same could be true with the British, Macmillan was also agreeable to separate negotiation,
but could not lead on the Berlin question.399 That left bilateral talks with the United States as the
next logical step and that could wait till the next US President. Though Khrushchev was
pessimistic about Vice President Nixon‟s attitude to the United States, he had a low opinion of
him and thought there was a good chance the next President might be more flexible.400
Thus, the Soviets in Paris kept open the possibility of a postponed multi-lateral summit
but never seriously followed up on that option. This would be the last Heads of State meeting till
the Berlin Wall came down. The reason that another attempt at a Big Four summit was never
again scheduled during the crisis years may have been that the Wall stabilized the situation.
Khrushchev had quieted the East Germans and other critics, but, in so doing, could not continue
to use Berlin as leverage against other issues. After all, in 1959, he had used Berlin to get
Western attention in hopes of a new German settlement or concessions. He wanted a summit, if
possible, to enhance Soviet prestige. As Livingston Merchant told the US National Security
Council, in a post-mortem review session some weeks after the Paris debacle, “the story really
began in November 1958 with Khrushchev‟s speech on Berlin and the intent to make a separate
peace treaty with East Germany ... [eventually] …it became an important part of Soviet thinking
that there was unanimity among the Allies…as the Summit approached.”401 If that is the case,
then Khrushchev probably left de Gaulle convinced Eisenhower and Macmillan were inflexible
on Berlin. The point is not to blame de Gaulle for the summit‟s demise but to show that
Summit‟s chances for success were low even before the U-2 crash. That incident and
Khrushchev‟s theatrics overshadowed the serious problems among the Allies and between them
399
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and the Soviets. A deputy ministers meeting on May 19 revealed little consensus about what to
do next on Berlin.402 These problems helped convince American leaders to begin direct bipolar
discussions with the Soviets. Although the summit was unsuccessful, it still must be recognized
as a pivotal event.

Conclusions
The Paris summit was the last Heads-of-State meeting, in the tradition of Potsdam
and Vienna, and it marked a decisive shift towards US-Soviet superpower diplomacy. 403
Disarmament may have been the desired purpose, but Berlin was the issue above all that brought
the leaders to the table. As such, it should be recognized as a key step in the 1958-63 Berlin
crises. Paris was also notable as a media event; the leaders went through with the summit mainly
because they wanted to appeal to public opinion reassure their respective publics that their
concerns were understood. Paris was a key event in the careers of all the leaders involved,
providing a good example of the importance of personal diplomacy in the détente process. 404
Perhaps the early phases of the Berlin crisis receive less attention today because the
events of the next few years neutralized the issue. For modern historians, Berlin may seem a
case of selfish interests by occupying powers who were reluctant to yield their residual
importance as World War II victors. But Allied and Soviet leaders did attempt diplomatic
resolution at Paris. Although the U-2 espionage that wrecked the summit may seem a selfish
interest today, Eisenhower and his advisors felt strong public pressure about Soviet missile
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strength.405 They saw more public concern with dangers of an insufficient nuclear deterrent than
the necessity for disarmament treaties. Khrushchev‟s very public demands for a German peace
treaty and expulsion of the West from Berlin made the public expect those issues would
dominate summit discussions. Disarmament might involve dangerous concessions. The
prospects for détente had seemed unpromising before Khrushchev's 1959 visit to the United
States.406 But the public approved the exchange of US-Soviets and high level unofficial talks,
suggesting that despite the summit‟s failure, direct superpower diplomacy might be more viable
than the familiar multi-polar dissension. For the first time since the war, there appeared some
chance that the US and Soviets would have to deal with each other again.407
A major reason for the shift from a multilateral East-West approach to engagement was
the lack of consensus on aims and approaches, not only on Berlin but on nuclear deterrence.408
This discord discouraged lesser allies in the Western camp, such as Italy and Canada, who were
not pleased with British and French efforts to dominate the Paris proceedings. They had made
their complaints known before and during the Western heads and NATO meetings in December
and through the spring preparations. After the summit‟s failure, other countries like Turkey
seconded these complaints, especially about de Gaulle. They expressed more confidence in
American leadership and respect for other national interests. These allies‟ skepticism reflected
the real problems that faced the Western allies. Macmillan‟s eagerness for peace agreements
worried the Italians who thought Britain too ready to disengage from Europe just to could prop
up their colonial positions. De Gaulle, Macmillan and Adenauer were confirmed in positions on
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Berlin and disarmament that they had staked out in the first weeks, through the foreign minister
conference, heads-of-state conference, Western heads and the summit.409
De Gaulle was particularly troublesome, though Eisenhower approved of his leadership at
the summit, if not during the preparations. De Gaulle tried to assume a chairman‟s role for a
summit he initially opposed. His private diplomacy with Khrushchev in March showed the
Soviets that the French had no intention of changing their position on Berlin. The Americans
and British had not opposed the visit. They were disappointed that the French leader had not
used the opportunity to convince the Russians that progress was possible on Berlin.410 They
showed little readiness for any limit on nuclear testing or for comprehensive disarmament that
would limit their own deterrent strength. Eisenhower expressed satisfaction for de Gaulle‟s
performance at the summit but did not think the French president was ready to offer any
breakthrough.411 Eisenhower was impatient with de Gaulle‟s intractability and delusions of
French importance. 412
Coordination of efforts with the British was easier but still difficult. The British were
also distracted and relatively weak in the wake of their colonial retreats. Macmillan was an old
friend, intelligent and experienced but he was not a strong partner. He faced strong political
pressures, especially on disarmament, defense costs, and Britain‟s failure to win more
participation in military research and development. The Skybolt shared-development project
was fraught with setbacks and eventually cancelled.413 De Gaulle was frustrating British
attempts to gain access to the Common Market. Eisenhower appreciated British loyalty and
409
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support but had little confidence in Macmillan‟s eagerness to negotiate with the Soviets without
preconditions. Macmillan had urged Eisenhower to consider making some concession to
Khrushchev so the conference could proceed. Even after the summit had been suspended, the
British were still eager to consider the Soviet offer to try another summit several months later.
The French were also willing to discuss such a possibility but to Eisenhower, such talk seemed
futile. 414
Eisenhower had less reason than ever to believe Khrushchev was interested in serious and
wide-ranging negotiations, but he also had little confidence in his own allies. If there were good
reasons to seek détente with the Soviets, Eisenhower would proceed cautiously.415 He had
agreed to a summit that, if not totally dedicated to Berlin, would probably not have been called if
that issue had not been so contentious and difficult to resolve. This last multi-lateral summit
coincided with the first experiments in mutual US and Soviet visits. Eisenhower was not
interested in attempting further visits or summits, multilateral or bilateral. Khrushchev later
offered to reinstitute the Eisenhower Moscow visit, on the same preconditions demanded in
Paris. Eisenhower angrily ridiculed the offer but understood that his successors might attempt to
revive the engagement that had emerged in 1959 and faltered in 1960. 416 He authorized
continued disarmament and test ban negotiations under the oversight of Glenn Seaborg but those
discussions made only incremental progress during the rest of his term.417 He also authorized
more vigorous Live Oak contingency planning for a response to armed action against West
Berlin. Eisenhower biographer Stephen Ambrose wrote that the President was very depressed in
the wake of the conference and believed that there had been the chance of swapping an
414
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unsupervised test ban for inspection teams within the Soviet Union.418 The diplomatic record
does not indicate great chances that this would have been the case, especially after Khrushchev‟s
Paris visit, unless the Berlin question was resolved first.
Despite Eisenhower's public position that he would not negotiate under a deadline, there
was in fact a constant threat of duress related to Berlin from 1958 to1960. To use a Western
idiom, Paris was a „shotgun‟ summit. Its failure was due to Western disunity as well as Soviet
stubbornness and belligerence. Despite its failure, it still represented a constructive approach
instead of the retaliation that had been urged as recently as the 1958 Iraq and Chinese island
crises. Eisenhower„s consistent reluctance to use force, while keeping a credible deterrent,
improved the climate for diplomacy.419 The difference was that, before Berlin, Eisenhower still
thought the United Nations Security Council was a better venue for resolution than summits. 420
Eisenhower also guessed correctly that Khrushchev would not wage war unless
absolutely necessary. Though reluctant to begin détente with the mercurial Khrushchev whom
he did not trust, he did come to believe it was worth attempting.
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that Eisenhower‟s restraint of contingency activity had helped contain the Berlin crisis in the
spring of 1958. The president offered a simple choice between negotiation and general nuclear
war, without allowing for the possibility of limited war. If this is the case, it may represent the
kind of brinksmanship which Dulles had been accused of, but which was to become a hallmark
of the next phase of Berlin and the ensuing Cuba crisis. More likely, Eisenhower and Dulles had
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already decided even before 1958, that diplomacy backed with maximum force did not mean that
they would use that force in any but the last resort possible. 422
In getting to Paris, there had been nearly two years of ambassadorial talks, top-level
Soviet and US visits by private and deputy leaders, such as Harriman, Humphrey, Nixon,
Mikoyan and Kozlov. More importantly there had been visits to the United States by Nikita
Khrushchev, Premier and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union. He had
been received by Eisenhower and there had been every expectation that American president
would return the visit. Ambassadorial connections between the Americans and Russians
increased. A network of contacts, official and back-channel alike, was creating an ongoing
dialogue. The conferences established templates for negotiating formats and tactics, as can be
seen in the briefing books prepared for successive meetings in Geneva and Paris. Khrushchev
tried to revive this momentum with his October 1960 visit to New York for UN sessions, but
failed. Despite new pressures on Berlin, he could not recreate the catalytic potential. Without a
focus, he ended up just banging his shoe at the United Nations. He would have to wait for a new
president to retry the Berlin gambit.423
When the Soviets proposed a new round of exchanges and meetings in early 1961,
experienced diplomats and analysts, a network of contacts and templates of protocol provided
Eisenhower‟s successor with many of the tools for engagement. Though engagement had seemed
unlikely two years before, it now appeared necessary and inevitable. Circumstance, more than a
change in ideology or softening of positions, had brought about this realization.
The Soviet leader, like Macmillan, de Gaulle, Ulbricht and Adenauer, would still be in
power when Eisenhower‟s successor John Kennedy assumed office in January 1961. Kennedy‟s
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attempts to keep continuity in some respects and depart from it in others meant that the next
phase of détente built on the Eisenhower legacy only in part. Berlin remained the catalyst, but
the new Kennedy administration's strategies diverged from the formulas established by
Eisenhower and Dulles. Berlin‟s refugee problem in early 1961 renewed Khrushchev's urgency
to quiet East Germany‟s Walter Ulbricht and created pressures for the Kennedy administration to
resolve what had become an ongoing crisis over Berlin.424
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Chapter 3: "Vienna & the Wall," January - August 1961

Introduction
Even after the collapse of the Paris summit in May 1960, the Soviet Union indicated its
willingness to resume Four-Power negotiations over the status of Berlin and Germany.
Disagreements among the Western allies and the firmness of the Soviet position ensured no
further summits would be undertaken till after the impending presidential elections in the United
States.425 The Soviet Union‟s Chairman Nikita Khrushchev, Britain‟s Prime Minister Harold
Macmillan, West Germany's Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and France‟s President Charles de
Gaulle waited to see whether president-elect John Kennedy would continue the personal
diplomacy begun by President Dwight Eisenhower. Berlin had been the main issue bringing
these leaders together, although intransigence had rendered summit negotiations largely futile.
Other compelling interests such as disarmament, nuclear testing and international cooperation
offered little opportunity for immediate agreements. Berlin remained Khrushchev‟s primary
concern. The Soviet leader used Berlin to control progress in other areas, divide the Western
alliance, forestall challenges within the Communist bloc and deter nuclear arms for West
Germany. He thought Kennedy might be more accommodating on Berlin.426
If Kennedy wished to continue the diplomatic momentum begun with the 1959 Foreign
Minister‟s Conference and the Paris summit, he would have to either bring together his Western
partners and persuade them to adopt more unified, practical approaches, or set aside the
multilateral approach exemplified by the wartime conferences at Tehran, Yalta, Potsdam and the
425
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1955 summit at Geneva.427 Instead, he might need to seek a more direct, bilateral rapprochement
with Khrushchev. Kennedy was inclined by personal temperament and external circumstances
to the latter course.
Like Eisenhower, he was unhappy with the degree to which Berlin had taken
precedence over other problems: the nuclear arms race, competition for influence in Africa, Latin
America, and Asia, particularly Laos. Both the outgoing and incoming presidents were impatient
with the limited cooperation offered by their erstwhile allies. They understood that, however
scant the actual prospects for progress through summit negotiations might be, domestic and
global public opinion now favored the attempts at diplomacy.428 Negotiation would be a
welcome relief from the tensions of containment and would assure the public that a more relaxed
peace remained possible. Though the challenges and ambitions of the United States were little
different at the beginning of Kennedy‟s presidency, it soon became clear that his approach
would differ markedly from his predecessor.

Contrasts Between Eisenhower and Kennedy
Eisenhower had been a generally popular, confident, authoritative president, though with
a reserved public presence and leadership style. Eisenhower‟s experience in military
administration had tempered his willingness to invest in new weapons systems and large force
levels. He was wary of using force as a crisis response, especially on Berlin.429 He relied on a
tightly organized and co-coordinated hierarchical foreign policy establishment run by Secretary
of State John Foster Dulles. Dulles' patience and pragmatism restored Allied unity in the first
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phase of the Berlin crisis.430 Dulles successor, Christian Herter, had taken over just before the
1959 Foreign Ministers Conference and generally continued Dulles‟s approach but less
independently. Herter retained most of the key staff , including Undersecretary Livingston
Merchant and Policy Planning Staff head Gerald Smith, and such distinguished career
ambassadors as Llewellyn Thompson in Moscow, Thomas Dowling in Germany and David
Bruce in London. The Eisenhower foreign policy establishment was considered by the incoming
President as professional but conservative, able to maintain an often tense status quo with
confidence, but perhaps unwilling to look past containment and convert crisis situations into
opportunities.431
Kennedy presented a strong contrast, with a strong personal charisma and personal
confidence. He was a decorated World War II veteran but most of his experience lay in
congressional legislation. As Kennedy scholars such as Lawrence Freedman and Mark J. White
have noted, Kennedy‟s „New Frontier‟ signaled a combination of military reinforcement and
initiatives for peaceful cooperation.432 Kennedy wanted to project an openness to new ideas and
diversity of opinion among his advisors. His foreign policy structure was more horizontal, with
McGeorge Bundy, special assistant for national security affairs having as much or more
influence than his Secretary of State Dean Rusk or the Secretary of Defense Robert Macnamara.
Adlai Stevenson, passed over for the job at State, was named United Nations envoy, while
Truman‟s Secretary of State Dean Acheson was brought in as a special consultant.433 Both of
these appointments, the former more open to unconditional negotiation and the latter more
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insistent on linking negotiation to progress on outstanding disputes, were subordinate to the inner
circle of Bundy, Rusk and McNamara. Acheson's strong, hawkish opinions and confidence in
his long experience often conflicted with the rest of Kennedy's security advisors.434 Rusk‟s
deputies, Chester Bowles and George Ball also enjoyed the President‟s confidence to a high
degree. Acheson‟s former head of Policy Planning Staff, Paul Nitze, recruited by Kennedy for
the Defense Department, also had a strong advisory role, particularly on nuclear issues. 435
Though Rusk, Acheson and Nitze had some experience in the official diplomatic
structure, they, like the rest of the new security apparatus, had been external policy experts in
academia, foundation and the Democratic party. Rusk had experience in the Truman-era State
Department but had been out of government since that time. He was well-informed but cautious,
inclined more to consider options than recommended specific courses of action. He cautioned
Kennedy against seeking an early summit with Khrushchev. McNamara had been a Ford Motor
Company executive, brought in more for managerial than foreign policy expertise.436 Retention
of the senior ambassadorial corps helped provide continuity; Thompson was especially valuable
as one of Khrushchev‟s preferred conduits and Bruce was adept at handling not only British, but
other European partners. In addition to these senior personnel, younger advisors such as Henry
Kissinger often challenged established opinion-makers.437 The president‟s younger brother and
new Attorney General, Robert Kennedy emerged as an important foreign policy influence, who
434
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the Soviets sometimes used for back-channel communications with the White House.438 In
addition to this already broad variety of advisors, Kennedy often sought external opinions and
could be receptive to unsolicited opinions, to a degree not seen in the previous administration.

Kennedy Assesses Berlin Situation & Meets with Allied Leaders
Eisenhower briefed Kennedy after the election and just before inauguration,
identifying security issues and specific country problems but de-emphasizing Berlin. Soon after
the inauguration, Rusk summarized the history of the Berlin controversy, noting that refugee
flight from East Germany was intensifying and Khrushchev was still intent on his Berlin „free
city‟ and German „peace treaty‟ demands.439 No immediate Soviet action was anticipated. On
February 17, Kennedy assured West German Foreign Secretary Heinrich von Brentano that their
interests and opinions would be respected and protected. Kennedy explained that America was
not going to bring up the Berlin issue for the time being and remained committed to the status
quo. When asked whether he thought the Soviets were preparing to renew their demands more
vigorously, von Brentano said he did not anticipate new moves as long as Western commitment
remained visibly firm.440
At the same time, Kennedy was also considering new overtures for US-Soviet
discussions. Meetings with the French and West Germans had already touched on the possibility
of a new Paris-style meeting, with unanimous feeling that such meetings remained premature.
The reluctance to consider a new summit camouflaged lingering disagreements among the
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Allies.441 Exploration of bilateral talks reflected a still-embryonic trend, with precedents like
Macmillan‟s solo visit to Moscow in February 1959, Khrushchev‟s talks with Eisenhower at
Camp David in September of that year, and de Gaulle‟s reception of the Soviet leader in Paris
several weeks before the abortive summit.
In a February 23 meeting, February French ambassador Herve Alphand told Rusk his
government had no problems with such talks but cautioned about the need for „Big Three
(France, Britain and United States)‟ agreement. Alphand emphasized Berlin‟s primacy among
Western security interests and indicated the Soviets might be planning a new initiative in
advance of German elections coming up in September. He thought that Khrushchev‟s recent
letter to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was a clear signal to the West Germans that Soviet
demands remained on the table. Like West German Ambassador to the U.S. Wilhelm Grewe,
Alphand believed the Soviets would, if they acted, proceed in small but steady increments till
their demands de facto if not de jure were enacted; from there, the West would to have to
recognize the new environment. Rusk did not disagree. He felt contingency planning must be
advanced.442 The British, hopeful of strengthening their „special relationship‟ with US in hopes
of offsetting a burgeoning Franco-German alliance, had already approached Kennedy on a
variety of issues including joint weapons development and nuclear testing.443
Kennedy had begun by consulting the Allies, but soon realized the major
differences in their relative positions, both in policy and capability. Discussions with
Ambassador Thompson confirmed his belief that he should meet personally with the Soviets and
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that it would be to his advantage to control the circumstances.444 Once a reasonable amount of
common ground had been established and relations were acceptable, Rusk asked Thompson to
approach Khrushchev about new bilateral discussions on issues like disarmament/testing, aid to
the underdeveloped, and joint scientific programs. Thompson was instructed to avoid broaching
the subject of Berlin but to carefully observe and communicate any signals on that subject. 445
Khrushchev listened to Thompson's message from Kennedy for better Soviet relations,
but immediately noted Berlin had not been mentioned. That, said Khrushchev, was the subject
he most wanted to discuss. He emphasized the issue of German unification, which he
understood to be a goal held in common with the West. The borders in place since the war
“needed legal foundations” but that the “socialist camp does not want to expand towards the
West. Khrushchev then directed his focus toward Berlin, which he called “ a bone in the throat
of Soviet-American relations…if Adenauer wants to fight …West Berlin would be a good place
to begin.” 446 He shifted his tack again, asserting he wanted “better relations with the US” and
said that he merely wanted to “render it impossible for preparation for aggression and everyone
understands what this would mean with nuclear weapons.”
Thompson replied that the President was reviewing the situation and looking for
clarification of the Soviet position about how the Berlin “free city‟ plan would work in actual
practice. Khrushchev answered that West Berlin might be able to keep the current arrangements
- a step away from the original „free city‟ plan – but was vague about how this could be
guaranteed. Thompson pointed out that East German leader Walter Ulbricht “was very much
interested in West Berlin.” Khrushchev said Ulbricht would also sign the commitment to ensure
West Berlin‟s status. Thompson did not force the issue further but reiterated that the German
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problem was under review. Khrushchev identified Adenauer as the aggressor but said that if
“Pres. Kennedy and they (Soviets) could sign a peace treaty, it would be a great step forward in
American-Soviet relations” which at present resembled an armistice more than peace. The peace
treaty could be implemented in installments and an “atmosphere of trust” could foster
"disarmament negotiations.” 447
Although Khrushchev had not been explicitly offered a new summit opportunity and had
not extended one himself, he did say he wanted better relations with America. Berlin was still
his top priority and progress towards his peace treaty and „free city‟ plans were prerequisites for
disarmament negotiations. This talk of incremental implementation of the peace treaty was
remarkably similar to the French and West German estimates of how Khrushchev might proceed
unilaterally. Khrushchev at this point was making his most forceful demands directly to the
West Germans. Thompson thought Khrushchev was not yet ready to sign his German peace
treaty.448
In Washington that same day, March 10, Ambassador Grewe was reviewing the recent
Khrushchev letter to Adenauer which reiterated familiar demands with renewed harshness.
Grewe asked the president about a shift in US military policy, which the Germans feared would
de-emphasize nuclear deterrence even if it amplified conventional forces. The President was
noncommittal on this topic and on Grewe‟s suggestion that a new public statement of the
Western position would be helpful.449 Kennedy met with West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt a
few days later; Brandt was running against Adenauer in the September elections and Kennedy
did not want to play favorites.450 Kennedy asked Brandt about recognition of the Polish-East
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German border at the Oder and Niesse rivers, which the West was inclined to grant as an easy
concession. Brandt felt that was an issue for a peace conference. Brandt viewed reunification as
a possibility but only over a very extended period. The president commented that he wanted to
continue contingency planning, but thought that NATO commandant Lauris Norstad‟s force
targets were “grandiose.” He clearly did not want to begin his presidency with a new Berlin
conflict. Kennedy did not have particularly warm relations with either Adenauer or Brandt and
was keeping his distance as long as he could.451
A cable from Thompson a few days later indicated the Khrushchev might not give him
that option much longer. The consensus among the Western missions in Moscow was that,
without a new round of negotiations, Khrushchev would proceed with his plans before the
German elections. Thompson‟s guess was that the Soviet leader would conclude his peace treaty
with the East Germans but would try to avoid a Berlin conflict by instructing them to continue to
allow Western access to the city. The decision would be heavily influenced by the overall state
of relations with the West, which were not presently favorable. Thompson thought Laos might
be settled amicably but that Latin American and African competition would intensify. Test ban
and disarmament prospects were not encouraging, with minimal progress in UN-sponsored talks
and new increases in US defense spending after the force reductions of the Eisenhower years.452
Kennedy‟s personal support for Radio Free Europe and American refusal to grant licenses for
machine tools further clouded prospects with the Soviets.
West German foreign minister Von Brentano believed new East-West talks might
postpone the peace treaty, though he did not mention this when he was in Washington.453 West
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German rejection of Khrushchev‟s demands remained adamant, but they were concerned that
Kennedy's "flexible response" policy, deemphasizing nuclear use, would encourage Soviet
ambitions on Germany.454
Thompson thought “at such time as the President might meet Khrushchev,
discussion German problem will be main point exercise so far as he is concerned and he will
probably make his decision on German policy at that time or shortly after. …alternative would
seem to be that President should be able to hold out prospect for negotiations which would at
minimum enable Khrushchev to save face somewhat and maintain his position.” Thompson
noted that while Khrushchev was probably better for US purposes than other Soviet leaders, he
did not think this possibility should determine US policy.455 These last comments indicate that
some kind of US-Soviet meeting was likely, but neither side was yet making specific overtures.
They also showed awareness that Khrushchev‟s authority was not absolute and that he had rivals.
Thompson did not believe the West Germans could handle implementation of the peace treaty
without US assistance.
The Ambassador warned that Khrushchev might begin to take the incremental steps
already forecasted. Specifically, he warned: “If we expect Soviets to leave Berlin problem as is,
we must at least expect East Germans to seal off sector boundary in order to stop … refugee flow
through Berlin.”456 This is the first prediction of the Wall on record from a senior US foreign
policy officer. Thompson was probably better acquainted with Khrushchev than any other
American and was an astute observer of Soviet politics.
It is remarkable that the possibility of a border closure had not received much attention in
contingency planning or position papers already. Even after this warning, US planners
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concentrated on initiatives like negotiation or even forceful probes with force, instead of
contingency planning for incremental Soviet actions toward Berlin. Henry Kissinger, a new
consultant drafted from strategic studies at Harvard University, urged the president personally to
visit Berlin during a goodwill tour of Western European capitals projected for April, but this
option was not carried out till thirty months later in a very different situation.457
Kennedy needed to consult with the other Western heads of state before he could further
consider direct US-Soviet negotiation. A briefing that Dean Acheson provided for a meeting
with the President and Harold Macmillan, as well as most of senior foreign policy leaders of the
US and Britain, did not reflect immediate readiness to negotiate with the Soviets.458 Instead,
Acheson wanted a demonstration of ground power to show the West was ready to defend Berlin
though surface-to-air missiles now made an airlift unrealistic; blocked ground access was still
considered Khrushchev‟s likely first move. Acheson criticized the slack pace of conventional
planning. The president was reluctant to concede that an airlift was no longer an effective
option, but Macmillan told him he had gotten the same opinion. McNamara was pessimistic
about a ground attack, and the leaders and their advisors returned to the idea that an airlift might
be feasible after all. 459
British Foreign Secretary Lord Douglass Home warned that “if Khrushchev says he
wants a conference and that we wants to make a change, then we have no alternative to propose.”
Home thought the West should try get Khrushchev to accept a deal that would defer change in
occupation for ten years. Acheson rejected the suggestion that this “would get Khrushchev off
the hook,” saying that should be of no concern since Khrushchev “was trying to divide the
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allies.” Rusk seconded Acheson by saying that Khrushchev should not be allowed to seem as
though he could grant what was already guaranteed by the end-of-war agreements. Home
observed that “the right of conquest was wearing thin.” Rusk ended the meeting by reaffirming
the familiar declaration to stand up for their rights by agreement. But first Home noted that he
did not like “going to a conference knowing we had nothing to offer.” 460
Home‟s observation confirmed the reality that rhetoric could not conceal: there was no
reason to believe that Khrushchev would accept what was still the Western peace plan of July
1959. Unless the West was prepared to much more visibly acknowledge East Germany to defuse
the German peace treaty issue and then accept their control of ground access, their occupation
position in West Berlin would probably be challenged very soon, with unpredictable results.461
Eisenhower, and Macmillan, too had been willing to consider these concessions in the spring of
1960, but de Gaulle and Adenauer were reluctant to consider any form of German reunification
that did not give them complete assurance of the outcome. Even before the Paris summit it had
become apparent that no breakthrough on Berlin was likely.462 Whether the West might have
been able to use such a compromise to leverage progress on disarmament cannot be known,
because such an offer was never approved in common.
The comments of Acheson and Rusk indicate a retreat to initial, hard-line reactions of
late 1958 when Khrushchev began his free city/peace treaty demands. Home‟s comments at the
Acheson meeting also indicate that another Paris-type of summit was not likely in the near
future, even if a possible Soviet move might be more imminent now than at any time since the
demands were first presented.463 In subsequent talks, the President and Macmillan tried to look
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at more flexible approaches, including co-opting the „free city‟ with a Western counter version
but indicated no movement to the deeper concessions probably necessary.464
When Adenauer himself came to Washington a few days later, he mostly discussed
contingency issues. Asked by the President what he thought the proper US response should be in
the event of a peace treaty, the Chancellor indicated legal questions would be raised that might
deter immediate action, but would be troublesome nevertheless. He also worried that the West
Germans might not be fully involved in any NATO defensive action on Berlin. He queried
Kennedy and Rusk about Allied access plans in the event of a peace treaty, but they had no ready
answer. 465 In a follow up visit with West German Ambassador Grewe, Rusk warned of the
Soviets blocking access through incremental means: "it would be difficult to find definite line
which, if breached by the East, would elicit specific Western measures. Here was the old
Communist problem of ... salami tactics."466 Soon after, Khrushchev informed Hans Kroll, West
German Ambassador to the Soviet Union, that he planned to sign a peace treaty with East
Germany after the West German elections, then about four months away.467
The Joint Chiefs of Staff contingency plans required at least two divisions to avoid
reliance on nuclear weapons, which would require a significant mobilization effort. 468 They
wanted to enlist West German forces although their participation was still limited in NATO. A
quadripartite session of US, French, British and West German foreign ministers in Bonn
“generally agreed that was no basis for Western initiative to open negotiations with the Soviets
on Berlin.” They thought Khrushchev‟s “possible misperception … re Allied firmness of
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intentions on Berlin … could be highly dangerous.” Von Brentano said the West Germans
wanted to be more active in planning (Kennedy had told Adenauer that was his wish also). Rusk
said this would be helpful, especially in legal matters.469
Multi-party negotiations did not look promising but Kennedy remained interested in
meeting with Khrushchev. The President had just suffered a major credibility challenge when
the US failed to provide air cover for an ill-prepared CIA-sponsored guerilla incursion of Cuba at
the Bay of Pigs in April 1961.470 Khrushchev, on other hand, could bask in the achievements of
Cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin, who became the first human in space in early April. Kennedy hoped
that he could recover some of his questioned authority with a vigorous tour of Europe.471 He had
already received most of the western heads in Washington, with the notable exception of French
President Charles de Gaulle. A visit abroad would help Kennedy project the commitment and
outreach he wanted his administration to stand for. He hoped Khrushchev might respond to a
day or so of intimate meetings where they might be able to explore issues besides Berlin. The
initial contact came from Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who asked Thompson if the
President did in fact want a personal meeting with Khrushchev. Kennedy responded
affirmatively that he hoped to adjust his tour schedule to meet in neutral Vienna in early June; he
promised to set definite details shortly.472
This contact was supplemented by backchannel communication through the president‟s
brother Robert, who had already had informal but apparently privileged messages from the
Soviets through their embassy aide and GRU operative Georgi Bolshakov.473 Robert Kennedy
469
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outlined his brother‟s program: progress on the nuclear test inspection issue which could lead to
broader disarmament discussions.474 These contacts are notable not only as indicators of
Kennedy‟s desire to move past Berlin and build a more stable and productive base for US-Soviet
relations. David Reynolds notes they also mark the emergence of Robert Kennedy as a major
voice in Kennedy‟s inner foreign policy circle. And, since the Bolshakov-Kennedy connection
continued for another eighteen months, it is also an important precedent in secret backchannel
diplomacy. Backchannels would be a key element of the diplomatic campaigns of the later
détente era.475 Khrushchev approached Thompson on May 23, two weeks before the summit, to
make it clear that Berlin was still his main concern. The tough message only made Kennedy
more determined to announce his conventional arms build-up to send a message that the United
States would be negotiating from a position of strength, not under intimidation. 476
The meeting pioneered a bilateral US-Soviet summit approach, using a neutral country as
backdrop. Guenter Bischof has recently argued that the bilateral approach with the Soviets was
continued through his week-long series of visits with other heads of state. 477 Kennedy planned
to conduct an intensive round of bilateral summits as an alternative to the multilateral approach
that had stalled even before Paris 1960. Optimally, this would open the foreign relations
deadlock between East and West which had existed since November 1958 and bridge the
distance among the allies already apparent before the Berlin/peace treaty issue. It also marked a
new readiness to assume the superpower role that Eisenhower and Dulles had to moderated to
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avoid unwelcome commitments. Kennedy needed to balance firmness with outreach to make his
strategy work. In preparation for the talks, Kennedy was advised to avoid ideological
discussions and the subject of Berlin if at all possible. 478 The president, by his later admission,
still did not understand the extent of Khrushchev‟s single-mindedness and determination
regarding Berlin and Germany. Experienced Soviet observers like Thompson, Undersecretary
Charles Bohlen, Foy Kohler and George Kennan advised caution.479
On May 24, Khrushchev himself sent a clear signal, through a private interview with
Thompson at the American ice skating exhibition, that Berlin remained his top priority for the
Vienna meetings.480 Khrushchev “revealed plainly that he was troubled by problem how to deal
with the president on question Berlin.” He could not make the same approaches in a getacquainted meeting in front of staff that he did privately with the Ambassador. Khrushchev
reaffirmed his intention to sign separate peace treaties, pending the failure to sign a new Berlin
agreement, just after the German elections. He had told West German Ambassador Hans Kroll
the same thing. Khrushchev acknowledged the danger of war but insisted his moves would not
lead to war. Thompson replied that it was his official duty to make American commitment to
Berlin clear to the Soviet leader. Khrushchev answered by saying that “if he wanted war, we
could bet it,” but, “only madmen wanted war and the Western leaders were not mad, although
Hitler was.” Khrushchev tempered this provocative line by trying to bring up the „free city‟ idea
as a peaceful alternative. Thompson pointed out, while Khrushchev “might not want Berlin,
Ulbricht clearly did.”481 Khrushchev kept returning to the theme of finally normalizing relations

478

Beschloss, Crisis Years, p. 174-76.
Freedman, Kennedy's Wars, p. 56.
480
Fursenko & Naftali, Khrushchev's Cold War, p.354.
481
Telegram from Thompson to Herter, May 24, 1961, FRUS 1961-1963,Vol. XIV, doc. 24.
479

135

sixteen years after the war. He said Western access would not be obstructed by a treaty,
promising no blockade; the West could then deal with the East Germans.
Khrushchev seemed interested when Thompson indicated the US might be flexible on
East European frontier issues if that would help. Khrushchev, very informally, mentioned
possible troop reductions of as much as a third. Thompson thought Khrushchev “seemed to be
groping for some war out of [an] impasse. Thompson carefully suggested that a freeze might
still be the most productive near-term course, saying this might allow time for disarmament
progress. Khrushchev “said frankly that disarmament impossible as long as Berlin problem
existed.” Despite the tough line, continued sparring, and Khrushchev‟s refusal to discuss allBerlin alternative solutions, the Soviet leader did appear “most anxious” that the talks with
Kennedy should “go well” but appeared "deadly serious” about signing the separate treaties. 482
Thompson followed this report by noting that he had compared notes with Kroll and
other Western Ambassadors in Moscow, all of whom believed Khrushchev would proceed with
the peace treaty. Thompson thought the Western position should put Khrushchev in the position
of being the one “saying no” to peace. Thompson saw some hope in trying to re-advance their
Geneva peace plan (the "July 28" plan also used at Paris), but spread out over time and
sweetened with assurances that East European borders were accepted by the West. 483 He hoped
these offers could be accompanied by better access guarantees for the West. He noted also that
both the Americans and Soviets had tremendous prestige interests at stake: some formula must
be found which would enable both sides to save face…difficult but not impossible…President
might most usefully explore with K. in private stating frankly what his purpose was.” Thompson

482
483

Ibid.
Telegram from Thompson to Herter, May 25, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963,Vol. XIV, doc. 25.

136

ended his assessment pessimistically, observing „some difference of opinion‟ among the
Allies.484
Thompson believed the peace treaty would provide a wedge for “radical action from the
Communist side.” The lack of Western consensus encouraged bilateral US-Soviet diplomacy
and discouraged the back-up consensus that the West had been able to rely on through the
problems of the Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference and the Paris summit.485 A State
Department paper from May 25 noted that Khrushchev might be emboldened by successes with
"Laos, Cuba, and Yuri Gagarin, " The analysts cautioned "Khrushchev is undoubtedly reluctant
to risk a major war ... real danger is that he might risk such a war without realizing he is doing
so."486
Michael Beschloss and David Reynolds have noted that Undersecretary Bohlen and Press
Secretary Salinger tried to downplay expectations for the summit in the final days. 487 Kennedy,
still recovering from a perceived lack of leadership surrounding the Bay of Pigs, faced a much
different negotiating situation than Eisenhower. The former president had met Khrushchev in
Geneva at the 1955 summit and held informal talks on his own home ground at Camp David. In
both those meetings, he was working with an experienced, centralized foreign policy team. He
knew the other Allied heads of state well. By the time of the Paris summit, they had worked out
and defended their positions for nearly two and a half years. Kennedy, on the other hand, was
484
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still getting to know his Western counterparts and had never met Khrushchev.

His own

advisors were not in agreement, with Acheson urging a hard line and Averell Harriman calling
for a new beginning to discussions.

488

Just days before the President left for Europe, US Ambassador to West Berlin, Allan
Lightner urged that Kennedy should use the unilateral setting to make clear that the US regarded
the Soviets as responsible for the problems of a divided Germany. Kennedy needed to say “Sovs
should keep hands off Berlin where US committed to stay…nothing further to discuss on Berlin
itself …Vienna will be psychological testing ground.” Lightner thought Yuri Gagarin‟s space
flight and Communist gains in Laos and the Congo had cushioned Khrushchev against hard-line
rivals who might be more difficult to deal with. 489 Thompson noted Khrushchev had so
committed himself to this issue that he would not want to risk losing face, through concessions,
before the Communist Party Congress met just after the West German elections. In this
situation, he might not accept the kind of rebuff suggested by Acheson and Lightner.
Thompson had the most confidential relationship with Khrushchev of any US official; he
saw strong determination on Berlin, as well as a hope for negotiations in Khrushchev. This was
a difficult situation for the US to approach: “we should not allow gradual erosion (of) our
position by embarking on slippery path of tempting compromises. President has difficult task of
convincing K on one hand that we will fulfill our commitment…and on other that it is not our
attention to saw off limb on which he has crawled.”490 Thompson advocated some kind of
solution that would mutually save face and defer action so other problems could be studied. The
President needed to make clear to Khrushchev that American remained committed to both West
488
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Berlin‟s freedom and productive relations with the Soviet Union; these positions did not need to
be mutually exclusive.
A final pre-summit talking points memorandum by the State Department suggested that
Khrushchev might respond if Kennedy showed strong concern about the destabilizing effects of
any unilateral Soviet move on Berlin. By indicating that the US still viewed occupation
withdrawals and GDR recognition as unacceptable, Kennedy could perhaps steer the discussion
to disarmament instead.491 Although these latter suggestions sounded reasonable, they were
unlikely to be persuasive. Khrushchev‟s messages to Kroll and Thompson had made it plain that
he would need strong reasons to change his demands.
Part of Khrushchev‟s urgency in renewing his demands was increased pressure from both
Walter Ulbricht in East Berlin and Mao Zedong in China. This pressure might be reflected in
the upcoming Party Congress. The flow of refugees from the East through West Berlin had risen
to nearly 18,000 in May 1961.492 From Khrushchev‟s view, Kennedy‟s May 25 speech calling
for sharp increases in American defense spending may have also been a challenge that needed to
be answered. The tough warnings to Thompson may have been a response to Kennedy‟s
proposed build-up. The increases were a unilateral move in which Kennedy tried to recover
from the Bay of Pigs indecision and make good on campaign promises for a strong defense.
Though Khrushchev had considerable hopes that Kennedy was more interested in negotiation
than Eisenhower, he was not impressed by his performance in the Cuban fiasco.493,
William Taubman says that Khrushchev announced, to the Praesidium just days before
the Vienna meeting, his intention to press the American President hard on Berlin. Mikoyan
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cautioned against forcing Kennedy into hardening the American position.494 Khrushchev
apparently dismissed such cautions, saying that he did not believe Kennedy had Eisenhower‟s
political maturity. Sergei Khrushchev says that his father “never regarded Kennedy as a weak
president.”495 Whatever the Soviet leader‟s estimate of Kennedy, he shortly was to demonstrate
his intention to test Kennedy through the Berlin issue. His treatment of Kennedy would be
reminiscent of his attempts to intimidate Vice-President Nixon in the private meetings after the
Moscow “kitchen debate.” Unlike his tactics in the televised encounter, in the private talks,
Nixon, aided by the presence of the President‟s brother Milton Eisenhower, had followed his
briefing advice to respond vigorously but not to seek confrontation or be drawn into ideological
debates.496

Kennedy's Trip to Europe
In the new bilateral mode of summitry, personal dynamics assumed much more
significance than was the case in the large-staffed formats of the Foreign Minister‟s Conference
or the Paris summit. This was especially true because Kennedy was conducting a series of
bilateral summits with a small staff. While a large staff may have impeded spontaneous
negotiations, it also provided some insulation in the case of serious disagreements, as well as a
mechanism to keep negotiations going. Kennedy had not yet met de Gaulle or Khrushchev. The
latter were already secure in their leadership and with much longer diplomatic experience,
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particularly regarding Berlin. Both also differed with Kennedy on a number of issues, notably
the dangers of German rearmament.497
In his first visit, with Charles de Gaulle, the French President urged Kennedy to take a
non-confrontational approach. De Gaulle had his own interests in assisting Kennedy. He wanted
to improve US-French relations which had cooled over the Eisenhower years. He did not want a
US-led NATO to control European defense matters.498 Kennedy respected and admired de
Gaulle and appeared interested in the latter‟s advice. De Gaulle had managed to retain cordial
relations with Khrushchev despite their disagreements over Berlin and Germany and the failed
summit. He established a warm personal accord with Kennedy, though the US and French
positions diverged widely on issues from post-colonial problems in Africa and Asia to defense
and economic integration in Europe.499
In their talks on May 31, Kennedy noted that Berlin continued to be the most pressing
issue in East-West matters and openly asked for de Gaulle‟s advice. De Gaulle observed that,
since the initial Soviet demands had been presented two and a half years earlier, that Khrushchev
had established a pattern of setting and then postponing deadlines. This suggested that the Soviet
leader did not, in fact, want war, but that he was not yet prepared for a real détente, which would
involve practical disarmament negotiations. De Gaulle said that he had told Khrushchev as
much. Kennedy pressed de Gaulle for advice on how to show the Soviets that the West still
remained firm on Berlin. De Gaulle said it was necessary to make clear that it was the Soviets
who were intent on disrupting a stable, if unsatisfying, situation. Khrushchev must also be told
that if the Soviets proceeded to sign a separate „peace treaty‟ that the West would not recognize
497
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it any way, not even accepting East German document stamping. De Gaulle repeated his belief
that the Soviets did not want war; since a Berlin confrontation would probably devolve into
general war, that a visible Western readiness not to be intimidated would deter Khrushchev. 500
Notably absent from their discussion was any mention of resuming four-power talks. De Gaulle
indicated no displeasure with the independent talks. He himself had held bilateral talks with
Khrushchev – but said there could be no revision of Berlin agreements unless agreed upon and
signed by all four occupying powers.501
In their next session, de Gaulle reported that he had talked with Macmillan, whose
position was “unclear … (and) … hesitant,” and the British would, of necessity, have to go along
with the French and American positions. 502 This probably misrepresented the situation.
Although the British had the weakest position, they were also determined not to be perceived as
subordinate to the French. Further, the British had consistently shown themselves to be, among
the Allies, most inclined to a flexible Berlin strategy. Although De Gaulle may have been less
than realistic in assessing British readiness to negotiate and Soviet willingness to risk general
war, Kennedy accepted his formulations. Kennedy stated that he was not satisfied with
contingency planning or the material state of Western defense capacity. Although Kennedy
spoke in broad terms, de Gaulle responded in terms of strengthening just the West Berlin
occupation forces. De Gaulle noted Soviet nuclear deterrence now made an airlift less feasible.
He did think, however, that increased Soviet trade with the West made the Soviets more
vulnerable to economic retaliation. De Gaulle was sanguine: “Generally speaking, the West is
not as weak as people think in regard to the Berlin question and Mr. Khrushchev must be made

500

Memo of Kennedy-de Gaulle meeting, Paris, France, May 31, 1961, FRUS, 1961-63, Vol. XIV, doc. 31.
Garrett Martin, "A Grand Strategy" in Globalizing de Gaulle, eds. Neulist, Locher and Martin, p. 299
502
Memo of Kennedy-de Gaulle meeting, Paris, France, May 31, 1961, FRUS, 1961-63, Vol. XIV, doc. 31.
501

142

to understand this.”503 This view was much more optimistic than observers like Kroll and
Thompson were suggesting. De Gaulle's priority in these talks was Laos and Africa, not Berlin.
He wanted to reassure Kennedy about Berlin so that the America would be more receptive to
French policies in the Third World. Although de Gaulle may have underestimated Khrushchev‟s
resolve, his advice on how to handle Khrushchev was sound.
Khrushchev had little reason to believe that Kennedy was any more inclined to accept his
terms than Eisenhower had been. Through his long experience as an executive leader,
Eisenhower had become adept at cautious, patient personal diplomacy, using his foreign policy
team to insulate himself as needed. Kennedy was impetuous and more confident in his own
charisma than in his handler‟s advice. British historian David Reynolds suggests that
Khrushchev saw Kennedy as personally immature because of his penchant for womanizing.504
American historian Robert Dallek‟s research confirms the reports of Michael Beschloss that
Kennedy was being heavily medicated just prior to the Vienna stop; the president had strained
his back during an unproductive summit with the Canadian prime minister a few weeks
earlier.505 Beschloss speculates that Kennedy was less than ready for the tough encounter to
come; Dallek does not believe Kennedy was functionally impaired for the summit. Whether
Kennedy was in full capacity or not, if Khrushchev‟s intelligence services made him aware of the
president‟s pain and fatigue, this knowledge may have contributed to the aggressive
confrontation he soon launched in their private sessions.
In their first session on June 3, the two leaders were accompanied by staff. Kennedy had
Secretary Rusk, and perhaps more importantly, Thompson and Undersecretaries Foy Kohler and
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Charles Bohlen; these State Department aides had been involved with the Berlin problem since
its beginning and were more familiar with Khrushchev‟s tactics than Rusk. After opening
statements of peaceful intentions, Khrushchev became combative.506 He led with an ideological
thrust, asserting the inevitable victory of a superior Communist system. Kennedy, despite many
briefings against accepting this line of discussion, chose to answer Khrushchev on the
Chairman‟s own terms.507 This was a mistake. Khrushchev was capable of speaking in
abstractions at greater length than Kennedy had ever experienced in his political life. Nixon had
confronted Khrushchev with abstract moral arguments, but, briefly, in a media environment.
That exercise in contentious public diplomacy stands in sharp contrast to the caution of Nixon‟s
private talks held later the same day with Khrushchev. Kennedy‟s attempts at cordiality
collapsed in the face of Khrushchev‟s invective. Practical discussion was delayed and the
president failed to gain momentum.
As the discussion turned to the German issue, Khrushchev evoked the Soviet Union‟s
wartime sacrifices, including his and Gromyko‟s own loss of family, to frame his „peace treaty‟
proposal. He asked how the Americans could oppose ending the last vestiges of the war. The
unspoken but present subtext here was the delay in opening a second front against Germany till
1944. Kennedy replied that “We are not in Berlin because of someone‟s sufferance but by
contractual rights. We fought our way there, although our casualties may not have been as high
as the USSR‟s.”508 Kennedy noted his predecessors had upheld this principle of contractual
rights and he intended to do the same. Khrushchev was hardly moved by the statement, saying
this meant “the US did not want a peace treaty.” Kennedy tried to work his way out of this
impasse by asking why it was necessary to change a stable, if “abnormal,” situation when there
506
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were so many other pressing problems. Khrushchev replied that the US still did not understand
the Soviet goal of normalizing “the situation in the most dangerous spot in the world.” He then
proceeded to restate the Soviet Union‟s wartime losses and the claim that the peace treaty was
the only just solution at the present time. When Kennedy interrupted to ask “whether the peace
treaty would block access to Berlin,” Khrushchev said it would.509
As recently as his talk with Thompson at the ice show, Khrushchev still claimed
the peace treaty would leave Western access unimpeded. His blunt dismissal of the President‟s
question shows that Khrushchev felt little need to accommodate the president. Mikoyan had
cautioned Khrushchev about bullying the inexperienced Kennedy.510 Just as Kennedy failed to
heed expert advice, so did Khrushchev‟s rashness lock him into a belligerent posture, at the cost
of possible gains in other areas. The tone of these initial discussions also shows that Berlin still
outranked all other issues. Khrushchev‟s toughness on Berlin reflected not only personal belief
that his strategy could solve many problems, but also the degree to which he had staked his
personal prestige on this issue.
The only concession Khrushchev was willing to offer was another six month deadline.511
Overall, his position and language was nearly the same as it had been since 1958, now presented
to a new President and Secretary of State. The parties broke for a lunch, which turned out, not
unexpectedly, to be an awkward affair. Rusk tried to steer the conversation to agriculture,
especially corn, one of Khrushchev‟s favorite topics. Khrushchev was not so easily deterred
from taunting his guests, ridiculing Nixon‟s kitchen debate performance.512 Mrs. Kennedy found
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him boorish. Toasts were awkward and the afternoon sessions promised to be little better than
the first. When Kennedy suggested an outdoor walk, Khrushchev again brought up Berlin.513
Kennedy suggested their last session on June 4 be held with only translators; the
Chairman agreed. Despite Kennedy‟s attempts to win his counterpart over with self-deprecating
humor and observations on common national interests, Khrushchev returned argumentatively to
Berlin.514 Again, Kennedy tried to debate Khrushchev in ideological terms, a disastrous tactic.
Kennedy attempted to introduce a more global perspective, “an evolution is taking place in many
areas of the world and no one can predict which course it would take … it is most important that
decisions should be carefully considered.” Khrushchev made it known that he had already made
his decision by saying that if, after a peace treaty “the borders of the GDR – land, sea and air
borders –were violated, they would be defended.”515 He painted the US as a potential aggressor
intent on humiliating the USSR. He was willing to offer six months delay to protect US prestige.
To make further concessions would be a dereliction of his duty as Soviet head of state.
Kennedy interrupted to say he was afraid he would have to tell Macmillan that the West
had been given a new ultimatum instead of a breakthrough. Kennedy‟s frank admission that his
prestige was at stake elicited only token offers to retain some Western troops, alongside Soviet
troops, without any contractual basis. Khrushchev did not further sweeten his offer or suggest
further negotiation. Instead, he ended on a tough note, “It is not the USSR that threatens with
war, it is the US.”516 The President needed to tell Macmillan, de Gaulle and Adenauer that “the
decision is firm and irrevocable and the Soviet Union will sign it in December if the US refuses
an interim agreement." Kennedy understood well that another interim agreement in these
513
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circumstances was unacceptable, since it would probably be accompanied by incremental steps
to transfer access authority to East Germany. He simply replied to Khrushchev that “it would be
a cold winter.”517
Kennedy had found himself in an even more defensive position than in the morning
sessions. By the end of the day, the President was indeed fatigued, perhaps due to the back
problems, perhaps the medication.518 Not only had he failed to reverse Khrushchev‟s course on
Berlin, he had attempted to defuse Third World competition by acknowledging the superpowers
were effectively stalemated in attempting to bring their military strength to bear through proxies.
David Reynolds says that Khrushchev saw this as an unprecedented US admission of military
parity, an admission which seriously displeased the American Joint Chiefs of Staff. 519 A tired
and dejected President told his Press Secretary that Khrushchev “just beat hell out of me.” The
formal state dinner that followed did not improve the situation. The Kennedys and Khrushchevs
found scant rapport. The attempted pleasantry of the evening was uncomfortably forced.
Khrushchev later said Kennedy was “very gloomy … I sympathized with him … but there was
nothing I could do to help him."520 Khrushchev acknowledged that he had “kept the pressure on,
in order to place the president in a hopeless position and force him to recognize the necessity
meeting us halfway; otherwise a military conflict would be possible.” He told Austrian Foreign
Minister Bruno Kreisky that the President was “pleasant” but “displays no understanding.”521
Kennedy had attempted personal diplomacy to resolve a solution which had defied
American and Allied diplomats and executives for two and a half years. This was an ambitious
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goal, and he underestimated Khrushev's fixation on Berlin. Thompson said the outcome was
predictable once the President strayed from his briefing advice. Domestic and European public
reaction to the Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting was cool at best. The comity seen at Secretary
Dulles‟ funeral during the Foreign Ministers Conference and in some of the period leading up to
the Paris summit now seemed even more distant than it had in the wake of the U-2 incident.522
Multilateral diplomacy had been postponed indefinitely. Khrushchev had not indicated any
reason to convene the Heads of State again, for disarmament, resolution of Third World
competition, international cooperation or any other cause. The bilateral approach pioneered by
Macmillan in February 1959 and Khrushchev in Paris in March 1960, had stalled. Kennedy and
Khrushchev had damaged the most important bilateral relationship in the world. The fact that
they had even attempted diplomatic resolution as a basis for a détente seemed unimportant in the
face of their failure to negotiate prudently.523 However they still had the rest of the summer to
try to salvage the Berlin situation before the German elections.
Discouraging as this situation was, it was fortunate that Kennedy's next scheduled
bilateral summit in this period was with the supportive British Prime Minister. Harold
Macmillan had championed head-of state-diplomacy for some time. He had also suffered
through Khrushchev‟s belligerence in Moscow and in Paris.524 Macmillan observed that, as harsh
as Khrushchev‟s personal language had been with Kennedy, the official aide memoire the
Soviets handed the US at the Vienna was considerably milder. Khrushchev had suggested that
the treaty be handled through a „peace conference‟ instead of by simple unilateral diktat. The
President and the Prime Minister recognized that, however tough Khrushchev‟s language was,
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and however much observers were convinced of his determination, the Berlin deadline had been
extended once again. Khrushchev would be most unlikely to make any large move before the
September German elections. The immediate Western task was to draft, in concert, a reply to
the Soviet note. They also needed to upgrade West Berlin‟s capacity to withstand a blockade.525
In Europe, Kennedy had touched base with the US's West Berlin occupation partners, but they
were no nearer a common strategy on Berlin, let alone resolution, than they had been a year
earlier at Paris.

Preparing for the Soviets to Sign Their German Peace Treaty
Forceful defense of West Berlin occupation rights now had to be considered with greater
intensity.526 Joint Chiefs of Staff memo JCSM-287-61, providing the latest update on the state
of contingency planning, outlined a „checklist‟ of conditions, options and other considerations.
The checklist approach was incremental and carefully targeted, to avoid escalation or negative
effect on countries not directly involved. It did not constitute a plan for a general war response
and, in fact, shows the narrow limits Allied planners faced in considering forceful response.
Non-military measures of „political, economic, or psychological nature‟ would first be applied,
but “more severe military measures” amounting to reprisals “should be considered.”527 Both
military and non-military measures should be flexible enough that they “may be turned on and
off again in accordance with the situation.” Reprisals might be required in the event of “Soviet
or East German actions or omissions adversely affecting Allied rights of access to West
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Berlin.”528 Naval and air controls would be imposed quickly after notifying „friendly
governments.‟ The checklist states that “Nuclear weapons will not be used, except upon direct
order of the President, and no threat or implication of their use will be made.” Clearance and
guarantees of non-interference would have to be obtained from neighboring countries.
A naval blockade would expand the area of possible confrontation outside of Berlin and
the Germanys and “US effort applied to reprisals against Soviet merchant shipping and air
activities could become disproportionate to the real effects obtainable.” Adding forces in the
area could adversely affect US ability to deter threats elsewhere. Soviet probes in other sensitive
areas worldwide could be expected in response.529 Public reaction would be more supportive of
forceful Allied responses if the responses were made after the Soviet had already blockaded
West Berlin. The report concluded by emphasizing the need to curtail responses if the Soviets
showed a willingness to negotiate. This would require careful coordination among the Allies.
Paul-Henry Spaak, head of NATO, summed up the major challenges facing NATO in
achieving better integration at this time. Spaak said “Nothing is more important in NATO than
to enmesh West Germany into the Alliance in every possible way,” in part to ensure that a postAdenauer West Germany would remain committed to the Alliance. Of secondary importance
was the “problem of bringing General de Gaulle‟s France more into the Alliance.”530 Spaak also
wanted to bring American nuclear capacity more fully into NATO, but US representatives
informed him that was not a priority for the US at that time. Although the Soviets still had a
strong advantage in conventional forces in Europe, the JCS report had been very cautious about
bringing any more explicit nuclear deterrence to bear than necessary. NATO dissonance, and
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increasing public concerns about nuclear fallout, discouraged continued reliance on theater
nuclear response, though such deterrence still needed to be made evident to the Soviets. Airlift
scenarios involved considerably more difficulties than imagined two years before.531 Debate on
the nature and degree of force would become increasingly important as President Kennedy
commissioned new plans for US responses to Soviet moves on Berlin.532
Although military planning had gained more immediacy in the wake of the Vienna
meeting, softer new Khrushchev speeches suggested further negotiation might still be possible.
533

The four-power Allied working group gathered in Washington in mid-June to draft a response

to the June 4 Soviet aide-memoire. In private talks, Undersecretary Foy Kohler told French
Minister Jean Laloy that Khrushchev, despite his bluster, was taking a cautious approach on
Berlin: “the President may have had more effect on Khrushchev than was thought at the time.”534
Laloy agreed, though he doubted whether the UN might provide a productive diplomatic forum
for resolution. The working group‟s full session agreed the UN would only complicate the
problem; the Allies should focus on contingency planning and a reply to the Soviets ' tough
diplomatic note of June 4.535 British Undersecretary Sir Evelyn Shukburgh told Kohler that his
government wanted to emphasize diplomatic correspondence and publicity efforts to delay the
peace treaty. The UK remained skeptical about military measures on Berlin.536
Bonn wanted to emphasize the legal problems of a unilateral change to a multi-party
agreement. They wanted to make their own reply in advance of the Allied joint communiqué,
but Kohler wanted the US to make its response first, followed immediately by the German note.
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The US would propose to bring the matter before the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
Opening the Berlin issue up to juridical negotiation offered a new non-reprisal alternative to
stalled diplomacy. Kohler said this strategy might be accomplished through the UN and could
produce favorable public reaction.537 British delegate Sir Evelyn Shukbrough was reluctant to
spell out recourse to the Court mediation just yet. Further review of this idea brought forth
doubts by the French that the UN Security Council would be able to bring the issue before the
ICJ and that ICJ resolution would lead indirectly de jure recognition of East Germany. Kohler
said that bringing the case to the ICJ would be done on grounds of threatened world peace rather
than as a simple legal dispute.538
Speaking informally with West German attaché Martin Hillenbrand, US diplomatic
counselor to the French Jean-Claude Winkler said he thought the new French objections might
be a sign of displeasure at bilateral US-Soviet disarmament discussions. 539 Further talks between
Laloy and Kohler centered around what they discerned as reduced threats of nuclear threats from
Khrushchev re Berlin. Laloy dismissed East German and Chinese pressure on Khrushchev, as
well as the importance of Berlin to the Soviets but did acknowledge that Khrushchev might still
need support against Kremlin hard-liners.540 While these Allied talks were cordial and some
general accordance was found, serious differences remained on basic assumptions and attitudes,
as well as on prescriptive action.
Some of Kennedy‟s advisors outside the State Department were also looking at the
possibility of non-military responses. Eugene Rostow urged Chester Bowles, personally close to
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the President, to suggest a new diplomatic and much-less defensive approach. The US initiative
should try to marshal global public opinion towards a spirit of détente and towards European
progress. Rostow felt that British integration into Europe was a development on a par with the
Chinese revolution. Rostow noted further the Soviet supplemental note on disarmament to the
June 4 aide-memoire and suggested a fresh linkage of disarmament and Berlin.541
He saw possibilities for such an approach in an emerging Russian shift to diplomacy.
Soviet military confidence, based in great part on missile progress, was the foundation for a
diplomatic campaign evidenced by the Mikoyan, Kozlov and Khrushchev visits to the United
States. This campaign involved some risks that Soviet prestige would be damaged if the visits
were unsuccessful and that their Chinese rivals might be displeased. The campaign might
currently be centered around Berlin and Germany but involved farther reaching goals for
enhanced Soviet influence. Secretary Dulles had erred, Rostow believed, by never sufficiently
challenging Soviet domination of Eastern Europe as a violation of the Yalta and Potsdam
understandings.542.
Rostow‟s comments on Dulles might have been a suggestion that the Kennedy
administration could develop a new paradigm in its diplomacy. They overlook the fact that
Dulles consistently invoked Potsdam as the contractual basis for insisting on continued Allied
occupation rights. Dulles had, moreover, marshaled Allied unity as Herter and Rusk had not.543
Rostow saw the Berlin/German strategy as a wedge leading to greatly increased Soviet presence
in Europe, accompanied by conspicuous nuclear strength. British estrangement from European
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economic integration hindered a common Western front. The West needed a more vigorous and
positive public relations effort to counter Soviet ambitions.544
Senator Mike Mansfield, a frequent critic of what he saw as laxness in US Berlin policy,
supported the firm but open tone being considered in response to Soviet note, and suggested that
private talks might be arranged between Bohlen and a Soviet counterpart, perhaps at the United
Nations.545 Unofficial advisor William Griffith wrote from Berlin, concerned that US
compromises against reunification could rapidly alienate the West Germans. Griffith also
reported that the East German economy was disintegrating, that the Poles preferred a divided
Germany, and that public opinion in Berlin was firmly in the Allied favor. Contacts in
Yugoslavia and Albania reported deteriorating Sino-Soviet ties and that their leaders, Marshall
Tito and Enver Hoxha, were attempting to gain leverage with Khrushchev as a result.546 The US
thus had to consider dissenting allied opinion, tentative Congressional support, and a diverse
range of public opinion in Europe.
Kennedy also had to deal with prominent vocal critics like Walter Lippmann who told
CBS News on June 15 that Berlin was still the most important issue in the Cold War.
Lippmann thought Khrushchev was bluffing, but that nuclear war was more likely to result over
Berlin than any other issue.547 Lippmann and other vocal commentators only complicated the
US Administration‟s hope of pursuing a diplomatic resolution of the Berlin issue. On June 10,
Bundy forwarded recent commentaries by Lippmann and Joseph Alsop to the President, noting
that while Alsop remained as hawkish as ever on Berlin, Lippmann saw a true, sustainable
neutralization of Berlin as the best hope for resolution. Bundy also recommended the recent
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Kissinger position paper to Kennedy, particularly in regard to its renewed emphasis on German
unification. Kennedy‟s personal leadership was going to be essential, said Bundy, because
“Four-power parleys will almost surely produce uncertain postures.”548
On June 19, Llewellyn Thompson provided Secretary Rusk with his own analysis. He
thought Khrushchev‟s objectives were stabilization and border recognition for East Germany,
neutralization of Berlin preceding East German assimilation, and erosion of NATO coherence.
Although Khrushchev had attempted to shield US prestige previously through sweeteners like
the „free city‟ concept, he was so disappointed by Vienna and the Western reply that he was now
willing to „discredit the United States or seriously damage our prestige.” Thompson was
convinced Khrushchev was not bluffing and without unacceptable concessions he would go
through with the treaty. The imminent timeframe for action could divided into four phases: the
time remaining before West German elections, the time between elections and Soviet
convocation of a peace conference, the time between a conference agreement and its expected
date, and the time between that date and treaty implementation. 549 Although each of these
phases offered some continued room for a non-peace treaty resolution, the West must make its
decisions well in advance of each deadline. Short term, pre-election options included an
alternative to the „free city‟ plan, well-publicized proposals for a Berlin plebiscite, and
resumption of nuclear testing, which the British might strongly resist. He also suggested Soviet
Marshal Vershinin be invited to review Western military readiness.
Thompson saw few new diplomatic options once a peace conference was called; if such
a conference did not agree on a treaty, military readiness must be in their final stages. He still
thought that military measures should begin with an airlift, while ground forces were put into
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position to probe the access corridor. If these measures failed, we should then proceed with
military action, including the use of tactical atomic weapons.” The Soviets should be made to
see that the West would not stop with economic and political sanctions.550 It is notable, in
retrospect, that Thompson did not discuss possible responses to a border closure, even though he
had been one of the first, in February 1961, to mention such a possibility.
On June 16, Dean Acheson presented his preliminary report on Berlin to the
interdepartmental group headed by Foy Kohler and including Kissinger, Henry Owen,
Thompson, Martin Hillenbrand, and Paul Nitze. The Acheson report, commissioned by the
President but not binding, would become a basic, hotly contested reference point for discussions
in the coming weeks.551 Acheson affirmed the continuing importance of Berlin “involving
deeply the prestige of the United States and perhaps its very survival…(and) …did not believe a
political solution was possible.” 552 Because Khrushchev, under pressure from the East Germans
and rival Communist factions, perceived less risk of a Western nuclear response and was feeling
certain other pressures, he was now willing to carry out his long-delayed threats over Berlin. “It
was absolutely essential,” for the United States, “to increase the belief that we would use nuclear
weapons to oppose Russian advances.” The US needed to make such readiness highly visible in
the post-Vienna military buildup in order to maximize deterrence. Such demonstrations of
readiness were, so far, missing in Berlin contingency preparations. Conventional force
enhancements and civil defense needed to be increased concurrently, and nuclear testing
resumed. “It would be important to bring our Allies along,” said Acheson, “but we should be
prepared to go without them unless the Germans buckled…we should be prepared to go to the
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bitter end if the Germans go along with us.” Acheson said the US needed to decide on its policy
within two weeks.553
Foy Kohler expressed his general agreement with Acheson, and opened the meeting to
questions. Paul Nitze noted that General Nathan Twining said that it might not be advisable to
cross the East German border with a large ground force. Nitze added that the British were
uneasy about such plans. Acheson dismissed Allied "cold feet", saying: “We should … say
“boo” and see how far they jump." Thompson cautioned against putting Khrushchev in a position
where he could not back down from hard-line Western response. Thompson wanted incremental
steps including air raid shelters, a garrison airlift and delayed reaction to separate treaty. 554
Perceived Allied unity would deter Khrushchev more than saying “boo” publicly. Kohler agreed
with Thompson that it was important to leave Khrushchev with “a face-saving device.” Paul
Nitze noted that it would “necessary to mobilize the entire US behind this program {of increased
deterrence and civil defense}and that it would be very visible.” Acheson reaffirmed his support
for a garrison airlift, but noted “the situation would heat up very quickly,” especially if the
Soviets shot down Allied aircraft. 555 Military contingency measures, not further attempts at
multi-polar resolution, would constitute the next immediate steps on Berlin.
Kohler headed both the US inter-departmental group and the Allied working group, but
the tone of their discussions was markedly different. The US policy planners were more
convinced that Khrushchev was serious this time and there would be no more postponed
deadlines. The US was becoming more willing to act independently of the Allies. At the same
time the Allies were more forthcoming with their reservations about American assumptions and
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proposals.556 The Western reply to the Soviet June 4 note was still under review. Kennedy
complained drafts were just recycled boilerplate dating back to 1958, but J Kohler said anything
new would have to get Allied approval.557 The British, French and German governments were
working on their own military contingency reports while the US began deliberating its own, now
much tougher, plans. Allied cooperation had not improved since Vienna.
On June 19, US Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke sent a memo to
Acheson and to the JCS cautioning that military planning also needed to take into account
possible Soviet diversionary moves in Southeast Asia and suggested that Khrushchev might link
Berlin concessions to US guarantees of non-interference in that region. NATO commandant
and US General) Lauris Norstad had met with Acheson and the JCS prior to Acheson‟s full
report to the coordinating group. Norstad‟s subsequent memo to the JCS reflected the now more
visible commitment to forceful response, but also cautioned that the West, and specifically the
US, must retain flexibility and freedom a action to avoid dangerous circumstantial escalation. 558
Not spelled out in the JCS memorandum, but still important to the US planners, was the need to
keep popular support for a course that involved substantial risks of war over an issue, Berlin, that
might not seem to be worth the danger. British and French public opinion was much cooler
towards war over Berlin.559
Dean Acheson issued his full report on June 28. He framed his argument “an issue of
resolution between the US and the USSR…which will go far to determine the confidence of
Europe - indeed the world - in the United States.” In this “conflict of wills”, said Acheson, “an
attempt to solve the Berlin issue by negotiation is worse than a waste of time and energy…it is
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dangerous.” Negotiation was contingent on Kremlin attitudes, which could be turned to
constructive purpose only by a demonstration of Western force. Otherwise, negotiation could
only lead to “a submission to Soviet demands.”560 Acheson‟s proposal outlined his idea of an
effective demonstration of force, in military, economic and political terms.
Successful negotiation, insisted Acheson, would be explicitly contingent on the extent
and outcomes of demonstrated readiness to maintain Western positions in Berlin and Germany.
He saw little merit in „interim freeze‟ variations, or an indefinite agreement, which define the
peace treaty‟s consequences for Berlin; these options would be unacceptable to West Germany.
He saw some value in Thompson‟s idea of an agreement, reached between East and West before
the „peace conference,‟ which would leave the West in Berlin despite a peace treaty, but doubted
this arrangement would gain Soviet approval. Accommodations like a pledge against nuclear
arms in Berlin, disengagement from espionage and propaganda activities and recognition of the
Oder-Niesse border between East Germany and Poland. Acheson did not think Khrushchev,
after staking prestige on demands for withdrawal, would accept continued occupation.561
Acheson concluded his report by noting force carried its own risks, including refusal of the
Allies to carry through with forceful measures, escalation to general (i.e. nuclear) war by
“mischance, ” or Soviet determination to implement its new arrangements despite the
demonstration of force.
Kennedy had commissioned the Acheson report but he invited review and critique ,
which was quick in coming. The State Department‟s Bureau of Intelligence and Research
observed that the proposed military buildup would be expensive but manageable for the US,
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more so for the Allies and difficult for the Soviets.562 Kennedy‟s May 25 television
announcement had already outlined major new military investments by the US. The President
would, within the next month, call for additional new military spending. These major increases
in defense costs marked a distinct shift from Eisenhower‟s restrained defense spending. The
same State Department research unit also presented a report noting considerable difficulties for
an airlift. Electronic counter measures, harassment and sabotage on the ground, and economic
interference would make an airlift difficult, but possible. West Berlin could be sustained on an
austerity basis for up to a year, but eventually the Allies would have to resort to ground action.563
State Department analyst Roger Hilsman doubted whether Khrushchev really sought the
showdown of „will‟ that Acheson envisioned.564 All these reports suggest that Acheson‟s
proposed use of force entailed serious collateral concerns, economically, logistically and
politically; furthermore, a “showdown” might be basically unnecessary since Khrushchev‟s
continued extension of the crisis suggested he really did not war.
Not only did forceful response have its critics, but some advisors continued to hold out
hope for renewed negotiation. State Dept. legal counselor Richard Kearney suggested a new
approach to negotiation that would de-emphasize reunification. The Kearney proposal essentially
called for neutralization of Berlin with a guaranteed access corridor, but on terms more
acceptable to the United States and hopefully for France and West Germany as well. Kearney
raised the possibility of another summit: “it would be possible to offer the Soviets at a summit
meeting a variety of other Berlin solutions so as not to appear to be standing on a take-it or
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leave-it position.” 565 Presidential special advisor Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. explicitly argued
against Acheson‟s assumptions and recommendations, especially the dismissal of further
negotiation. Schlesinger urged Kennedy to examine possibilities for negotiation “well before the
crisis.” 566
Eugene Rostow, Walt's brother and dean of the Yale Law School, continued to argue that
the Soviets wanted negotiation much more than conflict. He delivered lectures and circulated a
paper arguing that the Soviets had embarked on a diplomatic campaign that was "one of the most
strenuous and dramatic of the century." He cited the Khrushchev, Mikoyan and Kozlov visits to
the US as gambles that that showed intense Soviet interest in using diplomacy to avoid conflict
with the West. Rostow said the Berlin initiative was more than just an attempt at incremental
expansion of their dominion or a public relations gambit. Their real goal, thought Rostow, might
be the limitation of nuclear arms. 567 The arms race was expensive, dangerous and destabilizing.
Khrushchev's Berlin campaign could thus be an oblique strategy to begin serious disarmament
negotiation. Rostow suggested that the US be more understanding of legitimate Soviet fears
about German militarization, notwithstanding the admitted Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.
Although Rostow denigrated Dulles's Berlin strategy, perceived linkages of Berlin and
disarmament were not, in fact, new but had been understood since the beginning of the crisis in
late 1958. The difficulty had been, and still remained, in getting the Soviets, to show enough
flexibility on either Berlin or disarmament to advance towards new agreements.
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Disarmament was becoming more timely in mid-summer 1961, because contingency
scenarios for Berlin pointed towards use of nuclear weapons in the event of a forceful Western
response to a Berlin blockade. Limited nuclear use in Europe could readily escalate to total
war.568 Carl Kaysen, an NSC deputy who became very influential from mid-1961 on, wrote a
memo for Bundy outlining the risks and effects of nuclear attacks on the United States. Kaysen
recommended that more attention be paid to civil defense. Henry Kissinger also wrote Bundy
about general nuclear war. He agreed with Acheson that Kennedy must decide if he was ready to
risk nuclear war over Berlin. That commitment, Kissinger said, was essential to all Western
plans to ensure ground access; the problem was preparing a set of graduated nuclear options and
understanding their risks.569 Bundy told Rusk and McNamara that the US prepare short-term
disarmament options, including a "crash effort which might be proposed to the USSR at the
height of a Berlin crisis, in order to defuse a dangerous situation." 570
Allied cohesion was still shaky, though drafts of reply to the Soviet June 4 note
were finally being circulated. Rusk advised the US envoy to NATO that “we cannot begin
intergovernmental consultations until ... we ourselves are clear about how we see the problem
and how we think the West should proceed.” Rusk acknowledged that news reports were
suggesting the Allies felt ignored, but added that the allies were welcome to offer their own
alternatives. Rusk wanted to send the Western replies, grouped as closely as possible, by July 14.
In National Security Action Memorandum 58 dated July 30, the President commissioned yet
another comprehensive Berlin report, including the state of contingency planning. NSAM 58 set
an October 15 deadline for airlift capability, a November 15 deadline for naval blockade

568

Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, p. 286-88.
Kissinger memo to Bundy, July 7, 1961, JFK, NSF Box 81A, folder 7/1/61.
570
Bundy memo to Seaborg, Rusk and McNamara, July 7, 1961, JFK, NSF Box 81A, folder 7/1/61.
569

162

capability, and ongoing Strategic Air Command readiness for an alert.571 On July 12, at the
initial review session for the resulting paper, the lingering divide between advocates for forceful
demonstration and those favoring new negotiation became quickly evident. Acheson, backed by
General Maxwell Taylor, said adequate military preparations would require not only sustained
effort into 1962, but might also involve a congressionally approved state of national emergency.
Bundy agreed “in general” with Acheson but was worried about collateral effects of declaring
such an emergency. Participants were cautioned to keep discussions in strict confidence. 572
Meanwhile, US Ambassador to West Germany Thomas Dowling reported that the
refugee exodus through Berlin was rapidly becoming uncontrollable for East German leader
Walter Ulbricht. Dowling warned that the US prestige would be badly damaged if it remained
“on sidelines” in the event of refugee riots. Khrushchev was under great pressure to resolve the
problem and began to seriously consider Ulbricht‟s requests for an inter-zonal border closure to
stabilize the Berlin situation. The East German press demanded an end to the drain of human
resources. 573 Western planners continued to ignore the possibility of such a stop-gap solution.
At a July 13 National Security Council meeting, Secretary Rusk admitted that the West
really did not know what Khrushchev‟s timetable for action might be. Rusk affirmed the
Acheson view that “the US was not currently in a good position to negotiate.” Khrushchev no
longer appeared interested in providing cover for Western prestige and would be compelled to
negotiate only if “appropriate steps were taken for our side.” Rush wanted to begin
implementing economic counter measures, but was still reticent about declaring a national
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emergency. Kennedy said he wanted to first see a very specific program. Acheson “made clear
his belief that the President should decide to support a full program of decisive action.” 574
Vice President Lyndon Johnson agreed with Acheson, arguing for a speedy and
substantial reinforcement of ground forces. Secretary of Defense and McNamara agreed with
Rusk that measures short of requiring a state of emergency should be implemented first.
General Taylor wanted a declaration of emergency and mobilization up to the point of calling up
reserve forces. President Kennedy did not specifically endorse any of these plans, but, to
McGeorge Bundy, appeared still committed to maintaining US presence in and access to
Berlin.575 The next day Rusk, Macnamara, and Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles met
to address the calls for new preparedness reports, emphasizing military and economic
preparation for a probable and imminent crisis.576
In these highest circles of foreign policy-making, negotiation now seemed a distinctly
unlikely alternative. There had been only incidental discussion of further summits for
resolution of the Berlin problem. Nevertheless, negotiation did remain an outside possibility.
Schlesinger continued to argue for negotiation, warning that the US should provide “an escape
hatch for Khrushchev.”577 State Dept. planners issued a new paper on Soviet positions in the
event that the US were to actually participate in the „peace conference‟ that Khrushchev had
referenced often as a vehicle for his peace treaty. Problems included East German participation,
which the Soviets had lobbied hard for in the 1959 Geneva Foreign Minister‟s Conference and
which was anathema to Paris and Bonn. Khrushchev might still try to assuage the West by
delaying reunification and allowing East and West Germany to remain in their respective
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military alliances for the time being. The planners thought concessions might be offered to link
Berlin/German resolution to a new round of disarmament talks: “the Soviets would probably
hope to elicit a conditional but positive response from the West, which they would cite as an
endorsement for separate, unconditional negotiations on European security within a reconstituted
disarmament forum.”578 The Soviets however would not advance such linkage before they had
secured a satisfactory amount of their basic Berlin/German program.
Linkage continued between Khrushchev‟s Berlin proposals and Soviet disarmament, but
the Soviets had hardened their positions against any German reunification based on a freelyelected government. They certainly would want to retain the option of concluding their own
arrangements with East Germany to end the existing occupation regime. Since these demands
had been consistently rejected by the West, Khrushchev's apparent intention to sign the peace
treaty still constituted, an unacceptable outcome for the Western occupying powers in Berlin and
for the Allies. The West was unaware that the East Germans and Soviets were already
mobilizing for a border closure.579

Post-Vienna Standoff Deepens
Soviet Ambassador Mikhail Menshikov sought out Bundy's NSC aide Walt Rostow on
July 17 to exchange views. The conversation quickly turned to Berlin. Menshikov and Rostow
both restated the familiar positions of both sides. Menshikov wondered why the US could deal
with other opposed governments, but not the East Germans which the US “evidently disliked.”
580
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replied the Soviets were very worried about a nuclear-armed West Germany. Rostow said the
US was also anxious about this development, a curious position since it was official US and
NATO policy to equip the West Germans with US-supplied tactical nuclear missiles. Rostow
said that nuclear armaments in Europe were a good reason to complete a test-ban agreement.
They both expressed regrets over escalating problems in Africa. Then Menshikov announced the
Soviets would sign a treaty with East Germany in the latter part of November, preceded first by
invitations to all parties involved in Berlin. He wondered if the US would come to such a
conference. Rostow tried to avoid answering directly; the Soviet Ambassador then said he had
gathered that the US would not attend such a conference. Rostow did not deny such reports. 581
Menshikov returned to basics of the Berlin conflict. He asked “Why do you wish to be in
Berlin as conquerors?” Menshikov told Rostow he did not think the US public was really
prepared to go to war over Berlin. 582 Rostow said Hitler had made similar assumptions about
American resolve. They both agreed that the nuclear weapons had changed the equations of
national security. They concluded by briefly discussing Laos without any particular animus, but
also without any particular enthusiasm. Rostow reported that Menshikov seemed willing to
defuse the issue of Western access but did want to confirm US interest in recognizing East
Germany, if not outright, then by degrees. Rostow said this was the first time he had heard a
Soviet official mention the peace conference with a firm late November date. Menshikov did not
appear to doubt US readiness to “fight over access, nor did he threaten the US.”583
He appeared conciliatory to Rostow, who thought this softened tone reflected Soviet
awareness that the US was making its crucial decisions on Berlin that same week. If that was the
case, it might confirm Acheson's conviction that US firmness might prompt new negotiations.
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Thompson reported harsh new Soviets statements about West Germany that struck a much more
belligerent tone.584 'Peace conference‟ negotiations would, in no way, represent Soviet
acceptance of the status quo as Acheson had so optimistically imagined.
On July 25, President Kennedy delivered a televised address on Berlin. He said the US
would not allow the Soviet Union to "drive us out of Berlin." He announced mobilization
measures including a call-up of reserve troops, civil defense actions, and a state of ground alert
for combat and support aircraft. Acheson had argued for a declaration of national emergency,
but Kennedy wanted to provide some margin to encourage the Soviets to reconsider
negotiation.585 Kennedy explicitly reminded the American people that the Berlin crisis carried
dangers of thermonuclear war. Those warnings did not deter an appreciative public response or
Congressional approval of the announced measures.586
Further refinements and arguments over the Acheson plan continued over the next few
weeks. Henry Kissinger lobbied hard for a new more positive and confident US diplomatic
initiative, but defense planning overshadowed such ideas. On August 3, Bundy forwarded plans
for possible new US-UK-France-USSR foreign-minister and summit meetings to Kennedy. The
Allies were not enthusiastic over negotiations, but the deteriorating situation in Berlin and lack
of contingency preparedness compelled them to reconsider their options.587 In Moscow,
Khrushchev was angry over Kennedy's speech and authorized new Soviet statements calling for
implementation of his peace treaty. 588
The Western foreign ministers met again in Paris from August 4-9 to discuss Berlin.
They could not agree on a timetable or common program for resuming negotiations, but did
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agree the situation called for new high-level talks. A near-term plebiscite, the heart of any allGerman self-determination proposal, did not seem feasible.589 The imagined timetable for
conferences would be in October after the German elections. The Soviets were about to take
"game-changing" action well before the elections. On August 10, when Rusk visited Adenauer
in Bonn, the West still did not realize the Soviets were about to undertake their most significant
restriction of Berlin access since the 1948 blockade.590

The Berlin Wall is Constructed
The conflict in Washington over pursuing a forceful or negotiable US response to the
June 4 Soviet demands was soon rendered moot by events in the Soviet Union an East Germany.
The drain of 50 to 75,000 people from East Berlin and heavy financial support meant
Khrushchev had to stabilize the situation.591 East Germany was key to the Warsaw Pact and
Ulbricht was a prominent leader in the Communist bloc, with allies in the Soviet Union.
Ulbricht also wanted to minimize the Western presence in East Berlin. He made a persuasive
plea for assistance to Warsaw Pact leaders in East. He had been demanding a border for months.
and in early July, Khrushchev finally gave his approval.592 By August 10, Soviet Army
engineers had delivered vast loads of materials and technicians and prepared to construct a
barbed wire barrier, with concrete reinforcement. Soviet and East German troops and tanks were
brought closer to Berlin.
Khrushchev was still most interested in his peace treaty but had decided a border closure
was necessary first, if only to quiet Ulbricht. Michael Beschloss has suggested that Robert
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Kennedy may have suggested, through Bolshakov, closure as a compromise to the Soviets. 593
Hope Harrison says Khrushchev was angry over Kennedy's July 25 speech announcing an arms
build-up.594 Sergei Khrushchev recalled that his father did not seem very enthusiastic about the
Wall at first. The reluctance seems likely. Khrushchev probably realized that the Wall would be
viewed as harsh symbol of Communism. A wall might not fit well with the 'free city' concept.
Nor did Khrushchev know how the West would react. Though he later became pleased with the
Wall, it may have been because it calmed things down. He still had not successfully negotiated
with the Americans. 595 The Wall gave him time to figure how to achieve the peace treaty.
On a Sunday morning, August 13, the East Germans, with Soviet assistance and
approval, erected barriers closing East Berlin‟s access to the city‟s Western zones. By
afternoon, they had sealed off most access points. There was little resistance on either side,
though news got out quickly. They reinforced the border crossings, notably at Friedrichstrasse
and Steinsteucken. 596 The Wall was erected before there was any thought of mobilizing the
occupation troops. The East Germans had armor and troops within sight. Escapee numbers went
from thousands to hundreds to dozens to singles within a few days. Initial Western reaction was
relaxed. Neither Kennedy nor Macmillan interrupted their vacations for full-on crisis
consultation. The Berlin refugee crisis had been, at least temporarily, resolved.
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The cool reaction may have been prudent, but the US could not accept the Wall without
some protest. Quadripartite Western meetings in Paris failed to develop an effective response.598
Willy Brandt, Mayor of Berlin, was furious that the troops had done nothing and West German
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public opinion was turning against the Americans. He sent a strong letter of protest to
Kennedy.599 Adenauer was more understanding but still concerned about what might happen
next. President Kennedy, under some pressure, sent Vice-President Lyndon Johnson to Berlin to
reassure the West Berliners. Kennedy bolstered Johnson‟s mission by sending along a US
ground battalion, commanded by General Lucius Clay, who had overseen the 1948 airlift.
Adenauer and Brandt were locked in a bitter election for the Chancellorship. Johnson would
have to placate both of them and deliver reprimands from Kennedy for their presumptuous
demands on the US.600
Johnson and Clay, with Ambassador Bohlen along as a "minder," went to Bonn on
August 19, when they met with Adenauer. They then flew to Tempelhof airport in West Berlin,
though Adenauer had to take a separate plane to appease Brandt. All received an overflowing
and appreciative reception. Johnson effectively navigated the Adenauer-Brandt rivalry, though
he made clear Kennedy's impatience with their refusal to acknowledge the hazards of military
action in the situation. Johnson's Texas-politician street skills served him well in an enthusiastic
motorcade tour where he stopped and walked among the crowds. Bohlen prevented him from
attempting to enter West Berlin. Johnson's street tour presaged a later appearance by Kennedy in
Berlin in June 1963, but Johnson did not have Kennedy's oratorical skill. Clay remained with the
battalion, which met only minor harassment as it travelled the access corridor.601
During his trip, Johnson made no attempt at negotiations with either East German
or Soviet representatives. The Johnson visit was only a stopgap measure, a sharply limited
protest against the Wall. Dean Rusk recalled in his memoirs: "we quickly decided that the wall
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was not an issue of war and peace between East and West; there was no way we would destroy
the human race over it." The Secretary was, however, less confident about new negotiations than
the President.602 New talks would be further complicated by the Soviets' August 31
announcement of resumed atomic testing.603 The events of August 1961 concluded a very
significant phase of the Berlin crisis and set the stage for a much different approach to
negotiations beginning in September 1961.

Conclusions
Construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 concluded the first, multilateral phase of
a diplomatic arc that began in November 1958 with Khrushchev‟s demands for a new Berlin and
German arrangement. In the first phase the Western partners in Berlin chose closer consultation
with each other and with the Soviets to address Khrushchev's ultimatum. The Geneva
conference, US-Soviet goodwill/trade visits of 1959, and the attempted Paris summit had raised
hopes that a détente was in the making.604 Détente, i.e. a mutual effort to create and sustain an
atmosphere of negotiation, relaxed tension and cooperation, would stand in sharp contrast to the
diplomatic estrangement that had characterized the „containment‟ era. The failure of the Paris
summit showed how frail this fledgling detente was. The disappointments of Vienna and the
Wall reflected that detente had again been attempted and had apparently failed.605 New
precedents for high level negotiation, however, had been established.
The arc from late 1958 to late 1960 was an important learning exercise in the transition
from containment to détente. Berlin was the catalyst, though the hoped-for linkage with
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disarmament did not produce recognizable gains. The dangers associated with Berlin fostered
awareness of the need for arms-control, but the Geneva disarmament talks made only slow and
intermittent progress. Disarmament would gradually be de-linked from Germany in the arc that
began with Kennedy's election and the Vienna summit. The Wall's construction may have
stabilized the Berlin situation, but it also lessened the impetus for Berlin negotiation.
Though the next year would seem to represent a definite slide back into vintage Cold War
tensions, much progress had been made at times up the „slippery path.‟ These lessons would be
helpful in the years to come, as US leaders, frustrated by Allied disagreements, decided it had to
take the diplomatic initiative. In the coming months, Kennedy continued the transition from
multi-lateral to bilateral diplomacy.606 Though tedious and unproductive, these talks provided
useful negotiating experience with the Soviets and precedents for the later, disarmament-centered
detente. But, in 1962, the strains on the US-Soviet relationship would disrupt diplomatic
engagement. Increasingly distant from their alliance partners, the test for both Khrushchev and
Kennedy would be whether they would anchor superpower relations in confrontation or detente.
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Chapter 4: “Salami Tactics,” September - December 1961

Introduction
The sudden construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 marked the end of the
preliminary détente American and Soviet leaders had been exploring since 1959. Renewed
interest in diplomacy instead of force to resolve the lingering Berlin controversy had led to the
1959 Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference and then to the 1960 Paris and 1961 Vienna heads of
states summits. Just before the Wall's construction, Western leaders had been ready to accept a
new East-West foreign minister's conference and possible summit. Afterwards, they were less
willing, although Khrushchev still seemed ready to sign his peace treaty very soon, possibly at a
'peace conference." To avert potential conflict and recover American leadership on Berlin,
Kennedy decided to try a confidential approach to the Soviets, with the Allies deciding any final
agreement.607 He had to balance this private diplomacy with alliance disunity, as well as
pressures from military and hard-line advisors for tough contingency planning that might
include limited nuclear warfare.
The fall of 1961 did not accomplish any new agreements among the Allies or with the
Soviets, but included some of the most significant diplomatic sequences of the Berlin crisis.
The American and Soviet foreign ministers, Dean Rusk and Andrei Gromyko, held bilateral
diplomatic talks in September 1961. Nikita Khrushchev and American President John Kennedy
began an unprecedented private correspondence to renew negotiations. 608 US Ambassador
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Llewellyn Thompson prepared to begin new discussions in Moscow that winter. Western
ministers and heads of state also met to try and develop a common strategy on Berlin and
German issues. Britain's Harold Macmillan was most interested, as always in a summit, but
France's Charles de Gaulle was adamantly opposed to new negotiations with the Soviets on
Berlin. One reason for the impasse was the lack of persuasive new proposals on Germany/Berlin
or the related topic of disarmament. The lack of Western consensus on Berlin became more
pronounced than at any time since Soviet demands of November 1958. Soviet resumption of
nuclear testing, and France's continued testing, discouraged disarmament progress, even while
the need had become more obvious. The Soviets did seem very interested in negotiating, despite
the impasse, but the ongoing pursuit of negotiations helped leaders on all sides resist the use of
force to resolve post-Wall conflicts in Berlin.

Searching for a Post-Wall Strategy
In late August, Khrushchev had told American columnist Drew Pearson, “There will be
no war.”609 Kennedy and his advisors could not be sure how long the post-Wall truce would last.
The construction of the Wall on August 13, the Soviet resumption of nuclear testing on August
31, and Khrushchev's evident intention to sign the peace treaty with East Germany signaled a
sharp retreat from detente, but fell short of an open break with the West. Vice-President
Johnson‟s visit to West Germany and West Berlin on August 19, carefully managed by Kennedy,
Ambassador Charles Bohlen, and national security aide Walt Rostow, aimed to reassure
European allies and deflect domestic criticism in America.610 Kennedy hoped to display some
toughness by assigning General Lucius Clay to accompany Johnson and dispatching a combat
609
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battalion through the East German access corridor.611 While successful as a morale-builder, the
Johnson-Clay expedition did not attempt any new East-West discussion and instead highlighted
the growing impasse over Berlin. West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and West Berlin's
mayor Willy Brandt were locked in a bitter election contest. Both leaders had offended Kennedy
with their ham-handed insistence on a more vigorous response. Neither de Gaulle nor
Macmillan was impressed by the American exercise, nor did they expect that Khrushchev would
be either. 612 Scarcely had Johnson made his report to Kennedy, when Khrushchev announced
that the USSR would resume nuclear testing. The president was furious at the announcement,
but was reluctant to respond in kind. He delayed agreeing to the Joint Chief of Staff‟s calls for
immediate US nuclear testing and further mobilization for a possible Berlin conflict.613
Khrushchev further surprised Kennedy by requesting, via a private letter delivered by
Cyrus Sulzberger, “some sort of informal contact with him to find a means of settling the crisis
without damaging the prestige of the United States - but on the basis of a German peace treaty
and a free city of Berlin.”614 Thompson had just warned that the West would probably have to
“accept de facto” the Wall and avoid the temptation to tie West Berlin and West Germany further
together politically.615 Unwilling to accept Khrushchev‟s apparent ability to define the situation,
Kennedy resolved to find a new approach to negotiations. Two days after receiving
Khrushchev‟s note, Kennedy and Rusk agreed they should call for a peace conference to
consider parallel peace treaties for Germany. The president did not want to use a new variant of
the familiar “Western Peace Plan,” which dated back to the 1959 Foreign Ministers Conference,
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as the basis for new discussions.616 Kennedy would not call for reunification through all-German
free elections – an idea unacceptable to the Soviets, as well as the East and West German
leadership. Instead of specific political measures, Kennedy wanted to open with a statement of
general goals before presenting a “real reconstruction of our negotiating positions.” He thought
new British proposals were tied up in “impracticable machinery.” He designated a small group of
advisors, including Bohlen, Kohler, Hillenbrand and Owen, to prepare new options that might
lead to a resolution of the Berlin and German issues. 617 This group was to work in the strictest
confidence, outside from the usual working group on Berlin and without input from Acheson and
others committed to forceful responses.
Berlin remained tense, with particular Soviet harassment at the chronically troublesome
Steinstuecken and Freidrichstrasse checkpoints. Kennedy wanted to convey American readiness
to respond to further provocations. In mid-September, Kennedy assigned General Lucius Clay to
remain as a special military advisor.618 West Berliners found Clay's appointment reassuring, but
the General soon troubled Kennedy with unauthorized probing of various boundary points.
Adenauer defeated Brandt, but had to settle for a coalition government and the promise he would
not serve a full term. Walter Ulbricht, believing Khrushchev would soon implement his peace
treaty, was ready to consolidate access control for all Berlin.619
On September 14, Rusk advised British Foreign Minister Lord Home and French Foreign
Minister Couve de Murville that he intended to sound out Gromyko, at the upcoming United
Nations General Assembly sessions, about the prospects for new negotiations. The French were
cool to this idea, saying Soviet positions were still unchanged and new negotiations under the
616
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circumstances were “not appropriate.”620 If the Americans and British wanted to explore the
possibility, the French would not object. Rusk noted ongoing British and French differences
over what the Western position should be regarding Berlin and Germany, but thought his own
recent talks with de Gaulle had lessened their overall differences. De Murville noted the French
press had already announced Rusk‟s intended overtures to Gromyko at the UN; public response
was already critical. Bohlen said it was necessary to keep talking with the Soviets because they
had earlier “changed their positions” on important matters like the end of the 1948-49 Berlin
Blockade and the Austrian peace treaty. 621 De Murville said the Soviets had a more immediate
objective now: shutting down air access to starve out West Berlin. France thought serious RuskGromyko talks could be useful, but as long as the Soviet Union remained committed to getting
the West out of Berlin, there was no point in a conference held on Soviet terms.
Rusk‟s meeting with Soviet Ambassador Mikhail Menshikov less than three hours later
seemed to confirm French skepticism. Menshikov said that if the Americans were prepared to
negotiate in a “businesslike” manner, the Soviets would meet with them in the same spirit.
However, the Ambassador said recent US language might also be read as threatening, a tone the
Soviets were prepared to match. Rusk said it was the Soviets and East Germans who were
making obstructive threats to air access for West Berlin. Menshikov dismissed Rusk‟s
objections, saying the US did not have “the full facts.”622
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The next day, Kennedy met with the Western foreign ministers and asked them what
differences remained regarding negotiations. De Murville noted that negotiations would entail
concerns similar to those presented by coordinating individual national contingency planning
(for a military response) with the multilateral Live Oak planning. The problem was to “convince
Khrushchev that he was facing a serious risk of war and he should not be allowed to have his
own way.” Only the United States “had the strength to speak convincingly to Khrushchev along
these lines … a US private warning was extremely important…the preliminary to everything.”
Kennedy also said "he wanted to stress the role of the Federal Republic in this question," a
statement much appreciated by West German Foreign Minister von Brentano.623
The Western ministers met again without Kennedy. Lord Home said he didn‟t think
Khrushchev would pay much attention to public warnings; instead a conference was needed, an
idea that de Murville quickly dismissed. He reiterated that the US would have to take the lead in
opening up new negotiations, which could only proceed if Khrushchev was really prepared to
negotiate constructively and flexibly. West German foreign minister Heinrich von Brentano, also
present, but saying little, said that the West needed to be able to match Soviet initiatives like the
„free city Berlin‟ plan with firm proposals, such as free elections for Berlin and Germany.
Kennedy endorsed Von Brentano‟s statement; the US would “keep closely in step with the (West
Germans) and that we not undertake courses of action or proposals which would turn them away
from the Alliance.”
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especially de Gaulle.625 While all Western co-signatories of the Berlin occupation accords had
equal political status, disparity in their relative practical strengths hindered a balanced alliance
with the US. Trade rivalries disturbed Allied unity.626 The French were telling Kennedy to take
the lead, but not proceed far without consensus. The British, weakest of the alliance and keenest
on conference negotiation, had little weight to back their positions. The French had little
confidence in the British, but both encouraged and resisted US leadership. The West Germans,
still regarded with some skepticism by the French and British, would be most affected by matters
in which they could not yet negotiate directly.627
The United States felt it essential to preserve West German freedom from Eastern
domination, yet understood that Berlin in itself did not have much essential value economically,
militarily or for intelligence and propaganda purposes. The European leadership of Macmillan,
de Gaulle, and Adenauer had remained a stable constant, besides Khrushchev‟s unwavering
attachment to his free city/peace treaty proposals. That constant provided a steady reference
point for the US leadership. Kennedy was sincere in wanting to find new approaches to this
central problem for the Western alliance.628 The problems he faced, even after the Wall, were
essentially the same as Eisenhower and Dulles had faced in December 1958. De Gaulle and
Adenauer wanted no revision of the Berlin status quo and Macmillan was too willing to bargain.
At the same time as the Western powers were trying to find consensus for a new
approach to negotiations, a series of war-games designed by Professor Thomas Schelling were
conducted to gauge the viability of forceful responses. Schelling devised a set of scenarios
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requiring decisions at crucial stages and evaluated the probable outcomes.629 NATO
Commandant General Lauris Nortsad reported that the Soviets could field 100 divisions, twice
the number estimated by the US Defense Department. At a meeting with Kennedy, Rusk and
McNamara Joint Chiefs of Staff representative General Curtis Lemay said the Army and the JCS
chairman were split over sending more reinforcements. Kennedy decided to call up one infantry
and one armored division, but with little fanfare.630 He had good reason to be cautious.
Reports from the Schelling exercise indicated that the US would find it “difficult to use
its military power flexibly and effectively for tactical purposes.” One problem was “alliance drag
... getting agreement among a number of allies on day to day measures.” Another was predicting
reliably what the other side might do in a given situation Rolling force back once deployed also
appeared difficult. The problem of finding allied and domestic consensus in support of tactical
operations was not easily solved. The democratic nature of Western Europe's political systems
made heads of state cautious about public reaction. Greater political flexibility in dealing with
the East on GDR recognition or the Oder-Niesse border could mean trouble at the polls. The US
had to “take more initiative in relation to our allies and to assume a degree of independent
leadership which corresponds more nearly with the degree of responsibility we bear for the final
result.”631 National Security Council advisor Carl Kaysen concluded that it would be more useful
if the exercise was repeated with high-ranking participants, such as General Maxwell Taylor,
Foy Kohler, Paul Nitze, Walt Rostow and McGeorge Bundy. 632 Those individuals would
actually shape decisions in a crisis.
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Rusk and Gromyko Begin Talks
At the beginning of the United Nations General Assembly sessions, Rusk approached
Gromyko about private bilateral discussions on Berlin. They began their discussions on
September 21.633 McGeorge Bundy outlined for Kennedy what Rusk needed to consider. The
US needed to concentrate on the demands to end occupation rights, restrict access to West
Berlin, and make unilateral political changes regarding East Germany‟s status. The US wanted
serious bilateral talks with the Soviets in a mutually acceptable setting. The US would consider
the idea of peace conference to normalize unresolved issues left over from World war Two. The
US would not use the Western Peace Plan as its starting proposal and did not think another
Four-Power Foreign Minister‟s conference would be productive. 634
The Rusk-Gromyko meetings proved “reasonably relaxed” but not very productive.
Gromyko underscored the intransigent tone that the Soviets had presented at Vienna and in their
June 4 aide-memoire. Rusk said he was speaking for the US alone. He said the Berlin crisis
“was essentially a Soviet creation.” The peace treaty threatened “vital interests and fundamental
commitments of the US.” The US did not want an arms race but would meet such challenges.
Although Rusk believed the Soviets did not want war either, Soviet unilateralism did threaten
war. In response, Gromyko narrowed in on the specific issue of the peace treaty, which the
Soviets cast as a legitimate means of normalizing the post-war situation and as the best means
for German unification. Western forces would definitely have to withdraw but that did not mean
Soviet forces would replace them; neutral or UN peacekeepers could be brought in to oversee
Berlin. Access to the city was, likewise, a residue of the wartime situation and had no role in
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perpetuity. Rusk replied that while the 1945 agreements were to designed as temporary
mechanisms, “it was not intended that one side would unilaterally terminate them.” 635 The
Soviets had already unilaterally turned over their responsibilities for East Berlin and removed its
status from discussion. The Soviets could begin, Rusk said, by inviting UN peacekeepers to
replace East German and Soviet forces in East Berlin. Western access rights were not Soviet
property to be disposed of at will. The meeting ended noncommittally, with no new ground
being broken but no new obstacles to further discussion.
British Foreign Secretary Lord Home held his own private meetings with Gromyko three
days later. Home asked Gromyko if the Soviets, before proceeding with their peace treaty, might
arrange with the East Germans for guaranteed Western access. Gromyko said that would best
handled through Western recognition of East Germany (with the Oder-Niesse eastern border) and
withdrawal of occupation forces from West Berlin. Home asked if Khrushchev was prepared to
make good on his offer to negotiate “any time, anywhere and at any level.” If that was the case,
said Home, it would be useful to discuss other approaches than the free city/peace treaty
package. Gromyko “said with strong emphasis that this would be useless and a waste of time.”
He repeated the Soviets had no interest in discussing “the whole of Germany or the whole of
Berlin.”636 He repeated that the USSR had one main interest and that was the normalization of
the wartime agreement. The West was worried about access, he complained, while the East was
“interested in respect for the rights of the DDR, boundaries, atomic weapons, demilitarization of
Western Germany, and the status of West Berlin.” The Oder-Niesse border, established at Soviet
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insistence after World War II, had granted German territory to Poland as a buffer zone for the
USSR. Khrushchev wanted full Western recognition of Warsaw Pact boundaries.637
Berlin was, as Khrushchev had reminded Thompson, in the middle of East Germany.
The Soviets thought West Berlin‟s current status was an unacceptable anomaly in that system
and could be corrected only by a peace conference to formally accept the Soviet Berlin/German
package. Home said the Soviet Union must know the Western powers could not sign an
agreement with East Germany. Could not Berlin be placed under some neutral administration
like the United Nations? Gromyko ignored this suggestion, saying again that a peace conference
was the only acceptable approach. If the West participated, they could help shape the
arrangements (on general Soviet terms). If the West boycotted the conference, the Soviets
would have no obligation to consider their objections. Home concluded the meeting by saying
that would be a very dangerous course the Soviets. The United Kingdom did not want war but
“would not be threatened by threats.”638
The British, as they had since 1958, had again demonstrated their persistent pursuit of
negotiation. Home‟s approach was nuanced and principled. However, it was reactive and could
never have the same focus and momentum as the single-minded Soviet approach. 639 Gromyko‟s
replies also revealed a basic dynamic to the problem that the Britain, France and the United
States still did not fully understand. West Berlin destabilized East Germany and encouraged the
strength of West Germany. A nuclear West Germany would be a constant threat that reminded
the Soviets of the worst dangers of wartime invasion. Compared with these concerns, Western
complaints about access rights, let alone occupation rights, seemed trivial.640
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This Soviet attitude could be challenged at a number of levels . Both France and Britain
had suffered terrible wartime incursions. Soviet occupation in Eastern Europe violated wartime
protocols and was overtly hostile to the West. The Soviets possessed overwhelming combatready superiority in conventional forces. The Western powers could not solve the Soviet
challenge by endlessly rebutting minor details. Nor were the Soviets any more ready to pursue
Western ideas; Gromyko refused to consider any all-German discussion.641 Soviet negotiating
tactics over Berlin and Germany followed a negotiating pattern that was very familiar to Kennan,
Thompson, Bohlen and other experienced Western diplomats. The Soviets were adept at
sticking to a particular agenda, to the exclusion of any other topics or approaches. Yet, the same
observers who best knew Soviet intransigence remained the most committed advocates for
continued negotiation, however difficult that might prove. 642
The difference between veterans like Bohlen and Kennan and less experienced advisors
like Kissinger is that the novices believed the Soviets could be influenced by theoretical
arguments, no matter how attractive and reasonable these ideas might seem in Washington.643
The Rusk-Gromyko-Home talks and the fledgling „pen pal‟ correspondence did amount to
constructive efforts to renew negotiations. But the initial discussions continued to reflect the
same self-imposed limits and unrealistic thinking that had so far separated both East and West
into unproductive positions.644
NSC consultant Carl Kaysen noted that achieving consensus was difficult for both
internal and external reasons. Internally, there was concern that any new position would be
perceived as weakness – a retreat from long-standing positions. Externally, difficulties
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remained in getting the French and Germans to support new negotiating proposals. Kaysen
thought that Khrushchev was softening his position regarding access, provided “we accept
legitimacy of GDR.” Kaysen thought both the internal and external obstacles might be
overcome by a Kennedy speech recapping the Rusk-Gromyko talks and proposing a choice of
negotiation approaches: broad, encompassing all of European security, or talks narrowly focused
on Berlin and Germany. The Soviets would be publicly challenged to engage in peaceful
negotiation, an idea advanced by William Griffith, Henry Kissinger and others. Even Kaysen
admitted in this memo that he did not how the Soviets would react to such a proposal. 645
The Soviets had, for a number of years, shown themselves to be willing to forego public
approval in lieu of specific security aims. Examples of this indifference to opinion included
interference in Berlin in 1948 and 1953, suppression of Hungarian resistance in 1956, and, more
recently, the Wall‟s construction and the decision to resume testing. Speeches generally did not
move Khrushchev. When they did, as in the Kennedy's May and July speeches announcing
higher defense spending, they often had the opposite effect than intended. Khrushchev resolved
to delay his military cutbacks once Kennedy announced reserve call-ups of 250,000 troops.646
Military planning indicated the West could not readily present a credible deterrent to a
blockade.647 A week after the US/UK/USSR foreign minister sessions, General Maxwell Taylor
reported to the President about some likely, and serious, difficulties projected in the event of a
forceful response. The President was about to meet with NATO‟s General Norstad who had just
made a pessimistic report to the JCS. Norstad had concluded that “the Allies cannot unilaterally
control any conflict with the USSR and thus may not be able to enforce a gradual controlled
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development of the battle … the US must be prepared for explosive escalation to general war.”
Norstad distrusted the concept of “progressive escalation” because it might encourage the
Soviets “to think that they can become involved without the risk of incurring nuclear war at
once.”648 Norstad did not think six extra divisions (not yet even approved) would provide more
operational flexibility. He warned that the Allies would become very apprehensive if planning
directions indicated the US might concede territory “for time to negotiate and to avoid spreading
the war to the United States.”
Norstad said six divisions might be able to reopen access and secure a corridor for a
week, but the Soviets would be able to repel such action. The Soviets were readily capable of a
strong counterattack; the question would be whether they were politically disposed to undertake
such a risk. Taylor noted Norstad had said the cause for nuclear use would be “to insure the
success of major military operations,” instead of the standard phrase, “to avoid defeat.” No use
of West German troops was anticipated. Taylor‟s cautious advisory about the memo would have
indicated to the president that serious doubts about forceful response persisted even within the
highest levels of the military.649 At least, the September Rusk-Gromyko talks indicated the
Soviets were also interested in negotiation.650

Beginning of Khrushchev-Kennedy 'Pen Pal' Correspondence
Gromyko-Rusk talks resumed on September 29, followed immediately by a long letter
from Khrushchev to Kennedy. Notable in the ministers' sessions was a broader, more muted
Soviet approach that almost concealed the standard free city/peace treaty demands. This same
648

Memo from Taylor to Kennedy, September 28, 1961, JFK Library, NSF file, (Germany/Berlin series) , Box 83,
folder 9/23-9/30/61.
649
Ibid.
650
Cable from Rusk to US Europe embassies re Gromyko meeting, September 22, 1961, FRUS 1961-1963, Vol.
XIV, doc. 155.

186

tone was evident in Khrushchev's letter. Even before the Rusk meeting, the Soviet Chairman
had delivered an oral message for Kennedy through the Soviet Foreign Ministry's press
secretary, Mikhail Kharmalov, to the President's spokesman, Pierre Salinger. That message noted
the hazardous Berlin situation and suggested they hold another meeting soon. Kennedy had
Salinger deliver a reply, also unwritten, to Kharmalov, indicating his interest.651 Kennedy hoped
the message indicated Khrushchev was not yet ready to sign the peace treaty. That exchange
prepared the way for a private written correspondence, the 'Pen-Pal' exchanges, which would
continue till mid-1962.652
In his first letter dated September 29, 1962, Khrushchev mentioned the late summer
weather he was enjoying on vacation. He then turned to afterthoughts on Vienna and what he
saw as conflicting signals from Kennedy in the weeks since. Khrushchev said he was convinced
that, like himself, Kennedy did not want war. A draft 'statement of principles' on disarmament,
then under consideration for submission to the UN General Assembly, was a good, if tentative,
first step. He restated his desire for "prompt implementation of general and complete
disarmament," with no mention of the contentious issue of inspections. But, said Khrushchev,
the current "strengthening of armaments ... in connection with the German question" discouraged
prospects for disarmament. He tied the situation to "problems we inherited from the last war"
which could, he said, be best resolved by the peace treaty proposal. Khrushchev then brought
up, for the first time, a Kennedy visit to the USSR, a possibility "I am hoping for." He said that
such a visit, a clear sign of detente, would be contingent on a peace treaty. 653
To sweeten this offer, the first such incentive offered since 1959, he also suggested that
there could be parallel peace treaties, one for the Soviets to sign with the (East) German
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Democratic Republic and one for the US, France and Britain to sign with the (West) Federal
Republic of Germany. These treaties would include language which could be used for
unification "if the Germans so desire," but would have to recognize the current borders between
the GDR and the FRG. The peace treaty would supersede the Potsdam agreement and Berlin,
situated within the GDR, would be transformed into a "free city." The Soviet Union would
provide guarantees of Berlin's "free city" status but would allow a small transitional presence of
Western troops in Berlin. This was still basically the 1958 proposal, with token innovations of
parallel treaties and small, temporary contingents of Western peace-keepers to assuage Western
prestige.654
Khrushchev also brought up the possibility of UN or neutral peace-keepers for Berlin but
emphasized that "the occupation regime in West Berlin must be eliminated." He dismissed the
occupation arrangements as a destabilizing residue of the war, but invited the United States to
present its own versions of his formula. He suggested the Rusk-Gromyko talks could serve as
the start of broader discussion on the German question: "it could be arranged for you and I to
appoint appropriate representatives for private meetings and talks." Such talks could prepare the
ground for a conference to conclude a peace treaty. He mentioned the recent discussions that
Ambassador to Yugoslavia George Kennan was having with Soviet delegates in Belgrade.
Though Khrushchev thought these diplomats were wasting too much time "sniffing each other
out, " he respected Kennan and authorized the Soviet ambassador to hold substantive
discussions. Khrushchev suggested that Llewellyn Thompson, Ambassador to the Soviet Union,
might be a suitable representative for high-level talks to arrange a peace conference.655
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Khrushchev noted that non-aligned leaders had recently written to him and to Kennedy,
calling for another summit meeting, and that they had both replied positively to that suggestion.
Khrushchev now said to Kennedy, "I believe a meeting between us could be useful." This was
the first direct reference, by either head of state to the other, to a new summit since Vienna.
Such a meeting would require careful and confidential preparation but could be held "any place."
It's purpose would be to conclude a German peace treaty, for which all nations would be grateful.
Khrushchev again disavowed war and said their political difference should not obstruct the quest
for peace. He invoked a surprising analogy of both "clean and unclean" animals going together
into Noah's Ark to seek sanctuary. So too did the superpowers need to put aside their
differences and resolve this issue, not only for themselves but for all nations. He linked
"disarmament and the German question" one last time, saying he would need to make a progress
report to the upcoming 22nd Party Congress.656 His tone was noticeably less confrontational, his
desire for high-level negotiations unmistakable.
The final round of Rusk-Gromyko talks in New York on October 2 showed that serious
difficulties still remained, but the Soviets wanted a diplomatic solution.657 Rusk noted the
Soviets had not clarified what effects the peace treaty would have on access rights to West
Berlin. Gromyko replied that the treaty would make West Berlin a 'free city' without occupation
rights. Diplomatic relations with the GDR could be optional but de jure recognition would be
necessary. Parallel treaties could satisfy Western prestige but Western non-participation would
leave the Soviets and East Germans free to determine access. Gromyko surprised Rusk by
suggesting their talks be expanded to consider broader questions of European security. Rusk
said the US might be interested in broader discussions but not by giving up rights that had
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already been established by legal treaties. 658 Gromyko brushed this objection aside, complaining
that the US only wanted to perpetuate an outdated wartime understanding. Rusk said the US was
more interested in preventing another world war than re-addressing well established agreements.
The US could not make specific proposals affecting European security without the input and
approval of other nations involved. The US and the USSR might not be overtly involved,
militarily, in Europe, but they could not disengage quickly without creating a "vacuum."659
Rusk stressed that the US was very interested in disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation and wanted to review current Soviet proposals to the UN about these topics.
Gromyko said his government needed to consult with Ulbricht and consider GDR interests. He
spelled out the essential goals the USSR and GDR held in common: recognition of current
German borders, recognition of GDR sovereignty over its territory, halting the spread of nuclear
weapons in West Germany, and transformation of West Berlin into a free city, with East Berlin
remaining the capital of the GDR. These demands could not be made contingent on broader
discussions of European security. Further, said Gromyko, "existence of two separate German
states must be accepted as ... fact. Unity of Germany only possible through arrangements
between the two German governments."660 Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, who have
had extensive access to Soviet records, say that Khrushchev was very pleased with this first
Rusk-Gromyko meeting and did what he could with socialist allies to ensure the talks would not
be disturbed with new frictions.661
National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy reported to the President that the Soviets
seemed "more willing to settle the access question" but were not offering any significant
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concessions themselves. Bundy warned "unless something more is put into the record before
these conversations close, I think we are on a dangerous slope of appeasement. He added that
this would be the likely view of "the Germans, the French and the Republicans." Gromyko
needed to be told, before returning to Moscow, that further clarification of Western access was
still necessary, not conditional on GDR approval; one internationalized route to West Berlin
should be established. Bundy thought Rusk had done an excellent job and the talks had on the
whole been constructive.662
Walt Rostow prepared for Bundy a counter-proposal for a '1961 protocol' which would
supersede the Potsdam agreements but keep Western occupation forces in West Berlin. Because
the USSR was unwilling to recognize the legality of the Potsdam agreement, the US would not
proceed with a peace treaty or recognition of the GDR. This proposal would offer recognition of
the Oder-Niesse boundary for the GDR, proscribe ownership or control of nuclear weapons for
both the FRG and GDR, encourage contacts and agreements between the FRG and GDR without
demanding they recognize each other diplomatically, and use such contacts as a gauge to guide
US policy in the region. Rostow's proposal also called for moving the UN Economic
Development office from New York to West Berlin and planning a new Four-Power Foreign
Minister meeting.663 Keeping the West Germans from owning nuclear arms was less a
concession to the Soviets than a reflection of the Kennedy administration's desire to control
NATO nuclear forces. 664
If the Soviets were not prepared to offered substantial concessions, neither were the
Americans. Rostow's proposal would have the US and FRG accept GDR document stamping on
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the principle that they would be agents of the Soviets, recognize the Oder-Niesse border wanted
by the GDR and Soviets, and withdraw nuclear weapons from Germany if the Soviets would do
the same. Although neither the US or USSR were prepared to offer more than incremental
flexibility, they were at least, as Kennan and Thompson had urged, still negotiating.665
The talks were still very tentative, while the tensions on the ground in Berlin were
rising.666 Serious potential for escalation remained. While contingency planning for Berlin
action was based on a credible nuclear deterrent, considerable differences had emerged among
State, Defense, JCS and NATO. These disagreements were reflected in Bundy's brief for
Kennedy at an October 4 meeting with General Norstad. NATO and Defense Dept. planners
agreed on an immediate buildup of conventional forces in Europe, and wanted both planning and
forceful action carried out by NATO, instead of the West Berlin occupying powers. Norstad was
much more willing than Defense Secretary Robert McNamara or the JCS's General Maxwell
Taylor to employ nuclear weapons. Bundy wanted the President to remind Norstad who was
Commander in Chief. 667 The meeting proved generally satisfactory but also made evident the
ongoing problem of developing pre-agreed response plans with the other allies. Norstad took
care to point out he did not, in fact, think that escalation could be smoothly managed in a
crisis.668 Reaching NATO agreement was difficult, yet necessary because the Western powers
were at odds about negotiation tactics or even the desirability of continued negotiations.
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When Rusk briefed the Ambassadorial working Group partners (UK/France/FRG) the
same day, he did not bring up contingency planning. The FRG's Ambassador Wilhelm Grewe
considered the Rusk-Gromyko talks useful but thought they should be discontinued precisely
because they were on the verge of including broader European security issues. France's
Ambassador Alphand said that the Soviet definition of a 'free city' would be one with no political
connection with West Germany, a condition that would be unacceptable in either Bonn or West
Berlin. He thought that too much optimism in the press over the Rusk-Gromyko talks would
only make the Soviets less likely to offer real concessions.669
President Kennedy feared the Soviets might take advantage of American desire for
negotiation. He invited Gromyko to the White House on October 6th, 1961. They had met
during World War II, when Kennedy was a reporter, and again at Vienna. Gromyko now told
him that, when they first met, "I formed the opinion you were no ordinary newspaperman."670
Kennedy informed the Soviet Foreign Minister that the US would be consulting its allies and
preparing questions, particularly regarding access guarantees and other present treaty rights.
This might provide a basis for further talks Ambassador Thompson would conduct in Moscow.
Gromyko had a number of things to say himself. Reading from a prepared statement,
the Soviet diplomat repeated the normalization of wartime situations rationale, outlined the peace
treaty as presented to Rusk, and criticized the US for having unilaterally made peace with Japan
in 1945. Gromyko said there was no set timetable for the peace treaty, but that it was inevitable.
US abstinence would result in not being to participate in setting the new treaty's terms. He said
the Soviet Union was guaranteeing access and offering concessions to honor Western prestige.
Kennedy was willing to consider broader security issues, including nuclear non-proliferation,
669
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troop reductions and removal of foreign bases, "for the cause of an international detente." He
proposed demilitarizing both Germanys. While the current US/USSR bilateral talks were
"extremely useful," the Soviets were also willing to consider a new Four-Power conference to
conclude a peace treaty and discuss European security.671
Kennedy observed that the Soviets were demanding that the US give up longstanding
rights the Soviets themselves had agreed to. The token sweeteners now being offered were only
superficial; the Soviets were giving up nothing. For the US, said Kennedy, this "would not be a
compromise but a retreat." Gromyko said it appeared that the US and its Allies were more
concerned with its occupation rights inside East Germany than in stabilizing European security
and recognizing the realities of post-war Europe. There was no need to doubt Soviet guarantees
on access or West Berlin's political freedom. The offers of token peacekeeping presence were an
honorable concession to Western prestige, said Gromyko.672 At the end of the general meeting
which included Rusk, Menshikov and Kohler, Gromyko requested a few minutes alone with
Kennedy, though apparently each simply summed up their major themes. Kennedy rejected in
particular the new Soviet proposal to include their troops in the peacekeeping contingent.673
Though the Gromyko talks in America in September and October 1961 were much
preferable to the kind of forceful confrontation Dean Acheson had proposed just weeks before,
they showed that diplomacy was not an easy alternative. The official positions presented in the
Rusk-Gromyko talks varied little from their governments' longstanding positions, though some
wavering was visible. In an advisory memo to Rusk, Ambassador Charles Bohlen suggested
that Khrushchev had realized he had "made a major misjudgment" with his early summer "shock
treatment" approach for a new German/Berlin settlement. Bohlen thought the Wall and the
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resumption of testing had been reactive decisions to Kennedy's July 25 defense buildup speech,
and the dispatch of Vice-President Johnson and the reinforcement battalion to Berlin mid-July.
Since early September, Khrushchev had been looking for ways to pull back from the brink of
war. Changing tactics from confrontation to negotiation "is a classic Bolshevik method." The
Soviets were prepared to soften original demands but not offer real concessions. 674
Bohlen carefully articulated the outstanding questions on guarantees for West Berlin
access and political freedom, stressing that Gromyko needed to be pressed hard on these issues.
In a sign as to how flexible some in the US diplomatic establishment were becoming on Berlin,
Bohlen also pointed out that he had not discussed preservation of occupation rights: "in the
conversations with Gromyko, there was no reference to our intention of preserving this statute
and the Soviets appear to be quite adamant on this point."675 In fact, Rusk had indicated that the
West intended to keep troops in West Berlin and Kennedy would affirm this commitment to his
own talks with the Soviet Foreign Minister. That an American advisor of the rank and expertise
in Soviet relations as Bohlen would officially, if confidentially, discuss compromises on the
occupation indicated some of the Eisenhower/Dulles-era pragmatism on Berlin still survived.676
Bohlen's observation of cracks in the Soviet leadership was bolstered by a report from
NSC consultant Henry Kissinger on conversations that included American peace activist Erich
Fromm and Soviet playwright, Central Committee member and Khrushchev confidant Alexander
Korneichuk. Korneichuk and Soviet journalist Ilya Khrenburg "indicated that there is increasing
opposition to Mr. Khrushchev in the Soviet Union because his peace policy with the West
appears to be a failure."677 Supposedly, Kennedy had drawn back from concessions thought to
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have been offered by Eisenhower. Khrushchev was facing opposition from both public opinion
and high-ranking military leaders. Negotiations were needed "very soon" or else the US might
have to deal with a tougher Soviet leadership. Similar warnings had come from diplomats like
Thompson and West German Ambassador Kroll, but now they were coming from well-placed
Soviet source Kissinger discounted these warnings, though without saying why, but found them
significant enough to pass along. Even if these sources were planted by Khrushchev's
administration, though, the fact that he felt the need to go to such measures showed that he now
needed negotiation to strengthen his own political position. 678

Allied and Defense Criticism of Negotiations
The US and USSR may have felt that, by default, they had to turn to bilateral dialogue to
resolve the problems of Germany and Berlin, but the other Berlin signatories were becoming
concerned about decisions that might be made without them.679 Rusk's cautions to Gromyko
about the limits of their bilateral authority were reflected in worried notes from the French and
German ambassadors in Washington.680
On October 7, US Ambassador to France John Gavin reported more serious difficulties
with de Gaulle, who "has been using almost every public opportunity to restate opposition to
negotiations with Soviets on Berlin/Germany unless these were preceded by detente, condition
regarded here as most unlikely." De Gaulle felt the US was unduly concerned about imminent
danger of war and this fear was prompting a rush to negotiate. Gavin noted that de Gaulle wanted
678
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to concentrate on the withdrawal of French forces from Algeria. At present, said Gavin, "French,
including de Gaulle, have now indicated they might not participate in negotiations even if they
are arranged." The French were concerned over how a deal might affect the FRG. De Gaulle
"firmly" supported the FRG, though he was "cool to ...[FRG] ... efforts to embrace West Berlin
... (and)...lukewarm on German reunification." 681 Nor were they sympathetic to FRG efforts to
regain territories lost to the East.
The French adamantly opposed recognition of East Germany. Their difference of
opinion with Eisenhower and Macmillan on this issue had stymied efforts to present more
flexible proposals in preparation for the Paris summit. The French were "nervous" over possible
discussions on European security because they feared such talks would diminish the West's
strength in Central Europe. Gavin tried to convince de Gaulle that a real danger existed for war
over Berlin and that US-USSR talks would not prejudice French interests.682 Gavin and de
Gaulle favored a new Western Foreign Ministers meeting, and even a Western Heads of State
meeting. De Gaulle was more interested in restoring French influence with the US than planning
new negotiations with the Soviets.683
The twin currents of Berlin-related negotiation and military preparedness still
created turbulence when they met. Military and hard line factions felt acceptance of a divided
Europe might invite Soviet expansion.684 The JCS were worried about Allied readiness and
willingness to meet forceful Eastern action on Berlin. Their "Preferred Sequence of Military
Actions in a Berlin Conflict" memo to Bundy started with non-military measures like economic
sanctions in the event of a blockade and proceeded though a series of conventional-force ground
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actions to restore access. The JCS and NATO wanted a faster military response than the State
Dept. favored. If non-military efforts failed, they recommended either "selective nuclear attacks
for the primary purpose of demonstrating the will to use nuclear weapons" or "limited tactical
employment of nuclear weapons." However, "the Allies only partially control the timing and
scale of nuclear weapons use, " with Soviet "unrestrained pre-emptive attack" or in-kind nuclear
response being very possible.685
The NSC meeting of October 10, where Rusk reported optimistically on the talks with
Gromyko, reflected disagreements about nuclear response. The President and most of advisors,
especially McNamara, favored greater emphasis on conventional forces, which lessened danger
of nuclear escalation and increased likelihood of effectively using these forces. Paul Nitze
strongly disagreed, feeling this policy would encourage the Soviets to consider a nuclear firststrike. The US should reserve a first-strike option for itself. McNamara said first-use provided
no assurance of victory. Though Rusk reminded the group of the "very grave responsibility"
involved in first-use of nuclear weapons, the issue was not flatly resolved. General Norstad
needed "clear guidance as to basic intentions of the United States with regard to military
contingency decisions." 686
The French did not want to negotiate further; the Americans were not sure
whether they needed to be more concerned with negotiation or military preparations. The
British, keen on negotiations but militarily weak, said little for the moment.687 British Foreign
Secretary Lord Home told Bundy that de Gaulle's objections would preclude a Western Foreign
Minister's meeting on Berlin, but Kennedy should keep trying to get Adenauer's support for
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negotiations at some level. Home thought Gromyko was generally "pitching his demands very
high" but "showing less interest in European Security arrangements" and the West should let the
issue alone.688
The West Germans voiced their objections more loudly. Adenauer wrote Kennedy on
October 4 to compliment the President's UN address but complain about US willingness to
accommodate the Soviets. Ambassador Grewe passed these complaints (particularly regarding
GDR recognition) to Rusk, who said recognition was not on the table but acknowledgement of
the GDR's existence could facilitate an interim understanding.689 Dean Acheson, who was
tougher on the Berlin issue than most of the Kennedy administration

Acheson cautioned

against trying to incorporate West Berlin politically into the FRG or suggesting military strategy
to the US. Instead the FRG needed to develop its own negotiating position and marshal the
economic, political and military resources to make it credible.690
Kennedy, in his reply to Adenauer, tried to placate the Germans about overly generous
concessions to the Soviets. Kennedy assured the recently re-elected Chancellor that the US had
no intention of withdrawing from Berlin; he also told him that "it is not realistically in our power
to prevent indefinitely the signing of a separate peace treaty between the Soviet Union and the
East German regime." Referring to such an event as an "inevitability," Kennedy asked Adenauer
whether it was better to simply boycott the process and have no input, or to consider negotiations
that might mitigate a treaty's effects.691
Kennedy said he thought Thompson should continue discussions with Gromyko
or Khrushchev in Moscow, and that these discussions might lead to a new East-West foreign
688
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ministers meeting. Kennedy also assured Adenauer that current UN disarmament discussions, on
both conventional and nuclear forces, would not diminish the FRG's security. Ambassador
Dowling later reported that Chancellor had been assured by Kennedy's letter. The French
remained troublesome, refusing assent for a week-long Ambassadorial working group meeting
proposed for London, starting October 19. They said that a meeting intended to work out new
negotiating positions was unnecessary if there were not going to be new negotiations.692

Further Bilateral US-Soviet Negotiation on Berlin
French resistance to negotiation may not have been constructive, but it was not
unrealistic either. De Gaulle would be later proved correct in predicting there would be no war
over Berlin, though he had not fully acknowledged the possibility of dangerous conflicts like the
standoff that soon developed over the Friedrichstrasse checkpoint.693 Although not realized yet
in Washington, the talks with Gromyko had largely been a byproduct of circumstance, i.e. his
being in the United States for the UN General Assembly sessions. The Soviets presented the
latest version of their German/Berlin proposals, through Khrushchev's letter and the discussions
with their Foreign Minister. Once this was accomplished, the West needed to respond, which it
was slow in doing. Khrushchev wanted to act while the inexperienced Kennedy was still off
balance from Vienna and the Wall. The tentative warming of early fall 1961 would represent the
closest East-West engagement for many months to come.694
Kennedy still held out considerable hope for renewed talks when he wrote Khrushchev
on October 16. His letter paralleled the Soviet premier's in several respects, commenting on the
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vacation weather in Hyannis Point, the disappointments of Vienna and the hope for discussion
unclouded by ideological debate. The President said he liked Khrushchev's Noah's Ark analogy
(Both leaders refrained from speculating on which was the 'clean' or 'unclean' side.)695 He agreed
that neither side wanted war. But, where Khrushchev used this line of thought to introduce his
theme of finally ending the state of war, Kennedy said the worse danger was thwarting German
desires for re-unification. That frustration, said the President, encouraged the 'militarists and
revanchists' Khrushchev and Gromyko warned against. Walter Ulbricht's provocations were not
helping the situation either.696 As much as the US and USSR might want a unified, demilitarized
Germany, conditions were not yet conducive for that, nor would a peace treaty solve the
problems. Kennedy emphasized that the current stewardship of Berlin was maintaining a stable
situation there. Stationing Soviet troops there could not improve the situation.697
The president told the Chairman that negotiations could help prepare the way for a
demilitarized, unified situation, but would have to be prepared carefully. Kennedy would be
talking with the Western allies, while the Premier would be meeting with the Party Congress.
They needed to avoid "any statement, incident, or another provocation in Berlin which would
make negotiation impossible." Ambassador Thompson, in Washington but about to return to
Moscow, could continue the private discussions. Kennedy said "as for another meeting between
the two of us, I agree completely that ...we had better postpone a decision on that until a
preliminary understanding can be reached ... on positive decisions which might appropriately be
formalized."698
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Kennedy linked a visit to the Soviet Union to " a reasonable settlement on Berlin. "If the
international atmosphere improves, I would take great pleasure in such a visit," said Kennedy
recalling that he had visited the Soviet Union in 1939 and wanted to see "the great changes that
had occurred since then." Like Khrushchev, he reserved mention of disarmament till his closing
remarks; "I do not intend to relegate the achievement of complete and general disarmament to a
place of secondary importance. " He thought their joint statement of principles submitted to the
UN was, at least, a start toward an important and rewarding goal. Kennedy briefly touched on
competition for influence in the Laos situation, and even suggested that settlement there would
improve the atmosphere for Berlin negotiations.699 Kennedy's letter was briefer and more
general than Khrushchev's. It was not so much a formal diplomatic reply as an
acknowledgement that he had been granted some to reconsider the Berlin/Germany situation.
Kennedy tried to keep the situation as indefinite but amicable as possible.

700

Berlin Harassment and Allied Estrangement
The US would soon be involved in the kind of military provocations Kennedy had
pleaded against in his letter. In early October, Ulbricht began to limit free movement for
diplomatic personnel in East Berlin.701 They also were closing check-points, at one point
isolating the oft-contended Steinstecken neighborhood. On October 18, Secretary Rusk advised
Ambassador Lightner in West Berlin that the White House approved a plan to use two or three

699

Ibid.
Beschloss, Crisis Years, p.326.
701
Harrison, Driving the Soviets, p. 212.
700

202

tanks to clear any new check-point obstructions.702 The same day, Clay wrote Kennedy to
complain that his options to respond to provocations were overly restricted. Clay was frustrated
because "I find little evidence in West Germany of the will to fight and I doubt if the West
German people are as determined as we are to defend Berlin." He warned against increased
nationalism that "could lead West Germany into breaking with the West."703 Clay affirmed his
respect and loyalty to the president, but he was clearly uneasy about his position in Berlin. At
the same time, Adenauer was lobbying for a Kennedy visit to Bonn, though this was not a
serious possibility.
The Chancellor was now being more cooperative, offering to try and persuade de Gaulle
to do likewise. Allied cohesion was still far from what it was needed for productive
negotiation.704 Even the US diplomatic corps was having its doubts about Allied policy.
Ambassador Bruce wrote from London that it seemed the West had forgotten its 1954
commitments to work for German reunification and never recognize the East German regime. In
light of the current diplomatic stalemate and perceived lack of will, Bruce thought the best
course might be to take Khrushchev up on the proposal to internationalize Berlin under UN
auspices. But, said Bruce, "meanwhile, I would consider it essential that we take, and make
credible decision to engage if necessary in nuclear war rather than lose West Berlin, and
consequently, West Germany."705 In contrast, NSC advisor Henry Owen, part of the inner circle
advising Kennedy's private approach to the Soviets, prepared for Bundy an all-Berlin plan
without occupation. The purpose, he said, was to consider a West Berlin without occupation.
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Owen thought that the value of parallel peace treaties was that they would necessitate revising
the occupation statutes.706
Contingency planning was hotly contested that same day at an NSC meeting, where
Defense Undersecretary Gilpatric disputed Norstad's acceptance of the new emphasis on
conventional forces. McNamara rejected that assertion, whereupon the President asked Dean
Acheson for his opinion, and "from that point on, the meeting was dominated by Mr. Acheson's
arguments." Acheson said Norstad had received unclear instructions that needed to focus on
Kennedy's preference on non-military action, and air action in the event of conflict. In broader
terms, Acheson argued that "the United States has been spending too much time seeking
theoretical arguments with our allies ... the momentum of American decision and action is what
will make the difference ... the United States should begin moving divisions in November."707
When the President asked why, Acheson said a visible deterrent would provide useful
political and diplomatic leverage to influence Khrushchev productively. Kennedy was worried
by the "gold drain" required for such a buildup, though Gilpatric and McNamara said this could
be managed with allied cooperation. Kennedy asked Foy Kohler about current allied relations.
Kohler replied that the Germans were being more helpful now but "he could make no such
optimistic judgment on the French." Acheson said that, instead of asking the partners to
negotiate, "we need to tell them."708 He approved of current US negotiating ideas and these
needed to be presented to the allies as the firm US position. He said Adenauer would be the key.
Kennedy proceeded to write Norstad to confirm the official US policy of graduated, conventional
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response in a Berlin conflict. This policy would, the President said, have the most deterrent
value, because it would show NATO readiness without even having to use its reserve of nuclear
weapons. 709
Kennedy now faced a very enigmatic situation over Berlin. The Wall's construction had
eased tensions for a few weeks, but the East Germans were hardening the border closure and
eliminating checkpoints. 710 On October 23, Lightner was stopped by East German 'vopos',
despite the clear diplomatic markings on his vehicle; he called in a US military escort and
successfully entered East Berlin. A Soviet political aide arrived, apologized (though protesting
the military escort), and cleared him for transit. Though access was later tested without
incident, Lightner observed nearby tank movements in East Berlin.711 US Generals Clay and
Norstad were at odds, with each other and with Washington, over how to respond to these
provocations and how to proceed with military preparations for a potential Berlin conflict that
could lead to general war. The October 23 dispute was the beginning of more serious
confrontation in the days to come.
The diplomatic momentum of early October had stalled, for the most part because of
French and West German disagreements but also because of the deepening realization that the
Soviets were offering very little in return for Western withdrawal from Berlin. The British
supported the America initiative but worried the other Allies could derail negotiations.712 On the
day Lightner was stopped in East Berlin, Ambassador Gavin called on de Gaulle who showed
him a letter he had just written to Kennedy. Gavin said he thought it important to continue the
ambassadorial talks but de Gaulle made it clear such talks should not be construed as providing
709
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guidance for Thompson's discussions in Moscow. He rejected Kennedy's idea of a Western
ministers meeting in November. Gavin asked what would happen if they abandoned negotiations
and the Soviets resorted to force? De Gaulle replied that negotiating under threat of force was
the worst option possible.713 On the other hand, if the Soviets were not going to use force, there
was no need either to negotiate. De Gaulle did not think the Soviets wanted war and the US was
in too much hurry to negotiate. He thought negotiations detrimental to the US, to Adenauer and
the Germans and to the Western alliance.
Meanwhile, Ambassador Grewe was telling Kennedy that the FRG had never opposed
negotiations and would help get the French on board. But Grewe also made clear that the West
Germans were not happy with the new contingency plans deemphasizing nuclear use, in
particular a first-strike option.714 Nor were they happy with US advice to explore unification
through talks with the East Germans, rather than on the principle of free all-German elections.
The new policy seemed more likely to reinforce than remove political divisions. Said Grewe,
"the Germans regarded the confrontation of Soviet and American forces as a desirable situation
rather an as a bad one."715 Kennedy said that negotiations were a much better alternative and the
rest of NATO supported this view. Before Thompson proceeded very far in his Moscow talks,
Kennedy thought it would be helpful for Adenauer to visit Washington again for talks.

Armored Confrontation at "Checkpoint Charlie"
On October 24, Clay wired the President that East German provocations were becoming
so severe as to preclude further negotiation until the Soviets reined in Ulbricht. He would cease
further attempts to enter East Berlin with an armed escort but would make an unarmed probe
713
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again that day. He and Lightner urged the president to immediately call Ambassador Menshikov
in to make a vigorous protest.716 Unhappy with Clay and Lightner's tactics, Kohler immediately
wired back that they were over-reacting. Kohler said most of what he received in reply was
"doubletalk," but Lightner acknowledged over-reaction and accepted the rebuke, blaming "higher
authority."717 He was told that negotiations depended on more important factors and to stress
Washington's displeasure to Clay.
Although Lightner was considerably more hawkish on Berlin than most of his State
Department colleagues, he was a loyal and experienced team player. General Clay, however,
was about to demonstrate that he was considerably more independent. With his approval,
unarmed probes of entry access continued and met with official harassment and denial of access.
On October 25, Norstad told the JCS's General Lyman Lemnitzer , "a foundation has certainly
been established for a showdown."718 Despite Kohler's opposition, Ambassador Dowling, in
Bonn, favored continued armed probes; Lightner reported that the West Berlin public also
supported the probes, as did Bundy aide Colonel Lawrence Legere.719
After another probe was stopped the next day, US personnel observed , while East
German officials refused to summon Soviet political aides, Russian vehicles were circling the
scene. Norstad wanted Washington to have Thompson protest Soviet refusal to intervene. On
October 27, in Washington, Paul Nitze told Bundy that the JCS thought probes should continue,
regardless of "Thompson's demarche in Moscow," but that McNamara disagreed. Kohler, also a
member of Kennedy's private negotiating group, wanted all probes stopped immediately.
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Ambassador Dowling in Bonn thought they should be continued. Lightner reported strong
public support in West Berlin for the probes. On October 30, Bundy told Kennedy that he had
denied Lightner and Clay's request for reciprocal measures against Soviet visitors to West Berlin.
Kennedy decided to limit Soviets to one point of access to West Berlin.720
The same day British Foreign Office aide Lord Hood was telling Foy Kohler the
British were still reluctant to commit to economic counter-measures in the event of total
blockage to the city. Nonetheless, the British were ready to demand reciprocity on showing
entry credentials, though the French were still reluctant to take this step. They noted that the
Soviets would take careful note of these deliberations.721 Aides to Undersecretary of State
George Ball cast doubt on economic counter measures as an effective deterrent to Soviet actions.
Measures would be difficult to coordinate, would have little short-term effect and might appear
as weak-willed, thus emboldening Khrushchev.722 Thompson had been instructed to make a
strong protest personally to Gromyko about the Friedrichstrasse harassment and stress that
negotiations could not take place under duress. Positive reaction from Gromyko would defer
further probes till the matter was straightened out.723
On October 28, after another refusal of entry at this crossing, near the Brandenburg gate,
dubbed Checkpoint Charlie, Clay ordered three US tanks brought within a quarter mile of the
crossing. The Soviets responded, and the tanks moved forward in turn till they were visibly
facing each other across the border crossing. More tanks, twenty on each side, were brought up
to the checkpoint.724 This standoff continued overnight, but, apparently, messages conducted
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through the Robert Kennedy/Georgi Bolshakov backchannel produced an agreement for each
side to back off to a distance of two miles. Kennedy wrote Clay to congratulate him on his
nerve. Clay answered that it was the nerves in Washington he was more concerned about.725
The incident brought home the seriousness of using force. Both American and Soviet
forces around the world were brought to full readiness. Ulbricht was furious about Moscow's
caution in the standoff and Khrushchev was angry that he had been baited into displaying more
force than he wished.726 Despite Kennedy's congratulatory message, the incident also marked
the end of Kennedy's confidence in the general. After masterminding the 1948 airlift and
accompanying the Vice-President in August, Clay felt a strong personal commitment to Berlin.,
but his superiors worried about both his objectivity and his judgment. Rusk ordered a halt to
armed probes into East Berlin. "to provide a cooling off period."727
Kennedy, determined not abandon negotiations, applied pressure on de Gaulle. In an
October 30 letter, the President reminded de Gaulle that the US was providing most of the
personnel and material support for NATO. Kennedy proposed the Western heads meet in
December. However, said Kennedy, if prospects appeared dim for progress, it would be better
not to meet at all. He emphasized to de Gaulle how necessary it was for the West to work
together. De Gaulle sat stone-faced through Ambassador Gavin's presentation, offering only a
perfunctory offer to consider the information. If de Gaulle accepted, this would be the first
Western Heads meeting since Paris 1959. As with that meeting, the purpose would be Berlin
resolution.728
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The situation in Berlin was not improving. On November 2, Lightner advised Rusk that
he saw little point in either submitting to the current East German identification checks for Allied
diplomatic/military personnel or admitting similar Soviet personnel to the Western sectors. To
do otherwise would admit to de facto recognition of East Germany.729 Rusk replied that
Kennedy agreed the West should not submit to identification checks but should take no further
action. The Wall had demonstrated East German control of their sector, whether or not this was
politically recognized by the West. Rather than wasting time contesting small issues, like
identification checks, the West needed to deal with "other slices of salami which the Soviets will
try to take to establish the wall as a state-frontier of the GDR."730 The West needed to remain
focused on negotiation and military preparedness.

Allies Attempt New Negotiations
Kohler reported that the allied ambassadorial group was unable to agree on any cohesive
response to the Friedrichstrasse problem. They thought "the probable next attempt to slice the
salami" would have the GDR requiring identification from previously-exempt military. Kohler
noted that West Germans, asked to explore intermediary relations with the GDR, were very
reluctant to consider "making practical arrangements with someone from the other side. Kohler
also said "Ambassador Thompson has expressed doubts concerning the wisdom of continuing
the Moscow probe of the Soviet position on the Berlin and German questions." 731 With the
Western ambassadorial group unable to make much progress and Thompson skeptical about his
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private mission, Kennedy would need agreement among the Western heads to prepare a
constructive new approach to the Soviets, as well as viable contingency planning.732
In a meeting with Kennedy, Norstad made clear he understood his responsibilities as a
US General took precedence over NATO loyalties. However, he also had, as SACEUR, to
operate in the contentious context of the North Atlantic Council. McNamara now understood the
difficulty. When asked by Kennedy what they should do if access were stopped, Norstad said he
would respond with small probes and suggested appealing to the UN. When Kennedy scoffed at
the UN's efficacy, the General suggested that the President might consider inviting Khrushchev
"to meet him in Berlin on a specific day."733 Kennedy seemed interested in this idea; he also told
Norstad that he appreciated the General had not taken advantage of the opportunity to receive
more divisions in Europe. On the whole, this meeting bode well for cohesion in military
planning and response. Norstad's suggestion for an unplanned one-on-one meet with
Khrushchev in Berlin was an innovative idea that could have transformed the whole nature of
modern summit diplomacy.734
Kennedy's next step would be to steer Adenauer towards realistic negotiation. The
British wanted to push harder now new talks with the Soviets, without waiting for Adenauer and
de Gaulle, or to see how Friedreichstrasse settled out, which could take a while.735 The Soviets
had again lifted their deadline but might not take kindly to much delay in negotiation. The
Soviets were, in fact, in no hurry to resolve the checkpoint problem. At a Kremlin reception on
November 8, Gromyko told Thompson they did not intend to reply to Rusk's request for
intercession since the situation had quieted somewhat. Thompson said the quiet was only due to
732

Freedman, Kennedy's Wars, p.106.
Memo re Kennedy/Norstad/Taylor meeting, Washington, D.C., November 9, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, Vol. XIV,
doc. 205.
734
Ibid.
735
Nigel Ashton, Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War, p. 62.
733

211

Western attempts at a cooling-off period. Gromyko said the problem had come up solely
because of Western armed provocation. Thompson said the reverse was true and the West would
not accept the provocations much longer.736 Lightner was lobbying from Berlin for a more
vigorous response to show that "even though we cannot effectively resist salami tactics in East
Berlin, we will resist them wherever our interests are concerned."737 To do otherwise would risk
West Berliners' confidence in the Allied protectors. Lightner acknowledged that confrontation
could harden Berlin's east-west division but felt the current position was doing that anyway.

Khrushchev Turns Tougher
Khrushchev chose this time to reply at some length to Kennedy. The Premier had had a
difficult few weeks himself. The 22nd Party Congress in Moscow, drawing delegates not only
from all over the USSR, but also the Peoples Republic of China, Albania, Yugoslavia and Cuba,
was much more trouble than expected. Former protégés like Frol Kozlov, who had visited the
US in 1959 as a counterpart to Vice-President Nixon's visit to Moscow, now openly criticized
Khrushchev for both domestic and foreign policy shortcomings.738 Khrushchev was also
criticized behind the scene for allowing Soviet defenses to lag while Kennedy bolstered
American forces.739
President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense McNamara authorized Defense
Undersecretary Roswell Gilpatric to publicly expose the gross exaggerations of Khrushchev's
claims about Soviet missile strength. U-2 over-flights had been made superfluous by the new
Corona reconnaissance satellite which sent back photos revealing that the Soviets had at best ten
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to twenty-five ICBMs, without hardened silos or easy-launch capability; this was barely enough
for a first strike, let alone retaliation. Intelligence gained from Soviet Colonel Oleg Penkovsky
also indicted Soviet missile strength was much weaker than imagined. In a speech to the
Business Council in Hot Springs, Virginia on October 21, 1961, Gilpatric revealed this
information to embarrass Khrushchev, sharpening the jibe by alluding to Soviet worries about
Red Chinese competition.740 The speech was also intended to lessen the imposing technological
shadow created by the Soviets' recent detonation of an unprecedented fifty megaton
thermonuclear bomb.741 This 'Tsar Bomba,' as it was called, was too big for most Soviet missiles
or bombers to carry, but it was another first, like the Gagarin spaceflight, that caught the US by
surprise. Gilpatric's exposure of Soviet weakness was only one problem for Khrushchev,
though, who now faced pressure from domestic and East bloc critics.
Bad harvests, environmental blunders and administrative corruption had resulted in food
shortages, embarrassing the Premier who prided himself on being an agricultural specialist.
Failure to more vigorously assist 'national liberation struggles' more vigorously brought jeers at
the Party Congress from the Chinese, who walked out when Khrushchev began speaking of
'peaceful coexistence." Hard-line delegates from Soviet Union's own Communist Party criticized
the failure to win concessions over Berlin and Germany.742 Khrushchev's further efforts at deStalinization were approved only after considerable debate. Although Khrushchev managed to
get an overall vote of confidence, clearly domestic opposition was growing stronger. Thus,
Khrushchev knew he had to renew his Berlin campaign with toughness, as well as tact.743
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In the new letter to Kennedy, the Premier attacked Allied strengthening of West
Germany as a violation of Potsdam. He ridiculed de Gaulle for posing as the FRG's protector,
when actually it was the Germans who were controlling de Gaulle's moves. The peace treaty,
said Khrushchev, was the one mechanism that could resolve dissension and competition in
Europe. It was not his intent to impose a socialist system on Germany nor could the West try to
impose capitalism upon the East. He had hoped that the practical measures outlined in his last
letter and the discussions with Gromyko would have been answered in Kennedy's reply letter or
in Thompson's presentation, but that had not happened.744
The Soviet Union, he said, did not want troublesome West Berlin for itself, but all the
West seemed to care for was its occupation status there. Why not take the easy, peaceful course
of turning Berlin into a free city and recognizing East Germany, since the Allies already had de
facto dealings with the GDR? Did the West want to keep Berlin as a base for subversion,
espionage and propaganda? These, he said, were the important questions, not guaranteed access,
which the West need not doubt.745 He said he also wished to discuss other matters, but they
would have to wait. Though cordial, the letter was noticeably tougher, with more boilerplate
language than the previous letter. Michael Beschloss has written that Khrushchev viewed the
Gilpatric speech as a deliberate humiliation authorized by the President. The cold tone of his
November 7 letter reflected this bitterness.746
West German Ambassador Kroll visited Khrushchev on November 11, and informally
suggested a Berlin plan that basically kept the status quo, except for the Wall, on the basis of a
new four-power agreement. Khrushchev sounded receptive but Kroll's superiors in Bonn
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repudiated the proposal.747 Thompson was briefed by Kroll but was still more concerned by
Gromyko's refusal to intervene in the Berlin checkpoint problem. Acceptance of the situation
seemed unlikely to improve the situation, said Thompson.748 He did not want to proceed with
more serious negotiations till Kennedy spoke with Adenauer. Clay told Washington that if force
proved necessary, the United States might have to proceed unilaterally. Collateral problems
would ensure a pyrrhic victory at best. The Allies were so unprepared to negotiate they would
certainly lose ground. Ground force would be futile unless backed by an visible readiness to use
nuclear force.749 This attitude may have, in fact been realistic, but it was also a retreat back to
the fearful confusion of June and July. As for Norstad's idea of an impromptu summit, Rusk
offered indecisive approval, saying that "we have always had in mind ... a meeting at the highest
level with the Soviet Union."750 Rusk noted pros and cons of bilateral vs. four-power Berlin
summitry, but deferred actually making any recommendation.

Bringing the West Germans on Board
On the eve of Adenauer's US visit, Bundy and Kissinger told the President they did not
think the Germans actually wanted negotiations. However, thought the National Security
Advisor and his influential new aide, failure by the allies to pursue negotiations would result in
the Soviets implementing their peace treaty which would probably find general public favor
outside of Europe, more "salami tactics" to limit access to West Berlin, deepened allied division,
and "possible war -conventional or nuclear." Adenauer and de Gaulle's support remained
essential, no matter how difficult it was to obtain. Kennedy was being told again his own "firm"
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personal leadership would bring the Chancellor around. This rhetoric was becoming familiar
but less optimistic with each refrain.751
Kennedy's meeting with Adenauer on November 20 proved anticlimactic. The
Chancellor opened with a long, if disingenuous, exposition on the Kroll's recent 'private
diplomacy, saying that Khrushchev had engineered the incident and arranged for details to be
leaked to the press. Adenauer said that Kroll had not been fully briefed, but still had been
retired.752 Adenauer agreed with most of Kennedy's talking points, without displaying much
commitment to negotiation.753 He was open to a Western Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris in
December and he approved of the Thompson demarche. Unlike many observers, Adenauer
thought Khrushchev had "emerged from the 22nd Party Congress at the height of his power."
This 'success' had fueled the Chairman's vanity and bravado, but he really did not want
war: "one must neither show fear to Khrushchev or be impolite to him." Kennedy said he
agreed with de Gaulle that an unprepared or divided Western approach would be worse than no
negotiations at all, but the West was now in a strong enough position to proceed. Their nuclear
advantage might be much less in a couple of years. Delay would endanger West Berlin and
Europe. France might isolate itself from the rest of the West. Adenauer said the general still had
bitter feelings about his treatment by Roosevelt and Churchill during the wartime negotiations.
The Chancellor would write de Gaulle immediately and urge his participation. Before the
meeting ended, Adenauer said he had to emphasize that, in the event of a conflict, the West
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would be stronger militarily only "only if nuclear weapons were used from the very beginning otherwise the West would not succeed."754
Though Adenauer gave a warm appearance of cooperation, he had avoided any specific
discussion of the really difficult sticking points like recognition of and cooperation with East
Germany or the Oder-Niesse as a border.755 Without serious consideration of how they could
now get the Soviet Union to relax its core demands for GDR recognition and Western
withdrawal from Berlin, they had agreed on negotiation only in theory. Kennedy did not press
the Chancellor on specifics beyond the need to negotiate and getting de Gaulle to participate. 756
Complicating things further, the West Germans had a new foreign Minister, Gerhard
Schroeder, who met with Rusk on November 21 to do more practical bargaining. Rusk said they
could try to get the Soviets to agree to the West Germans' preference for an all-Berlin plebiscite
and removal of the wall, but there was no reason to expect any success in that direction.
Schroeder acknowledged this and said their best chance lay in stressing the legal foundation for
occupation rights. The Soviets had already accepted that the West was there by treaty-ratified
"right of conquest" and should be held to the legally recognize status quo. This would have the
most positive resonance with the public.757
Rusk agreed with this strategy, but said integrating West Berlin into the FRG would
compromise the legal argument for maintaining the status quo. Schroeder accepted this
objection and said the FRG would not press the issue. Rusk promised the US would "strive very
hard to protect the full freedom of action to West Berlin to maintain ties with the Federal
Republic." The FRG and West Berlin had already established some political links which might
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have to be amended in a new affirmation with the Soviets on occupation rights. West German
requests for specific guarantees on civilian rights might not be easily bundled into the occupation
agreements. Undersecretary Kohler said these difficulties were more semantic than substantive.
The allies would be seeking to ensure free access to the city for civilians as well as military. 758
More serious questions arose to how the FRG and GDR might recognize and deal with
one another. Schroeder said he did not see how West and East Germany could deal with one
another on access problems without recognition. Rusk said the US had told the Soviets would
not deal with the GDR on access questions, but Schroeder replied the GDR would prefer dealing
with the Allies rather than West Germany. The Allies could bring more leverage to bear on
access questions.759 FRG State Undersecretary Carstens (in rank and influence, similar to
Kohler) noted a number of problematic situations. He also observed that the GDR would not
make trouble without Soviet approval; this point was debatable since the checkpoint
provocations had been instigated more by Ulbricht than by Khrushchev. Carstens disagreed with
Rusk's suggestion that the UN might constructively assist in access problems. Rusk kept his
patience and ended the meeting on a neutral note, saying allied access could not be brought into
question.760
Adenauer and Kennedy spoke again shortly afterwards. Rusk opened the meeting with a
review of his discussion with Schroeder saying "as usual, when the ministers do the talking, the
experts must tidy up matters afterwards." Apparently, the problem of West Germany
considering Berlin as one of its 'lands' (equivalent to a state or province) was more serious than
first realized. Rusk said he recognized the sensitivity of this issue and wanted to allow the West
Germans to make their position clear; Schroeder declined to add anything. Rusk outlined the
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strategy of framing access questions as a matter of uncontestable occupation rights and potential
problems in dealing with the GDR. Rusk said "the problem before us was what might happen
after he Soviet Union enters into a separate peace treaty with the GDR." 761 The West Germans
might suddenly have to deal with the GDR on a day-to-day basis, wherein it would behoove
them to have some practical framework with the East. This process could be started by now
preparing detailed legal briefs on the current access arrangements.
Business-like and optimistic, Kennedy said this had to be worked out in detail and that
progress was already being made in this regard. When the subject turned to the UN assistance,
Schroeder again became cool, saying that could lead to GDR recognition.762 Further discussion
of UN administration or peacekeepers in West Berlin brought even more objections from
Schroeder. Adenauer, who had been silent so far, said that some UN involvement could have a
positive psychological value for West Berlin, but UN soldiers would inspire no confidence.
Kennedy invited him to speak further. Adenauer said "the constitutional status of Berlin ... (is) ...
most important of all." He was a legal scholar who had helped draft the FRG's Basic Law
system and had helped reconcile legal differences with the allied occupation. he was concerned
also about the "80 or so" FRG offices in West Berlin." 763 FRG political connections with West
Berlin were highly valued by the city's populace: "he wanted to hear no further talk about the
removal of coats of arms." Practical administrative matters might be shifted to UN auspices. 764
The President, in turn, moved to build on Adenauer's cooperative tone, saying "we should
start negotiating on the basis of a position of a position..which would insist on the complete
freedom of Berlin to maintain its relations with West Germany." There was a catch though;
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Kroll had told Khrushchev that FRG/West Berlin ties were not negotiable. Now, said Kennedy,
there might be need for "some limitations on the freedom of Berlin." 765 Schroeder said this
might be acceptable with sufficient guarantees. Kennedy and Adenauer withdrew for private
discussions. Rusk then told Schroeder there would be no recognition of the GDR or the OderNiesse boundary, both concessions that Eisenhower and Macmillan had tried to advance in 1959
and 1960 and both under active US discussion in the early summer and mid-autumn of 1961. By
taking these options off the table, the West could not offer the Soviets any more attractive terms
than in their July 1959 Western Peace Plan. The Soviets had consistently rejected that package
but Rusk did not acknowledge this reality. The price for West German support in November
1961 would probably be rejection by the Soviets.766
The Rusk-Schroeder conversation then devolved even further away from pragmatic
compromises that might attract the Soviets. Rusk intoned the 'we won't buy the same horse
twice' line to Schroeder, which Gromyko had pointedly ignored every time it was used. FRG
defense minister Strauss showed a map showing Soviet dominance of Eastern Europe; all agreed
that the West should not be pushed back any further. The German Foreign Minister brought up
non-starting ideas like all-German plebiscites for unification as though it were a serious
negotiating position.767 It was as though they understood real negotiation with the Soviets was
not going to happen and they might as well indulge their fantasies about an ideal settlement.
The foreign ministers may have departed from practical approaches, but in the same
minutes, Kennedy and Adenauer were speaking seriously. The Chancellor said agreements
needed to be as flexible as possible, but if they could guarantee "the freedom, the US need not
fear any difficulties from the German side." At that very moment, Rusk was accepting very
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difficult demands from Schroeder. Kennedy asked Adenauer what he thought of Walter
Lippmann's statement that German acceptance of neutral reunification would result in
irreversible assimilation into the East's orbit. Adenauer dismissed any such possibility.
Kennedy pressed Adenauer on West German renunciation of acquiring weapons of mass
destruction. Adenauer replied this would be no problem, as long as they could be assured of
immediate communication with Washington in a crisis.768 The conversation ended amicably, but
without any clear expressions from either leader on what the next step might be, either with
among the Allies or with the Soviets.
In a summary session with the ministers to draft a joint communiqué, the failure to make
any substantive progress became apparent. Disarmament and boundary questions thought
already settled proved particularly awkward. Kennedy and Rusk's attempts to make the West
Germans more flexible were dismissed with flat statements that the Soviet and East German
assurances were not to be trusted. Glad to have at least some restoration of allied solidarity, the
US accepted these objections along with Adenauer's assurance that he would work on de
Gaulle.769 Kennedy told UK Prime Minster Macmillan that the meetings had been successful
and had prepared the way for a Western Ministers meeting before Christmas and possibly an
East-West foreign ministers meeting shortly after the new year. Kennedy also told Macmillan
that, however difficult, Britain was going to have to commit to more military support.770
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Negotiations Stall in December
The West Germans had been more cooperative than expected but had still hads not
agreed to the kind of practical concessions needed.771 The failure to produce a workable program
in Washington may have been just as well, because attitudes in Moscow were hardening against
negotiation. Noting the tougher tone of the Premier's November 7 letter, Thompson told the
President a few days later that Khrushchev "may have been misled by the Gromyko talks and the
fact that some of his statements were not specifically rebutted." Said Thompson, "Khrushchev
may have been over-encouraged by the splits within the Western ranks," specifically British
willingness to recognize the GDR and some West German readiness to "sacrifice West
Berlin."772
Having had time to reflect, Khrushchev was growing cautious. Opposition within Soviet
Union and the Communist bloc, agricultural failures, and East German economic weakness
further discouraged his confidence in negotiation at this time. Thompson speculated that the
Premier may also have also become worried about hawks in the West ready to renew
containment policies. Thompson suggested sharing the Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence
with the British so they would have a more realistic idea of the situation. Kennedy, said the
Ambassador should tell Khrushchev that "there is little hope for a broad agreement at this time
but ...we should make every effort to prevent war."773
Reports from the allies were no more optimistic. Macmillan held disappointing talks
with de Gaulle. Falling ill on his return to Bonn, the elderly Chancellor's attempts to talk with
the General were delayed until mid-December . In a note of apology, Adenauer sounded more
interested in Western commitment to resist aggression than to pursue negotiation. In addition, the
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letter from the Chancellor was apparently much softer on negotiations than hoped.774 Whatever
momentum hoped for from the Kennedy-Adenauer meetings dissipated quickly. Minor but
chronic harassment persisted at Berlin checkpoints and the access corridor.
Impatient with allied refusal to develop a unified position, the President decided he
needed to write Khrushchev and salvage a deteriorating situation. Kennedy had recently been
interviewed again by Khrushchev's son-in-law, journalist Aleksei Adzhubei.775 He told
Khrushchev now that interviews were where people made ideological arguments; this
correspondence should be more practical and constructive. Kennedy said they needed to
abandon gimmicky language about 'free cities.'776 Kennedy said the fact of the matter was West
Berlin wanted Western troops and not Soviet troops to protect their freedoms. Western access
rights preceded the establishment of East Germany; the Soviet Union had a legal obligation to
uphold those rights. The US and its allies were open to clarifying those rights but not to Soviet
unilateral action to abrogate them. Khrushchev should not be misled by reports of dissent in the
Western ranks. The West was preparing constructive negotiating proposals and the Soviets
should so the same so that "we and you will be able to sit down in ... to reach a solution mutually
satisfactory to all." The president concluded "what best serves peace, not merely prestige, must
be our yardstick."777 Having replied to Khrushchev, with a toughness matching the Chairman's,
the American President now had to hope the Western Ministers could salvage enough common
ground to back up his message.
The Western Foreign Ministers met in Paris on December 10-12; the Heads of State
meeting anticipated in October did not occur. Britain's Lord Home told the Ministers they
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needed to find some agreement before the NATO meetings a few days away. Neither the French
nor West Germans were eager to discuss the de Gaulle-Adenauer talks that had just occurred.
French minister Couve de Murville cast the Soviets' Berlin proposals as part of their larger, longterm design to dominate Western Europe. The French had hoped the Paris 1960 summit would
provide a forum to discuss European security problems with Soviets; they were ready for another
opportunity but thought it would be difficult.778
They thought Berlin was only "a means to an end" for the USSR, which was offering
nothing of value to the West. Since the Soviets did not really want war, no matter how much
they blustered, there was no need for negotiations. Not only were negotiations unnecessary, said
de Murville, they would seriously weaken Germany and, in turn, all of Western Europe. Lord
Home answered that it was still possible to negotiate on specifics with the Soviet Union.779 He
cited concurrent talks on Laos, nuclear testing and disarmament, though these examples were in
fact only marginal discussions. Home made an articulate argument in principle for negotiations,
but did not move the French in the slightest.
De Murville contrasted the pre-Paris period when "an atmosphere of detente as
generated" with the current environment of border closings and high-yield thermonuclear tests.
He asked what the West expected to gain when Khrushchev was making such threats?
Schroeder entered the argument on the side on negotiation, saying it was an imperfect but
necessary tool to avoid catastrophe and offer hope for the city's residents. De Murville said the
very nature of the occupation statutes was in question. Home said there were ways to protect
those statutes. Unlike the French, he thought the stakes were too high not to attempt negotiation.
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If the West could not even "come away from these meetings with greater unity, then the Soviets
would indeed erode our position and the unity of the alliance is unlikely to be repaired." 780
Negotiations with the Soviets did not require unacceptable concessions, said the
Secretary. citing the 1949 Jessup-Malik agreement ending the airlift situation. Rusk said that
Gromyko understood in September that the issue of GDR recognition was not on the table and
that the deadline for the treaty had been lifted.781 De Murville agreed on some points with Rusk,
but said that since the French did not believe the Soviets would go to war over Berlin, that there
was no need to negotiate over Berlin at the present time. Schroeder said the greatest danger that
could come out of negotiations was neutralization. Rusk saw a danger of splitting the US away
from Europe. Home emphasized that they needed to get better organized before they met with
NATO in two days. In final sessions on December 12, the four countries could barely agree on a
communiqué suggesting an East-West foreign ministers meeting.782
Kennedy called de Gaulle the same day to get the General to accept their final resolution:
"Diplomatic contacts with the Soviet Union should be undertaken on the basis of the agreed
positions of the Western powers in order to ascertain on what basis it might be possible to
undertake formal negotiation at Foreign Ministers level with the Soviet government."783 De
Gaulle rejected even this cautious language. He was not in favor of negotiations at this time.
Kennedy said they would try to find acceptable language, but the conference was already
breaking up. The Soviets were becoming very non-conciliatory; public speeches indicated little
hope for negotiations, especially if the West was determined to return to its least flexible
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positions. At the National Press Club in Washington; Soviet Ambassador Menshikov had made a
very tough presentation that rolled the Soviet position back to November 1958.784 On December
9, Khrushchev had made a similar speech to the world Federation of Trade Unions.
Khrushchev wrote a private letter again to Kennedy on December 13, thanking the
president for his publicly conciliatory interview with Adzhubei but admonishing him for the
private toughness of his December 2 letter. Taking special aim at the occupation arrangements,
Khrushchev complained that the US wanted the Soviets "to play traffic cops on the roads to West
Berlin and (to make) your temporary occupation status become permanent." He ridiculed the
idea of a permanent occupation regime in West Berlin, saying that a German peace treaty was
long overdue,. A special protocol making Berlin a free city would answer any other questions
the West might have about the city's status. Khrushchev warned again against arming West
Germany. Not only was the West refusing to end the last vestiges of World War II, they were
potentially sowing the seeds for its resurgence. Khrushchev did not set a new deadline but
neither did he make any specific suggestions on further negotiation.785
The Allies seemed to have lost all progress on Berlin made since December 1958. They
had been in disarray then, but Eisenhower's Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had been able
to maneuver his fellow foreign ministers into some agreement. Rusk had also gone to Europe
but with more meager results. Adenauer was trying to escape blame for his failure to make de
Gaulle more agreeable to negotiation.786 French indifference to his attempted intercession
visibly diminished Adenauer's influence and the idea of French-German solidarity they used to
keep Britain at a disadvantage in Europe. De Gaulle had gotten his way in obstructing
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negotiations, but at serious cost to his relations with NATO, European allies and the United
Sates. The British, keenest of all on negotiations in 1961, had not been very influential in Paris
or in Washington. Macmillan and Ambassador Ormsby-Gore had good relations with Kennedy
but without substantial results.787 United States leadership had increased disproportionally that
its relations with smaller allies were becoming very uncomfortable. The Soviets had the same
problem with allies like East Germany. Both Kennedy and Khrushchev faced significant
domestic criticism over their Berlin policies. As these leaders prepared for a bilateral
negotiations in1962, they also had to consider the growing danger of nuclear escalation and the
slow progress of disarmament talks.788 Ambassador Menshikov made clear, in a speech to
Washington's National Press Club, that Khrushchev was still intent on signing his peace treaty,
but without a new deadline. 789

Conclusions
1961 marked the pivotal phase of the shift from multilateral East-West diplomacy on
Berlin to bilateral engagement. Kennedy's unfamiliarity with the other leaders, disagreement
with the Allies defense and trade issues, failure to notify them of the Bay of Pigs mission, and
bilateral meetings at the start of the summer all helped erode the Eisenhower -era relationship.
Perceiving uncertainty on Kennedy's part, Khrushchev pressed harder with his Berlin/German
demands. Western disunity prevented Kennedy from framing a coherent response. Neither force
nor negotiations promised successful outcomes. The Wall eased the pressure for either rushed
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negotiations or a quick military buildup, but did not solve the problem of Khrushchev's peace
treaty plans or his disagreements with East Germany.790
That situation prompted the United States and Soviet Unions to begin private
negotiations in the fall of 1961. Khrushchev faced his own alliance problems, but the West's
were more serious regarding Berlin. Disarmament prospects remained minimal, especially since
NATO planning relied heavily on nuclear deterrence.791 Although Berlin resolution did not seem
likely, Western leaders did consider possible East-West foreign minister or heads-of-state
meetings. The personal objections of de Gaulle and Adenauer prevented the West from finding a
common platform or purpose. There would be no new summit. The United States, secured the
agreement of the Allies for further US-Soviet talks.
From this point forward, the US and USSR would conduct the most important
talks on Berlin.792 The West Germans grew more influential, the French more independent, and
the British more insulated, but still had a determining say on Berlin. So did Walter Ulbricht.
Frustration with unrealistic and uncompromising allies led the superpowers to conduct Head-ofState correspondence, highest level ambassadorial talks, and foreign minister meetings on Berlin.
Disarmament linkage was used by both sides to gain leverage. In the process of the next ,
intensive but formulaic rounds of talk, the participants - Thompson and Dobrynin, Rusk and
Gromyko, Kennedy and Khrushchev, et al - got to know the other more closely than American
and Soviet leaders had since the war. As unproductive, prolonged and contentious as these
meetings were, it is significant that they proceeded in spite of military tension and armed
confrontations in Berlin.
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The question going into 1962 was whether force might replace negotiation.793 The
importance of nuclear weapons, including ICBMs and long-range bombers, in Allied and Soviet
military strategy meant that force would be a more dangerous option than ever. This would
become even clearer in the next year, as Khrushchev developed a plan to put nuclear missiles in
Cuba. That, he thought, would show the United States how it felt to have missiles on its
doorstep. But by introducing a new nuclear threat to the US, Khrushchev would diminish
Berlin's leverage value for negotiations.
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Chapter 5: "Vital Interests," January - August 1962

Introduction
The failure of the Western powers in late 1961 to agree on a practical negotiating
strategy ended the last major multilateral attempt to dissuade the Soviet Union from signing a
separate peace treaty with East Germany and abrogating Allied occupation rights in West Berlin.
In 1962, the United States and Soviet Union continued bilateral discussions they had begun in
September 1961.794 Their basic positions remained the same but their negotiating goals shifted
to more pragmatic ends. The Soviets focused now on putting the occupation under a UN flag
and linking a Berlin settlement to a European non-aggression pact. The United States, speaking
for the West, wanted an interim agreement and an international access authority. Minimal
progress on a negotiated settlement, and problems in Southeast Asia and Cuba eroded the
importance of Berlin, so that the Berlin Crisis diminished in importance by late summer 1962,
though the issue still held grave potential.795
Even with the bilateral approach, Western cohesion remained shaky and US-Soviet
relations uncertain. Concerned over the dangers and consequences of forceful response plans
that involved nuclear weapons use, President John Kennedy and British Prime Minister Harold
Macmillan strongly advocated negotiations and tried to develop new options that might placate
the Soviets.796 French president Charles de Gaulle, convinced that Khrushchev was not prepared
to force the Allies from Berlin, discouraged negotiations, despite the increasing Soviet-approved
pressure on West Berlin. West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer could not be persuaded to
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approve even modest concessions to East Germany, but other elements in his government
recognized the need for an inter-German detente.797 The British approved of the US 's
diplomacy but chafed at their own diminished influence. Because France was also a signatory to
the occupation agreements and West Germany's approval of any revision of the current situation
was also necessary, the US could not agree to alterations in the Berlin status quo without
undermining the Western alliance.798
The bilateral US and Soviet dialogue in 1962 further emphasized a trend away from the
multilateralism that characterized the first two years of the Berlin Crisis. Begun soon after the
Wall's construction in August1961 and resuming in 1962, these confidential negotiations
consisted of back-channel contacts between Soviet agent Georgi Bolshakov and Attorney
General Robert Kennedy, private correspondence between Kennedy and Soviet Chairman Nikita
Khrushchev, more personal discussions in Washington and Moscow through their respective
ambassadors, Llewellyn Thompson and Anatoly Dobrynin, and extended talks between US
Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Soviet Foreign minister Andrei Gromyko.799
The Soviets did not sign their peace treaty with East Germany or blockade West Berlin
during these negotiations, but checkpoint and access corridor harassment increased steadily
through the next several months. Contingency plans included nuclear weapons use to contest a
West Berlin blockade.800 The resulting debates revealed the importance and hazards of nuclear
deterrence more explicitly than at any time since the Korean War.801 The resumption of Soviet
testing just days after the Wall, the US revelation in October 1961 that Soviet missile strength
was but a fraction of Khrushchev's claims, and the US's own resumption of testing in March
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1962 underscored concerns about the nuclear arms race.802 However, German and Berlin issues
remained the most troublesome obstacle in their relations, with disarmament progress still
dependent on their progress.
Eighteen-nation (East-West plus observers) disarmament talks, centering on a nuclear test
ban, began in Geneva in the spring of 1962.803 Just as Gromyko's attendance at the United
Nations sessions in October 1961 had allowed him to meet several times with Rusk, the Geneva
talks provided diplomatic cover for extended discussions on Berlin between the two foreign
ministers in April 1962. In the absence of a summit, these meetings were the most significant
East-West discussions on Berlin since the ministers' October talks and the discussions with
Adenauer in November 1961. Those talks were not productive however and even represented a
hardening of positions.804 The ambassadorial and Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence
dialogues lapsed as a result and harassment increased. An ongoing impasse over Berlin,
minimal progress at the disarmament conference, US resumption of testing and increased
competition in the Third World signaled a retreat from detente. The severity of this
estrangement is defined by Khrushchev's decision in May 1962 to station Soviet ballistic missiles
with nuclear missiles in Cuba.805

Ambassador Thompson's Discussions in Moscow
When US Ambassador Thompson began discussions with Gromyko in January, he
understood that resolution was unlikely in the near future. Rusk instructed him to first probe for
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a productive basis for negotiation.806 Gromyko said that, although the most recent deadline had
been extended for the time being, "it would be wrong to draw conclusion they are prepared to
leave West Berlin situation unchanged." As for Western proposal to hold all-Berlin plebiscites
to replace the Potsdam accords, "this question cannot be discussed." Gromyko made clear that
since "East Berlin is completely integrated into the German Democratic Republic (GDR), West
Berlin is the problem precisely because it social system is different." 807 Thompson replied that
the West still insisted on guaranteed access to West Berlin as a separate issue from recognizing
GDR sovereignty.
Without actually stating that the West had little confidence in GDR responsibility for
access, Thompson said the US was prepared to discuss an international access authority, one of
the few new proposals in the 1962 dialogue. Rejection of an all-Berlin approach, a main element
of the new US approach, "would greatly restrict possibility for discussion." "An agreement on
access, even in absence of agreement on other matters," was essential, "if serious collision were
to be avoided."808 He also reiterated the Soviet "free-city" was still not acceptable. Despite this
unpromising start, Gromyko welcomed further discussion.
Reviewing the meeting, Thompson noted that Gromyko indicated no hurry to re-impose
the deadline and did not malign the West Germans. Gromyko's reticence to discuss access may
have reflected Soviet uncertainty about the Western position. Thompson thought that if the
Soviets were aware that the West wanted more clearly defined links between West Germany and
West Berlin, "discussions would be over." Thompson asked Rusk for permission to suggest a
"Confederation of West and East Berlin," with both sides determining their own system but
sharing some municipal administration. Because East German leader Walter Ulbricht had
806
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already proposed an all-German confederation, advancing a parallel idea might be seen as
acknowledgement of Soviet prestige. This proposal might restore some unity and stability to the
city, provide them with occupation rights in West Berlin, and even provide an excuse to remove
the Wall. Said Thompson, "in any case I need something positive to say ... on status West Berlin
at next session."809 Rusk , talking to British Ambassador David Ormsby-Gore, saw some slight
signs of promise, especially regarding the international access authority. Rusk also noted "The
French ... are showing a great deal more interest in these talks than they are supposed to."810
Rusk replied to Thompson that the Soviet interest in further talks was encouraging, but
the Soviets needed to be told that any unilateral peace treaty moves on their part would be
unacceptable - Western occupation rights could not be in question. He should ask Gromyko to
define how West Berlin was a threat to European peace and tell him that guaranteed access did
not represent any infringement upon or interference with East German sovereignty.811
Thompson could note that the West had not moved to make West Berlin the capitol of the
Federal Republic, while the Soviets had "first begun rearmament of Germany by rearming East
Germans over Western protests." Regarding Gromyko's reference to "broader questions" in the
first session, Thompson should say that the access question needed to be settled first.812 Specific
details of the international access authority proposal would not be presented yet. The Soviets
would first have to demonstrate they wanted to use the talks for more than just reiteration of their
familiar positions.
So far, the latter was all the Soviets were showing Thompson. Gromyko opened their
next discussion by reiterating the Soviets' standard free city proposal. Although they still
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intended to proceed with the peace treaty, this could be preceded by an agreement on West
Berlin. Gromyko "stressed that questions of formalization of existing German borders, respect
for sovereignty GDR, prohibition nuclear arms for both German states, non-aggression treaty
between NATO and Warsaw Pact must be considered simultaneously." An international access
authority would unacceptably infringe on GDR sovereignty. Thompson responded that the peace
treaty and free city proposals were unacceptable and Western occupation rights were not
negotiable. He then told Gromyko that "it would seem we have come full circle and in some
respects have taken a step backwards."813 Gromyko responded that GDR sovereignty must be
respected, ruling out an international access authority and an all-Berlin plebiscite. Access could
only be discussed alongside the other Berlin issues. If the West believed they could improve and
perpetuate their occupation rights, "all talk will be in vain." Thompson regretted the Soviets
would allow the GDR to determine whether a new access agreement was acceptable; this made
negotiations futile because the West would be "buying the same horse twice."814
In evaluating the conversation, Thompson first reaction was pessimistic; he speculated
that Gromyko's tough line may have been meant to delay the talks, possibly to bring in the
Germans or to force a summit, or even scuttle discussions in favor of a separate treaty. British
Ambassador Frank Roberts thought the Soviets were gauging the West, hoping to find out if
Macmillan-Adenauer talks just a few days before had influenced the Americans. Thompson
noted that "Gromyko asked no questions about international authority idea even for purpose of
being in better position to knock it down." 815 Thompson did not know what to recommend as a
next step. The Soviets had "tabled free city proposal even though told already it was
unacceptable." He felt the US, perceived as having "made a good faith effort to resume
813
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negotiations," should encourage a Macmillan visit. British softness on GDR recognition might
persuade the Soviets to discuss access as a specific issue.816 An Adenauer visit to Moscow might
move the Soviets to offer something new. Adenauer did not like Khrushchev and wanted to talk
with Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan, whose senior authority did not extend to foreign
policy.817 Thompson thought a "meeting between President and Khrushchev in present
circumstances seems to me out of the question."818 Thompson wanted to hold one more talk with
Gromyko and then return to Washington, to buy time while Kennedy and Rusk decided what to
do next.
After reading Thompson's reports, Kennedy suggested the Ambassador should be
allowed to open the talks to positions not pre-agreed by the British and Germans. Kennedy
thought Thompson should be asked his ideas but that maybe another channel should replace him.
Assuming Thompson would probably hold one more talk with meager results, the President
wondered if they should try more formal talks. The private channel proposals had to be vetted in
London and Bonn first though the Americans had to actually conduct discussions.819
On January 17, 1961, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy told the President
"Berlin was the greatest issue of all ... talks in Moscow are getting nowhere, but we think it wise
to keep on talking." Kennedy told the NSC the next day that "the Soviets could be expected to
proceed with a separate peace treaty and there might be a direct case of nerves in the Spring." He
stressed the military responsibilities involved and the need to review closely their contingency
plans. He said they must "think hard about the ways and means of making decisions that might
lead to nuclear war. If there were to be any such war, we must know what it is for, and know
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what other steps we can take before such war comes."820 The next Thompson-Gromyko meeting
would have to make whatever gains could be salvaged from this round and estimate Soviet
intentions on Berlin.
Rusk told Thompson to tell the Soviets they had not presented negotiable proposals. The
Ambassador should ask "what will happen when they sign separate peace treaty."821 He should
signal that the West did not regard that as a desirable or an inevitable outcome. Soviet flexibility
could lead to progress. The West would document their desire to negotiate by formally
presenting the all-Berlin plebiscite and international access authority proposals to match the
Soviet free city and GDR-favoring Protocol of Guarantees (for access). He should avoid "any
implication that we considered talks had reached complete impasse and that only thing left was
to proceed to improvisation for crisis situation after peace treaty." If a peace treaty signing did
appear imminent, the Soviets should be made to understand that could cause a "highly dangerous
confrontation." 822 The all-Berlin and international access authority proposals should be tabled,
but immediate discussion was not necessary. He should ask for a further meeting, linking
Gromyko's stated interest in "broader questions" with progress on Berlin.
In the meantime Kennedy met with a high-ranking Soviet press delegation, which
included Khrushchev's son-in-law Alexei Adzhubei, editor of Izvestia, and Georgi Bolshakov,
nominally the editor of the pictorial magazine USSR, but also an intelligence aide at the Soviet
Embassy and back-channel Soviet conduit via Attorney General Robert Kennedy. Khrushchev's
daughter Rada also attended the lunch meeting.823 Bolshakov and Robert Kennedy had become
good friends. The President had granted Adzubei an interview in November and thought him a
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useful conduit to Khrushchev. The President told his guests than since a final solution to Berlin
and German problems might be "quite impossible" at present, an accommodation should be
found to "prevent tensions from mounting." 824 Such arrangements need not be immediate.
Kennedy pointed to Laos and the Congo as situations where arrangements had been
made. Adzhubei asked if the president believed a final solution for Berlin could be found.
Kennedy said this was not possible based on present positions, but the dangers of conflict
impelled them to find some temporary compromise. He noted that both Gromyko and
Thompson had made proposals unacceptable to the other side, and was concerned both sides had
become "more and more formal and more and more incompatible .... failure to reach an
accommodation could be fraught with serious consequences." He asked Adzhubei if the Soviets
would proceed unilaterally with their peace treaty or to seek a compromise. Adzhubei replied
that an all-German solution would be best. He hoped Kennedy would continue contacts with
Khrushchev to that end. He thought that the US might be taking advantage of the Soviet Union's
"loyalty and desire for an agreement," but "the worst peace is better than a good war."825
Assistant Secretary of State Foy Kohler told Rusk that the Soviets seemed less urgent
regarding the peace treaty. He said "while these did not reflect any serious split in the Soviet
leadership, they might conceivably make it more advisable for the leadership to reduce ... the
high visibility of the Berlin crisis in a manner not damaging to Soviet prestige." Kohler thought
the Soviets were trying to use the West Germans to achieve their Berlin goals. Other Berlin
items of business included restoration of East-West commandant access, reassuring NATO on
US troop levels and Inter-zonal trade. 826
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When talks in Moscow resumed on February 1, Gromyko accepted the statement of
principles and access authority proposals, but informed Thompson he should not think "our
attitude is in any degree favorable to the documents or what you have said today." 827 The access
authority could only be considered in context of the whole Berlin situation. Gromyko said US
avoidance of the occupation issue did not reflect the "current facts." The US wanted to
perpetuate a wartime situation, he said, against the interests of peace and progress. Thompson
then emphasized impartiality in the access authority, citing the precedent of international air
service agreements which included the Soviet Union and East Germany. The US had its
proposals to reduce dangerous friction and improve specific West Berlin problems, but the free
city idea was not unacceptable. He asked what would happen to the occupation troops: "we did
not believe it would be in the interest of peace if you did not understand what would happen if
anyone tried to throw them out. The same applies to their access to and from Berlin." 828
Gromyko replied that US proposals were unrealistic; the peace treaty was the
"best solution" because it represented "facts of life in existing situation." He said the Soviets did
not want West Berlin and rejected a plebiscite, saying troops had not been invited in by the
German people. Thompson said West Berliners wanted the Allied troops to remain and a
plebiscite would prove that. Gromyko said this was an international situation involving greater
interests than just the West Berliners. Thompson said the wishes of West Berliners should be
considered too. Both expressed regret that no progress had been made, but Thompson rejected
the charge that the US proposals were meant to prevent agreement.829
The Ambassador reported to Rusk that he would wait for Gromyko to call the next
meeting, but wanted guidance on how to respond. He noted that Khrushchev was not then in
827
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Moscow and Soviet intentions might not be clear till the Chairman returned. Thompson worried
that the Soviets might have decided that the West had hardened its position under pressure from
Adenauer and de Gaulle. He had briefed the other Western ambassadors who did not think the
Soviets would accept the international authority without "major concessions."830 West German
Ambassador Kroll, often considered too friendly with the Soviets, thought the Soviets were more
interested in the peace treaty than in West Berlin, but Thompson doubted that Bonn was ready to
accept any arrangement that would permanently divide Germany. Ambassador David OrmsbyGore complained to Rusk the Soviets were trying to divide the Americans and British. 831
Kohler summed up the situation for Rusk prior to a White House meeting on February 9.
Kohler addressed the idea that the recent Soviet intransigence signaled they might be trying to
bury the issue. The impasse presented a confusing situation for military planning, but did
maintain the status quo in Berlin. On the whole, said Kohler, continued delay was a more
desirable outcome than a sudden unilateral move. If they signed a peace treaty but compromised
on access and allowed continued occupation, that could be acceptable.832 Kohler did not address
probable French or German reaction, but noted that current French insistence on a detente before
proceeding with formal negotiations precluded their renewed participation in exploratory talks.
Thompson could not predict whether the French would actually block any revised
agreement but expected they would be consulted again soon. A summit, multilateral or USSoviet, was unlikely at present, but Rusk might be able to accept Gromyko's invitation to visit
Moscow. More probably, Rusk would hold private sessions with Gromyko while both were in
Geneva for the upcoming disarmament conference. The arrival of a new and more capable
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Soviet Ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin, in Washington would provide a better conduit than
Menshikov, and comparable to Thompson's stature in Moscow.833 British Ambassador Frank
Roberts was not expected to produce any better results than Thompson had, but there was still
some chance that Prime Minister Macmillan might again attempt personal intervention, as he had
periodically since March 1959.834 There was an outside chance for West German-Soviet talks,
which the US would not oppose. The best immediate hope would be continued ThompsonGromyko talks, followed by Rusk-Gromyko talks in Geneva, and cultivation of Dobrynin as a
conduit.
Gromyko opened the next meeting with a long declaration that devolved into familiar
arguments. Thompson said the US wanted to reduce tensions and increase areas of agreement,
but there had been no change in the US position and no agreement could be approved without
consulting the Allies. The US did not want West Berlin as a "military springboard" and saw no
reason to allow Soviet troops there. Gromyko replied that if the US wanted to reduce tension,
they should not object to a peace treaty. He said Western troops were dangerous and their
presence was not obligated by the Potsdam Agreement, "which you have broken."835
The meeting was noticeably more formal than previous sessions. Thompson reported
that Gromyko's declaration had evidently been prepared for publication, and the US should
produce a corresponding statement. Thompson noted that the Soviets had paid more attention to
the Oder-Neisse border (which also affected Poland) than to the internal borders. He thought
the US might sweeten the plebiscite proposal by offering temporary replacement of Western
troops with UN troops, but did not think the West Berliners would like the idea. He saw little
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grounds for continuing the talks on the current basis, though "Gromyko certainly gave
impression Soviets not yet ready for break and in any event would put onus for break on us."836
Thompson was ready to hand over the talks to the foreign ministers in Geneva, but State
Department analysts noted that Gromyko "made no attempt to end the talks."837
Thompson also received a letter from US Ambassador to Yugoslavia George Kennan,
who was a veteran of the first US missions to Moscow and author of the 1946 'Long Telegram'
warning of Soviet intentions in Europe. Kennan now warned against assuming the Soviets were
bluffing and urged negotiation on grounds more acceptable to the Soviets, lest they use the
impasse to provoke a more dangerous situation. Too much attention to Berlin's symbolic value,
while ignoring more pressing realities, could lead to closer ties between Moscow and Belgrade,
extending Soviet influence to the Eastern Mediterranean.838 Kennan's letter produced friendly
but heated criticism from other US diplomats in Europe, who found his willingness to
compromise with the Soviets unrealistic. In the face of growing Soviet interference with Berlin
corridor air traffic, such accommodation seemed dangerous.
NATO Commandant Lauris Norstad told Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Melvin
Lemnitzer that their plans needed to be updated to allow fighter escorts of transport and civilian
air traffic in the access corridor.839 Checkpoint and train travel incidents also continued, drawing
concern from General Lucius Clay. US leaders needed to determine if Berlin harassment had
any relation to the diplomatic standoff in Moscow. Walter Ulbricht had also gone to Moscow to
pressure Khrushchev to sign the peace treaty soon.840
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Walt Rostow, head of State's Policy Planning Staff, summed the Berlin situation up for
Rusk after meeting with policy aides and CIA representatives on February 9. These analysts
thought the Soviets were still undecided on whether to back off re Berlin, sign the peace treaty,
pursue negotiations realistically or use the issue as leverage for wider discussions The
Gromyko-Thompson talks would probably decide the issue, but Soviet presentations had been so
opaque, the analysts could not guess which choice the Soviets would pursue. They
recommended the US try to maintain the status quo in lieu of seeking a negotiated settlement,.
Negotiations should continue, however, with "more forthcoming" positions (these were not
spelled out). They could also try again to offer discussions in other areas like disarmament to
provide diplomatic cover for the Soviets.841 This prescription repeated what US analysts had
been suggesting for three years.
Khrushchev kept coming back with the peace treaty/free city demands as his central
issue. The Sino-Soviet crisis had gotten worse than in 1959, raising hopes that the Soviets might
seek to reduce tensions. Khrushchev felt he should seem tougher with the West.842 Khrushchev
also was very concerned with gaining Soviet influence in Cuba, which he regarded as a crucial
link to the Communist bloc and the emerging post-colonial Third World.843 Gains elsewhere
might compensate for indecision on Berlin and even bolster his hand there.
Rusk met with British and French delegations on February 13 to try and figure out
"what what the Soviets were really up to in Berlin." French Ambassador Herve Alphand saw
Soviet ambiguity, with air harassment and a tough negotiating stance balanced by good will
gestures like the Adzhubei visit and an invitation to have Robert Kennedy visit Moscow. British
Ambassador Ormsby-Gore thought the Soviets realized "they could not obtain their kind of
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German settlement at this time." They had to balance realistic expectations against domestic and
Bloc pressures, and wanted some kind of resolution before extending the dialogue to other
issues. Rusk observed that they also had "to stabilize Eastern Europe" while dealing with
domestic problems like agriculture and "setbacks to with regard ... to under-developed
countries." They had to deal with the West's knowledge that their missile strength had been
greatly over-estimated and increased US defense spending. Rusk guessed that they were
"probably" not going to sign a separate treaty, but "the possibility could not be ruled out."844
Alphand wondered if the Soviets would perceive Western uncertainty. He also asked
what Rusk thought about direct bilateral West German-Soviet talks. Rusk thought these might
be profitable, but Alphand worried these might compromise West Germany's role in NATO.
Rusk wondered why the West Germans were so reticent to deal with their weaker East German
counterparts. Ormsby-Gore thought Soviet participation in the upcoming Geneva disarmament
talks a positive sign, even if they were only in it for the propaganda value. Rusk discounted the
Soviet interest in the talks because the Chairman had not shown any real interest in a summit for
disarmament, despite his calls for head-of-state participation; Ormsby-Gore seconded that
opinion.845 Overall, this meeting indicated a mix of wary uncertainty and cautious optimism that
a major Soviet move was imminent regarding Berlin and Germany. It also showed that the
focus of trans-Atlantic concern was about to shift towards the more positive topic of
disarmament. However, Alphand's discussion with Foy Kohler two days later about Berlin air
harassment, reflected the fact the Soviets were far from done with Berlin.846
Kennedy delayed answering Khrushchev's December 13 letter while waiting to see what
the Thompson-Gromyko talks might produce. On January 15, he told the Chairman that the
844
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formality of those talks was a disappointing reversion to the earlier phases of the Berlin crisis.
While the current situation might not be satisfactory, "It is not the Western powers who are
seeking a change in the status of Berlin," he said. The Western side had no intention of using
force to change the situation, but the Soviets must recognize that they cannot unilaterally make
changes "which would result in damage to the rights, obligations and interests of the Allied
Powers and the people of West Berlin." Both sides needed a solution which would "avoid any
shift favorable to one side and detrimental to the other and ensure a greater degree of stability
and tranquility in the entire German situation ...if we can take those two principles as a starting
point, we might ...see light at the end of the tunnel."847
Kennedy alluded to the difficult struggle to limit nuclear testing, saying it was essential to
the success of the Geneva disarmament talks not to increase tensions. He noted that Thompson
had protested Berlin air harassment and warned that such provocations would prevent any
serious progress at the Geneva conference. He warned Khrushchev that Soviet pressure would
only induce France to build up their military forces and seek independent nuclear capacities.
Restraint and negotiation would be more productive. Thompson and Gromyko needed to discuss
"concrete matters, "such as the international access authority. He noted that Adzhubei had said
such an instrument might be acceptable with GDR participation, but did not mention Gromyko's
emphatic rejection of even that concession. Kennedy closed by reaffirming his hopes that
private diplomacy, though a "departure" from usual practice, could bring about the peaceful
outcome he knew they both desired.848
At the same time Khrushchev was at his Black Sea dacha in Pitsunda, where he was
conducting a review of Soviet missile progress, both for space exploration and delivery of
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nuclear weapons. A new heavy booster, the UR-500 was approved, capable of carrying both
space vehicles and the recently-tested thirty megaton thermonuclear device. Most importantly,
new ICBM designs were commissioned to replace the first-generation R-16, which was so slow
to set up it would never survive a first strike and to keep parity with the American Minuteman
and Polaris missiles. 849 Though development problems continued, the new ICBMs would soon
give the Soviet Union a practical rapid response long range nuclear capability, which it still did
not have in 1962.
Ambassador Dowling and NSC advisor Dr. Henry Kissinger met with Chancellor
Adenauer in Bonn on February 17 to brief him on US nuclear capabilities, reassuring him about
the ability to withstand and deliver retaliatory strikes.850 Kissinger told him both the US and
USSR would share potential impact. The US saw some possibility of a NATO nuclear force,
such as the proposed MLF (Multi-Lateral Force), but at present the most efficient approach for
the West was extending the US's protective nuclear umbrella through closer integration of the
NATO countries. Adenauer noted that Norstad's request for more medium range missiles
(MRBM) had been delayed, but Kissinger said that was for technical reasons and the US was
not opposed to the MLF.851 Neither mentioned that political rivalries had so far stymied progress
on the MLF idea.852
They also discussed contrary opinions within quadripartite military planning. Adenauer
objected to having to clear all planning, including economic and naval counter-measures,
through NATO. US estimates of 26 available Soviet conventional battalions was about a third of
what really faced them. That imbalance could lead to disaster. Kissinger said that US forces
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were modernized and could be deployed with adequate strength to compel the Soviets to
negotiations; this would also provide a strategic hedge in the event of nuclear conflict.
Adenauer said that changed the situation but still preferred naval blockade to ground action in
the event of conflict. Kissinger said that, at the risk of being undiplomatic, the Chancellor's
attitude "might indicate the Federal Republic was unprepared to fight for Berlin if ground action
or nuclear war might result."853 Adenauer reacted sharply to this suggestion, saying that since
"consequences of nuclear war were incalculable ... every other measure should be tried before
resorting to a nuclear war."854 If a blockade proved unsuccessful, he said, the FRG would
support conventional ground action and whatever might follow. Adenauer expressed
appreciation for US efforts to defend its friends, saying historic opportunities for cooperation
were now possible. Kissinger affirmed that US leaders held the same view. The meeting ended
with the Chancellor expressing profuse appreciation for US dedication to the Atlantic
Community.
FRG Ambassador Wilhelm Grewe told Kennedy and Rusk how much the Chancellor has
appreciated the briefing. Kennedy said he was glad the meeting went well but complained that
the Chancellor needed constant reassurance.855 The President wanted to make clear that a naval
blockade would do little; more serious conventional force plans were necessary. With sufficient
commitment from NATO partners, a conventional deterrent could be viable and less risky than
front-line nuclear defense. Grewe also assured the President that Adenauer was supportive of the
ambassadorial working group, despite his sometimes disparaging remarks. Kennedy
acknowledged that progress had been minimal and prospects uncertain. Rusk asked what "the
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German view was on next steps to be taken." Grewe said that despite the standoff, the current
talks in Moscow should continue but not be "expanded."856
Kennedy said the Soviets had made clear that even if Western troops remained temporarily - that Soviet troops would have to be included with them. Grewe said he was "not so
sure" the Soviets would proceed with a treaty that might lead to a war which Khrushchev did not
want. Kennedy agreed with Grewe that the US military buildup had so far stalled Khrushchev's
hand, but said "a difficult spring and summer" still awaited. He asked if there was much public
interest in the FRG for their own bilateral dialogue with the Soviets. Grewe said no and they
wished to continue to treat West Berlin as a quadripartite (US/FRG/UK/France) concern. He
also said he hoped that these powers should have a "common reassessment" of the situation
before the Geneva talks commenced.857
Thompson cabled the next day to say he had encountered Gromyko at a Nepalese
reception in Moscow and the Foreign Minister had initiated the subject of Berlin. Both took
standard positions but Gromyko made a point of saying that if access agreement was reached and
accepted by GDR, "such agreement would be carried out." Thompson replied that the West was
still unprepared to accept the division of Germany and pointed out that Ulbricht had reneged on
agreements for use of Tempelhof Airport. Gromyko repeated that the GDR would carry out
agreements and "if were not prepared to respect GDR sovereignty, then outlook was very
gloomy. The Foreign Minister made no effort to set a time limit for the talks or indicate
imminent Soviet actions if resolution not found soon: "on the contrary, his concern appeared to
be how we could keep talks going in view of current impasse."858 This conversation indicates
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that, however skeptical some in the West may have been about the wisdom or utility of their
talks, Khrushchev and Gromyko valued them highly.
Adenauer, however, was not content with their progress and, unless the Soviets retreated
from their "maximum positions", was ready to suspend them and call a Western foreign
Ministers conference. He told Ambassador Dowling he did not want to proceed with FRGUSSR bilateral talks.859 Adenauer said Kennedy was "being unfair" in saying the US had
already fully briefed him before the Kissinger meeting and complaining that Adenauer was not
realistic. He showed Dowling a report from FRG Ambassador Kroll that suggested Thompson
favored a "more flexible attitude." Dowling refuted reports that Thompson "advocated
concessions beyond those agreed by four Western allies in concert." Adenauer accepted this and
acknowledged that Kroll himself was thought to be more favorable to GDR recognition.
Dowling thought Kennedy's frank comments to Grewe had made the Chancellor realize how far
he had tested US patience; he also noted Adenauer's "frailty." 860 As capable a leader as
Adenauer had been for East Germany, he was proving a very difficult partner over Berlin.
Rusk told Thompson to arrange another meeting with Gromyko to "put further comments
on record and link discussions with possible talks at Geneva." The Ambassador should tell
Gromyko he would be accompanying Rusk at the conference and could brief the Secretary on the
substance of their discussions so far, if Gromyko wanted to hold higher level talks. Thompson
should state the recent Berlin air harassments "threatened to create highly dangerous situation."
He should reiterate Kennedy's comments to Adzhubei that both sides should seek temporary
accommodation, pending final resolution, and emphasize US serious intent. He should explain
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that US focus on access resulted from a belief that access disputes could lead to conflict.861 Rusk
also told Thompson that, although the French had allowed the talks to go on without their direct
participation, any agreement reached would still have to meet their approval. That would also be
a problem if the Western Foreign Ministers met, as they would in Geneva. Ulbricht had just
visited Moscow and the Soviets' Central Committee would also be meeting on March 5. Rusk
doubted that Khrushchev would be making any immediate move in these circumstances. But he
was telling General Clay in Berlin that it was still imperative to preserve Allied unity in West
Berlin, however difficult that might be.862
On March 6, Thompson held his final session with Gromyko. He told the Foreign
Minister that air traffic harassment did not help "when we are discussing possibility of new
arrangements" regarding access. Gromyko said their fighter activity was a justifiable response to
Western provocations in GDR airspace . He also said the US warnings about aggravating
tensions only underscored the need for a peace treaty. 863 Their free city proposal would not
favor either side, he said, and claimed the US was only interested in supporting their own
positions. He did not want to further discuss the all-Berlin plebiscite proposal. Thompson
pointed out that the Soviets had just unilaterally changed arrangements in place since the end of
the war and those arrangements had been designed to ensure free access to Berlin. Thompson
"reiterated our conviction that resolution problems ... is impossible without satisfactory
agreement on access." He understood that Gromyko wanted to have a broader discussion with
Rusk in Geneva; this would only be possible with a "strong and clear settlement on access and
preservation rights in West Berlin." He also said Kennedy "is determined to leave no method of
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discussion untried in seeking a sensible accommodation of rights and interests (of) both sides."864
Thompson complained of the vague generality in Gromyko's remarks about respect for GDR
sovereignty and his use of that issue as a blocking device to backtrack on agreed points.
Thompson moved on to Soviet insistence that Western occupation rights must be
terminated; this was most "serious and discouraging." If the Soviets considered this their bottom
line, "any agreement between us would be impossible." Thompson said the Western troops were
going to stay till "the German question is finally resolved." Gromyko did not directly respond to
Thompson's declaration, but said that the Soviets had researched the air traffic issue and were
sure they were legally justified. He concluded by saying that "respect for GDR sovereignty" was
"not only a phrase, it was an important condition." Any agreement on access must be "in accord
with GDR sovereignty."865 Thompson thought Gromyko seemed preoccupied and so did not
press for further discussion. He did not anticipate another meeting before Geneva. Their
Moscow talks had produced nothing, but they may have postponed the peace treaty and
forestalled conflict. 866

Preparations for Geneva Foreign Ministers Meeting
Both sides had an obvious and sincere interest for negotiations, for various reasons. As
they prepared for Geneva, their respective governments had to determine how to defend and
advance their vital interests. Some in the West, like Ambassador Dowling, were now less
inclined to deal with the GDR on access, especially in light of the air harassment, lest they "make
sustaining West Berlin's viability extremely difficult."867 In Berlin, Assistant Chief of the US
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Mission Alan Lightner belatedly answered George Kennan's letter urging more Western
flexibility: "Short of abandoning Berlin and ultimately all of Germany, what have we not done
that we still could do to further peace with honor on the continent of Europe?" Lightner said
Kennan's suggestion that the US need to offer Ulbricht something to create a more situation in
Central Europe smacked of Neville Chamberlain's "peace with honor." Appeasement, said
Lightner, was even more dangerous in a thermonuclear age.868
Kennedy's March 2 announcement that the US would resume nuclear testing underscored
concern about the dangers of thermonuclear war.869 Though not discussed in the last GromykoThompson talk, this decision would affect the proceedings in Geneva. The decision was a
reminder that American strategic doctrine continued to require nuclear deterrence to balance
Soviet advantages in conventional forces. If cuts as large as 30-50% were agreed on, the JCS
was concerned that large and expensive increases in conventional forces would be necessary to
maintain strategic balance.870 A major reason for the resumption of testing lay in the need to
keep the nuclear deterrent viable, especially since the Soviets had also resumed tests. The
Soviets had walked out on the previous round of UN-sponsored disarmament testing in 1960.
The new round of talks, the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) added
eight neutral nations to the five apiece from NATO and the Warsaw Pact.871 Nascent nuclear
power France elected not to attend, objecting to the inclusion of non-nuclear -armed nations.
The British had tried to forestall the American decision and would press for more stringent limits
than the Americans preferred. Khrushchev hoped that the neutrals would support his calls for
sweeping disarmament without inspections. When the conference began on March, Gromyko
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immediately introduced the same all-or-nothing disarmament proposal the Soviets had
championed since 1959. US and UK representatives offered concessions designed to make a
comprehensive test-ban possible, but the Soviets rejected this offer in their informal sessions.
The majority of the conference then designated the US/UK/USSR as a subcommittee to draft a
test ban treaty. If France had chosen to attend, they might have been included; that would have
constituted a session of Berlin signatories.872
Even without France, the subcommittee soon found itself mired in the same kind of
deadlock that had stymied the Berlin negotiations. Although the West had reduced the number
of inspections they wanted, the Soviets still rejected inspections as camouflage for espionage.
The US delayed the start of its new test series but on March 2, Kennedy said the US would
resume testing in April if the Soviets would not agree to a test ban first.873 The subcommittee
discussions between the "Big Three" (US/UK/USSR) stuck closely to the test-ban topic; but also
discussed Berlin Soviet air traffic interference in Berlin. When Rusk jokingly asked if Gromyko
was going to call the Soviet Commandant in Berlin and ask him to change their flight plans,
Gromyko said Rusk "should not prompt him on how to conduct his affairs.874

Rusk-Gromyko Sessions on Berlin at Geneva
Rusk and Gromyko began bilateral sessions in Geneva on March 12 in an uncertain
climate for both sides.875 Kennedy instructed the Secretary to develop a modus vivendi on
Berlin, i.e., a protocol to accommodate their respective interests pending final resolution.
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Kennedy provided him with a draft proposal for a modus vivendi agreement; it included
statements of general principles, nuclear non-proliferation, non-aggression, and an international
access authority.876
Khrushchev had just sent a new, noticeably tougher letter to Kennedy, repeatedly stating
Soviet intent to sign a separate treaty with the GDR. Khrushchev now offered to allow an access
authority but only temporarily, under GDR supervision and with the understanding that a free
city arrangement without occupation forces and in context of his separate treaty. He
acknowledged that the Berlin impasse had stalled disarmament progress. Khrushchev also noted
that Kennedy had referred to a possible summit and agreed this could be useful if an
accommodation is reached on a number of questions" before it took place. He said that
sometimes "efforts by ministers are not enough and ...heads of state and government have to join
the effort.877 Khrushchev was holding out hope for a summit, but on condition of acceptance of
the Soviet demands.
Kennedy amended his instructions to Rusk to take Khrushchev's counter-offer as a sign
of interest despite its strict conditions; above all Rusk was to seek an accommodation agreement
regardless of the air harassment.878 Rusk, Thompson, Kohler and Bohlen met with Lord Home
on the eve of the new round of Berlin talks. They had some cautious grounds for optimism: the
West Germans seemed supportive; Khrushchev had moved slightly on the access authority, did
not set a new deadline and was distracted by the Sino-Soviet schism; and the Soviets had just
granted the East Germans a large loan that might placate them. They agreed to attempt an access
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agreement, clearly spelling out reasonable air access rights, without seeking approval from
French and German partners till a draft was ready.879
Gromyko met Rusk at a luncheon at the Soviet embassy on March 12 and brought up the
Berlin topic. Rusk framed the US approach in terms of common interests and respective
problems. He said that the conference attested to the hazards nuclear weapons brought to the
pursuit of peace, noting the difficult progress of disarmament efforts. Common interests
included mutual desire for resolution of Berlin tension, limiting the 'diffusion' of nuclear
weapons, and establishing non-aggression policies. Although Rusk had just expressed
frustration that Soviets had been inconsistent about "existing facts," Gromyko renewed that
approach. The Foreign Minister took the same line as he had with Thompson in Moscow. Facts
in Germany had changed since the Potsdam agreements; the GDR was a reality and its
sovereignty must be respected; Western occupation was inconsistent with that sovereignty. The
USSR felt that Berlin problems could only be solved through the peace treaty and the free city
proposal would preserve the existing social order in Berlin without coercion.880
Gromyko said the idea of general principles was something new, but these would have to
respect both sides' interests. Rusk replied that the occupation was a well-established fact that
could not be ignored. The US was concerned that a peace treaty would negatively affect US
interests.881 This cordial beginning was disturbed by reports that Soviet planes had again dropped
radar jamming chaff over Allied flights in Berlin air corridor. Rusk and Lord Home agreed they
needed to protest to Gromyko, but not walk out on the conference. 882
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The jamming incident did not, however, disturb the next session. Rusk opened by citing
respect for "vital interest." This expression would become a signature theme of the US approach
throughout the next several months. Rusk said the US had no intention of disturbing GDR
sovereignty in its territory, but the GDR had no legal rights to interfere with West Berlin access.
He again cited the 1955 Zorin-Bolz protocols as documentation.883 Gromyko said that since the
access corridor was within GDR territory, they had the right to approve access arrangements, in
accordance with international law. He did not accept Rusk's contention that Western rights or
West Berlin's preferred social order would be diminished by the peace treaty/free city proposals.
Rusk said they were following completely different approaches. It was "one thing to
propose a solution and say that it was good for the other side; it was another thing to recognize
that each side had vital interests and to see how the problem could be resolved in accordance
...with those interests." He observed that both the US and USSR subscribed to various transit
arrangements where the ground governments claimed no control over traffic crossing their
territories. Gromyko said Rusk should understand that the Soviet proposals would be "in the
interest of all concerned." He dismissed Rusk's precedents: "there were many things in the past
which no longer existed." Gromyko concluded that he "liked" Rusk's statement that the "US and
USSR had been allies against Germany and that Germany should not make them enemies."884
Soviet air harassment against civilian and military flights was increasing.885 Rusk said he
could not manage the problem from Geneva. In Berlin, Clay clashed with Norstad over the
latter's plan to reschedule civilian flights; Clay wanted to keep to schedule and provide fighter
escorts. US advisors there were already discussing possible suspension of the talks with
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Gromyko. For the moment, they elected to send a sharp warning to the Soviets. 886 Thompson
was advising Rusk not to offer acceptance of GDR personnel at checkpoints or else the Soviets
would assume Western weakness and proceed with their separate treaty. Kohler brought up the
air interference problem with his Soviet counterpart Vladimir Semenov, who said the Soviet
actions were legal. Semenov told Kohler that the "real reason" the Soviets wanted to change the
Berlin situation was to eliminate the use of West Berlin for intelligence and propaganda
operations and reduce their "organic links" with the FRG. He stressed concern about German
militarism. When Kohler brought up making West Berlin the FRG capital, matching the GDR's
action, Semenov replied, "You just try that."887 Kohler thought the talk a positive indication the
Soviets wanted a mutually acceptable solution.
In Geneva, Rusk continued to have short talks with Gromyko, hoping his opposite
number would receive instructions that might open up their discussions. Their next formal
sessions were longer because Rusk and Gromyko wanted more substantial discussions before
they had to return home.888 Rusk bluntly complained that the Soviet efforts were designed "to
undermine and destroy the freedom of West Berlin." Neither side really wanted a crisis to
develop, but they had been unsuccessful in negotiation. Now they had to figure out how to
manage their disagreement: "the problem was to find a method not involving the interests of the
West or requiring a formal withdrawal of Soviet proposals." Gromyko responded with recitations
of his standard arguments about GDR sovereignty; Rusk responded in kind, invoking the "vital
interests" rhetoric. Rusk concluded by repeating "many problems would fall in place if the
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central questions could be resolved."889 These questions seemed no closer to answers than they
had been in the talks with Thompson, the previous October's sessions in Moscow, at the Vienna
and Paris summits, or even at the 1959 Foreign Ministers Conference.
Meanwhile, the Berlin situation was getting worse, with incidents of East German vopos
wounding a British soldier and shooting at a US military vehicle.890 Because Rusk was about to
leave Geneva, there was no more suggestion of breaking off those talks. Rusk wrote Kennedy
that, Gromyko was not belligerent or threatening and wanted to continue talks. However, "there
seems to be no movement in the Soviet position toward Western vital interests ... there is no
doubt Gromyko understands conditions under which they could sign a separate peace treaty ...
without precipitating crisis."891 He saw no signs of an agreement but could not predict whether a
crisis was imminent. He would have to see how Gromyko reacted to the modus vivendi idea in
their final talk. The Soviets might be interested in continuing talks to keep open the possibility
of a summit, which Rusk had mentioned as a possibility in delivering the modus vivendi paper.
In Berlin, Alan Lightner protested bitterly to Washington that continued acceptance of the
harassment could lead to war.892
In their final Geneva session, the two foreign ministers compared their working papers.
Rusk said the contrast illustrated the difference between their negotiating strategies. He said the
their access proposal was obviously designed to diminish US vital interests, while the US
statement of principles was not so much a technical paper as way to move their dialogue
forward.893 Gromyko said that his proposals were "aimed at a detente." The Soviets desired
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good relations with the US, he said, their German/Berlin proposals were intended to reduce
tensions and they had no intent to seize Berlin. All they wanted to do was finally end World War
II. He went through the US paper point-by-point, refuting each carefully crafted nuance with
standard rhetoric. As usual, the simplicity and consistency of the Soviet perspective produced an
opaque cover that was hard for Rusk to penetrate. Gromyko concluded by reaffirming
Khrushchev's statements that Central Europe was the only area in which the US and USSR were
in "direct collision."894 .
Rusk repudiated some of Gromyko's points but said he wanted to focus on specific points
that experts in Washington would have to study first. In their remaining time, he wanted to focus
on trying to first resolve small, fixable specific problems. They should at least affirm mutual
commitment to pursue negotiated agreement before either took unilateral action. They briefly
discussed their agreed goal of limiting nuclear "diffusion," and restated their basic positions: the
peace treaty vs. continued occupation pending German self-determination. They concluded they
would consider new bilateral contacts and study the other's proposals further. Both agreed they
did not want "negotiations for the sake of negotiations."895 Gromyko invited Rusk to Moscow,
noting that he himself had gone to Washington. This was a benign end to a difficult meeting and
a disappointing round of talks.896 It would also mark the end of East-West foreign-minister level
direct talks on Berlin. There would be no Rusk visit to Moscow, nor any further heads of state
summits to resolve the German problem.
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US and Soviets Evaluate their Options
Rusk told the President "the Soviets had not changed their proposals in any significant
way since the Vienna summit." Gromyko had not been threatening nor ready to end
negotiations, but "opportunities to clarify completely their real intentions, specifically to
discover whether they are determined to move to a crisis." Gromyko had not explicitly rejected
the modus vivendi approach but remained insistent on their original objectives. US insistence on
its own 'vital interests' represented "a formidable obstacle and they are reluctant to challenge us
frontally."897 In his report to the NSC, Rusk said he saw some Soviet flexibility on access; the
trick would be getting them to separate that issue from their main demands.898 Rusk still did not
recognize that the Soviets were not going to de-link the access issue. They wanted negotiations
to secure Western acceptance of their demands without use of force.
While Gromyko did not indicate to Rusk that the Soviets were about to implement their
peace treaty, the West Berliners were beginning to lose confidence in American commitment.
Rusk advised Clay that he did not anticipate imminent Soviet moves on Berlin.899 Clay replied a
week later that that he saw a significant change in Soviet attitudes since the talks: "I am inclined
to believe that it marks the full end of the Wall crisis and that we have won this round."900 This
relaxation provided an opportunity to bring Clay back from Berlin. Announcements and
correspondence praised Clay's tenure, but the White House may have been relieved to have the
independent and outspoken general out of the picture lest he disturb negotiations.901
Such relief was soon clouded by vehement objections from Chancellor Adenauer, who
objected to the recently proposed GDR participation in the access authority. In a Bonn meeting
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with Nitze, he said the West German public was disappointed at Clay's departure. Adenauer
wanted a pause in the US-Soviet negotiations so the FRG could further study current proposals
and prepare a response. He may have sensed that Washington was impatient with FRG rigidity,
which he acknowledged may have worsened prospects for negotiations. Nitze assured the
Chancellor his views would be considered and the West would not proceed without FRG
agreement.902
In Washington, Grewe complained that the post-Geneva draft of the access authority
proposal would change legal foundations of West Berlin, including the occupation rights, and
would be a big step towards acceptance of a permanently divided Germany.903 Foy Kohler told
him the British accepted the paper and that it would provide a road map for the next round of
talks with Dobrynin. The document reflected ongoing remained commitment to the status quo;
the Soviet papers presented at Geneva had been rejected as inconsistent with that commitment.
In further meetings, Grewe expressed increasing frustration that the US was not taking FRG
objections more seriously or responding in a timely manner. 904 Adenauer sent Kennedy a very
short, terse note complaining of American unilateralism and urging him to suspend negotiation,
pending consultation "with the three great powers."905 Kennedy and Rusk had their own
complaints about FRG press leaks of the secret working papers. Dobrynin was just about to
arrive in Washington and the leaks could compromise chances for continued discussion. That
may have been exactly what the West Germans hoped to accomplish. 906

902

Memo re Adenauer-Nitze meeting, Bonn, April 13, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, Vol. XV, doc.34.
Text attached to Klein memo to Bundy, April 25, 1962, JFK, NSF Box 84, 4/62.
904
Memo re Grewe-Kohler meetings Washington, April 13 & 14, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, Vol. XV, docs. 34 & 35.
905
Adenauer-Kennedy letter, April 14, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, Vol. XV, doc. 37.
906
Mayers, Kennedy and Adenauer, p.72-73.
903

261

Rusk-Dobrynin meet in Washington; Americans Resume Nuclear Testing
At their first meeting on April 14, Rusk outlined some of the negotiating problems for
Dobrynin. The Soviets had insisted on "drawing a line under World War II" and introduced their
peace treaty/free city proposals to normalize what they considered outdated arrangements. The
US had responded with all-German/all-Berlin proposals as an alternative. The Soviets had said
the situation needed to be changed to recognize the "existing facts" in Germany. When the US
responded that occupation was also a fact, the Soviets would say the facts should be changed.
The US wanted to "deal with the existence of underlying disagreement in such a way as not to
move toward a dangerous crisis." 907 Regarding their respective working papers on access, the
US objected that the Soviet version was tied to Western withdrawal from Berlin; could
Dobrynin clarify this? Rusk said the Western proposals would not "interfere with activities in
East Germany." Dobrynin said the "present position" of his government linked access
agreements to the troop withdrawals. He asked about broadening the discussion and Rusk told
him that was possible if they could reach a better understanding on the Berlin/German
problem.908 Dobrynin clearly had no instructions to depart from Gromyko's approach in the
Geneva talks, nor did he signal the Soviets "were ready to move the matter to a crisis." In his
memoirs, Dobrynin says he thought Kennedy was willing to recognize a divided Germany and
withdraw US troops but was afraid that would be perceived as weakness.909
Other problems were clouding relations between the superpowers. These problems did
not directly involve their alliance partners in the same way the German issue did.910 Bilateral
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superpower rivalry was evidenced by Third World competition and the contest for nuclear
supremacy. One immediate Third World concern was Laos, where Pathet Lao rebels were
making strong gains. Both the US and Soviets had generally respected their recent agreements to
avoid escalation, but Chinese intervention was encouraging the rebels. In response, the US had
sent troops to Thailand. The Communist North Vietnamese were also intervening in the Laos
conflict and making aggressive incursions in South Vietnam.911 In Cuba, the Americans had
renewed efforts to destabilize the Castro regime through the Central Intelligence Agency's
Operation Mongoose. The Soviets were offering increasing military and political support to the
Castro regime, which had not only instituted communist programs in Cuba but was providing
weapons and guerilla training to leftist revolutionaries in Venezuela and Nicaragua.912
On April 25, the United States resumed atmospheric testing of hydrogen bombs.913 The
Joint Chiefs of staff and hawkish members of Congress had lobbied hard for the decision, but the
president's inner circle had divided opinions. The US had notified the Soviets of this decision,
noting the lack of progress in the Geneva disarmament talks. The Soviets protested, without
acknowledging that they had had been the first to break the moratorium. 914 Domestic and
international press reaction to the new US tests was generally negative, renewing the calls for a
comprehensive test ban treaty.

Allied Dissension
The US needed to consult with the Allies before it started another round of bilateral talks
with the Soviets. On April 28, Macmillan met with Kennedy in Washington. Macmillan was
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most interested in reviving prospects for UK production of the Skybolt missile, which had been
scaled back.915 They agreed that the recent relaxation in Berlin, whatever the cause might be,
provided hope for better progress in the Dobrynin talks. Rusk noted, however, that initial
meetings offered little evidence that the Soviets were prepared to yield on their key issues. Since
the Soviets still indicated they would sign a separate treaty, the danger still lay in how they
would treat the Western occupation after a treaty. Macmillan told Kennedy he had no plans to
visit Adenauer himself, but would see de Gaulle in June. 916
They agreed that the West Germans now doubted whether the Allies were still interested
in defending West Berlin and keeping the road open for unification. Macmillan said he wanted
an agreement or, failing that, a modus vivendi. Macmillan offered a different sort of problems
than those presented by the Germans or French. The British were much more cooperative and
encouraged negotiations, perhaps overly so. They could not however, negotiate from strength
and were treated accordingly, both within the alliance and by the Soviets. Macmillan would
occasionally upset the Allied approach with solo diplomatic overtures.917
On the other hand, the West Germans could sometimes act constructively and in
recognition of their responsibilities as an emerging mature partner. But they chronically reverted
to political immaturity, bemoaning their station in Europe and begging protection without regard
to the hazards and costs their protectors faced. 918 The inconsistencies in their official positions,
including the Berlin issue, were partially due to their own domestic divisions. Former FRG
foreign minister Heinrich von Brentano's visit to Kennedy on April 30 reflected those divisions.
Von Brentano acknowledged his own disagreement with the Chancellor and his successor
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Schroeder. He stressed that he was not speaking officially for his government but expressed
regret at the recent leaks. Kennedy said he was getting the feeling that the West German press
"was waging a war against the United States," despite the US's expensive investments in their
security and military and political risk taking. 919 Why were the French upheld as friends when
they would only deploy a few divisions on their behalf? He said the US would be glad to let
someone else take over the prolonged fruitless negotiations. Von Brentano said that he
personally, and the German people generally, did appreciate US sacrifices.
They turned to the current US/UK working paper, which Adenauer had objected to.920
Kennedy acknowledged that the German authorities, and the French too, were not happy with US
policies to limit the diffusion of nuclear arms in Europe. He said the non-aggression pact
elements could be adjusted to satisfy the West Germans. Von Brentano said he had no problem
on those issues, but GDR recognition was "not a prestige factor but a political question of overriding importance." GDR participation in an international access authority or joint commissions
would grant East Germany a political legitimacy unacceptable to the West Germans. Worse, he
said, it could lead to all-German political union that would take West Germany out of the
Western alliance, "which would be disastrous." 921 Kennedy asked what it was in the current
proposals that would suggest serious consequences? He pointed to recent public criticism of US
policy by von Brentano and noted that he FRG had not fulfilled its defense commitments. He
told the West German: "if the United States and the Federal Republic cannot reach an agreement,
it would not be possible for the talks to go on with the USSR."922 The FRG was being told the
US would not indefinitely shoulder the burdens of negotiating a solution to their problems.
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Rusk tried to patch up the rift in talks during the May 4-6 NATO meeting in Athens. He
told Schroeder there had been no questions of "broader questions" that the FRG might be
apprehensive about. Nor would there be any German settlement without FRG "concurrence."
He thought the French were waiting these rounds out because they did not want to make any deal
that the Germans might later hold against them. Rusk asked why the FRG was so apprehensive
about dealing with the much weaker GDR. They should anticipate a post-Ulbricht East Germany
being more reasonable. Rusk brought up East-West cooperation on trade commission's but
Schroeder downplayed the options. Were the French were ready to rejoin negotiations on
Berlin? The Germans said the NATO sessions would provide the answer. They wanted Grewe
restored to confidence, after his press indiscretions, with full participation in the ambassadorial
working group on Berlin.923
Bundy met with von Brentano, who continued to object to the access authority. Bundy
said the West Germans must be misunderstanding the position papers. The US would not
compromise its vital interests, which included continued occupation and no political recognition
of the GDR.924 Schroeder, along his advisor Dr. Carstens and the still-influential von Brentano,
were mostly appreciative but the real test would be Ambassador Dowling's meetings with
Adenauer in Bonn.
Kennedy's press secretary Pierre Salinger visited Moscow at this same time, and met with
Khrushchev. Khrushchev received him warmly and indicated his wish for better relations,
including interest in another summit. But he also informed Salinger that he was committed to his
peace treaty and free city plans. There could be no place for an ongoing occupation regime in an
open Berlin , nor was there any need for an international access authority. Khrushchev was
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basically friendly though. Salinger got the impression Khrushchev did not believe the US would
go to war over Berlin.925
Adenauer, not Khrushchev, had become the immediate problem for the Americans. Rusk
told Dowling that Adenauer's pride was wounded on several counts and he might be reasonable
after some assurances. He said Kennedy was still wondering why the Germans were so
sympathetic to the French who risked so little for them. That question showed how Washington
leaders still did not understand an important idea: emerging bonds in Western Europe could be
stronger than their postwar attachment to the United States. Kennedy thought the French should
appreciate that the US was assuming much of their burden not only in Europe, but in Southeast
Asia. Dowling should make clear that the US would not appreciate the FRG's joining with
France to block British entry into the Common Market. 926 Fortunately for Dowling, Adenauer
was contrite: "with his underlying attitude being one of injured innocence characteristic of child
with hand caught in cookie jar."927 Adenauer went to some lengths to emphasize his good
personal relations with the President and the Secretary. He affirmed his support for continued
Berlin negotiations with the Soviets. When he said he only wished the French would join them,
Dowling observed that Adenauer might be in the best position to do that. Adenauer said he
would be visiting Paris in July and would do his best to bring de Gaulle around.
After cautioning Adenauer to be careful with the press, Dowling cabled Rusk that things
had gone well, but he remained concerned. Adenauer seemed to have fallen out with Schroeder
and Carstens. A fragmented West German leadership would not make a reassuring partner in
negotiations with perceptive Soviets. The impressionable Chancellor's visit to the persuasive de
Gaulle in Paris offered "prospects for further damage. " "Further inoculation ...in Washington"
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might be a good idea, setting the stage for yet another hopefully decisive Adenauer-Kennedy
meeting.928 Kennedy helped by sending the Chancellor a warm note, downplaying Rusk's
disappointing talk with Schroeder and assuring him that he would find current proposals would
protect FRG interests. The president told Adenauer that, while a real settlement might not be
possible they might be able to get "this three and half year old crisis cooled off."

929

What he did

not say was that West Germany, not just Adenauer, was becoming an adversarial negotiating
participant.930

Khrushchev Decides to Put Missiles in Cuba
Meanwhile in May, Khrushchev was making a decision that would change the
superpower relationship in ways the US could not imagine. Increasingly concerned over USsponsored nuclear encirclement, from West Germany to Turkey, he wondered how he could
project a missile force within striking distance of the United States. He considered Cuba a good
partner for this venture, which could also enhance his leadership within the Communist Bloc. 931
He would present to Castro a plan to station several dozen medium and intermediate range
ballistic missile sites, along with troops, materiel and advisors. Partly this could be proposed as
an effort on Cuba's behalf, partly as Soviet duty to the communist cause. Not all his Presidium
colleagues approved of such an adventure. Mikoyan, in particular, voiced objections. 932 His
ambassador in Cuba, Aleksei Aleyeev doubted at first whether Castro would accept.
Surprisingly, Castro readily assented, on condition the Soviets first provide him with
surface to air missile batteries. While the West was trying to develop strategy for the round of
928
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negotiations with Dobrynin in the summer of 1962, the Soviets were taking steps that would
render most of the West's basic assumptions and options irrelevant.933
In Washington, Bundy's NSC aides Martin Hillenbrand and Henry Owen were working
on a new position paper,"Next Steps in Berlin" to supplement the "Draft Principles" paper Rusk
had presented to Gromyko in Geneva.934 The trouble was that the Soviets had not agreed to
"Draft Principles, " which had been offered in hopes of moving the negotiations off their dead
center insistence on troop withdrawals and GDR recognition. Henry Owen advocated accepting
GDR border personnel, but it was decided to reserve even this small concession unless Dobrynin
offered Soviet concessions. At this point, the Americans were running out of options for new
negotiating tactics. Changes in nomenclature, such as "police forces" instead of "occupation
forces," would not move the Soviets, nor would another change of venue or negotiators. Part of
the problem was clearing new offers with Allies, but the biggest obstacle was still Soviet
insistence on their core issues. The bilateral dialogue was becoming "negotiation for the sake of
negotiation." 935 While this was preferable to conflict, it was time-consuming and futile.

Rusk-Dobrynin Discussions Begin
The Rusk-Dobrynin talks began in earnest on Memorial Day 1962. Rusk summarized
their recent negotiating history, noting the Soviets had balked at even temporary "modus vivendi"
understandings" to keep stability short of full resolution. Rusk reiterated that "there was no
inherent contradiction between free access and the authority of the East Germans." He wondered
why the East had undertaken more harassment recently: "a crisis over Berlin would have the
gravest implications for disarmament." US suggestions for all-Berlin joint commissions, he said,
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had been offered to foster a more cooperative atmosphere. Dobrynin responded that the US
principles paper said "nothing new" and then said he was expecting a reply to the Soviets'
Geneva paper. Rusk said the US needed to see more recognition of "our vital interests" to make
discussion "profitable."936
Dobrynin backtracked to the Soviet theme of finally ending a wartime situation. He
alluded to Allied disagreements and said the Soviets were not demanding de jure recognition of
the GDR, only de facto measures. Technical commissions, he said, should be a matter for the
Germans to decide. He acknowledged the connection between Berlin and disarmament and said
he welcomed concrete proposals. Rusk dismissed Dobrynin's assertion that the West was in
Berlin to fight the Soviets and said the technical commissions had been suggested to relieve
tensions, thus benefitting both East and West. GDR sovereignty over Berlin was not the Soviets'
to grant unilaterally. Dobrynin said the peace treaty would do just that. Rusk answered "not
without our consent. " Dobrynin said "this is where we differ."937
Tensions in Berlin were beginning to increase again, as they had during the earlier rounds
of 1962 negotiations.938 In early June, US contingency planners revamped their plans to deal
with convoy harassment, with more discretion allowed for forceful response. These new
directives reflected a more unilateral tone in US planning, even though the plans would be
submitted to the Allies for their concurrence.939 On June 7, the Soviets sent letters of protest to
the Allies, decrying what they called provocations; the Allies said shots fired into the Eastern
sector were only answering fire initiated against refugees trying to escape to West Berlin. In
Rusk's next session with Dobrynin, the Soviets repeatedly stressed the danger of having
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occupation troops in Berlin. Dobrynin again suggested that UN troops replace the current
regime, but Rusk rebuffed the idea, saying "a lot of experience in mutual confidence was
required."940
While both the US and USSR had reduced their forces in the latter 1950s, they had been
steadily rebuilding during the prolonged crisis over Berlin. But, the US would still not allow
West German control of nuclear weapons there, a caution which gave the Soviets some
comfort.941 McNamara told Kennedy that the arms buildup, along with domestic and Bloc
pressures, had tempered Khrushchev's early expectations that the West would acquiesce to his
Berlin demands. Khrushchev, he said, may have anticipated greater advances in Soviet and
Bloc strength than had been realized. As a result, the Soviets were not expected to sign a
separate treaty soon. McNamara thought they would continue " the same rigidity in negotiations
without ... any serious attempt to break them off." He expected "a new round of Berlin
harassments, intended primarily to keep pressure on West Berlin morale and on Western
negotiators."942
Rusk travelled to Europe in late June to consult with Allied leaders. He met first with the
French, who he found "much more relaxed on Berlin." He told de Gaulle that the latter's
pessimistic view on negotiations had proved correct. De Gaulle said the talks had not caused the
alliance problems he had feared. Foreign minister Couve de Murville said the French still could
not "approve or participate."943 Rusk then visited Bonn, which the West Germans had been
hoping for as a sign of respect. He told Adenauer and Schroeder that he was impressed by West
Berlin morale. Schroeder said that East German unrest was due to a continuing exodus problem
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which the Wall had not completely stopped. The East German populace, he said, was opposed
to credits from Bonn because that might strengthen the GDR regime; the US would be closely
consulted on the matter. Rusk said the morale risks were probably worth putting the GDR in
position more amenable to negotiations. Schroder asked if recent GDR brutality at the Wall
should be brought before the UN. Rusk observed that referring the problem to the UN might
strengthen Khrushchev's proposal for UN peace-keepers in Berlin.944
Rusk reported home that the visit had gone well and Adenauer was generally agreeable.
He noted some hints of Franco-German unease and had tried to put in a good word for British
entry into the Common Market, for which he found considerable support in Bonn. However, the
visit "removed any doubt that I might have had as to the inevitable growth of German pressure
for nuclear weapons unless there are multilateral arrangements in NATO or ... significant steps
toward disarmament." Schroeder lobbied hard to remove non-diffusion language from the
current position paper. Rusk deferred action on that suggestion, pending resumption of Geneva
disarmament talks in July.945 He noted that newer and more flexible voices were apparent,
suggesting that the Adenauer-von Brentano leadership was waning. There were also signs that
Ulbricht might also be replaced. In Washington, Kennedy's disarmament advisor John McCloy
was hinting to Dobrynin that Ulbricht's removal would improve the situation in Berlin.946 Both
Adenauer and Ulbricht were troublesome partners and bitterly opposed to cooperation between
the two Germanys.
Personality continued to exert a strong influence on the Berlin situation. Second-tier
leaders like Adenauer and Ulbricht could derail the calculations of the major heads of state.
President Kennedy believed in personal diplomacy. He gained confidence in foreign affairs but
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was often frustrated by intermediaries.947 Kennedy had by this time narrowed his circle of
security advisors, distancing himself from divisive personalities, right and left, like Acheson and
Bowles. Robert Kennedy's influence grew however and did not always blend well with more
experienced advisors. 948 The President's other Cabinet members like Rusk, McNamara, and
Bundy were more reserved and studious. Ambassadors Thompson, Dowling and Kohler had
been involved in the Berlin crisis since its inception and their well-controlled diplomatic
performance was a great help to the US.949
Macmillan was less trouble than he had been with Eisenhower, with whom he had
presumed great influence. As British prestige and power waned, he was more supplicating with
Kennedy, hoping to renew their countries' "special relationship." Lord Home had proved a
satisfactory replacement for Harold Caccia and the new Ambassador, David Ormsby-Gore was
an intimate of the Kennedy family.950 De Gaulle interfered less than he had in the earlier phases
of the Berlin Crisis. Now convinced Khrushchev was bluffing, de Gaulle worried more about
Algeria and development of the French bomb. His foreign minister Couve de Murville and
Ambassador to the US Alphand enjoyed the general, but not complete, confidence of
Washington. 951 The French were now less close than the West Germans to Washington.
Schroeder was more businesslike than von Brentano had gotten, but was not always on the same
page as Adenauer; Grewe was still not fully restored to confidence.952 Willy Brandt was also
proving more inconsistent and independent than he had been previously, at least in US
perception.
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The most important - difficult - personality was still Nikita Khrushchev. Khrushchev
vacillated between impulsive direct communications and calculated impersonal statements. His
July 12 letter to Kennedy used the more formal plural voice.953 He noted recent Berlin tension,
which he blamed on opponents of peace, and complained about US refusal to negotiate
constructively. He said the peace treaty could no longer be postponed; to forestall a crisis, he
was offering a proposal that would "take into account the wishes of the United Sates on the
question of the presence of its troops in West Berlin so far as those wishes are compatible with
the task of completing a general settlement." US troops could remain in West Berlin as part of a
UN peacekeeping force while the peace treaty was being implemented. Warsaw pact members
would also be part of this UN "police military formation," to be phased out over four years.
Then, Berlin would become an independent and neutral "open city." Khrushchev cited the recent
US-Soviet agreement on Laos, as an example of phased withdrawal they could build on. Both
sides had maintained reasonably good faith on Laos, though they reneged somewhat after
Chinese intervention changed the situation. Khrushchev dangled the prospect of a US-Soviet
summit to sign a final resolution of the Berlin situation, based on the peace treaty.954 Dobrynin
had hand delivered the note, but it was not presented as an official communication. Rusk
decided not to answer without careful consideration, nor share it with the Allies yet. Other signs
were suggesting that the peace treaty might indeed be on the horizon again.955
Dobrynin presented a formal and more detailed version of the same proposal to Rusk
soon after. Except for the new concession to Western prestige, it was the same as their original
demands. 956 Rusk answered indirectly, saying Kennedy had come "into office as one of the few
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young men in high position ... among the great powers. He was looking ahead for decades
...taking a broad historical view." Kennedy felt they faced a choice between paths of "hostility
and catastrophe, and that of improved understanding leading to more normal relationship."
Kennedy wanted to take the latter path. Dobrynin said the Soviet Union also wanted
peace, specifically eliminating the danger posed by troops in West Berlin. Rusk asked why the
Soviets chose just West Berlin, which put the Allies on a "slippery slope."957 Dobrynin objected
to the phrase as inappropriate. Rusk said if it was not the case, the Soviets would not be
pursuing this course. He said Dobrynin drew an unwarranted distinction between Soviet troops
in East Germany and Allied troops in West Berlin. Dobrynin demurred, saying Soviet troops
could be thinned after the peace treaty. They briefly discussed all-Berlin joint commissions,
which Dobrynin again called a matter for the Germans to decide for themselves. Rusk told
Dobrynin he would be expecting more reciprocity when he met Gromyko in Geneva. Dobrynin
simply brought up the familiar demand for the end of occupation. Rusk had his answer.958
Kennedy met with the Ambassador on July 17, telling him that he would soon be replying
to Khrushchev. The current Soviet proposal was inconsistent with the "vital interests" of the
United States, which included its presence in West Berlin. Dobrynin asked if he was concerned
over American or German interests? " A vital US interest, " replied the President, cautioning
him not to doubt Western unity. Dobrynin argued that Western troops posed a danger and
should be removed. Kennedy told him that withdrawal would be a "disaster" for the West, but
continued occupation would not be so for the Soviets. He said the crisis had already sparked a
US defense buildup and demands in Europe for nuclear weapons; confrontation could produce
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"results which the Soviet Government would not like."959 Dobrynin said the Chairman would be
disappointed by the US response.
Kennedy's July 17 letter to Khrushchev, while far from his last, began the close of the
Berlin-related "pen pal" correspondence. From its inception in the fall of 1961, both had hoped
personal letters between heads of state could enhance the work of their foreign ministers and
foster a personal bond lead to a productive summit.960 The letters did not have as much effect as
actual meetings but were generally friendly exchanges. The intimate tone of the earlier letters
had gotten tough, devolving into the "we" of Khrushchev's last note. Kennedy's reply was
equally formal. He complained the Soviet offer was incompatible with US "vital interests."
There could be no question of Western withdrawal but the way should be open for all-Berlin self
determination. He agreed Laos was a good starting point. He also thought Berlin and
disarmament issues did have some bearing on each other. Berlin relaxation could only help
disarmament talks. They could start with small, concrete steps. He hoped Gromyko would be
prepared to do that in Geneva.961
The personal correspondence and foreign minister/ambassadorial meetings had not
brought about an acceptable Berlin resolution. On July 19, Kennedy learned that military
contingency plans were still not operational. Allied consultation had been minimal, plans poorly
designed and not distributed, and mobilization not yet authorized.962 Kennedy was still not
familiar with the master plan, which had grown out of Live Oak, now dubbed "Poodle Blanket,".
The plan broke a potential crisis into four likely stages: access interference, outright blockade,
conventional ground action, and nuclear military action. Bundy explained that they were in
959
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Phase I, harassment. To respond during Phase II, a blockade situation, they would need to begin
a military buildup now and it would take about two months. Bundy said Soviet continuance of
negotiations meant they need not rush into Phase II readiness.963
Thompson reported from Moscow that he too doubted Khrushchev would move before
late fall. Thompson considered a "play for summit conference or bilateral meeting with
President Kennedy likely." He thought the emphasis on the known-to-be-unacceptable issue of
troop withdrawal was just for show. Said Thompson, Khrushchev now thought "successful
negotiation impossible and is building up his position for signature of treaty." He said
Khrushchev may have moved some towards a test ban treaty, to preserve recent gains before the
Americans could advance again.964
As well as he knew Khrushchev, even Thompson did not know, nor did Ambassador
Dobrynin, that the Soviets were already preparing launching sites in Cuba. They would ship
missiles with nuclear warheads beginning in just a few weeks.965 Because the Cubans demanded
the surface-to-air missiles be installed first, the site-building and shipments were delayed by
several weeks. The harassment in Berlin and toughness in negotiations may indeed have been
designed to distract US attention from the Cuban missile emplacement.966

Rusk-Gromyko July meetings in Geneva
Rusk's meetings with Gromyko in Geneva from July 23-25 broke no new ground and
provided no clear indication of Soviet intentions on Berlin nor the consequences of a peace
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treaty. Gromyko's negotiating line was tougher but cordial. 967 Rusk thought that Gromyko was
"more moderate" when not speaking from prepared statements. Gromyko seemed upset when at
one point he thought Rusk had suggested suspending the talks. Rusk made oblique references to
what Kennedy and Khrushchev might say to each other face to face, but Gromyko did not "raise
or pursue summit." Rusk noted that when he told Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki it would be
helpful "for those who have influence in Moscow to council moderation," Rapacki replied "you
may be sure this is being done." Rusk thought the Western Ministers showed good unity, though
they all agreed contingency plans needed urgent review.968
In his final session with Gromyko, Rusk expressed his frustration at endlessly repeating
the same arguments. He asked what could they "profitably say to each other at this point." He
said circumstances did not warrant a summit "there was danger two leaders reaching same point
we are now ... would not be satisfactory to either side." Gromyko said the problem was still
Western insistence on the occupation of West Berlin. His government had "suspended" air
harassment but received no thanks. As for Rusk's pessimistic outlook for a summit, he said that
was the Secretary's view but the Soviets would never accept perpetual occupation. Rusk said the
US had never used the term "perpetual." 969
The US, Rusk said, would uphold their responsibilities per their legal agreements. He
could not imagine the Soviets would simply turn over their responsibilities to Walter Ulbricht.
"Prudence required not to translate Berlin problem into sole determining issue in US-USSR
relations, " he said. Progress was possible on other issues, but without "reciprocity" on Berlin,
"it was indeed major issue between US-USSR." Gromyko returned to standard Soviet arguments
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about dangers of West German revanchism and the West Berlin regime's incompatibility with
GDR sovereignty. He would not commit to talks between their Deputy Foreign Ministers,
whether quadripartite or bilateral. Rusk had thought Gromyko too was signaling that
negotiations had run their course for time being, since the US would not yield its occupation.970
At this same time, Llewellyn Thompson was returning to Washington after nearly five
years in Moscow. He would retain the rank of Ambassador but would mainly advise Rusk and
Kennedy on Soviet matters. In his final meeting with Khrushchev, the Soviet chief said he
should ask Kennedy "whether it would be better for him if Berlin question brought to a head
before or after our Congressional elections. He did not want to make things more difficult for
Kennedy and in fact wanted to help him."971 But Khrushchev also said he was disappointed at
early reports from Gromyko in Geneva: "it was already clear our dialogue was coming to an
end." The Soviets had to stand by their East German allies and that meant signing a separate
treaty. Thompson asked what he would do if Soviet troops were in a similar position.
Khrushchev responded as expected: "sign the treaty and withdraw, " but Thompson thought the
remark had "some effect." The meeting was cordial, but Thompson thought Khrushchev
"realized he had to move ahead and was deeply troubled."
Khrushchev repeatedly emphasized "this was the one problem standing in way of good
relations ... I believe he is sincere in this."972 Thompson told Rusk he did not think Khrushchev
would push the situation to the brink of war. The West should quietly but visibly continue
contingency planning and avoid provocative statements or actions. Since Khrushchev was
"likely" to bring his case to the UN, the US should try to line up neutral support to prevent
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unacceptable compromises being forced on the West. Thompson noted some Soviet movement,
but also objections, to disarmament.973 He did not make references to next steps in negotiation.
While Thompson was correct in observing that the peace treaty was not imminent, he did
not realize that the Soviets were beginning a new campaign of harassment. The Western powers
did conduct a post-Geneva review of their contingency planning. Planning now emphasized
diplomatic rather than military reaction, in hopes of minimizing the importance of a treaty. A
major problem in planning a military response was the peace treaty would probably be
implemented in small incremental steps, which would difficult to respond to with appropriate
force. As long as the Soviets or East Germans did not take serious unilateral steps, the effects of
the treaty might be easily managed.974 Rusk told Kennedy that the Western powers were now
prepared to accept East German personnel substituting for Soviets in implementing existing
ground access procedures. Rusk papered over significant disagreements remaining between the
Allies. The Europeans still wanted early use of nuclear weapons if military operations became
necessary, but balked at building up their conventional forces.
McNamara told Kennedy the Allies lacked "understanding [of] the effects of these
[nuclear] weapons." Kennedy asked why the Germans still lagged in their build-up and why
Adenauer had not been more helpful with the French. He asked if he could tell the Allies would
agree to the early use of tactical nuclear weapons if they would build up to the 30-division level
that was expected would hold off their opponents for several weeks. Henry Kissinger had
recently written that even 30 divisions might not be enough to support a tactical nuclear strategy.
McNamara observed that early use would require getting all the heads of government to agree;
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that would "require time and some conventional defensive efforts."975 As for a US buildup,
McNamara wanted to wait for Congress's upcoming summer recess to lobby for support. Not
even the US was ready for major military action in Europe.
By early August 1962 neither diplomatic or military options for the Berlin problem
appeared as viable solutions to the Berlin problem. Continued French and West German
objections limited flexibility and kept the US on its bilateral track.976 Neither the Thompson
meetings, the "Pen-Pal" correspondence, or the Rusk-Dobrynin and Rusk-Gromyko meetings
had broken new ground. Nor did the 1962 Soviet focus on UN-flag occupation and the US focus
on an interim modus vivendi solve the deadlock. As Senator Mike Mansfield told Kennedy, lack
of diplomatic progress and renewed Soviet-GDR harassments in Berlin effectively stalled the
negotiating track.977 By early September, intelligence information about Soviet missile
installations in Cuba shifted attention away from Berlin towards new problems.

Conclusions
In the first half of 1962, the United States continued take the lead in negotiations with the
Soviet Union on Berlin. This bilateral diplomacy was conducted through back channel
approaches, ambassadorial talks, and foreign minister meetings conducted during Geneva
disarmament talks. The shift to bilateralism was reinforced by continued poor relations with its
Allied partners and Soviet interest in negotiating with the strongest Western power, the US,
which controlled their nuclear deterrent. The Berlin Wall had partially stabilized the German
situation, but harassments and Khrushchev's public demands for a peace treaty, well into early
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summer 1962, created tensions only the United States made serious efforts to resolve. The US
became even more estranged from the other Allies, who were inflexible diplomatically and illprepared militarily to resolve the Berlin problem.978 Britain receded in importance, France
became more isolated from NATO and West Germany's role continued to be more important, a
trend that had begun in the fall of 1961. Differing positions on disarmament and atomic testing
further divided the Allies and made US talks with the Soviets more vital.979
The Soviet Union had sharply different positions on disarmament as well, but its
comparable nuclear strength made its arms-control dialogue with the United States effectively
bilateral. Costs and dangers of nuclear weapons, as well as public pressure, renewed interest in
reconvening ENDC talks in Geneva in the spring of 1962. The Geneva talks, though
multilateral, allowed new bilateral dialogue. Like the fall 1961 United Nations sessions, they
provided an opportunity for discussions centering on Berlin.980 Both the US and USSR
continued to link disarmament progress with Berlin. Eastern harassments worsened at the same
time, hindering progress on Berlin and disarmament. Like Ambassador Thompson's discussions
in Moscow in January and February, Rusk's Geneva talks with Gromyko in the spring and
summer were formal and repetitious. Negotiations became a delaying tactic for both sides, but
disarmament, particularly a test ban, was finally emerging from the shadow of Berlin.981
By mid-1962, Berlin had lost its immediacy as an issue. Talks had gone on too long,
alliance partners were dissatisfied and domestic debates confused the issue till it became an
indefinite threat. Kennedy and Khrushchev, both frustrated and ready to find some way out to
salvage prestige, were unready to attempt another summit or continue the "Pen Pal"
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correspondence. Real negotiation on Berlin effectively ended with the Rusk-Gromyko talks in
July 1962, though Rusk and Kennedy continued to meet with Ambassador Dobrynin in the early
fall to no effect. Gromyko met with Rusk again in Washington in October, but neither side
attempted new proposals on Berlin. The Western ministers consulted with little more accord.
Despite late summer violence in Berlin, elimination of the Soviet commandant and likely
a peace treaty signing, the German issue had taken on the character of permanent siege not a
gathering storm.982 The failure of negotiations indicated Berlin's lessening importance. The
discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba in early fall showed Berlin was being replaced by other
concerns. None of these developments signaled a renewal of the proto-detente seen in 1959
through early 1961. Nor did they restore Allied unity. Berlin was a catalytic issue that brought
the US, Allies, and Soviets, closer than they had been in years. In 1962, Berlin divided the
Allies again. Despite their diplomatic attempts in 1962, Berlin ultimately divided the US and
USSR. After loss of faith caused by the Cuban missile crisis of late 1962, Berlin negotiations
would continue only as a ritual to appease Khrushchev.
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Chapter Six: "A Slippery Slope," September 1962 - November 1963

Introduction
Although new confrontations in Berlin followed the collapse of bilateral negotiations in
the summer of 1962, Western leaders believed Khrushchev would not sign his separate peace
treaty before the US elections in November. Actions like eliminating the office of Soviet
Commandant in Berlin were seen as incremental steps towards turning over their Berlin
responsibilities to the German Democratic Republic and allowing the GDR to control access to
West Berlin.983 Allied relations had frayed over the course of bilateral negotiation and there was
little consensus on how to proceed. As the West tried to improve its readiness for a conflict to
maintain Berlin access, attention was diverted to unexpected developments in Cuba, now a
Soviet ally.
Intelligence sources had indicated in late July 1962 that Soviet surface to air missiles
were being installed in Cuba. In September, analysts saw signs that medium-range ballistic
missile sites were also under construction. By October 16, these rumors were confirmed and
President Kennedy convened an 'Executive Committee' of advisors consider their options. 984
Unlike the Berlin situation, the Cuban development placed the United States in immediate
nuclear vulnerability. The resulting confrontation brought the two superpowers closer to general
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war than even the tensest periods of the Berlin crisis so far. Because the US now had little
confidence in either Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko or Ambassador Dobrynin, negotiations
were conducted largely through Robert Kennedy's Soviet backchannel Georgi Bolshakov.985
During deliberations, President Kennedy and advisers gave serious consideration to how the
missile crisis might affect the Berlin situation and vice versa.986 An exchange of notes between
Khrushchev and Kennedy produced a settlement that humiliated the Soviet Chairman but did not
provide the American president with a clear victory.
French refusal the next month to admit the British to the Common Market, an uneasy
Kennedy-Macmillan summit in Nassau, and renewed difficulties with the West Germans made it
unlikely by January 1963 that the Western allies could regroup to take advantage of
Khrushchev's setback.987 Despite the damage done to Soviet prestige and credibility,
Khrushchev continued to press his demands for Western withdrawal from Berlin and the peace
treaty.988 Serious negotiations did not resume and the standoff contributed to a general decline in
US-Soviet relations. President Kennedy visited Berlin in May 1963. This visit, with his famous
"Ich bin ein Berliner" speech reaffirmed American commitment, but like Johnson's visit in
August 1961, also served as tacit acknowledgement of a divided Germany. Khrushchev visited
East Berlin on June 28, to a much more reserved reception.989
The nuclear dangers of the Cuban missile crisis and resulting damage to public relations
encouraged the superpowers to redouble their efforts for a test ban treaty, which was signed in
July 1963. By February, the Soviets de-linked Berlin and disarmament issues in hopes of
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reviving negotiations on this issues, as well as recovering lost prestige.990 The Limited Test Ban
treaty did not produce a summit and fell short of the comprehensive disarmament action hoped
for by alliance partners and neutral nations. America's increasing involvement in Vietnam and
Soviet conflicts with the People's Republic of China distracted the superpowers. Khrushchev's
continued insistence on his Berlin demands further discouraged the resumption of negotiations.
Both sides increased their nuclear arsenals.991 With the assassination of President Kennedy in
November 1963 and the sacking of Khrushchev in October 1964, US-Soviet negotiations fell
into a decline that would last for the next five years.

Dobrynin Signals Stalemate; New Berlin Harassments
Berlin negotiations had already stalled by late summer 1962, just as Berlin harassments
became more serious. Rusk told Lord Hood and Georg Lillienfeld, the British and West German
ministers to the United States, that "exploratory talks and probes had about run their course."992
On August 13, Dobrynin had told Rusk that the Soviets could not agree to a Deputy Foreign
Ministers Conference "since it would give the appearance of negotiations which in fact would
have no real chance of success." Such a conference, he said, "would actually delay settlement."
Dobrynin noted Rusk had told Gromyko in Geneva that he could not imagine what they would
discuss. Rusk objected, saying that the US "general principles" paper, first submitted in March,
provided a basis for discussion. He said Western support for the Deputy Ministers conference
was not a delaying tactic but a positive step. Rusk said the four occupation commandants should
meet to work out problems, particularly incidents at the Wall.
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With the Soviet rejection of a Deputy Foreign Ministers Conference, the door was out
closed to further substantive negotiation for the foreseeable future. France and Germany were
not prepared to hold another East-West Foreign Ministers Conference or attempt a summit.994 In
August, Foy Kohler replaced Thompson in Moscow. Robert Kennedy and Averill Harriman
objected to Kohler's appointment, saying Kohler was unimaginative and dull. Rusk and his State
Department colleagues valued Kohler highly, as had Dulles. He had spent time in the Soviet
Union, as well as working closely with the Allied working groups, and been involved in the
Berlin crisis from the beginning.995 Kohler had the Soviets' respect and had been involved in
many high level discussions on Berlin over the previous three and half years. He did not and
never would have Khrushchev's confidence to the same high degree as his predecessor.996
Dobrynin would continue to meet in Washington with Kennedy and Rusk over the coming
weeks, but their exchanges became cooler and more formal, as Berlin harassments increased.
Khrushchev authorized the increasing Berlin harassments to turn up the pressure on the
West.997 Gromyko had told his translator in Geneva not to say that the Soviets had "stopped" air
interference but only "suspended" it. That air harassment had been a dangerous aggravation, but
did not produce the sharp public alarm as did increasing brutality at the Wall. On August 13, the
East Germans shot a young refugee, Peter Fechter, at Checkpoint Charlie (Friedrichstrasse
Crossing). He was left to die in view of the West Berliners, who responded with mobs throwing
rocks at the busses carrying guards for the Soviet War memorial. Kennedy was angry at the
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shooting and indecisive Western reaction, and at the stoning as well.998 The West strongly
protested but were met by indifferent responses from the Soviet Commandant.
West Berlin public sentiment was turning against the Allies because of their moderate
response to the shooting. The Soviets bristled at their war memorial guards being escorted by
Western troops, but angry crowds were heckling all of them.999 Norstad told McNamara that
events had gone beyond "the limits of the local military and political situation in Berlin" and
"constituted an offense against humanity. He wanted to be able to offer medical assistance, even
if it required force to intervene, but without the Soviets taking such action as a "challenge."1000
In Bonn, Adenauer told Ambassador Dowling that the Allies needed to show they were prepared
to intervene: "Do it soon ... and let the people of West Berlin know."1001
Tensions rose even more when the Soviets unexpectedly "liquidated" their office of
occupation commander in East Berlin on August 22. Allied observers saw this as a critical first
step in turning over their responsibilities for Berlin to the East Germans. The immediate effects
might be minimal but would set the stage for reducing the authority of the Allied Commandants
in West Berlin and erode the basis for its occupation troops.1002 Kennedy's military advisors saw
trouble in parsing the level of acceptable provocations. General Taylor's assistant Lawrence
Legere said the "vital interest" logic could lead to acceptance of 'non-vital' Checkpoint Charlie's
closing because counter-actions like denying Soviet access to the war memorial could lead to
closure of the 'vital' access corridor. Légere said the West "should not back down one inch." He
added, with emphasis: "Above all, General Clay is so eternally right when he says that if we
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stand up to them like men they will back down, not bomb New York and Washington." 1003 The
President's Cabinet advisors were more temperate, but recognized that the Soviets were taking
provocations to an new level. Dobrynin did not seem very alarmed. Bundy told Kennedy's
counselor Ted Sorenson to tell the Ambassador that the Soviets should not "confuse our
calmness and good manners with any weakening of our determination whatsoever."1004
In truth, the West, primarily due to US leadership, had consistently downplayed
confrontations since the February 1959 convoy detention at Marienborn. Even Western reaction
to the Wall had been muted. The sole significant exception had been Clay's tank standoff at
Checkpoint Charlie almost a year earlier. In those periods, negotiation was still considered a
viable alternative. With negotiations in limbo, a new uncertainty accompanied incident
response.1005 In a meeting with his Berlin working group on August 28, Kennedy tried to work
out some measures which might make the Soviets relent without pushing them to tougher
actions. Recommended measures included not just limited access to the war memorial and
restricted transit, but denial of any access by Soviet soldiers to West Berlin.1006 They would
need to review these measures with the other Allied powers, a difficult and not-secure process.
The President decided this would not be a good time to send General Clay back to Berlin,
especially after Clay told Rusk that he and other US officers opposed thinning their troop
presence. Kennedy's advisors were correct in noting that the Soviets very much wanted
continued access to West Berlin.1007
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Allied unity on response plans was far from ideal but still encouraging to Washington.
The Germans were now proving cooperative and the French not too much trouble. Western
planners decided to adopt their own incremental strategy to limit Soviet access piecemeal, to
stymie a broader response. Also encouraging was Khrushchev's statement in Russia to visiting
Secretary of the Interior Morris Udall that there would be no peace treaty before the US
election.1008 That news provided breathing room for the contingency planners. It also served to
camouflage Khrushchev's operations in Cuba. That operation was now just days away from
being discovered. Khrushchev would pay a heavy price for his Berlin brinksmanship. Not only
had he conducted negotiations in bad faith, he had authorized inhumane tactics in Berlin and
brought tensions in central Europe to dangerous levels.1009 Now that the negotiation had been
suspended, the US would be very cautious about renewing them.

The Missile Crisis
The bilateral US-Soviet negotiations over Berlin in the first part of 1962 helped define an
emerging superpower relationship accentuated by an imbalance of strength with weak and often
disagreeing partners. The Allies' confused reaction to new Berlin harassment in AugustSeptember 1962 and Walter Ulbricht's continued demands on Khrushchev for stronger support
created new pressure to salvage what was left of the bilateral dialogue.1010 The Soviets had
hinted they would that they would turn to the UN for support of their new idea to allow Western
troops to remain temporarily in Berlin under a UN flag and alongside East Bloc troops. 1011
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Though the UN General Assembly did not consider this potentially troublesome proposal,
their sessions did bring Gromyko to New York. Khrushchev indicated to Ambassador Kohler in
Moscow that he too might travel to New York after the US elections to talk to Kennedy about a
test ban agreement. He said he did want to consult about Berlin, but complained that Kennedy
had lately been provocative. For the first time since the planning of the Paris summit,
Khrushchev was - apparently - giving disarmament issues parity with the Berlin question, but
still linking progress on the latter with the former. Khrushchev declined to discuss Berlin, or the
missiles in Cuba, pending Gromyko's talks with Kennedy in Washington.1012
Gromyko was very cordial to the President. conveying personal greetings from
Khrushchev, noticeably absent from a strident late September letter.1013 The Soviet minister
assured Kennedy there would be no peace treaty before the elections, but the Berlin problem
needed to be resolved according to Soviet terms: "in those circumstances, disarmament would
also be easier to solve." Gromyko offered a summit, but was adamant that Western troops must
leave Berlin. Kennedy said he would be happy to meet with Khrushchev if he came over for the
UNGA sessions but, "it would be a mistake to describe such a meeting as dealing with a peace
treaty and West Berlin, since others were involved in these matters and more formal discussions
would be required." 1014 Kennedy worried later that he should have brought up the missiles and
made plain that there could be no summit in the present situation. Rusk and Thompson told the
President he had been prudent.1015 Anatoly Dobrynin has recalled that Gromyko thought "it
could well have been his most difficult conversation of all with nine American presidents."1016
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Gromyko's own meeting with Rusk was equally inconclusive; the Soviets offered an
international arbitration authority for access and air, the Americans asked only for respect of
existing arrangements. At one point, when Gromyko was again talking of how the occupation
agreements were obsolete, Rusk said they needed to "take the peels off the banana and to look at
the heart of the matter. The Soviet Union was a great power and so was the United States." 1017
Rusk, usually very careful to speak in multilateral Western Alliance terms, was acknowledging
that the superpowers might not be able to decide the Berlin question themselves but bore the
greatest responsibility for its resolution. He again invoked mutual recognition and respect for
"vital interests." But each made bitter historical references and mainly repeated their stock
arguments, with only token mention of the access mechanisms or other concrete business.
Though Rusk and Gromyko skirted around Cuba, White House planners were already
considering possible implications - and options - for the Berlin situation.1018
By October 22, international press disclosure of the Cuban missiles had usurped Berlin's
centrality in the public eye. The Cuban situation complicated the problems of Allied military
planning for Berlin, and vice versa. Paul Nitze told the Western Ambassadorial Group, "one of
the reasons for the use of 'quarantine' and not 'blockade' is to avoid the connection Khrushchev is
trying to make between Berlin and Cuba." 1019 Nitze also thought Khrushchev remained as
determined as ever to proceed with his separate treaty. He said that planners had anticipated
possible trouble in other regions and Berlin planning needn't be rethought. Berlin had about six
months of reserves to withstand a possible blockade; it would take the US about six weeks to
mobilize and transport reinforcements. Nitze's estimate would have been over-optimistic since
the extent of the hazards and possible response increased over the following days.
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The missile sites had been identified with the help of Soviet mole Igor Penkovsky who
had been providing Washington with essential intelligence about Soviet missile systems for over
a year. His information had been used for Roswell Gilpatric's October 1962 expose of slow
Soviet missile production. U2 over-flight photography revealed images similar to Penkovsky's
pictures of MRBM and IRBM launching sites in Russia. 1020 It was also learned that missileladen Soviet ships en route to Cuba. Some missiles were probably operational. Kennedy chose
not to respond immediately with an attack on Cuba., but instead ordered a naval blockade which
deflected most of the Soviet vessels.1021 Cuban SAM's took out a U2 and increased pressure for
various levels of invasion and airstrikes.1022
Kennedy chose a core group of advisors, the Executive Committee, or ExComm, mainly
from the NSC, to deal with the Cuban crisis.. The group included Vice President Johnson,
Secretaries Rusk, Dillon and McNamara, JCS Chair General Maxwell Taylor, Ambassadors
Thompson, Bohlen and Stevenson, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy and his aide
Paul Nitze, Dean Acheson who had been distanced by the White House for his hard-line attitudes
on Berlin, and others.1023 As a sign of his increasing foreign policy influence, Robert Kennedy
was also included.

This group advised on military responses, which ranged simple blockade to

nuclear strikes. As tentative offers appeared from Moscow, they also advised on settlement
terms.1024
Khrushchev had thought up his Cuban plan in response to his perceived humiliation over
the fact that his Berlin demands were not accepted, but he also had in mind NATO missiles in
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Turkey.1025 These missiles were first-generation Jupiters, already outdated. The West could give
them up and lose little strategically, but open acceptance of such an offer would have nearly
broken US-Turkish relations. Removal of those missiles would also ease Khrushchev's general
fears of encirclement and provided a consolation offering to his Central Committee colleagues.
Bohlen and Thompson noted the Cuba-Turkey missile linkage, but thought Khrushchev's main
Cuban objective was leverage on Berlin.1026
The President faced a basic choice: negotiation or forcible response. The first option,
including possible Berlin linkages, received only brief consideration. Diplomatic relations
would not be suspended but would be minimal. When confronted with the photographs,
Ambassador Dobrynin, who had not been informed of the operation, was embarrassed but
insisted they must be forgeries.1027 He communicated his government's instructions on Cuba as
faithfully as he did on Berlin. Because Dobrynin had not officially been in the loop on the
operation, Washington now had some doubt as to his authority.1028 When Kennedy announced
the discovery of the missiles and the quarantine in a television address on October 22,
Khrushchev realized that the element of surprise was lost. He would not be able to use
successfully installed missiles as a bargaining chip in the private sessions with Kennedy he had
hoped to hold before years' end. But he did not respond to Kennedy's quarantine announcement
with a Berlin blockade or any other military action.1029
Because the US now little confidence in official diplomatic channels. Khrushchev began
to open backchannels, first by KGB operative and Embassy aide Aleksandr Feklisov through US
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journalist John Scali.1030 The Soviet floated a simple offer of a missile withdrawal for a US noninvasion pledge. When the US took its time in responding and proceeded with the naval
blockade, Soviet embassy aide and agent Georgi Bolshakov approached Robert Kennedy with
private messages from Khrushchev for the President. ExComm was divided between factions
favoring reliance on the quarantine to block further missile shipments as opposed to those
wanting immediate invasion and airstrikes.1031 The Bolshakov backchannel was used for further
exploratory offers and demands, with Dobrynin as the official channel for messages. Soviet
ships, all but one, turned back at the quarantine by October 25, but missile sites already on the
island were becoming operational. In Cuba, Fidel Castro and Che Guevara advocated launching
the missiles, either ignorant or averse to the consequences. At the Kremlin, Khrushchev was
already admitting defeat and figuring how best to cut his losses.1032
On October 26, , the Soviets offered, through the Feklisov-Scali channel, a withdrawal
and non-invasion deal. The next morning Khrushchev upped his bid, publicly announcing by
radio an offer to that demanded withdrawal of the US missiles in Turkey.1033 Kennedy decided
that the out-of-date Jupiters were not worth the risk of nuclear war and agreed to Khrushchev's
amended terms, on condition the Turkish-missile proviso be kept secret and delayed for a few
months. Khrushchev eagerly accepted on October 28. While Robert Kennedy and others close
to the president were very pleased with the outcome, the Joint Chiefs of State were not happy.
They felt Kennedy had settled far too easily and set a dangerous precedent.1034
When the settlement was reached on the 28th, Bundy advisor David Klein thought
Khrushchev might be ready to come to terms on Berlin, but only if the US made the initiative..
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Ruling out a Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting as unwise, and talks with Gromyko who was now
"discredited," Klein suggested Thompson/Dobrynin talks.1035 The Soviets quickly indicated they
were not ready to compromise their Berlin demands. Khrushchev wrote Kennedy on October
30, saying the USSR was withdrawing its missiles and the Il-28 bombers, though he said the
latter posed no threat and the quarantine should be lifted immediately. He said now was the time
to make the world more peaceful. The German peace treaty was the place to start, followed by
dissolution of their military alliances, adoption of a non-aggression pact in Europe and
admittance of China to the United Nations.1036 On November 6, Kennedy replied that the
Soviets had to complete their withdrawal of all offensive weapons system before the US and
USSR could move on to other matters. The President made no mention of future meetings
between them or any other negotiations. 1037 Berlin had finally been de-prioritized in US-Soviet
relations.

Attempts to Restart Berlin Negotiations After Cuban Crisis
Nevertheless, the US was considering how they could use the situation to meaningfully
restart Berlin negotiations and restore Allied unity. Dean Acheson had visited de Gaulle during
the crisis to show him photographs of the missile sites; this consultation was greatly appreciated
and helped to repair relations with the French.1038 In Washington, new options were advanced
for Berlin talks. These included NATO-Warsaw Pact mutual strategic arms reduction, GDR
jurisdiction over East Germany in exchange for FRG political union with the FRG, concessions
to the Peoples Republic of China, and mutual pledges not to provide military support for the
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Middle East.1039 These ideas would require getting Allied and domestic political support, which
would be difficult. De Gaulle complained to Macmillan, though, that, Acheson's visit
notwithstanding, France and Britain had been inadequately consulted. De Gaulle suggested that
now was the time for the tripartism he had advocated since 1958.1040 Washington's disregard for
its European partners did not bode well for Berlin negotiations. At the least, they should try to
nail down a modus vivendi agreement to ensure stability for the foreseeable future. Thompson
remained skeptical of trying to restart negotiations, saying they could just stir up trouble.1041
If talks were mandated, the West might offer some minor concessions such as modifying
the legal status of the occupation troops and making the GDR signatories to new access
arrangements, mutual elimination of propaganda and espionage operations, and no attempts to
incorporate West Berlin into the FRG. These could be matched by Soviet acceptance of the
Western troops and secure access arrangements.1042 Another option was a lease proposal for
Berlin access, similar to an arrangement the Soviets had in Finland. The lease would be
combined with troop withdrawals, to be replaced by a "police-force" of their own choosing.
Thompson suggested a package of de facto recognition of the GDR, pledges against FRG
incorporation, a UN presence, elimination of espionage and propaganda apparatus, anti-nuclear
pledges, East Berlin access rights and other sweeteners were considered. Soviet concessions
might include accepting continued Western troops, no Soviet presence in West Berlin, no
espionage/propaganda/nuclear weapons in East Berlin. Khrushchev could then sign his peace
treaty if he wanted, without effect on West Berlin.1043 Bundy was also considering all-Berlin/all-
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German plebiscite ideas, disarmament linkage, bilateral cooperation agreements between the US
and Soviets, and short and long range interim plans. The problem remained though of securing
Allied agreement, as well as Soviet approval.1044
In early November, Rusk thought there was still a chance Khrushchev would still
come to the UN session and try to meet with Kennedy before he proceeded with the peace treaty.
Khrushchev again advanced his idea, through British Ambassador Frank Roberts on October 12,
of allowing some Western troops to stay under a UN flag. Lord Hood told Rusk the British had
no intention of "being drawn in to bilateral discussions with the Soviets on Berlin." They were
however, hopeful that negotiations might re-open.1045 Kennedy had closely consulted Britain
and France, contrary to de Gaulle's complaints. Macmillan hoped to capitalize on that
rapprochement, especially since he wanted Kennedy's support in other areas like the EEC and
Skybolt project. As always, the Prime Minister hoped Berlin negotiations would enhance British
prestige.1046
In Washington, Khrushchev's UN proposal was seen by the State Department as an
indication that he wanted to resume Berlin negotiations and shift toward detente.1047 Soviet
Embassy Counselor Georgi Kornienko told Martin Hillenbrand, director of Kennedy's Berlin
task force, that a Kennedy-Khrushchev summit should be arranged.1048 Adenauer visited
Washington in mid-November and told the President that Khrushchev would take new talks as a
sign of weakness. The Chancellor noted the Alliance had problems, namely de Gaulle's serious
political distractions. Kennedy said another problem was the FRG's failure to make agreed upon
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purchases from the US; the dollar drain to Germany could not be ignored. He agreed, though,
that the French and West Germans would be consulted before talks resumed. 1049
Khrushchev elected not to travel to the US, perhaps sensing he should not press Kennedy
too hard when there were still Soviet Il-28 bombers and troops in Cuba. Kennedy was angry that
Khrushchev was waffling on their removal. Instead, the more diplomatic Mikoyan visited
Washington in mid-November.1050 As in January 1959, the Soviets may have hoped Mikoyan,
level-headed and diplomatic and with high authority, might be able to build trust where
Khrushchev could not. Meeting with Rusk, along with Thompson and Dobrynin, Mikoyan
started with the timely, if disingenuous, topic of nuclear non-proliferation, but soon brought up
Germany. The USSR's position was unchanged - there must be a peace treaty soon and the
occupation troops had to leave. They could remain for a short period as part of a UN force, but
Berlin must become a free city as Khrushchev had demanded in November 1958. Though
Mikoyan "disclaimed any intention of conducting negotiation, the US should understand "the
seriousness of this issue for the USSR."1051
In Moscow, Kohler told Semenov that he was encouraged by Soviet acknowledgement
that the Cuban crisis had implications for Berlin. Semenov said Mikoyan and Khrushchev had
brought up disarmament. However, he said, although the Cuban crisis had been solved, FRG
provocations stymied a Berlin solution. Kohler did not rise to this bait and emphasized
American interest in practical measures for a peaceful situation in Berlin. Their exchange
quickly reverted to boilerplate language. Kohler noted that Khrushchev had spoken to British
Ambassador Frank Roberts, but no arrangements were made for further talks.1052 The Americans
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however, no longer seriously believed in any more Berlin negotiation than necessary to ward off
the peace treaty.
Acting JCS Chairman General Curtis LeMay told McNamara that military leaders now
favored the West turning over its responsibilities for Berlin to the FRG, just as the Soviets had
done with the GDR. With access guarantees, Berlin would then become a German problem. He
thought FRG and West Berlin were inclined to this solution. This arrangement would probably
not have been acceptable to the Soviets. LeMay was correct in noting that that Germanys might
have to work out their problems themselves.1053 Khrushchev wrote Kennedy on December 11 in
a friendlier tone, but still blaming Adenauer for the Berlin impasse.1054
French and West German resistance to a negotiated Berlin settlement was as much a
problem as Soviet intractability. The Germans wanted a nuclear capability Kennedy would not
grant. 1055Although the British were more cooperative, and always interested in negotiation, they
had difficult relations with the French. Kennedy and Macmillan had hoped to find common
ground on Berlin at their bilateral summit in Nassau in December, but were distracted by
Gaulle's early December decision against British entry into the Common Market with West
German assent.1056 The British thought some UN involvement would be "useful in any plan for
settlement."1057 Macmillan was also disappointed by US reluctance to proceed in joint
development of nuclear delivery systems. The promised Skybolt surface to ground missile
system had been scaled back and then cancelled. US offers of a partial Polaris submarine missile
system helped Kennedy patch up the rift but British confidence in America suffered. 1058
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The French were already displeased at the Americans for refusing to share missile
delivery systems. They now had their own bomb and wanted an independent nuclear deterrent;
NATO and the proposed multilateral force seemed too dominated by the Americans.1059 On the
other hand, NATO partners like the Belgians and Italians did not welcome de Gaulle's dream of a
trilateral US-British-French alliance determining Western Europe security. The West Germans
were able to exert leverage with both the French and British hoping to get their cooperation.
Bonn decided Paris made a better partner, and signed a Franco-German Treaty of Friendship on
January 21, 1963. The treaty did not interfere with NATO obligations, but was seen in
Washington and London as a serious breach of the Western alliance.1060

The US in a Bilateral Environment
With the refusal to admit Britain to the EEC, the signing of the Franco-German Treaty,
and the US cancellation, of the Skybolt Treaty, Allied relations were too poor to sustain new
Berlin negotiations. The Soviets were still expecting discussions geared towards an interim troop
presence under UN auspices, leading to a "free city," but they expressed little urgency. 1061 On
January 26, 1963, Gromyko told Ambassador Kohler that the Soviet Union wanted to reopen
talks. He also wanted to protest an American embargo on large-diameter steel pipe sales to the
USSR.1062 The FRG was cool to the new Soviet offer, as were the French. Kennedy told Rusk,
Thompson and Dowling that without Allied support, the US might have to tell the Soviets "we
could not carry on with the talks." Rusk said the US should proceed anyway "if only to keep the
Berlin situation under control. Thompson agreed, because otherwise the Soviets could increase
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pressure Berlin and force the US into discussions. Kennedy decided to delay response pending
consultation with the West Germans. 1063
With only a months left in office and too frail to fight, Adenauer did not object to new
talks since the Soviets had made the overture. The FRG's emerging new leadership was very
cautious about Berlin negotiation, especially given their new entente with the French. Kennedy
still urged their participation, and tried to assure them that the United States would not undertake
new talks without some expectation of improvement.1064 The United States did pursue those
talks with the Soviets in spring and summer 1963, but alone and without improving the Berlin
situation. Their disarmament dialogue, however, revived, with good progress toward a test ban,
with Khrushchev finally willing, in January 1963, to accept two detection stations in both the
US and USSR. 1065
That concession sparked new hopes for a test-ban, further encouraged by a Soviet
invitation for US disarmament chief Glenn Seaborg to visit the Soviet Union in May 1962 and
meet Soviet president Leonid Brezhnev. Brezhnev said Seaborg should tell Kennedy that
Khrushchev really did want peaceful cooperation. Seaborg and Kennedy thought Khrushchev
was sending a positive message on disarmament.1066 Brezhnev had been a Khrushchev protégé
but was already plotting a coup. He had an interest in arms-control and disapproved of wasting
time on Berlin. He was still counted publically as Khrushchev's ally, and his messages were
construed to indicate Khrushchev wanted negotiations that might not be contingent on his Berlin
demands.
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New Bilateral Talks with the Soviets
Kohler began new meetings with Gromyko in Moscow in February. Rusk advised him to
avoid any discussion of Berlin. If Gromyko insisted, Kohler should look for any sign of
relaxation on troop withdrawals as a sign of serious Soviet intent to find an agreement. 1067
Thompson remained cautious, speculating that Khrushchev might still be hoping for "a major
UN responsibility." Khrushchev also still had to deal with pressure from Walter Ulbricht and
wanted to keep the Allies at odds with each other. Since the US was indicating no more
flexibility on his basic demands, and Khrushchev was not interested in an interim modus vivendi,
further talks could provide diplomatic cover to insulate a treaty signing from military
confrontation. Thompson suggested the US should avoid serious discussion of the 'UN flag'
proposal. Instead, Gromyko should be asked again what was the real danger in having Western
troops in West Berlin.1068
Rusk and Dobrynin began new talks in Washington on March 26, 1963. Dobrynin noted
that the East and West had been discussing a "peace settlement" and "normalizing" West Berlin:
"the parties succeeded in reaching definite results on well known questions." Western troops
were still unacceptable but could remain a short while longer under the UN flag. Rusk asked
why UN troops shouldn't be in East Berlin too? He said "to think of Berlin as a NATO base is
not realistic on either military or political grounds." He emphasized the basic Four-Power
responsibility for Berlin as a stabilizing factor. Dobrynin said that arrangement was obsolete:
"West Germany, East Germany and West Berlin exist as separate states." The Soviet Union, he
said, was not opposed to German reunification, but first Western troops had to leave Berlin and
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the separate treaty signed, West Berlin would exist as a "separate state," with no political ties to
the FRG. The UN would oversee the transition.1069
How long would that take, asked Rusk, noting the Soviets had suggested four years; there
was also the question of a UN flag for East Berlin. Dobrynin said the Americans were well
aware the USSR considered East Berlin to be East German territory. Rusk said the West had as
much responsibility for East Berlin as the Soviets had for West Berlin. They should start their
negotiations with a systematic review of their positions.1070 By not presenting a new proposal,
on access or any other subject, the Secretary was indicating to the Soviets that the US would
offer no new substantive concessions. On the Soviet side, the UN idea dated back at least to the
previous summer.
Rusk told de Gaulle that a Berlin solution was only possible through concessions
unacceptable to the West. The West should maintain its "present military and diplomatic
positions."1071 He did not think the Soviets were in much of a hurry. In his talks with Dobrynin
on March 26 and April 12, Rusk chided the Ambassador for misleading Soviet statements
indicating agreements had been reached already. He complained the Soviets had offered
nothing new or acceptable. They also briefly discussed nuclear nonproliferation. The talks in
Washington with Dobrynin had already reverted back to the pro forma rituals of 1962. 1072 They
would remain so for several more months, with almost no change in their positions or arguments.
Khrushchev was still determined to wrest Berlin from Western occupation, but he had
other problems in the summer of 1963. Continued agricultural failures produced food shortages
and left dust-bowls. New increases in military spending, to make up the 'missile gap' revealed by
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Gilpatric, sapped resources for consumer goods production. Castro was still unhappy with
Soviet terms in the missile crisis and was flirting with the Red Chinese. 1073 Mao was openly
attacking the policy of 'peaceful coexistence' and not cooperating in Southeast Asia. Military
skirmishes had broken out on the long Siberian frontier with China. Hard-line opposing
factions, at first led by onetime lieutenant, Frol Kozlov and then by Leonid Brezhnev, criticized
his moves in the Central Committee. Mikoyan remained Khrushchev's ally, but had argued
against both the Cuban and Berlin operations from the start.1074
Khrushchev asked the advice of former American Ambassador, Averill Harriman, then
visiting in Moscow. Khrushchev downplayed the importance of a peace treaty; all the Soviets
wanted was the "normalization" of Berlin. Harriman told the Chairman he should leave Berlin
alone then and "come to an agreement on a test ban." He should also get the Chinese on board;
Khrushchev said Harriman should talk to them himself. Harriman said he'd tried already but
Mikoyan blocked it. Khrushchev replied: "Mikoyan was not the foreign minister of China and
could not get Harriman into China," a veiled reference perhaps to Moscow's growing
estrangement from Peking.1075 Khrushchev would take Harriman's advice on the test ban, but
was not prepared yet to give up on his German program. He told Harriman: "I will give you my
word that I will find a basis for a test ban agreeable to both sides provided you agree to work out
the basis for a German settlement which would recognize the two Germanies as they now exist"
Harriman said he "would not buy a pig in a poke."1076 The two issues had to be discussed
separately. Khrushchev joked that Harriman was "an old diplomat who knew how to talk
without saying anything."
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The new US and Soviet ambassadors, Kohler and Dobrynin, carried out rote recitals on
Berlin. In a Rusk meeting with Dobrynin, Berlin had been mentioned only in passing, with most
discussion about testing and disarmament issues. Rusk said the Soviets had asked for new talks
but were not "pressing" hard for progress. They had proposed a NATO-Warsaw Pact nonaggression pact (NAP), which Rusk said he hoped would not turn out to be another BriandKellogg pact. the Allies would later regret. Dobrynin seemed more interested in the NAP than in
Berlin this time, perhaps hoping for an agreement on something they could present to the world
as good faith diplomacy.1077
At a NATO meeting in Ottawa in May, Rusk discussed Berlin with Lord Home,
Schroeder, and de Murville. Rusk noted Khrushchev's troubles at home, among the Warsaw
Pact, and with the Chinese. Lord Home said Gromyko seemed very interested in a NAP. De
Murville said a NAP could lead to GDR recognition. Schroeder it was obviously very important
to the Soviets since they had introduced it at Geneva, "Khrushchev thinks he invented the NAP
in Geneva in 1955". Rusk noted liberalization among the Warsaw Pact satellites might make the
NAP more worth the West's attention now. Rusk told Home that Dobrynin had indicated
acceptance of an NAP might facilitate a Berlin settlement, except the Soviets did not seem very
interested in discussing Berlin. De Murville said "it is certainly not in the Western interest to stop
a move toward a detente if there is a possibility for one." They all agreed developments in
Moscow needed to be closely watched.1078 Hardliner Frol Kozlov's demotion in April 1963
reduced pressure on Khrushchev for toughness on Berlin.1079
One promising development in the Kremlin was the growing momentum for a test ban.
In addition to conveying a message through Seaborg's meeting with Brezhnev, Khrushchev
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received a message from Kennedy through American journalist Norman Cousins in April 1962.
According to Glenn Seaborg, Khrushchev overplayed Soviet insistence on only two inspections,
but sent a clear signal that he was willing to make further concessions. Khrushchev was now
prepared to seriously consider further Western proposals for a treaty. Harold Macmillan
suggested to Kennedy they try a summit on arms control. Though that was unlikely, they did
send a joint letter to Khrushchev, urging him to accept an emissary like Harriman to negotiate a
test-ban treaty. Khrushchev replied disagreeably at the end of May, but said he was prepared to
accept a representative for talks that summer. 1080
Kennedy issued a public call for better relations, including nuclear arms control, with the
Russians in a June 9 speech at American University. The speech was designed to encourage
Khrushchev's cooperation at a time when the Chinese were pressuring him for a tougher stance
against the United States. Khrushchev appreciated Kennedy's speech and, on June 20, approved
a 'hot line' direct telephone/teletype link with the United States for better crisis communications.
Khrushchev would be less enthusiastic about Kennedy's remarks a week later in Berlin.1081

Kennedy in Berlin
Kennedy decided to visit Europe again in early June to repair Allied relations through
personal diplomacy. He wanted to go to West Berlin as a public show of US support.1082 CIA
reports from June 7 and June 14 indicated that the West Berlin morale was good. The Soviets
were still attempting to "establish a foothold" in the westernmost sectors. They had less official
presence in East Berlin, having turned over many occupation duties to the GDR. The Soviets
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wanted fewer restrictions on their transit to the Soviet War memorial in West Berlin, as well as
more non-military contacts. They hoped to promote an image of an "independent" West Berlin,
that could still lead to a free city arrangement.1083 State Department analysts thought the Soviets
and East Germans were preparing to formally incorporate East Berlin into the GDR. That
incremental move would not have "dramatic" effect, but could hinder access and undermine
West German confidence in the Allies.1084
In Moscow Deputy Foreign Minister Zorn told Kohler that Kennedy 's plan to visit West
Berlin was a provocation by Adenauer and would not help Berlin discussions. The Chancellor's
official FRG presence in West Berlin was unacceptable. When Kohler met again with Zorn, the
Ambassador said that Soviet distinctions between the GDR and FRG were not founded in fact or
law. The Soviets did not press their objections further.1085 In fact, Kennedy's visit was not an
official state visit to either West Berlin or West Germany. It was a goodwill visit, intended to
show solidarity. Economic Minister Erhard would shortly succeed Adenauer and would also
have to be cultivated. The US would not use the visit to pressure the German leaders, but take
clear positions on the MLF, trade issues, including British entry into the Common Market, and
balance of payments. Kennedy could expect to hear much about reunification hopes.1086
Kennedy and Rusk arrived in Bonn on June 21, 1963. The president met with the
Chancellor alone, while the two foreign minister met. Schroeder told Rusk he was concerned
that the US seemed only interested in access now and had forgotten reunification - the
Americans should think of Berlin in a reunification context. They should discourage any level
of GDR recognition or agreements which would freeze the status quo in Europe, which Rusk was
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thought an allusion to the NAP.1087 Adenauer and Kennedy's talk was more personal. The
Chancellor knew he had only a few more months in office, but wanted to be at the forefront as
long as possible. Kennedy tried to emphasize continuity and good faith between the US and
FRG. The US remained committed to protect West Germany, but needed cooperation too. The
bloom was already fading from the Franco-German entente, keeping FRG leaders mindful of the
importance of good relations with the US.1088
Kennedy and Adenauer travelled to Berlin the next day, where they were met by Mayor
Willy Brandt. Rusk met with Brandt to discuss checkpoint problems.1089 The Austrians wanted
to open new air service, which Rusk approved of. The Secretary quizzed Brandt about West
Berliners visiting the Eastern sectors, which Brandt thought was fine. He wanted greater tourist
access and freedom for his citizens to enjoy the whole of the city, as best they could, thus
"punching holes in the wall." Rusk said he had no problem with this at all, but they had to
recognize they still faced the possibility of East Germany being able to control all Berlin access,
which even Brandt could not accept.1090 Brandt was more inclined to East-West cooperation
than he had been in 1959, but still more conservative in this regard than he would be a few years
later when, as Chancellor, he would advance his Ostpolitik policy. For the present, Brandt and
Adenauer cooperated during Kennedy's visit, in solidarity against East Germany and the Wall.
The next day, Kennedy, Adenauer and Brandt arrived at Tempelhof Airport together. All
appeared on the same reviewing stand and enjoyed thunderous reception by large crowds, which
overflowed sidewalks along the President's motorcade.1091 Kennedy stopped briefly at
Friedrichstrasse Crossing, site of Clay's tank confrontation. His famous "Ich bin ein Berliner"
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speech, declaring that the West Berliners had become worldwide symbols of freedom, was
rapturously received. For Kennedy, that rapture was a little disturbing and he worried about the
potentials of German reunification.1092 Alliance mending and public relations purposes had
been served well, but, in a way, East German sovereignty had been acknowledged. Kennedy
expressed abstract commitment, not new practical steps to remove the Wall, diplomatic or
otherwise. The Wall would stay.
Despite the success of the Kennedy visit, political problems remained with both Brandt
and Adenauer. Brandt was "not enthusiastic" about the MLF.1093 Adenauer, along with other
FRG leaders, had strong reservations about the Limited Test Ban Treaty which now seemed a
probability. He complained to the visiting McNamara that the US was too willing to
compromise with the Soviets and "the State Department had not been what it was under John
Foster Dulles." Indeed, it was not. Rusk never exerted the kind of unifying foreign policy
command and responsibility as Dulles. Bundy was a far more influential National Security
Advisor, at Rusk's expense, than Eisenhower ever had, nor would a Robert Kennedy ever have
played the same kind of role. But Rusk, not Dulles, was now Secretary and would proceed with
the Test Ban Treaty, though he was unsure Harriman was the best representative.1094

The Test Ban Treaty
The groundwork for serious test-ban negotiations had been established with the Seaborg
and Cousins visits to Moscow in the spring. Harriman was chosen as the US representative, with
Carl Kaysen providing assistance. The UK would also participate in the talks. Harriman was
uneasy about the conjunction of test-ban talks, set to start on July 15, with Khrushchev's
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discussions with the Chinese several days later. Khrushchev had complained to Macmillan about
Kennedy's tough language in Berlin. The Chairman still might try to make a test-ban contingent
on a non-aggression pact (NAP) for Central Europe.1095
The Limited Test Ban Treaty fell short of the comprehensive ban initially sought. It
produced intense political criticism in the United Sates and faced arduous Congressional
approval. Even when its passage seemed imminent in late July, Khrushchev told Harriman,
again in Moscow to finalize the Test Ban Treaty, that a German peace treaty was still necessary,
along with a NAP. Harriman helped ensure the test-ban agreement, because he had the Soviets'
confidence. A final sticking issue was US insistence on a withdrawal option, tied specifically to
perceived breaches in treaty observance.1096 The test-ban agreement bound signatories to
suspend nuclear tests in the atmosphere, underwater and outer space, but not underground. The
signatories also agreed not to assist or participate in tests by other nations. General disarmament
was not discussed in depth in the treaty negotiations, because Western and Soviet positions were
still as far apart as they had been in 1960 and 1961, when there had been some hope for
disarmament progress at the heads of state summit meetings. Gromyko's presence, instead of the
more intractable Zorin, was taken as a sign of serious Soviet intent, as was Khrushchev's own
participation in opening and closing sessions..1097
The July 16 meeting with Harriman, with Kohler, Kaysen and Gromyko also in
attendance, was relaxed and friendly, but Khrushchev did bring up his German issues and the
NAP.1098 Khrushchev suggested the "possibility of US pressure prompting Germans seeking a
Rapallo-type arrangement with USSR." The original Rapallo pact between Germany and the
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Soviet Union in 1924 had been controversial since the USSR was then in diplomatic isolation
and Germany was not supposed to enter into new alliances without approval from the British,
French and Americans. He said a new arrangement would benefit East and West and deflect
future German conflicts with the United States. Harriman said the US had no objections to better
intra-German and east-West relations, but "so long as Soviets sat on East Germany, they could
not expect friendship from West Germany." Harriman said there might be some connection
between a NAP and progress on Germany but Khrushchev insisted these were separate interests.
Khrushchev intimated that there were several areas, "corns" that could be stepped on, where the
Soviets could apply pressure on the West to encourage a peace treaty. Harriman replied that "as
long as Khrushchev said it with a smile, he was not taking it seriously."1099
Harriman told Kennedy a few days later that an NAP might actually loosen Warsaw Pact
ties. Thompson remained skeptical of a NAP but Harriman "pointed out consequences of a
detente in permitting a further loosening of ties between the satellites and the Soviet Union."
Kennedy observed "Berlin was not now in trouble and ... did not seem likely to be in the near
future" but an NAP's possibility might have some bearing on improvements in Berlin. 1100 He did
not want to hear pessimism about NAP. The immediate problem was securing Adenauer's
support for the treaty. Kennedy wrote the Chancellor that the treaty would not "create any
danger of increased recognition or international status for the East German regime."1101
Despite Khrushchev's relatively benign tone with Harriman and Kennedy's optimistic
assessment, the Soviets were still bringing up the German peace treaty in the final negotiations
for the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Although the Treaty was the most significant measure yet to
control the nuclear arms race, the East-West heads of state would not convene a summit for the
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signing. Lord Home and Rusk met with Gromyko on August 6 because the latter wanted to
discuss Germany and West Berlin. Western troops, said Gromyko, endangered peace: "What
kind of freedom existed in West Berlin guarded by foreign bayonets?" He said the all-German
plebiscite proposals "reeked of mothballs."1102
Complaining of the slow pace of negotiations, Gromyko said "No matter how capable
Secretary Rusk or Ambassador Dobrynin were, this could go on for 10-25 or even 100 years."
Alluding to the improved seismic monitoring which had convinced the West to lower their
demands for in-country inspections, he added, "there was no known instrument that could detect
progress in these discussions." Rusk said the West Berlin garrisons were necessary to ensure
access and "almost a waste of time to go on if this were not accepted." He said the troops posed
no threat to the "several Soviet divisions in East Germany."1103 He acknowledged that talks had
become repetitious but "far-reaching fundamental problems involved." Although the Western
Principles Paper had tried to present a basis for a comprehensive solution, he said, the East was
still not showing reciprocity. Gromyko said "the Soviets did not fear the word reciprocity," but
he insisted on "liquidation remnants of World War II." Gromyko also said the GDR needed tolls
and tariffs for Autobahn, rail, air and communications traffic through their territory. Rusk asked
why it was that the Soviets supported self-determination everywhere but in Central Europe.1104
When Khrushchev met the foreign ministers at his dacha in Pitsunda on August 9, he said
they must now turn to the German problem which was the most difficult, but also the easiest
facing them because it could be fixed with his peace treaty. He said Eisenhower had been
inclined in this direction but wanted to slow down West German competition by making them
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buy arms, an honest attitude for a soldier. Even de Gaulle, he said, acknowledged the division of
Germany - Adenauer was the only holdout since the British, Americans and NATO's Spaak were
coming around to accepting political recognition of a divided Germany. Rusk replied that,
though the Chairman might not like hearing this, it was not up to the Soviet Union or Western
allies to decide whether the Germans should accept political division. At the same time, neither
the US or USSR wanted a nuclear Germany. "Sweeping disarmament" might not be feasible at
the present time, but small steps could improve safety and security.1105
Khrushchev was not to be easily swayed from the German topic. The US, he said, had
intervened against self-determination in Pakistan, Guatemala and South Vietnam. But he did not
persist and offered no last minute objections to the Test Ban Treaty. Sergei Khrushchev says his
father was very pleased with the Treaty, saying the USSR would retain an ample nuclear
deterrent.1106 Vlaimir Zubok says Kennedy had Harriman ask Khrushchev about possible
preemptive strikes on Chinese nuclear weapon facilities, but this approach was rebuffed.
Khrushchev was unwilling to do anything to upset the growing schism with his Chinese
rivals.1107

Leaving It Up to the Germans
Adenauer tried to backpedal on the Test Ban Treaty at the last minute but had to
acquiesce. He complained to Rusk that the withdrawal of 600 troops from Berlin was a gesture
to Khrushchev that would only be interpreted as weakness.1108 Rusk was more worried about
Gromyko and Khrushchev's references to "stepping on Western corns," which might indicate a
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fresh round of harassment in Berlin. He thought the East might focus next on blocking access
instead of withdrawal of the Western occupation troops.1109 The West Germans had prepared
their own peace plan, emphasizing reunification, which they shared with their NATO partners
for consultation. Though the French seemed to favor the idea, Thompson thought the Soviets
might take the proposal as a provocation.1110
Rusk told Schroeder that the plan could destabilize the Western negotiating position and
encourage Soviets mischief, particularly if they thought it might deflect Chinese charges of
being weak with the West. He said Schroeder should first advance the West German ideas in a
general audience speech instead of formal proposal to the USSR.1111 When Schroeder met with
Kennedy in Washington on September 24, the latter emphasized the need for consultation.
Schroeder agreed they needed to expedited the MLF, though he doubted British and French
enthusiasm for the joint European-American nuclear force. He also said that while Berlin
tensions had not led to reunification of Germany, they did keep attention on the subject.1112
Extensive bilateral negotiations had encouraged the Soviets to put the United States in the
position of speaking for all the Allies. The United States was hindered because it could not
always reply directly without first consulting its partners, whereas the Soviets did not have to get
Warsaw Pact approval. In early October, Gromyko returned to Washington, again raising the
Germany issue, but without acrimony. Rusk asked whether a NAP would include references to
West Berlin, but was told that would "swamp" the NAP which could "provide a peaceful
settlement [of] all issues without exception." 1113 West German Economic Minster Erhard
thought the time had come to use economic leverage, noting the Soviet and East Germans needed
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more trade with the West. Rusk thought Erhard's understanding of Soviet political logic was a
little naive, but economic leverage need not be discouraged. They agreed not to try the idea out
on de Gaulle yet.1114
The US not only had to deal with three other contrary sets of opinion (UK/FRG/France)
in marshalling consensus, it had to deal with communication between those partners that could
run contrary to US thinking. French Foreign Minister De Murville told Rusk that the danger of
German reunification lay in its possible disengagement from the West. Rusk mentioned that the
US was still not committed to recognition of the Oder-Niesse border, which the French favored
but would also affect Poland. He also observed that Soviet relaxation over Eastern Europe
would encourage reunification. De Murville said "a detente would work in the long run would to
the advantage of the West ... the problem was what would happen in the short run." 1115
He had told Schroeder that the best one could expect from current negotiations was that
they might not change the status quo, but changes like the NAP could freeze the status quo with
no hope for improvement. Unlike Rusk and Schroeder, he said, the French did not think EastWest relaxation was an automatic good, nor did he think the Sino-Soviet split presented
problems for the West. He did not want to see the West Germans confronted by a choice
between siding with the US or France. Conspicuously missing from the French minister's
arguments was any mention of their other partner in Berlin, the UK. Also not discussed, was
French refusal to sign the Limited Test Ban Treaty.1116
When Kennedy met with Gromyko in Washington on October 10, the same day the Test
Ban Treaty went into effect, the Soviet minister said the German problem still needed to be
resolved. He said the Americans no longer seemed interested but the Soviets still considered
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their peace treaty an important matter. Kennedy did not directly answer Gromyko and instead
noted that relations had improved between their two countries, as evidenced by the Test Ban
Treaty and a pact to sell wheat to the Soviet Union. Rusk said the US wanted clarification on the
time frame of the Soviets UN flag Berlin-troop proposal. Gromyko said he still wondered if he
could inform Khrushchev that the Americans still were seriously interested in resolving the
German problem.1117
The next day, Soviet armed forces detained a large convoy from proceeding on the
autobahn, after already holding back a smaller detachment. Rusk told Kennedy and his Berlin
task force that both Dobrynin and Gromyko "acted like a man upset" when informed of the
incident.1118 Their surprise may have reflected the erosion of Khrushchev's political authority in
the Soviet Union; though noted in this meeting, the extent of that conflict was still not realized in
Washington. Whether a rogue field commander's action or an attempt by Khrushchev to silence
hard-line domestic and Chinese criticism, Rusk said the incident could signal a "major crisis"
with the Soviets. Immediate allied consultation and preliminary mobilization were in order, but
the convoys should attempt no actions in the meantime. This policy, which some more hawkish
advisors like Nitze protested, was in line with convoy harassments going back to the February
1959 Marienborn harassment. The Kremlin would be allowed time to regain control over the
situation. Thompson and Rusk agreed the incident was not directed from the top and may have
been staged by dissenting factions to embarrass Gromyko in his negotiations.1119
The convoy incident and conflicting Soviet attitudes thereto showed that, despite
Kennedy's optimistic observations to Gromyko, the test ban treaty had so far not fostered a spirit
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of detente. Kohler reported from Moscow that Zorin would provide no details, saying only that
the Americans must not have followed procedure.1120 Zorin, as deputy minister, had only limited
authority and always took a hard line in negotiations. Thompson asked Dobrynin's help to tell
Zorin a meeting between the US and Soviet field commanders needed to be arranged at once.
The more cooperative Dobrynin said it was "incomprehensible" that the convoy had been
stopped.1121 Though the convoy was released the next day, Zorin continued his tough line with
Kohler, placing all the blame on the Americans. Gromyko was more conciliatory with Rusk,
evidently hoping to do productive business while in the US for the UNGA sessions.1122 The
incident may have shown him that he needed to make gains for his country while present
circumstances allowed. Gromyko was a business-like Soviet foreign minister, but he was also a
member of the Central Committee. He was aware of Brezhnev's developing campaign against
Khrushchev, and while not an early member, would join the plotters by the following summer.
The Americans did not know that a regime change loomed in the Soviet Union but they
were pleased to welcome one in Bonn. Erhard, not Strauss, was named Chancellor to succeed
the ailing Adenauer.1123 Erhard, an academic economist, did not possess Adenauer's long
experience and broad perspective, but he was more flexible and forward-thinking. Rusk's
congratulatory visit was appreciated and augured well for greater US-FRG cooperation. Rusk
doubted Khrushchev was behind the convoy incident, but said he did not see good prospects for
near-term renewal of negotiations. The Secretary "made clear that there was at the present time
no detente ...only a hunting license for detente." The NAP was "dead because the Soviets would
not come clean on Berlin." Similarly, there could be no agreement on nuclear non-
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dissemination because the Soviets objected to the MLF. Rusk said "there is no possibility of
moving rapidly to a detente ... there is danger of people thinking there is a detente which does
not exist."1124 Though Rusk did not express to his misgivings about the recent FRG proposal to
offer economic incentives to relax tensions with the Soviets, Washington was still concerned.
George Ball recommended to Kennedy that Erhard be gently but firmly reminded that serious
overtures that might affect West Berlin needed to be cleared with all the Allied partners.1125
As had been the case the previous fall, Berlin negotiations had lapsed without any
progress and harassment ensued in the wake. On November 4, another convoy was stopped on
the Autobahn and this time it appeared Khrushchev had approved.1126 Dobrynin disclaimed any
knowledge and suggested the troops were looking to make trouble. He raised the issue of
whether West Berlin was covered by the Test Ban Treaty. Rusk made plain his displeased
"astonishment at [the] Soviet action."1127 In Moscow, Deputy Premier Kosygin and Gromyko
blamed Pentagon provocateurs and insisted the US respect access procedure.1128
New Berlin harassments disturbed a budding detente signaled by the Test Ban Treaty
While a detente could be reached only through many small steps, it might took fewer steps in
the other direction to return to the distant estrangement of the 1950s. However, diplomatic
contacts between the US and USSR had now become so frequent, that even when tensions
worsened, the US and Soviet ambassadors and foreign ministers remained in regular contact.1129
This was especially true when Gromyko was in the United States for the annual UNGA sessions.
Regular communication provided some assurance that crises could be controlled; both sides
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realized the importance of this after the Cuban affair. Kennedy and his advisors considered
whether they should match Soviet harassment without resorting to more forceful actions. Such
matching harassment could entail blocking access to the Soviet War memorial and even include
delays of Soviet transit through the Panama Canal. Rusk, McNamara and Kennedy decided to
prepare such options but not be in any haste to take such measures.1130

End of Kennedy and Khrushchev Period
Washington had good reason to be cautious and cool. The difference in November 1963,
and previous autumns, was that Khrushchev's authority was now in question, while the West
Germans were actively interested in pursuing their own negotiating track.1131 The British and
French had marginalized themselves. The British had not had not developed enough leverage to
back up their desire to negotiate. The French were still distracted by Algeria and dreams of
nuclear independence and political leadership in Europe. Also, the Americans were increasingly
occupied by a deteriorating situation in Vietnam. The Kennedy administration had supported
Ngo Van Diem, who, though eager for Western support, had alienated both the military and the
largely Buddhist populace. In mid-November, the Kennedy had to consider helping to bring
about regime change lest the insurgent Viet Cong exploit the instability.1132 The Test Ban
Treaty had faced difficult passage in the US Senate. Kennedy's acceptance of the Wall and
moderate terms for ending the Cuban missile crisis also created political pressure for a tougher
foreign policy. Examples of US domestic discontent could be seen in negative newspaper
advertisements and demonstrations in advance of the President's visit to Texas in late
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November to shore up Southern political support. When Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas in
on November 22, 1963, the momentum for any kind of Berlin resolution died with him.1133
Khrushchev realized he could not easily resume negotiations. further, he had little
backing from his colleagues to continue pressing a fruitless cause.1134 He continued to insist on
his peace treaty, without urgency, till he was quietly removed from office in August 1964, the
first Soviet leader ever to be painlessly demoted.1135 Most in the Kremlin thought, with Berlin
stabilized by a Wall that was continually being strengthened, that it was better to let the
Americans overextend themselves in Vietnam. President Johnson would be observed until new
overtures might be made. Contacts with the West Germans would be quietly pursued, the
Chinese loudly denounced and missile production accelerated.1136 Since there was no crisis to
avert or feasible advantage to be gained, there was no need to resume close diplomatic
engagement. Johnson had neither the inclination or temperament to resume negotiation. Neither
he or the new Soviet leaders were willing to inflame a fairly non-threatening issue like Berlin
into a cause for serious face to face negotiation. Except for a few small moments such as the
Johnson-Kosygin mini-summit in Glassboro , New Jersey in 1967, detente was postponed and
would remain so for the next five years.1137

Conclusions
Negotiations on Berlin never regained momentum after the deadlock of the July 1962
Rusk-Gromyko meetings in Geneva. The Peter Fechter killing and abolition of Soviet
commandant in East Berlin did not bring the quarrelsome Allies together enough to develop a
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common position. The placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba, partly a reaction to the Berlin
standoff, displaced the German problem as the main issue between the United States and the
Soviet Union. Talks continued at the ambassadorial level, mainly as a repetitious formality.
Although the Cuban Missile Crisis worsened already tense relations between the US and
USSR and did not improve Allied relations, it also helped delink Berlin and disarmament.
France and West Germany's exclusion of Britain ensured there would be no joint Allied
participation in Berlin talks. West Germany had become such a pivotal element, and with postAdenauer leadership, that it was already considering bilateral approaches with the Soviet Union.
Although Kennedy had disappointed Macmillan at Bermuda, British input in Test Ban
deliberations restored some influence. In general relations with both Allies and Soviets, the US
continued its trend towards general bilateralism. However, Khrushchev, the architect and chief
protagonist of the Berlin crisis, the main constant in US-Soviet relations for nearly a decade,
was losing influence.1138 Kennedy's term was cut short and the bilateral relationship could not
proceed until new leadership was established in the Soviet Union and in the United States.
Kennedy's visit to West Berlin was an exercise in American-West German bilateralism
that signaled the real end of a Western multilateral front on Berlin. This weakened Berlin as a
leverage issue Khrushchev could use.1139 Test Ban treaty negotiations were proof that he had
already decided to accept disarmament measures without concessions on Germany, though he
did try to bargain while he could. These talks were the highest level successful negotiations on
arms control yet between the US and USSR, but they still did not bring on detente.
The Test Ban did not bring Kennedy and Khrushchev together in another summit or
initiate goodwill visits to the other's country. Nor did Sino-Soviet rivalry, Cuba or Vietnam.
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Disarmament never developed the power Berlin had as a catalytic issue in US-Soviet relations.
Berlin's anomalous situation still had a symbolic importance for East and West. The possibility
of a solution promised progress and peace.1140 No other issue, not even disarmament, engaged
the US and Soviet Union as it had from 1958 to 1962. After Berlin as an issue was neutralized
by the Wall and Cuba, the US-Soviet relationship became less intense but much closer than
before Khrushchev began his Berlin campaign.
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The Berlin Diplomatic Campaign: Summary and Conclusions

Western leaders often used the expression "slippery slope" during the negotiations to
resolve the Berlin crisis. The words suggest potential more than active danger. Despite the
implicit threats of Khrushchev's demands and the explicit Western declaration to forcibly defend
'vital interests,' neither side really wanted a battle over Berlin, much less a general war that
could involve nuclear weapons.1141 Khrushchev's deadline tactic indicated that really wanted
was negotiations, possibly for disarmament, more than forceful confrontation.1142 Perceiving this
distinction, Western leaders over-ruled advocates of force and chose to pursue a diplomatic
resolution. Although flashpoints like the U-2 incident, the troubled Vienna and Paris summits,
construction of the Berlin Wall, the tank standoff at Checkpoint Charlie and Kennedy's visit to
Berlin remain the focus of public and academic attention, the unprecedented level of sustained
US-Soviet negotiation may be the most significant aspect of the Berlin crisis.
Though it often seemed that the superpowers - and their allies - were merely traversing a
hazardous slope in vain, their patient if slippery steps prevented war and provided a template for
future negotiations.1143 As a result of the Berlin discussions, US leaders gained familiarity with
Khrushchev and Soviet thinking, which helped them respond to the Cuban Missile Crisis and
enable passage of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. As serious as those events were, they did not
produce heads of state summits.1144 Only Berlin led to comprehensive negotiations between the
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US and Soviet Union. Berlin negotiations were a transformative factor in their bilateral relations
in this period and rekindled the hopes for cooperation seen in the days of the Teheran and Yalta
conferences but thought lost after the postwar division of Europe, the 1948 Berlin airlift, a
lackluster Vienna 1955 summit and the 1956 Hungarian intervention. US-Soviet relations may
have lapsed after the Berlin crisis but the 1958-1963 negotiations had renewed relations and
established diplomatic templates that would help enable a more robust detente in the 1970s.1145
The 1958-63 dialogue marked a profound shift away from diplomatic estrangement and
containment doctrine. Leaders who, even two or three years earlier, would have scarcely
imagined long running ministerial and executive discussions with the other side pursued those
discussions as one of their nation's highest priorities. They hoped to keep dangers, both military
and political, as potential but avertable threats through discussions by backchannel, foreign
minister level, and heads of state discussions.1146 Such discussions were not a familiar part of the
political landscape in 1958. East-West relations were in limbo and Allied and East Bloc
relations were strained. Berlin negotiations did not quite produce a detente that eased tensions
and enabled them to cut back on military spending, but did preserve the German status quo
without serious conflict or political destabilization.1147 Those dangers remained - militarily, in
the emphasis in contingency planning on possible nuclear use, and politically, in the stresses on
both NATO and Warsaw Pact unity and prestige.1148 The 'slippery slope' referred not only to the
hazards of using force, but also unacceptable concessions that might result from negotiations.
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Why did Berlin, and not disarmament, Third World competition or improved trade,
become the focus of diplomatic engagement? The answer may lie in the fact that the Berlin
crisis was, in many ways, an invented situation. Negotiation on Berlin became a proxy conflict
in which neither side was likely to take irrevocable action, but did see some chance at realizing
long-held security goals through small steps.1149 By contrast, their positions in other areas of
contention, like disarmament, the Third World or aid to underdeveloped countries ,were simply
too far apart. These 'great powers' were afraid of being compromised by agreeing to principles
and arrangements with unforeseen consequences. Berlin issues, particularly the refugee exodus,
were serious enough to warrant close attention and concern, but not immediately threatening.1150
Negotiations took on an indefinite, repetitious character like siege tactics.
Resolution of German and Berlin problems may have been improbable but did not seem
impossible. These problems were linked to disarmament, the most likely other candidate for
negotiations, because both Germanys hosted nuclear weapons by 1959. By linking disarmament
to progress on German/Berlin resolution, East and West alike hoped to advance stalled low-level
discussions on the former topic, which was a real concern and attractive to public opinion.1151
Negotiations would hopefully stabilize the Berlin situation, which could slide into the chaos of
war and political surrender.
Nikita Khrushchev's sustained demands for a separate German 'peace treaty' and making
Berlin a 'free city' thus made a tense but stable situation into the major area of contention
between the Soviet Union and the United States from late November 1958 to November 1962.
To a great extent, Berlin was an exaggerated concern. From the time of the 1953 East Berlin
riots to Khrushchev's 1958 declarations, Berlin had not been not a critical concern to the US or
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the Soviets, who remained diplomatically estranged for the most part. The 1955 four-power
Vienna summit dealt little with Berlin or even the alliance face-off created by the establishment
of the Warsaw Pact to match NATO.1152 The only substantial concerns that had developed by
1958 were the refugee exodus from East Germany and introduction of nuclear arms in Germany.
These were serious but manageable problems. The strain on human resources through
West Berlin was destabilizing to the GDR, until stopped midway through the crisis by the simple
expedient of the Wall. Kennedy and Rusk believed the Wall stabilized the Berlin issue. 1153
NATO and Warsaw Pact stationing of tactical nuclear weapons reflected military cost cutting
pressures, since nuclear weapons were cheaper than maintaining large forward-based
conventional forces. Nuclear deployment was too basic to both East West and East strategic
doctrine to be easily changed through negotiation. Eisenhower thought Berlin held little
strategic value for the US, but its defense was a symbolic commitment that could not be
compromised without serious losses to its prestige or the confidence of its NATO partners.1154
Berlin and the status of Germany were also vital interests for West Germany, France and Britain,
which would face the direct results of conflict but could not match the superpowers' resources.
The United States faced difficulties throughout the Berlin crisis in dealing with the Allies,
delaying negotiations and enhancing a trend towards direct talks with the Soviet Union. US
desire to control nuclear weapons in Europe, and European reluctance to accept the American
concept of a multilateral force, increased its distance from the Allies.1155 The US had to make
the strongest commitment of personnel and hardware, but it could not make arrangements on
Berlin and Germany without the approval of its Potsdam Treaty occupation co-signatories. The
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USSR had more freedom to make terms without client approval, but did face alliance pressures,
both within the Warsaw Pact and from its Communist Bloc rival, the Peoples Republic of China.
East German leader Walter Ulbricht's demands to solve the exodus problem and Chinese
Chairman Mao Zedong's demands for a more militant stand with the West created pressure for
Khrushchev to take a tougher stand on Berlin, but he did not want war. Mao and Ulbricht's
criticisms plagued Khrushchev throughout the Berlin Crisis.1156 Problems with alliance partners'
varying positions and the cumbersome process of reaching consensus appeared even before the
first major negotiating phase, the May-July 1959 Foreign Ministers Conference in Geneva.
Though the principle difficulty at Geneva was the refusal of either side to make significant
concessions, the imbalance of superpowers and lesser partners also hindered resolution.1157
The stalemate of summer 1959 fostered calls for a heads-of-state meeting to resolve the
differences. However, neither East or West Germany, the states that would be most affected by a
change in the status quo, were Potsdam signatories. West Germany's NATO allies, the United
States, France, and Great Britain were also signatories but of greatly unequal stature.
Khrushchev realized this and pursued his Berlin/German objectives in great part to create
sustained dissension in the West and quiet hard-line Communist rivals.1158
Promoting Allied discord was only one of Khrushchev's motives - he really wanted
bilateral high-level talks with the United States. Khrushchev authority William Taubman has
cited high-level discussions with the United States as one of the Chairman's primary goals. He
wanted better relations with the United Sates mainly to reduce the cost of the arms race, allowing
for more Soviet consumer production. 1159 Whether or not he thought the West would ever agree
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to his idea for complete and immediate, but uninspected, disarmament cannot really be known
but he certainly seemed to hope so. He also wanted better trade arrangements and credits from
the West, as well as cultural and technical exchanges that would benefit his country. He knew
that Eisenhower, as an experienced military leader, would be a tough but practical negotiator.
Though Khrushchev-Eisenhower relations never could be really called warm, they were
sufficiently friendly to allow for the 1959 deputy minister level exchange of visits and for his
own visit to the United States. If Eisenhower had been able to return the visit, as planned, such
reciprocity would have been taken as a clear sign of detente.1160 Though both leaders stressed
disarmament as a top concern, Berlin dominated their direct conversations, which had been
minimal up to that point. Berlin also became the chief topic of their ministers discussions from
late1958 to late 1960.
Ministerial discussions were particularly important in the early phases of the Berlin crisis
because Eisenhower's Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had a stronger influence on his
nation's foreign policy than either the Allied counterparts, Britain's Harold Caccia, West
Germany's Heinrich von Brentano or France's Couve de Murville. Frederick Marks argues that
Dulles was even less inclined than Eisenhower to use force over Berlin.1161 The Soviet Union's
Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, did not set policy but he acted on his executive's instructions
more consistently and faithfully than any of his counterparts, providing a strong coherence to
Soviet negotiating practice. When Dulles was replaced by Christian Herter, who took more of
caretaker role, US direction on Berlin became noticeably less forceful.1162 This contributed to
Allied disarray in planning the Paris summit conference in late 1959 and early 1960.
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Eisenhower's increasingly lame-duck status and Herter's softness enabled other
determined executives to attempt more divergent courses. France's president Charles de Gaulle
took advantage of the diluted US foreign policy leadership and pursued a more independent path
that he hoped would lead to France's principle leadership in European security.1163 De Gaulle
had come to power only weeks before the Berlin crisis began, but had already advanced his plan
to supersede NATO leadership with a triumvirate of the US-France-Great Britain deciding global
security matters. He wanted French leadership in Europe but would respect British and
American interests in their respective regions of interest. De Gaulle was skeptical of negotiation
with the Soviet Union in 1959 and would remain so throughout the crisis.1164 He did not believe
Khrushchev would go to war and was afraid of being led into unnecessary concessions that could
hinder French influence.
Britain's Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was much more inclined to negotiations,
having travelled to Moscow alone in early 1958. The US was not pleased with that visit nor the
implication, not very well founded, that the visit had enabled the Foreign Ministers Conference
which averted war. Macmillan also lobbied heavily for a summit conference to do what the
foreign ministers proved unable to do in Geneva in 1959. Macmillan wanted to restore British
influence but also to avoid a war his country could not afford.1165 He was the first to
prominently use the 'slippery slope' expression. When he used it, he was probably most worried
about nuclear conflict, not political destabilization.
Germany's Chancellor Konrad Adenauer also used the Eisenhower 'twilight' to take a
more independent course. The chancellor was inflexible about recognition of East Germany and
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maintaining the occupation regime, but unwilling to make the military commitment the other
Western leaders thought necessary. Insecure with the European Allied leaders and unable to
gain as much influence as he hoped for Eisenhower and Kennedy, Adenauer's vacillations
became chronic obstacle to developing a coordinated Western response.1166 Berlin brought out
these leaders' least cooperative tendencies and encouraged US and Soviet leaders to concentrate
on bilateral discussions.
The election of John Kennedy to succeed Eisenhower also fed the bilateral trend.
Kennedy believed in the power of personal persuasion, much as Franklin Roosevelt had. Like
Roosevelt, Kennedy thought a strong personal appeal to a Soviet leader could overcome a
general malaise and mistrust in their relations. Like Roosevelt with Stalin in World War II, this
conviction was not borne out in Kennedy's dealings with Khrushchev over Berlin. Likewise,
Kennedy's hopes that Western relations could be improved by better individual relations proved
largely unfounded. Much of the modern literature on Kennedy, from authors like Lawrence
Freedman, Michael Beschloss, Robert Dallek and Mark White, emphasizes ideas like a new
frontier extending to international relations.1167 That perspective does not always take into
account the pragmatic concerns of his more experienced European counterparts. They saw an
inexperienced idealist who could be manipulated more easily than they could the seasoned
veteran Eisenhower. Khrushchev saw Kennedy in much the same way.1168 The Bay of Pigs
disaster only encouraged that perception.
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Kennedy saw a global environment ripe for detente, to ease worsening conditions in
Berlin, nuclear tensions and Third World strife.1169 When Kennedy travelled to Europe a few
months into his presidency, he sought a series of mini-summits, bilateral meetings with
Macmillan and de Gaulle, as well as with Khrushchev. It is hard to imagine Eisenhower
attempting such an independent approach with Berlin very evidently on the table and still
requiring a common Western position.1170 The Berlin situation was serious enough that
contingency planners emphasized real probabilities of nuclear use, probably the most articulated
plans for nuclear use since Korea. Contingency planning ran parallel to negotiation all through
the Berlin crisis. Military leaders like General Nathan Twining and hardliners like Dean
Acheson vied with peace advocates like Arthur Schlesinger and Adlai Stevenson for their
president's attention. Eisenhower, always concerned about giving momentum to contingency
plans, preferred low-key diplomacy. The less experienced Kennedy, guided by the indecisive
Rusk, also preferred diplomacy but was afraid of showing military weakness.1171
De Gaulle and Adenauer were less interested than Macmillan in negotiation. They
wanted US declarations of US nuclear readiness, and sought leverage over Kennedy's refusal to
provide them with nuclear weapons.1172 Khrushchev had already had the same nuclear-sharing
problem with the Chinese.1173 Much has been made of the new Kennedy doctrine of flexible
readiness, as though this new policy was an abandonment of nuclear strategy in favor of
conventional response. In fact, flexible response involved considerations of tactical nuclear
weapons, short of general nuclear war.1174 Most force planning scenarios for breaking a Soviet
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blockade of Berlin included possible tactical nuclear use, after ground probes, and acknowledged
a high probability of general war as a result.1175
Kennedy was unprepared for the Vienna meeting and nearly undid all the previous
eighteen months worth of patient stabilization. It is worth noting that their meeting in Vienna
was arranged through back channels; this informal approach called for more informal discussions
than the earnest but immature ideological approach Kennedy attempted. The result led to a very
slippery time. Kennedy announced a major US arms escalation and Khrushchev authorized the
construction of the Wall. Nuclear use advocates made strong cases for forceful response
demonstrating clear nuclear readiness and even urged Kennedy to consider preemptive action.
Against that background, the largely nonviolent construction of the Wall was welcomed as a
pragmatic step to resolve the refugee crisis and quiet the nuclear advocates.1176 When it quickly
became apparent that neither a forceful response or emergency head of state or ministerial talks
would be called, it seemed for a moment that neither course was necessary nor did a choice
between the two need to be made.
The Soviet resumption of nuclear testing two weeks after the Wall and renewed Berlin
harassments soon convinced Kennedy to resume negotiations. The French and West Germans
adamantly opposed a new round of negotiations, despite the danger of conflict. Only Macmillan
was similarly inclined, but the British were thought too willing to make unacceptable
concessions regarding East Germany.1177 In September 1962, Kennedy resolved to initiate
exploratory talks with the Soviets for a Berlin resolution. He also began a private
correspondence with Khrushchev - the 'pen pal letters' - which both hoped would guide
ambassadorial and ministerial talks. Gromyko's visits to the United States for UN General
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Assembly sessions allowed for ministerial talks. These were inconclusive but showed strong
Soviet interest in negotiations. 1178 Khrushchev still wanted a summit but now his prestige
demanded Western acceptance of his position. For both sides, disarmament issues were
explicitly hostage to the Berlin question.
The problem of Allied unity also grew more acute in the fall of 1961, and produced some
of the most important (though largely unproductive) negotiations of the whole Berlin crisis. US
Secretary of State Rusk had neither the temperament or inclination to manage foreign policy as
Dulles had. Kennedy's inexperience demanded a stronger role than Herter had provided. Rusk
was talented but inclined to consider all views and postpone decisions.1179 The splitting of policy
making between the President, his newly influential National Security advisor McGeorge Bundy,
the clashing instincts of advisors like Dean Acheson and Arthur Schlesinger, and the wild card
influence of Attorney General Robert Kennedy produced a well informed but largely incoherent
policy and decision apparatus.1180 The President had tried to rein in this process in the fall of
1961 but it proved too difficult to contain for long. Rusk ended up doing most of the significant
discussions with the Allies and Soviets, with good advisors, like Thompson and Kohler
sometimes, but often in private one on one talks. He advised Kennedy against an early summit,
but was basically unprepared to deal with tenacious and immovable veterans like Gromyko and
the shrewd young Dobrynin, or even his Allied counterparts.1181
Intense efforts to get Adenauer's approval of a realistic package of proposals, much less
commit to good faith support for talks, produced indifferent results. The French were even less
cooperative than the West Germans. Adenauer never followed through with his eventually
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declared willingness to get de Gaulle on board. In October, Kennedy had hoped to arrange an
East-West foreign ministers meeting and possible summit by year's end. 1182 By the end of 1961,
after a tank standoff in Berlin, a public humiliation of Khrushchev exposing Soviet nuclear
inferiority, a rough Party Congress for Khrushchev where he was pilloried for his folly in
pursuing negotiations, and the near-collapse of Allied unity on Berlin, Kennedy's diplomatic
initiative was in shreds. The 'pen pal' correspondence was sometimes encouraging but vague
and inconsistent. Only Soviet readiness to begin confidential talks in Moscow between
Ambassador Thompson and Gromyko held any promise for diplomatic resolution of the Berlin
problems. No other serious East-West discussions were underway; arms control talks were low
level and intermittent. Khrushchev's public belligerence at the UN sessions had not augured well
for high level US-Soviet talks on any other subject.1183
The resumption of bilateral discussions on Berlin in January 1962 began a long sequence
that lasted several months. Thompson held the Soviets confidence, but had nothing new to
offer the Soviets except a proposal for an international access authority over Berlin.1184 By this
time, the US was ready to just seek an interim understanding, modus vivendi, to ease tensions
and work on small problems that could prevent larger Berlin incidents. The Soviets soon showed
that they regarded the talks as a mere formality to prepare the way for the peace treaty.1185 Their
new offer was a transitional mechanism that would allow a temporary continued occupation of
West Berlin under a UN flag alongside Warsaw Pact troops. Most of these sessions were held
with Gromyko, but Thompson did talk briefly with Khrushchev also. By March 1962, it already
seemed that negotiations could not last indefinitely.
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Still unsure whether the Soviets would soon implement the peace treaty, Rusk began
new talks with Gromyko in March. As with the previous fall's ministerial talks, these were
largely the result of circumstances, with both ministers in Geneva for UN disarmament talks. 1186
Neither the disarmament nor Berlin talks were productive. Allied support for the US-Soviet
talks was more forthcoming but still of little practical help. Even more than even in the fall, the
US realized that West Germans would be key to any solution. Even Gromyko began to
acknowledge that the Germans might have to resolve the Berlin problem themselves. None of
the Berlin signatories were quite comfortable yet with that prospect. Harassment in Berlin grew
and then ebbed again. The Soviets gave no clear sign of whether they would sign their peace
treaty or would abandon the idea. The 'pen pal' correspondence continued, though less
hopefully. The new foreign minister talks had followed the same pattern as the Moscow
talks.1187
As frustrating as the negotiating process was, the Berlin status quo remained basically
intact. Both sides devoted great time and attention to the process but their new working papers
had come to resemble theoretical exercises more than practical offers. A new series of talks
between the new Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and Rusk broke no new ground. By midsummer
1962, the ambassadorial, ministerial executive correspondence tracks had all effectively come to
naught.1188 This halt may have reflected other concerns like Southeast Asia demanding more
attention. The rote performance and interest on the Soviet part may be proof that they now
wanted talks only to cover the Cuban adventure. No other topic replaced Berlin to continue the
dialogue. Khrushchev improvised on negotiations. He may have just sensed, based in part on
Gromyko's reports, that the West would offer no more concessions. Rather than just publicly
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admit defeat, they could keep the Allies guessing on the peace treaty and fate of Berlin. 1189 In
the wake of the effective end of negotiations halt by August 1962 , came another wave of Berlin
harassments and then the Cuban missile crisis. These are not the signs of a well organized
strategy on Khrushchev's part. The West did not make the same connections between Berlin and
Cuba that he hoped they would.1190 The Cuban gamble indicates that his adventures were
beginning to interfere with each other, instead of complementing synergistically to reach unified
policy goals. Kennedy's ExComm group worried how Cuba might affect Berlin, but the overall
effect was to chill US interest in negotiations.1191
An improvised but sustained diplomatic campaign over Berlin seems characteristic of the
impulsive but determined Khrushchev, who launched bold adventures that came to unsettling
ends. The Virgin Lands scheme was a good example of a failed initiative he could not abandon
easily. Was the sustained diplomatic engagement over Berlin such a gamble? His own
testimony and that of many observers suggests that he was serious about his German goals. Did
he realize at some point it wouldn't happen and just decided to keep on negotiating to keep the
West off guard and hope it might lead to a more productive Summit opportunity? 1192 He may
have just wanted to protect his prestige and not let Mao tell him what to do. Except for the Wall,
all of Khrushchev's Berlin steps involved deadlines and postponements. He may have thought
that negotiation alone, prodded by occasional harassment would eventually accomplish his
Berlin goals. He never devoted as much attention to disarmament, even with his sessions with
Harriman during the Test Ban treaty debates. He never pursued a summit over Cuba or Laos or
the Congo or outer space.
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Berlin was Khrushchev's issue and he nursed it till he was deposed in 1964. He never got
the Western troops to withdraw, but did succeed in launching the most sustained US-Soviet
negotiating sequence up to that point, unmatched for at least five more years.1193 He also
fostered the Ostpolitik dialogue Willy Brandt would later explore more fully. 1194 US concern
over the implications of Ostpolitik helped motivate Nixon and Kissinger's 1969 overtures to the
Soviets. They benefitted from bilateral diplomatic templates laid out in the 1958-1963 Berlin
Crisis. They used backchannel diplomacy, ambassadorial talks, foreign ministers conferences
and head of state meetings, with mutual visits to the other's countries. They even continued
talking about Berlin, but without deadlines1195 Khrushchev and Gromyko worked from scratch
to renew US-Soviet diplomatic engagement. Brezhnev and Gromyko built on that foundation to
begin a new, disarmament-centered dialogue with the Americans. They followed classic Stalinera Soviet negotiating techniques, which were built on imperial Russia negotiating tactics. The
original impetus for detente came from Nikita Khrushchev, whose impulsive and often rude
tactics actually worked against his aims.1196
Individual leadership was also important on the Western side. Eisenhower's correct
instinct that Khrushchev did not want war, and Dulles' concurrence, helped the West stay its
guns, remain firm, and be willing, but not too eager, to negotiate. They emphasized Allied unity
and were able to hold it together through the 1959 conference. Despite Eisenhower's attempts to
make disarmament their priority, Berlin dominated discussions from 1958-60. 1197 Even after
Dulles, Eisenhower was able to sustain unity through the Paris summit, but just barely. Kennedy
never had the same disposition or understanding regarding Western unity, thus hampering his
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Berlin dealings. He also had to deal with the specific personalities of Macmillan, Adenauer, and
de Gaulle, who were not only more experienced generally but particularly on the Berlin issue.
But unlike those leaders, Kennedy proved the only one determined to attempt negotiations
against other counsel, and who carried them through for long unpromising stretches. Lawrence
Freedman says Kennedy, unlike Eisenhower, followed twin paths of rearmament and
negotiation. It is debatable whether that combination was successful or not, but Kennedy did
believe in and pursue diplomacy.1198
Dean Rusk also deserves credit for conducting these negotiations, without having the
clear mandate of authority that Dulles had enjoyed. Acheson or Bundy in the same role might
not have performed as evenly and with as much control. In the end, Rusk's unassuming
reasonableness may have proved as much of a challenge to Gromyko as the latter's obdurate
opacity was to Rusk. Gromyko could have been much worse too; he was more reasonable and
patient perhaps than was understood at the time.1199 The role of the ambassadors was also
helpful. Thompson proved invaluable in Moscow and as an advisor in Washington; he was the
most needed and longest serving player on the US Berlin team. While "Smilin' Mike"
Menshikov did not help much, Dobrynin earned Washington's confidence. The veteran Deputy
Minister Anastas Mikoyan also helped convince the US from time to time that Khrushchev might
be restrainable.1200
As important as all these individuals were to the avoidance of war over Berlin, the turn to
diplomacy may have been due to more than just their specific and combined influences. If
theoretical perspectives guided leaders, then perhaps the theories were changing without being
understood at the time. Massive retaliation doctrine did not suddenly yield to flexible response.
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Instead, the ideas of limited war served as a transition. 1201 Marc Trachtenberg has observed that
the tactical nuclear plans for defending Berlinof 1958-1962 were replaced by counter-insurgency
conventional-force Vietnam strategies out of necessity, not ideology. Exercises in planning
tempered ideas of limited nuclear war. Dulles, the supposed brinksman, never really wanted to
risk the consequences of any kind of use of nuclear weapons.1202 Publicly, he declared nuclearuse commitment over Berlin; privately he was among the most skeptical of containable nuclear
use in Germany. Eisenhower held the same views and Kennedy too, though more naively. So
did Khrushchev. For both East and West, growing awareness of the dangers of nuclear war was
a major reason for the turn to diplomacy over Berlin.1203
In Paris and in Vienna, heads of state had the chance to talk about disarmament, instead
of Berlin. Unfortunately, Khrushchev, despite his sincere wish for disarmament, chose to focus
on Berlin instead. Perhaps the US and its Allies could have managed him better; maybe not.
They did take a diplomatic rather than military course over Berlin without damage to Allied or
Soviet position or prestige. Berlin discussions, though tedious, averted war and that was a major
accomplishment. The slippery slope did not produce a calamitous fall. Neither did it allow
access to higher points. That the negotiations were not more productively linked to progress on
disarmament may be the greatest loss of the whole Berlin diplomatic sequence.
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